Tatiana Tkacheva

Environmental activism is one of the important forms of civic activity in all types of political regimes. But under the conditions of autocracies it has a distinct specificity, which involves a conscious distancing from politics. The tendency to avoid “politicization” is an integral component of the strategy of eco-activists, who are well aware of the risks of protest actions in an authoritarian context. Environmental protest activity is often perceived as non-political by the ruling elites, but their reaction to it varies. In search of an answer to the question about the causes of such variations the authors elaborate a theoretical model, according to which the reaction of elites to environmental activism is determined by the power potential of the heads of executive government in combination with a high level of inequality, which signals the possible risks of eco-protests turning into broad political mobilization. The model is tested on data concerning environmental protests in Russian regions. By using the method of statistical modelling, the authors come to the conclusion, that the factor of socio-economic inequality does not affect the intensity of environmental mobilization, but has a key significance as a catalyst for the coercive reaction of the authorities. In the regions with high levels of inequality, the “stick” is systematically applied to environmentalists, while in regions with relatively moderate economic stratification environmental protests remain an acceptable form of expressing discontent. At the same time, the presence of a coercive component in the political capital of regional elites plays a crucial role in reducing the eco-protest potential. In addition to that, the research indicates that regional protest activity on environmental issues in Russia is leaving the format of non-political mobilization. As a result, the authorities’ response is increasingly based on suppression, similar to other types of protests, which potentially limits the opportunities for conveying an environmental agenda.

Environmental protests have been a major strand of contention in Russia, yet the cross-regional variation in ecoprotests has not been systematically studied. In this paper, combining several protest event datasets we analyze the patterns of environmental activism across time and regions. The data cover more than 1000 protest events with an environmental agenda in the period 2007–2021. Based on these data, we develop a typology of Russian regions with the intensity and consistency of environmental mobilization as key dimensions. In the next step, we explore the covariates of ecoprotests in Russian regions and show that the overall level of mobilization, inequality, and governors’ tenure and links to the coercive apparatus are consistent predictors of ecoactivism. We also document the interaction between inequality and the strength of governor-siloviki ties indicating that in regions with high inequality, the negative effect of the latter is more pronounced. This paper contributes to the studies of environmental and subnational politics in Russia and demonstrates the need to account for spatial heterogeneity even against the backdrop of the consolidated autocratic regime.

The environmental movement in Russia has been a most institutionalized form of collective action. Originating from the Soviet period and gaining momentum in late 1980s, it survived the 1990s’ dramatic transformations as well as the changes in political opportunity structure in the 2000–2010s. Extant scholarship on environmental activism in Russia has been largely focused on case-studies of regional mass-mobilization, such as environmental campaigns at Shiyes station in Archangelsk. The paper represents the first systematic study of cross-regional variance in environmental collective action in Russia. Drawing on three datasets, we trace the general evolution of environmental protests in the period from 2007 to 2021 and provide a typology of Russian regions. The latter allows us to classify Russian regions by intensity and sustainability of eco-mobilisation. We demonstrate that, despite narrowing opportunities, the intensity of environmental protests during the last decade has been on the rise. The typology allows us to describe the existing variance and suggest new questions on the nature and factors of environmental protest activity in Russian regions.

How are candidates without official party affiliation able to succeed in authoritarian elections? We analyzed 1,101 independents who took part in city council elections in Russia’s regional capitals between 2014 and 2018. We found that independent candidates’ electoral fortunes depended both on their personal resources enabling them to attract voters’ support and pre-electoral deals with the regime. We also discovered that the chances of being elected were higher for those formally independent candidates who were the regime’s hidden representatives. For the latter group, the chances to win the race were boosted mostly by pre-electoral deals, rather than their personal resources.

The primary elections of the United Russia party serve as a tool for party organisation and voter mobilisation. In this study, we employ United Russia’s capacity to mobilise voter turnout in the 2016 primary elections as an indirect indicator of the strength of party-controlled regional political machines. Our analysis of the results of the 2016 Duma elections in 83 regions of Russia demonstrates that voter turnout in the spring 2016 party primaries of United Russia to a significant extent explains cross-regional variation in party success.

By permitting early resignations of the governors of Russia’s regions, followed by their participation in premature elections, the federal center seeks to facilitate their long-term political survival. This study uses the data from the 2013–2015 gubernatorial elections in order to reveal the Kremlin’s motivations for this strategy. The analysis demonstrates that in contrast to the previous periods of Russia’s political development, when the federal center tended to reward the governors for electoral deference, the current strategy is aimed primarily at long-term risk aversion. This signifies a shift in the order of priorities of the Kremlin’s policy toward the regions.