Jason Hanna
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Latest Publications
- 14 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Ulysses Contracts, Respect, and Motive-Based Anti-Paternalism
- 14 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Ulysses Contracts, Respect, and Motive-Based Anti-Paternalism
- 22 June 2021
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Journal of Moral Philosophy
- Vol. 18 (6) , 597-619
Beneficence, Numbers, and the Procreation Asymmetry
According to the Weak Procreation Asymmetry, there are weighty reasons not to create miserable people and only weaker reasons to create happy people. This view has several advantages over the Strong Procreation Asymmetry, which holds that there are no reasons to create happy people. Nonetheless, it faces a serious problem: according to some critics, it suggests that our reasons to create lives are as strong as our reasons to save lives. In response, this essay draws on the intuition that we have reason to maximize the number of lives saved, even when doing so would not secure a greater benefit. Numbers are not comparably relevant, however, to choices involving the creation of people. Taken together, these judgments show that there is typically an “extra” consideration that favors saving lives over creating lives. They thereby help to defuse a common objection to the Weak Procreation Asymmetry.
- 22 June 2021
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Journal of Moral Philosophy
- Vol. 18 (6) , 597-619
Beneficence, Numbers, and the Procreation Asymmetry
According to the Weak Procreation Asymmetry, there are weighty reasons not to create miserable people and only weaker reasons to create happy people. This view has several advantages over the Strong Procreation Asymmetry, which holds that there are no reasons to create happy people. Nonetheless, it faces a serious problem: according to some critics, it suggests that our reasons to create lives are as strong as our reasons to save lives. In response, this essay draws on the intuition that we have reason to maximize the number of lives saved, even when doing so would not secure a greater benefit. Numbers are not comparably relevant, however, to choices involving the creation of people. Taken together, these judgments show that there is typically an “extra” consideration that favors saving lives over creating lives. They thereby help to defuse a common objection to the Weak Procreation Asymmetry.
- 12 March 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Criminal Law and Philosophy
- Vol. 15 (1) , 123-129
Review of David Birks and Thomas Douglas, eds., Treatment for Crime: Philosophical Essays on Neurointerventions in Criminal Justice
- 12 March 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Criminal Law and Philosophy
- Vol. 15 (1) , 123-129
Review of David Birks and Thomas Douglas, eds., Treatment for Crime: Philosophical Essays on Neurointerventions in Criminal Justice
Causal parenthood and the ethics of gamete donation
According to the causal theory of parenthood, people incur parental obligations by causing children to exist. Proponents of the causal theory often argue that gamete donors have special obligations to their genetic offspring. In response, many defenders of current gamete donation practices would reject the causal theory. In particular, they may invoke the ‘too many parents problem’: many people who causally contribute to the existence of children – for instance, fertility doctors – do not thereby incur parental obligations. This article argues that the conclusions commonly drawn by causal theorists, and by their critics, are premature. Causal theorists have a promising response to the too many parents problem. This response, however, defuses the moral concern that many causal theorists have raised about gamete donation. A similar point, it is argued, applies to Rivka Weinberg's ‘Hazmat Theory’.
Causal parenthood and the ethics of gamete donation
According to the causal theory of parenthood, people incur parental obligations by causing children to exist. Proponents of the causal theory often argue that gamete donors have special obligations to their genetic offspring. In response, many defenders of current gamete donation practices would reject the causal theory. In particular, they may invoke the ‘too many parents problem’: many people who causally contribute to the existence of children – for instance, fertility doctors – do not thereby incur parental obligations. This article argues that the conclusions commonly drawn by causal theorists, and by their critics, are premature. Causal theorists have a promising response to the too many parents problem. This response, however, defuses the moral concern that many causal theorists have raised about gamete donation. A similar point, it is argued, applies to Rivka Weinberg's ‘Hazmat Theory’.
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 49-68
“It Won’t Be as Bad as You Think:” Autonomy and Adaptation to Disability
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 49-68
“It Won’t Be as Bad as You Think:” Autonomy and Adaptation to Disability
- 17 May 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Ethics
- Vol. 16 (4) , 421-439
Paternalism and the Ill-Informed Agent
- 17 May 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Ethics
- Vol. 16 (4) , 421-439
Paternalism and the Ill-Informed Agent
- 23 November 2011
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Applied Philosophy
- Vol. 29 (1) , 19-32
The Moral Status of Nonresponsible Threats
- 23 November 2011
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Applied Philosophy
- Vol. 29 (1) , 19-32
The Moral Status of Nonresponsible Threats
- 18 February 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
- Vol. 14 (5) , 517-531
Consent and the Problem of Framing Effects
- 18 February 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
- Vol. 14 (5) , 517-531
Consent and the Problem of Framing Effects
REVISITING CHILD‐BASED OBJECTIONS TO COMMERCIAL SURROGACY
Many critics of commercial surrogate motherhood argue that it violates the rights of children. In this paper, I respond to several versions of this objection. The most common version claims that surrogacy involves child‐selling. I argue that while proponents of surrogacy have generally failed to provide an adequate response to this objection, it can be overcome. After showing that the two most prominent arguments for the child‐selling objection fail, I explain how the commissioning couple can acquire parental rights by paying the surrogate only for her reproductive labor. My explanation appeals to the idea that parental rights are acquired by those who have claims over the reproductive labor that produces the child, not necessarily by those who actually perform the labor. This account clarifies how commercial surrogacy differs from commercial adoption. In the final section of the paper, I consider and reject three further child‐based objections to commercial surrogacy: that it establishes a market in children's attributes, that it requires courts to stray from the best interests standard in determining custodial rights, and that it requires the surrogate to neglect her parental responsibilities. Since each of these objections fails, children's rights probably do not pose an obstacle to the acceptability of commercial surrogacy arrangements.
REVISITING CHILD‐BASED OBJECTIONS TO COMMERCIAL SURROGACY
Many critics of commercial surrogate motherhood argue that it violates the rights of children. In this paper, I respond to several versions of this objection. The most common version claims that surrogacy involves child‐selling. I argue that while proponents of surrogacy have generally failed to provide an adequate response to this objection, it can be overcome. After showing that the two most prominent arguments for the child‐selling objection fail, I explain how the commissioning couple can acquire parental rights by paying the surrogate only for her reproductive labor. My explanation appeals to the idea that parental rights are acquired by those who have claims over the reproductive labor that produces the child, not necessarily by those who actually perform the labor. This account clarifies how commercial surrogacy differs from commercial adoption. In the final section of the paper, I consider and reject three further child‐based objections to commercial surrogacy: that it establishes a market in children's attributes, that it requires courts to stray from the best interests standard in determining custodial rights, and that it requires the surrogate to neglect her parental responsibilities. Since each of these objections fails, children's rights probably do not pose an obstacle to the acceptability of commercial surrogacy arrangements.