Maksim Rudnev
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Maksim Rudnev has a total of 429 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Igor Grossmann
University of Waterloo
8 shared publications - Brian Porter
Department of History and Philosophy of Science University of Pittsburgh Pittsburgh Pennsylvania USA
6 shared publications - H. Clark Barrett
Department of Anthropology UCLA Los Angeles California USA
6 shared publications - Hackjin Kim
Department of Psychology Korea University Seoul Republic of Korea
6 shared publications - Josien Reijer
University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa
6 shared publications - Júlia Halamová
Comenius University in Bratislava
6 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 7 November 2026
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Personality
The Architecture of Wisdom in Interpersonal Conflict: Structure and Trait, State, and Cultural Expression Across World Regions
Objective: How do individuals across diverse cultures navigate interpersonal conflicts, and what drives variation in their use of wisdom‐related strategies? Method: In two studies spanning eight world regions ( N = 4445), we examined the factor structure of five wisdom‐related strategies (Intellectual Humility, Others' Perspectives, Acknowledgement of Multiple Outcomes, Search for Compromise, Outsider's View), their individual‐difference correlates, and trait–state variance. Results: In Study 1 (autobiographical recall), we identified a three‐factor structure— Perspectival Metacognition , Conflict Resolution , and Outsider's View —that showed approximate measurement invariance across cultures. In Study 2 (standardized scenarios), we replicated this structure and partitioned trait, state, and cultural variance. Cross‐cultural differences accounted for about 4% of variance in expressed wisdom, whereas within‐person variation across situations explained the largest share: People expressed less wisdom in reflections on conflicts involving trust betrayal than social rejection, an effect linked to greater emotional reactivity to betrayal. At the individual level, need for cognition and relational‐interdependent self‐construal showed small‐to‐moderate positive associations with each wisdom‐related feature, whereas a sense of uniqueness was positively related to Conflict Resolution. Conclusions: Wisdom in reflections on interpersonal conflict appears organized around three metacognitive themes that replicate broadly across cultures, with situational affordances (vs. cultural or trait dispositions) accounting for most variation in its expression.
- 7 November 2026
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Personality
Open AccessThe Architecture of Wisdom in Interpersonal Conflict: Structure and Trait, State, and Cultural Expression Across World Regions
Objective: How do individuals across diverse cultures navigate interpersonal conflicts, and what drives variation in their use of wisdom‐related strategies? Method: In two studies spanning eight world regions ( N = 4445), we examined the factor structure of five wisdom‐related strategies (Intellectual Humility, Others' Perspectives, Acknowledgement of Multiple Outcomes, Search for Compromise, Outsider's View), their individual‐difference correlates, and trait–state variance. Results: In Study 1 (autobiographical recall), we identified a three‐factor structure— Perspectival Metacognition , Conflict Resolution , and Outsider's View —that showed approximate measurement invariance across cultures. In Study 2 (standardized scenarios), we replicated this structure and partitioned trait, state, and cultural variance. Cross‐cultural differences accounted for about 4% of variance in expressed wisdom, whereas within‐person variation across situations explained the largest share: People expressed less wisdom in reflections on conflicts involving trust betrayal than social rejection, an effect linked to greater emotional reactivity to betrayal. At the individual level, need for cognition and relational‐interdependent self‐construal showed small‐to‐moderate positive associations with each wisdom‐related feature, whereas a sense of uniqueness was positively related to Conflict Resolution. Conclusions: Wisdom in reflections on interpersonal conflict appears organized around three metacognitive themes that replicate broadly across cultures, with situational affordances (vs. cultural or trait dispositions) accounting for most variation in its expression.
- 4 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Behavior Research Methods
- Vol. 58 (6) , 150
Measuring intellectual humility through situated behavior: An alternative to dispositional self-reports
Although psychological theory views behavior as an interaction between person and situation, the measurement of metacognition often relies on situation-fre
- 4 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Behavior Research Methods
- Vol. 58 (6) , 150
Measuring intellectual humility through situated behavior: An alternative to dispositional self-reports
Although psychological theory views behavior as an interaction between person and situation, the measurement of metacognition often relies on situation-fre
- Open Access
- 21 April 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Predicting progress: Intellectual humility and accuracy in forecasts of global welfare
Experts and pundits routinely forecast societal trends, yet these predictions often fall short, leading to poor policy decisions. What distinguishes accurate forecasters? In a three-year longitudinal tournament (N = 520), we tested whether intellectual humility (IH)—recognizing the limits of one’s knowledge—predicts accuracy in forecasting global welfare trends (e.g., armed conflict, CO2 concentrations). While fluid intelligence and political ideology offered limited predictive power, IH consistently predicted accuracy, particularly in volatile domains. High-IH individuals were more likely to update predictions and showed better-calibrated uncertainty intervals. Crucially, passive exposure to diverse peer predictions did not improve accuracy; rather, gains in forecasting accuracy corresponded to metacognitive scaffolding - active acknowledgement of different perspectives and limits of one’s knowledge. Automated topic modeling confirmed that accurate forecasters focused on base rates and uncertainty, whereas inaccurate ones defaulted to generalized pessimism. Thus, in complex domains, metacognitive discipline predicts foresight more than intellect or information access alone.
- 21 April 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessPredicting progress: Intellectual humility and accuracy in forecasts of global welfare
Experts and pundits routinely forecast societal trends, yet these predictions often fall short, leading to poor policy decisions. What distinguishes accurate forecasters? In a three-year longitudinal tournament (N = 520), we tested whether intellectual humility (IH)—recognizing the limits of one’s knowledge—predicts accuracy in forecasting global welfare trends (e.g., armed conflict, CO2 concentrations). While fluid intelligence and political ideology offered limited predictive power, IH consistently predicted accuracy, particularly in volatile domains. High-IH individuals were more likely to update predictions and showed better-calibrated uncertainty intervals. Crucially, passive exposure to diverse peer predictions did not improve accuracy; rather, gains in forecasting accuracy corresponded to metacognitive scaffolding - active acknowledgement of different perspectives and limits of one’s knowledge. Automated topic modeling confirmed that accurate forecasters focused on base rates and uncertainty, whereas inaccurate ones defaulted to generalized pessimism. Thus, in complex domains, metacognitive discipline predicts foresight more than intellect or information access alone.
- Open Access
- 21 April 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Measuring intellectual humility through situated behavior: An alternative to dispositional self-reports
Although psychological theory views behavior as an interaction between person and situation, the measurement of metacognition often relies on situation-free, abstract self-views. To align measurement with interactionist frameworks, we proposed a situated approach, using Intellectual Humility (IH)—recognizing one’s limits and fallibility—as a proof of concept. We validated this approach across diverse populations: English- and Spanish-speaking North Americans (N = 633) and adults from 136 rural Honduran villages (N = 2,567). Rather than rating abstract tendencies, participants reconstructed three recent disagreements (freely chosen, wrong, and right) and reported specific behaviors via branching binary probes. This method demonstrated cross-cultural coherence of the IH construct while capturing substantial situational variability. Notably, 74–81% of variance occurred within persons: IH expression fluctuated significantly based on epistemic context (being wrong vs. right) and social dynamics (partner status). These situational effects also fully explained gender differences in the Honduran sample. The situated approach showed efficiency outside Western, educated contexts and helps overcome the humility paradox—wherein the least intellectually humble overclaim their humility. We discuss four principles for aligning measurement with theory—contextual specificity, sampling from actual experiences via event reconstruction, accessibility across diverse populations via branching probes, and modeling within-person variability—offering a framework for assessing metacognitive and self-regulatory constructs beyond the constraints of static dispositional measures.
- 21 April 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessMeasuring intellectual humility through situated behavior: An alternative to dispositional self-reports
Although psychological theory views behavior as an interaction between person and situation, the measurement of metacognition often relies on situation-free, abstract self-views. To align measurement with interactionist frameworks, we proposed a situated approach, using Intellectual Humility (IH)—recognizing one’s limits and fallibility—as a proof of concept. We validated this approach across diverse populations: English- and Spanish-speaking North Americans (N = 633) and adults from 136 rural Honduran villages (N = 2,567). Rather than rating abstract tendencies, participants reconstructed three recent disagreements (freely chosen, wrong, and right) and reported specific behaviors via branching binary probes. This method demonstrated cross-cultural coherence of the IH construct while capturing substantial situational variability. Notably, 74–81% of variance occurred within persons: IH expression fluctuated significantly based on epistemic context (being wrong vs. right) and social dynamics (partner status). These situational effects also fully explained gender differences in the Honduran sample. The situated approach showed efficiency outside Western, educated contexts and helps overcome the humility paradox—wherein the least intellectually humble overclaim their humility. We discuss four principles for aligning measurement with theory—contextual specificity, sampling from actual experiences via event reconstruction, accessibility across diverse populations via branching probes, and modeling within-person variability—offering a framework for assessing metacognitive and self-regulatory constructs beyond the constraints of static dispositional measures.
- Open Access
- 30 March 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Now it’s Personal: The Psychology of Moral Attachment and the Implications for Society
This paper introduces the concept of Moral Attachment, defined as a rigid psychological bond to moral beliefs, in which disagreement is interpreted as a threat to the self. In turn, this leads to inflexibility, defensiveness, and dismissiveness when faced with moral opposition. We developed and validated the Moral Attachment scale through five studies. Study 1 used exploratory factor analysis to identify three dimensions: (1) certainty and inflexibility, (2) emotional defense, and (3) character judgment. Study 2A confirmed this structure via confirmatory factor analysis, further demonstrating convergent and criterion validity. Study 2B showed that Moral Attachment is linked to the integration of moral beliefs into the self, and strongly predicts distancing from those who disagree. Study 3 provided evidence for the short-term stability of Moral Attachment, indicating that the construct is relatively consistent over a two-week period. Study 4 tested incremental validity, revealing that Moral Attachment uniquely predicts polarizing responses to the Israel-Hamas conflict above and beyond moral conviction. Study 5 tested the scale’s measurement equivalence across 44 countries, achieving approximate measurement invariance and linking higher Moral Attachment scores to greater societal instability at the country level. By understanding the nature and consequences of Moral Attachment, we provide an account of how moral disagreement becomes personally threatening and contributes to enduring social division.
- 30 March 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessNow it’s Personal: The Psychology of Moral Attachment and the Implications for Society
This paper introduces the concept of Moral Attachment, defined as a rigid psychological bond to moral beliefs, in which disagreement is interpreted as a threat to the self. In turn, this leads to inflexibility, defensiveness, and dismissiveness when faced with moral opposition. We developed and validated the Moral Attachment scale through five studies. Study 1 used exploratory factor analysis to identify three dimensions: (1) certainty and inflexibility, (2) emotional defense, and (3) character judgment. Study 2A confirmed this structure via confirmatory factor analysis, further demonstrating convergent and criterion validity. Study 2B showed that Moral Attachment is linked to the integration of moral beliefs into the self, and strongly predicts distancing from those who disagree. Study 3 provided evidence for the short-term stability of Moral Attachment, indicating that the construct is relatively consistent over a two-week period. Study 4 tested incremental validity, revealing that Moral Attachment uniquely predicts polarizing responses to the Israel-Hamas conflict above and beyond moral conviction. Study 5 tested the scale’s measurement equivalence across 44 countries, achieving approximate measurement invariance and linking higher Moral Attachment scores to greater societal instability at the country level. By understanding the nature and consequences of Moral Attachment, we provide an account of how moral disagreement becomes personally threatening and contributes to enduring social division.
- Open Access
- 3 January 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Wisdom for Interpersonal Conflicts across World Regions and Situations
How do individuals across diverse societies navigate interpersonal conflicts? We investigated wisdom-related strategies—such as intellectual humility, perspective-taking, and compromise—across eleven countries. In Study 1 (N=2,493), autobiographical recall of real-world conflicts yielded a robust three-factor structure: Perspectival Metacognition, Conflict Resolution, and Self-Transcendence. Study 2 (N=1,952) replicated this structure using standardized scenarios of social rejection and trust betrayal, establishing approximate measurement invariance across cultures. Though wisdom features were largely consistent across regions, Continental East Asian samples scored highest on Perspectival Metacognition, whereas regions endorsing independent agency were more likely to actively seek Conflict Resolution. At the same time, we observed robust individual and situational differences. In both studies, higher need for cognition and relational self-construal were aligned with wiser strategy use. Situationally, conflicts involving social rejection (vs. trust betrayal) elicited lower negative affect in the open-ended reflections and higher scores of wisdom-related strategies. Indeed, we observed high cross-situational variability: within-person variance exceeded between-person differences in all Study 2 samples (accounting for 70% of variance), challenging trait-centric conceptualizations of wisdom. These findings suggest that wisdom in conflict is less a stable trait and more a situationally grounded affordance, universally organized around three core metacognitive processes.
- 3 January 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessWisdom for Interpersonal Conflicts across World Regions and Situations
How do individuals across diverse societies navigate interpersonal conflicts? We investigated wisdom-related strategies—such as intellectual humility, perspective-taking, and compromise—across eleven countries. In Study 1 (N=2,493), autobiographical recall of real-world conflicts yielded a robust three-factor structure: Perspectival Metacognition, Conflict Resolution, and Self-Transcendence. Study 2 (N=1,952) replicated this structure using standardized scenarios of social rejection and trust betrayal, establishing approximate measurement invariance across cultures. Though wisdom features were largely consistent across regions, Continental East Asian samples scored highest on Perspectival Metacognition, whereas regions endorsing independent agency were more likely to actively seek Conflict Resolution. At the same time, we observed robust individual and situational differences. In both studies, higher need for cognition and relational self-construal were aligned with wiser strategy use. Situationally, conflicts involving social rejection (vs. trust betrayal) elicited lower negative affect in the open-ended reflections and higher scores of wisdom-related strategies. Indeed, we observed high cross-situational variability: within-person variance exceeded between-person differences in all Study 2 samples (accounting for 70% of variance), challenging trait-centric conceptualizations of wisdom. These findings suggest that wisdom in conflict is less a stable trait and more a situationally grounded affordance, universally organized around three core metacognitive processes.
- Open Access
- 27 August 2025
- Published by Cogitatio in Politics and Governance
- Vol. 13
Collective Narcissism, Left‐ and Right‐Wing Authoritarianisms, and Justification of War
Previous studies found positive relationships between collective narcissism, right-wing authoritarianism, and acceptance of war; however, they overlooked how these wars are seen as justified. In our study (N = 448, Polish community sample), we used a new tool to measure beliefs justifying war, identifying three dimensions: just war (with morally restricted views on reasons and means), unrestricted reasons, and unrestricted means. Using correlational, path, and network analyses, we found that left-wing authoritarianism is related to lower acceptance of just war and higher acceptance of unrestricted means, while secure national identification indicates opposite patterns. Contrary to our expectations, communal national narcissism was linked to lower acceptance of just war. Unexpectedly, even though beliefs justifying war reflect moral principles, they did not vary with religious identification or right-wing authoritarianism. This suggests that being attached to people sharing the same religious affiliation does not necessarily imply adherence to the moral principles that underpin that worldview. This study is the first to demonstrate a disconnect between beliefs justifying war and different forms of ingroup attachment.
- 27 August 2025
- Published by Cogitatio in Politics and Governance
- Vol. 13
Open AccessCollective Narcissism, Left‐ and Right‐Wing Authoritarianisms, and Justification of War
Previous studies found positive relationships between collective narcissism, right-wing authoritarianism, and acceptance of war; however, they overlooked how these wars are seen as justified. In our study (N = 448, Polish community sample), we used a new tool to measure beliefs justifying war, identifying three dimensions: just war (with morally restricted views on reasons and means), unrestricted reasons, and unrestricted means. Using correlational, path, and network analyses, we found that left-wing authoritarianism is related to lower acceptance of just war and higher acceptance of unrestricted means, while secure national identification indicates opposite patterns. Contrary to our expectations, communal national narcissism was linked to lower acceptance of just war. Unexpectedly, even though beliefs justifying war reflect moral principles, they did not vary with religious identification or right-wing authoritarianism. This suggests that being attached to people sharing the same religious affiliation does not necessarily imply adherence to the moral principles that underpin that worldview. This study is the first to demonstrate a disconnect between beliefs justifying war and different forms of ingroup attachment.
- Open Access
- 13 August 2025
- Vol. 292 (2052) , 20251355
Decision-making preferences for intuition, deliberation, friends or crowds in independent and interdependent societies
When multiple ways of deciding are laid out side-by-side, which does one favour? We conducted experiments in 12 countries (n = 3517 individuals; 13 languages; two Indigenous communities), with adults choosing among four decision strategies—personal intuition, private deliberation, friends’ advice or crowd wisdom—when working through six everyday dilemmas. In every society, self-reliant decisions (intuition or deliberation) were most commonly preferred and considered the wisest. Expectations for fellow citizens, however, were mixed: advice from friends was expected about as often as self-reliant routes. The self-reliance tilt was strongest in cultures and individuals high in independent self-construal and need for cognition, and weakest where interdependence and self-transcendent reflection were salient. The same patterns emerged when examining ratings of each strategy’s utility and oral protocols with Indigenous groups. Self-reliance appears the modal preference across cultures, but its strength is predictably tempered when cultures, and individuals within them, construe the self in relational rather than autonomous terms.
- 13 August 2025
- Vol. 292 (2052) , 20251355
Open AccessDecision-making preferences for intuition, deliberation, friends or crowds in independent and interdependent societies
When multiple ways of deciding are laid out side-by-side, which does one favour? We conducted experiments in 12 countries (n = 3517 individuals; 13 languages; two Indigenous communities), with adults choosing among four decision strategies—personal intuition, private deliberation, friends’ advice or crowd wisdom—when working through six everyday dilemmas. In every society, self-reliant decisions (intuition or deliberation) were most commonly preferred and considered the wisest. Expectations for fellow citizens, however, were mixed: advice from friends was expected about as often as self-reliant routes. The self-reliance tilt was strongest in cultures and individuals high in independent self-construal and need for cognition, and weakest where interdependence and self-transcendent reflection were salient. The same patterns emerged when examining ratings of each strategy’s utility and oral protocols with Indigenous groups. Self-reliance appears the modal preference across cultures, but its strength is predictably tempered when cultures, and individuals within them, construe the self in relational rather than autonomous terms.
- Open Access
- 26 July 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Decision-making preferences for intuition, deliberation, friends, or crowds in independent and interdependent societies
When multiple ways of deciding are laid out side-by-side, which does one favor? We conducted experiments in 12 countries (N=3,517; 13 languages; two Indigenous communities), with adults choosing among four decision strategies—personal intuition, private deliberation, friends’ advice, or crowd wisdom—when working through six everyday dilemmas. In every society, self-reliant decisions (intuition or deliberation) were most commonly preferred and considered the wisest. Expectations for fellow citizens, however, were mixed: advice from friends was expected about as often as self-reliant routes. The self-reliance tilt was strongest in cultures and individuals high in independent self-construal and need for cognition, and weakest where interdependence and self-transcendent reflection were salient. The same patterns emerged when examining ratings of each strategy’s utility, and oral protocols with Indigenous groups. Self-reliance appears the modal preference across cultures, but its strength is predictably tempered when cultures—and individuals within them—construe the self in relational rather than autonomous terms.
- 26 July 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessDecision-making preferences for intuition, deliberation, friends, or crowds in independent and interdependent societies
When multiple ways of deciding are laid out side-by-side, which does one favor? We conducted experiments in 12 countries (N=3,517; 13 languages; two Indigenous communities), with adults choosing among four decision strategies—personal intuition, private deliberation, friends’ advice, or crowd wisdom—when working through six everyday dilemmas. In every society, self-reliant decisions (intuition or deliberation) were most commonly preferred and considered the wisest. Expectations for fellow citizens, however, were mixed: advice from friends was expected about as often as self-reliant routes. The self-reliance tilt was strongest in cultures and individuals high in independent self-construal and need for cognition, and weakest where interdependence and self-transcendent reflection were salient. The same patterns emerged when examining ratings of each strategy’s utility, and oral protocols with Indigenous groups. Self-reliance appears the modal preference across cultures, but its strength is predictably tempered when cultures—and individuals within them—construe the self in relational rather than autonomous terms.