DTDimiter Toshkov

Dimiter Toshkov

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Dimiter Toshkov has a total of 46 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    When do citizens support government decisions to ignore social protests? The role of instrumental considerations and majoritarian preferences

    by Lars Brummel, Dimiter Toshkov

    In democracies, protests can challenge public policy reforms, raising questions on how governments should respond. Our study examines how citizens in the Netherlands would prefer their governments to respond to social protests. Using a pre-registered survey experiment (N = 1262), we varied the level of government implementing a reform and the level of public support for a reform. We used observational data to assess respondents’ views on the reforms and their trust in the government. While our findings reveal relatively strong support for accommodating social protests, citizens are more likely to back governments that ignore protests when these reforms have majority support and align with their own views. Trust in the government also plays a role, but the level of government does not matter for citizens’ attitudes. Overall, our findings highlight that citizens expect governments to listen to social protests but their attitudes are further contingent upon instrumental reasoning and majoritarian views of democracy.

  • Top Cited Papers
    Open Access

    Political Ideology, Policy Attitudes, and Public Support for European Integration

    by Dimiter Toshkov

    This article maps in a comprehensive way the relationships between support for European integration, left–right ideological positions, and policy attitudes towards redistribution, immigration, and gay rights. I introduce the use of flexible non-parametric methods (generalized additive models) and more appropriate measures of dependence (the distance correlation coefficient) to explore and measure the strength and forms of these relationships across time (2004–2023), countries, and indicators of European integration support. The link between European integration attitudes and left–right ideology is weak. The exact form of the relationship depends on the operationalization of EU attitudes, country, and time period, but it rarely resembles the classic inverted-U curve suggested by existing literature and studies of party positions. In fact, average EU support is typically highest at the moderate left rather than at the center. The relationship of European integration attitudes with immigration positions is much stronger, stable, consistent, and almost linear; with support for gay rights it is also linear but considerably weaker; with support for redistribution there is practically no relationship at all. While public opinion is much less structured and less extreme than party positions, there is some evidence that—across countries—the strength of the links between EU attitudes, left–right ideology, and policy positions at the party level is associated with the strength of these links at the level of the public. Furthermore, over time the strength of the link between European integration attitudes and different policy attitudes covaries systematically with the salience (media presence) of the policy issue at the EU level.


  • Open Access

    Motivated causal judgments and responsibility for civilian casualties in military conflicts

    by Dimiter Toshkov, Honorata Mazepus

    Causal judgments are ubiquitous in politics and crucial for assigning responsibility and blame. Cognitive science has demonstrated that people are more likely to pick factors as “causal” when they make a difference for the outcome across a range of counterfactual scenarios, with the scenarios sampled based on statistical and prescriptive normality. We propose that this makes causal judgments susceptible to motivated reasoning and ingroup favoritism in particular. We hypothesize that people will be less likely to assign causal efficacy and responsibility for counternormative outcomes to groups they support, and that the bias will be greater for more complex causal structures. We test these propositions in two pre‐registered survey experiments run on representative samples in Poland. The context of the experimental vignettes is a military conflict between Russia and Ukraine. We find that, in all scenarios, respondents assign significantly higher causal power and responsibility to the attackers when the attackers are Russian rather than Ukrainian, consistent with our theory and the very high levels of public support for Ukraine in Poland. Contrary to our expectations, the responsibility of the attackers is not significantly lower when they hit a public building as a result of defending combatants moving there rather than when unprovoked.

  • Open Access

    The impact of policy restrictions and mobility changes on excess mortality during the COVID-19 pandemic in The Netherlands, 2020–2022

    by Dimiter Toshkov, Camila Caram-Deelder, Brendan Carroll, Frits Rosendaal

    We analyzed the impact of the COVID-19 policy restrictions on mobility patterns and excess mortality at the regional level in The Netherlands between 2020 and 2022. Our analysis combines data on public policies, mobility patterns from the Google Mobility Reports, officially registered COVID-19 cases and deaths, and new region-specific measures of excess mortality over a relatively long time period extending beyond the first wave of the pandemic. We modeled the relationships of these so that policy responds to information about the pandemic; mobility reacts both to information about the pandemic and to policy; the number of COVID-19 cases is influenced by changes in mobility and policy; and excess mortality is affected directly by the policy restrictions and indirectly via the impact of policy on mobility. The results confirm that the stringency of policy restrictions increased with the number and growth rates of COVID-19 cases and deaths. Mobility, as reflected in presence in public places (transport hubs, groceries, retail, work), decreased while presence at residential locations increased in response to stricter policies and higher COVID-19 case and death counts in preceding weeks. The number of new COVID-19 cases declined when stricter policy restrictions were enacted and with reduced presence in public places (following a two-week lag). Excess mortality decreased with stricter policy restrictions (with a five-week lag) and, to a lesser extent, with reduced presence in public places and increased presence in places of residence. Importantly, the effects of policy restrictions and mobility diminished with consecutive COVID-19 waves. Overall, the evidence shows that policy restrictions were effective in limiting the spread of the pandemic and in saving lives. While policies influenced mobility patterns, the policy impact was not fully mediated by mobility changes.

  • Open Access

    Motivated Causal Reasoning and Responsibility for Civilian Casualties in Military Conflicts

    by Dimiter Toshkov, Honorata Mazepus

    Causal judgments are ubiquitous in politics and are crucial for assigning responsibility and blame. But causal judgments are also tricky, especially when complex causal structures are involved, such as joint production, omissive causation and double prevention. Cognitive science has demonstrated that people are more likely to pick factors as ‘causal’ when they make a difference for the outcome across a range of counterfactual scenarios, with the scenarios sampled based on their statistical and prescriptive normality. We propose that this makes causal judgements susceptible to motivated reasoning, and ingroup favouritism in particular. We hypothesize that people will be less likely to assign causal efficacy and responsibility for counternormative outcome to groups they support, and that the bias will be greater for more complex causal structures. We test these propositions in a pre-registered survey experiment run on quota-based representative sample in Poland. The context of the experimental vignettes is a military conflict between Russia and Ukraine. We find that in all scenarios respondents assign significantly higher causal power and responsibility to the attackers when the attackers are Russian rather than Ukrainian, consistent with our theory and the very high levels of public support for Ukraine in Poland. Contrary to our expectations, responsibility of the attackers is not significantly lower when they hit a public building as a result of defending combatants moving there rather than when unprovoked. Unexpectedly, in a scenario where the civilians get killed after moving to where the defenders are, the defenders get a higher share of the blame when they are identified as Ukrainian rather than Russian. This is consistent with people holding their favored party to higher moral standards for protecting civilians.

  • Open Access

    Government

    by Dimiter Toshkov

  • Open Access

    ‘We're All in This Together?’ A Survey Experiment on the Perceived Legitimacy of Region‐Specific Crisis Interventions in Germany and the Netherlands

    by Lars Brummel, Dimiter Toshkov, Brendan Carroll

    In responding to crises, governments often need to enact restrictions on the freedoms of citizens that might be perceived as intrusive and unfair. Yet, government interventions need to retain legitimacy in the eyes of citizens. We study the perceived legitimacy of pandemic crisis interventions with a focus on the effects of multi‐level governance and region‐specific interventions. Such territorially‐differentiated measures are often appropriate for effective crisis responses, but they raise concerns about equal treatment. Our pre‐registered survey experiments run on quota‐representative national samples in Germany and the Netherlands (N = 2252) find no evidence in support of the conjecture that citizens perceive nation‐wide crisis interventions as more legitimate than region‐specific measures. The level of government making the decision matters very little for the legitimacy of the interventions. Restrictions enacted by the national government are slightly more accepted than those decided regionally in the Netherlands, but there is no such difference in Germany.

  • Open Access

    Punishment Among Allies: Public Attitudes Towards Sanctions in the European Union

    by Dimiter Toshkov, Honorata Mazepus

    International organizations need to enforce their rules, but sanctions against their member states can erode public support for cooperation. At the same time, inaction against rule violations risks losing public confidence in the power and authority of the international organizations. This is a common dilemma in international cooperation, but we know little about public preferences for enforcement actions (e.g. sanctions) and the effects of strategic (non)enforcement on public attitudes. In this article, we develop hypotheses about the factors that influence preferences for/against sanctions as an enforcement tool and about the effects of (non)enforcement. We apply these hypotheses to the context of the European Union (EU), and we test them in two survey experiments conducted in Germany and the Netherlands on quota-representative national samples. The preference for sanctions is strongly affected by their expected effectiveness, whether the target is your own country or not, and whether you support the policy defended by the enforcement actions. When the enforcing institutions go against the preference for/against sanctions, their perceived authority declines, especially when sanctions are desired but not imposed. There is no evidence for effects on support for future cooperation. Altogether, we reveal that support for sanctions in the EU, and international relations more generally, is a divisive issue colored by instrumental and self-centered considerations, with important downstream effects on the perceived authority of institutions.

  • Open Access

    The Impact of Policy Restrictions and Mobility Changes on Excess Mortality During the COVID-19 Pandemic in The Netherlands, 2020-2022

    by Dimiter Toshkov, Camila Caram-Deelder, Brendan Carroll, Frits R. Rosendaal

    We analyzed the impact of the COVID-19 policy restrictions on mobility patterns and excess mortality at the regional level in The Netherlands between 2020 and 2022. Our analysis combines data on public policies, mobility patterns from the Google Mobility Reports, officially registered COVID-19 cases and deaths, and region-specific measures of excess mortality over a relatively long time period extending beyond the first wave of the pandemic. We modeled the dynamic relationships of these variables as a system in which policy responds to information about the pandemic; mobility reacts both to information about the pandemic and to policy; the number of COVID-19 cases is influenced by changes in mobility and policy; and excess mortality is affected directly by the policy restrictions and indirectly via the impact of policy on mobility. The results confirm that the stringency of policy restrictions increased with the number and growth rates of COVID-19 cases and deaths. Mobility, as reflected in presence in public places (transport hubs, retail, work), decreased while presence at residential locations increased in response to stricter policies and higher COVID-19 case and death counts in preceding weeks. The number of new COVID-19 cases declined when stricter policy restrictions were enacted and reduced presence in public places (following a two-week lag). Excess mortality decreased with stricter policy restrictions (with a five-week lag) and, to a lesser extent, with reduced presence in public places and increased presence in places of residence. Importantly, the effects of policy restrictions and mobility diminished with consecutive COVID-19 waves. Overall, the evidence shows that policy restrictions were effective in limiting the spread of the pandemic and in saving lives. While policies influenced mobility patterns, their impact was not fully mediated by mobility changes.

  • Open Access

    Political Ideology, Policy Attitudes and Public Support for European Integration

    by Dimiter Toshkov

    How does public support for European integration relate to the broader political views of European citizens? This article maps in a comprehensive way the relationships between support for European integration, left-right ideological positions and policy attitudes towards redistribution, immigration and gay rights. We introduce the use of flexible non-parametric methods (generalized additive models) and more appropriate measures of dependence (the distance correlation coefficient) to explore and measure the strength and forms of these relationships across time (2004-2020), countries and indicators of European integration support. We find that the link between public support for European integration and left-right ideology is weak. The exact form of the relationship depends on the operationalization of European integration support, the country and the time period, but it rarely resembles the classic inverted-U curve suggested by existing literature and studies of party positions. In fact, average EU support is typically highest at the moderate left rather than at the center. The relationship of support for further European integration with immigration attitudes is much stronger, stable, consistent and almost linear; with support for gay rights it is also linear but considerably weaker; with support for redistribution there is practically no relationship at all. While public opinion is much less structured and less extreme than party positions, there is some evidence that – across countries – the strength of the links between EU support, left-right and policy positions at the party level is associated with the strength of these links at the level of the public. Furthermore, over time the strength of the link of public EU support with different policy attitudes covaries systematically with the salience (media presence) of the issue at the EU level.[Nota bene: this version has a typo in Table 2, last column, penultimate row: entry should read 0.18 instead of 0.37]