E. J. Masicampo

Three high-power studies (N = 3,000 total) demonstrated that asking participants to recall an experience as a manipulation can have unintended consequences. Participants who recalled preoccupying secrets made more extreme judgments of an external environment, supporting the notion that secrecy is burdensome. This influence was found, however, only among a subset of participants (i.e., participants who successfully recalled secrets that corresponded to their condition). We introduce the concept of manipulation correspondence to understand these patterns of results. Without taking into account whether participants' recalled secrets corresponded to their manipulation, there was no main effect of the recall manipulation on hill slant judgments. Among participants whose secrets did not correspond with the manipulation, a contrast effect emerged (i.e., influences on perceptual judgments opposite to the intention of the recall prompts). Moreover, the very process of recalling a secret in response to a prompt can lead to contrast from that prompt. Exposing participants to extreme exemplar secrets can experimentally produce, or counteract, this contrast effect. Preoccupying secrets are burdensome but tests of this phenomenon must take into account whether participants are actually preoccupied with their secrets (i.e., whether their recalled secrets correspond with the experimental manipulation), or experimentally ensure that participants judge their secrets as in line with the manipulation. More broadly, the current research speaks to a fundamental principle of recall manipulations; when recalling a particular experience, correspondence with the manipulation will determine its effects, and the process of recalling an experience (and comparing it to a prompt) might change how one perceives that experience. (PsycINFO Database Record

Across 7 studies, the authors examined the relationship between experiences of verticality and abstract versus concrete processing. Experiencing high, relative to low, verticality led to higher level identifications for actions (Study 1), greater willingness to delay short-term monetary gains for larger long-term monetary gains (Studies 2 and 5), and more frequent perceptions of meaningful relationships between objects and categories (Studies 3, 4, and 6), demonstrating that high verticality leads to more high-level construals. Mechanisms of these effects were explored, and the studies present evidence suggesting that mood (Studies 3 and 4), felt power (Study 4), arousal (Study 4), perceptual scope (Study 4), superficial semantic associations (Study 5), and movement (Study 5) do not mediate these effects. Instead, we found that even minimal experiences of verticality influence construal level (Study 6) and that verticality can influence construal level independent of the many plausible mediators. Furthermore, the relationship is reciprocal with abstract and concrete processing influencing the verticality of one's visual perspective (Study 7), suggesting an intimate link between construal level (abstract vs. concrete processing) and experiences of verticality.

We tested whether imagining another context during encoding would offset context-dependent forgetting. All participants studied a list of words in Context A. Participants who remained in Context A during the test recalled more than participants who were tested in another context (Context B), demonstrating the standard context-dependent forgetting effect (e.g., Smith & Vela, 2001). Importantly, some participants imagined another mental context during encoding. Some of these participants imagined Context B during encoding, and when they were later tested in Context B or even in a completely new Context C, they did not show forgetting, confirming our predictions. Other participants imagined a new context during encoding simply by transforming the current context (i.e., by imagining that it was snowing in the room), and this likewise counteracted context-dependent forgetting. These data suggest a moderator of context-dependent forgetting. When the context surrounding a memory is largely mentally generated, context-dependent forgetting is eliminated.

After people exert self‐control, self‐control performance on subsequent tasks tends to suffer, as if the capacity for self‐control was depleted by the prior exertion. The present paper discusses self‐control depletion and how people may overcome it. We searched the psychology literature and found nearly 40 empirical articles documenting diverse traits and strategies that counteract depletion, thereby facilitating self‐control success. The evidence points to two major strategies for overcoming depletion. The first strategy involves offsetting the high amount of effort required for self‐control (e.g., introducing a brief period of rest). The second involves compensating for the low immediate rewards that most self‐control tasks offer (e.g., providing an additional incentive for exerting self‐control). These strategies can be interpreted neatly within the framework of recent motivational accounts of self‐control depletion. This analysis may inform those aiming to improve self‐control success or simply to understand and anticipate when and why self‐control depletion occurs.

Psychologists debate whether consciousness or unconsciousness is most central to human behavior. Our goal, instead, is to figure out how they work together. Conscious processes are partly produced by unconscious processes, and much information processing occurs outside of awareness. Yet, consciousness has advantages that the unconscious does not. We discuss how consciousness causes behavior, drawing conclusions from large-scale literature reviews.