JGJohn Gallemore

John Gallemore

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


John Gallemore has a total of 28 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Unintended Regulatory Spillovers: The Impact of Bank Regulatory Oversight on Environmental Enforcement

    by John Gallemore, Vincent Giese

    We explore whether bank regulatory oversight affects the ability of environmental enforcement to reduce industrial emissions. A major objective of environmental enforcement is to reduce industrial emissions by encouraging firms to employ greener production processes and technologies. However, such changes often require external financing obtained from banks, and prior research shows that regulatory oversight of banks can affect bank lending. We find that, on average, the reduction in air pollution in response to county‐level environmental enforcement is attenuated in counties exposed to increased bank regulatory oversight, as measured by severe enforcement actions. Furthermore, we show that the negative impact of bank regulatory oversight on small business lending to affected counties is the likely mechanism behind this on‐average effect. However, when bank regulatory oversight targets banks with stronger capitalization, we find that the negative effect of bank regulatory oversight on environmental enforcement is mitigated. Collectively, our findings suggest that bank regulation has a nuanced effect on the extent to which environmental enforcement reduces emissions, indicating that one regulator's mission can impact the objectives of another.

  • Does Anti-Tax Avoidance Regulation Curb Industry Concentration?

    by John Gallemore, Martin Jacob, Jesse Marangoni, Christian P. H. Peters

    Policymakers claim that combating tax avoidance can help reduce industry concentration by leveling the playing field between industry leaders and their competitors. We test the validity of this claim by using administrative data on industry concentration and exploiting the staggered introduction of anti-tax avoidance regulations across 17 European countries. Although these regulations significantly reduce tax avoidance, we find no statistically or economically meaningful effect on industry concentration. Further tests indicate that our nonresults stem from a genuine lack of effect rather than a lack of statistical power and that our inferences are robust to multiple research designs. The sole exception is in industries with both high levels of leader tax-avoidance advantages and multinational presence, but even in these industries, effect sizes are modest and fall short of regulatory benchmarks. Overall, our findings cast doubt on the idea that broad-based anti-tax avoidance regulations can materially influence industry concentration. JEL Classifications: D40; H25; M40; M41.

  • Open Access

    Does Tax Complexity Hinder Innovation?

    by John Gallemore, Edward L. Maydew, Ricky Xu Yao

    We examine whether tax complexity hinders the effectiveness of tax incentives that are intended to promote innovation. Many jurisdictions offer tax incentives to stimulate innovative activities. However, firms must navigate complex rules and procedures to obtain the tax benefits, reducing the effective generosity of the incentives. We examine the rules and procedures of U.S. state-level R&D tax credit policies across four decades to develop a novel, time-varying measure of complexity in state-level R&D tax credit policies. We find that while larger R&D tax credits are positively associated with future corporate patenting, the effect is attenuated when tax credit complexity is high. Moreover, we find that the attenuation varies depending on specific features of the complexity and with firm characteristics. Finally, we find that R&D tax credits are associated with lower average innovation novelty, but tax complexity does not materially moderate the novelty effect. Overall, our findings indicate that tax complexity hinders the effectiveness of innovation incentives, with important implications for policy design and knowledge spillovers.

  • Top Cited Papers
    Open Access

    Corporate Tax System Complexity and Investment Sensitivity to Tax Policy Changes

    by Harald Amberger, John Gallemore, Jaron Wilde

    Effective policymakers must balance the demands of formulating a corporate tax system that raises revenue and spurs economic activity (e.g., investment) while promoting a “level playing field” across firms. Balancing these tradeoffs has likely caused tax systems to become more complex over time, increasing firms’ difficulty in understanding and complying with tax regulations. We investigate the impact of tax system complexity on the responsiveness of firm‐level investment to tax policy changes. Exploiting staggered tax rate changes and variation in tax system complexity across countries, we document two key findings. First, firm‐level investment is less sensitive to changes in the corporate tax rate when tax system complexity is higher, suggesting that such complexity can undermine the ability of tax policy to affect economic growth. Second, the impact of tax complexity on the sensitivity of investment to tax rate changes varies significantly across firms, with domestic‐owned, smaller, and private firms being more affected. These cross‐sectional disparities are consistent with tax system complexity potentially reducing tax system parity. Collectively, our findings suggest that corporate tax system complexity can negatively impact the ability of fiscal policy to affect investment and lead to heterogeneous tax policy responses across firms.


  • Corporate Tax Enforcement and Business Activity

    by John Gallemore, Martin Jacob

    We examine the consequences of corporate tax enforcement for business activity. Using two different empirical approaches—a regional design and a firm-level design—we document that corporate tax enforcement is negatively associated with business activity, as measured by establishments and employment. This association is economically significant and is robust to tests that mitigate concerns regarding endogeneity and measurement. Furthermore, we find that the negative association between tax enforcement and business activity varies substantially in the cross-section. Specifically, we find that it is weaker for regions and firms with greater access to external financing sources and is stronger for regions and firms where compliance costs are likely higher and for which the ex ante costs of tax enforcement are greater. Our findings suggest that the effects of tax enforcement on business activity are economically important and heterogeneous, which should be of interest to academics and policymakers. JEL Classifications: H25; H26; R11; R12.


  • Tax Policy Expectations and Investment

    by John Gallemore, Stephan Hollander, Martin Jacob, Xiang Zheng

    This paper examines how firms’ tax policy expectations (TPE) evolve around and relate to their investment responses to changes in tax policy. Using a text‐based approach to measuring TPE, we find that two recent tax policy–changing events—namely, the 2016 U.S. presidential election and the enactment of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA)—spawned considerable between‐ and within‐firm variation in TPE, with aggregate time‐series patterns in TPE occasionally challenging prevailing assumptions in previous research. Further, we observe that event‐induced TPE relate to investment both before and in response to the TCJA's passage in 2017, with offsetting associations between its first and second moments, and that these TPE moderate the TCJA's intended investment‐stimulating effect. Furthermore, we document a difference between domestic and multinational firms in their TPE‐investment response, with the former (latter) more likely to adjust the level (shift the country location) of their investment. Overall, our findings support the idea that TPE can impact investment behavior in the face of a tax policy change and suggest that our methodology can be used by future research to incorporate TPE into analyses of tax policy effects.


  • Tax Planning Knowledge Diffusion via the Labor Market

    by John M. Barrios, John Gallemore

    We examine the extent to which the labor market facilitates the diffusion of tax-planning knowledge across firms. Using a novel data set of tax department employee movements between S&P 1500 firms, we find that firms experience an increase in their tax planning after hiring a tax employee from a tax-aggressive firm. This finding is robust to various research designs and specifications. Consistent with tax-planning knowledge driving the result, we find that the tax-planning benefits are more substantial when the employee is involved in a director-level role and has more experience. Further tests suggest that tax-planning knowledge is highly specific in nature: the increase in tax avoidance is larger when the hiring and former firms are similar (i.e., operating in the same sector or having similar foreign operations), and firms are more likely to hire tax department employees from firms with similar characteristics. Finally, we do not find that the prior firm’s tax planning changes after the employee leaves the firm, suggesting that the tax-planning knowledge simply spreads to the hiring firm and does not leave the prior firm. Our study documents the first order role of the labor market in the diffusion of tax-planning knowledge across firms, and our findings suggest that tax department human capital is a central determinant of tax-planning outcomes. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4741 .


  • Open Access

    The Sound of Uncertainty: Examining Managerial Acoustic Uncertainty in Conference Calls

    by Daniela De la Parra, John Gallemore

    Building on the literature in linguistics showing that the manner in which individuals speak provides context incremental to the actual spoken words, we study whether uncertainty expressed via the acoustic features of managerial speech in conference calls impacts analyst behavior. Using a novel measure of managerial acoustic uncertainty, we find that when managers sound more uncertain in their responses to analyst questions, analyst forecast dispersion increases, even after accounting for characteristics of the actual language being used by managers and analysts. This finding is consistent with analysts relying less on information conveyed via acoustically uncertain responses, and thus more on information idiosyncratic to the analyst. Furthermore, we find that the association between acoustic uncertainty and analyst forecast dispersion varies predictably with the characteristics of these manager-analyst interactions, such as the specificity and forward-looking nature of the manager's response. Finally, we find that managerial acoustic uncertainty is positively associated with bid-ask spreads, and that this is concentrated within firms with greater increases in post-conference call forecast dispersion. Our findings suggest that uncertainty expressed in the acoustic features of managerial speech can affect market participants. Furthermore, our study creates and validates an approach to measuring managerial acoustic uncertainty.


  • Open Access

    Corporate Tax Planning and Industry Concentration

    by John Gallemore, Jesse van der Geest, Martin Jacob, Christian P. H. Peters

    Recent research has documented that industry concentration has increased significantly over the past 25 years, with potentially negative consequences for competition, productivity, and social welfare. Some have suggested that greater corporate tax planning by industry leaders, which can provide them with a cost advantage over their competitors, has contributed to this trend. As a result, policymakers are targeting such tax planning to reduce industry concentration. We provide large-sample empirical evidence on whether tax planning is associated with industry concentration. In contrast with conventional wisdom, we find that industry leaders generally do not exhibit greater tax planning relative to their closest competitors. Furthermore, industry leader tax planning advantages do not meaningfully explain the trend in industry concentration over our sample period. Finally, we document that industries with plausibly tax planning-induced concentration do not exhibit different aggregate productivity growth than other industries. In short, our findings cast doubt on the idea that corporate tax planning is responsible for increasing industry concentration or other anti-competition industry-level outcomes in recent years.