Susan Ariel Aaronson
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Susan Ariel Aaronson has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Jamie M. Zimmerman
New America Foundation
2 shared publications- M. Rodwan Abouharb
University College London
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 3 January 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 125-147
Trade Agreements and Cross-border Disinformation
Disinformation is simultaneously a domestic and an international problem. It can be created and disseminated by domestic actors, or it can be created and transferred from individuals in one group or country to another. Moreover, because of its global and continuous nature, disinformation is a ‘wicked problem’ that transcends nations and generations. Wicked problems cannot be ‘solved,’ but they can be mitigated. This chapter argues that the governance of disinformation can productively be understood from polycentric perspectives, pointing to how trade agreements between governments can deal with cross-border disinformation, as they already deal with spam. While international trade agreements cannot address the problem of domestically created disinformation and cannot stop individuals, groups, or governments from disseminating malicious or dangerous cross-border disinformation flows, these accords can serve as governance tools within a polycentric landscape for mitigating the worst effects of such flows.
- 3 January 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 125-147
Open AccessTrade Agreements and Cross-border Disinformation
Disinformation is simultaneously a domestic and an international problem. It can be created and disseminated by domestic actors, or it can be created and transferred from individuals in one group or country to another. Moreover, because of its global and continuous nature, disinformation is a ‘wicked problem’ that transcends nations and generations. Wicked problems cannot be ‘solved,’ but they can be mitigated. This chapter argues that the governance of disinformation can productively be understood from polycentric perspectives, pointing to how trade agreements between governments can deal with cross-border disinformation, as they already deal with spam. While international trade agreements cannot address the problem of domestically created disinformation and cannot stop individuals, groups, or governments from disseminating malicious or dangerous cross-border disinformation flows, these accords can serve as governance tools within a polycentric landscape for mitigating the worst effects of such flows.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Review of Economic Policy
- Vol. 39 (1) , 98-109
Building trust in digital trade will require a rethink of trade policy-making
In 2019, Shinzo Abe, then Prime Minister of Japan, stated that if the world wanted to achieve the benefits of the data-driven economy, members of the World Trade Organization should find a common approach to combining ‘data free flow with trust’. However, he never explained what these rules should look like and how nations might find an internationally accepted approach to such rules. In this paper, I argue that trade policy-makers must pay closer attention to users’ concerns if they truly want to achieve ‘data free flow with trust’. I begin with an examination of what the most recent digital trade/ecommerce agreements say about trust and discuss whether they actually meet user concerns. Next, I turn to three different examples of online problems that users have expressed concerns about, namely internet shutdowns/censorship, disinformation, and ransomware, describing how these may yield both trade distortions and less trust online. I argue that policy-makers should address these issues if they believe trade agreements should build trust in cross-border data flows. Moreover, I argue how policy-makers respond to user concerns is as important as what they include in trade agreements. Finally, I note that trade negotiators will need to rethink how they involve the broad public in digital trade policy-making, while recognizing that trade policy agreements may not be the best place to address these problems.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Review of Economic Policy
- Vol. 39 (1) , 98-109
Building trust in digital trade will require a rethink of trade policy-making
In 2019, Shinzo Abe, then Prime Minister of Japan, stated that if the world wanted to achieve the benefits of the data-driven economy, members of the World Trade Organization should find a common approach to combining ‘data free flow with trust’. However, he never explained what these rules should look like and how nations might find an internationally accepted approach to such rules. In this paper, I argue that trade policy-makers must pay closer attention to users’ concerns if they truly want to achieve ‘data free flow with trust’. I begin with an examination of what the most recent digital trade/ecommerce agreements say about trust and discuss whether they actually meet user concerns. Next, I turn to three different examples of online problems that users have expressed concerns about, namely internet shutdowns/censorship, disinformation, and ransomware, describing how these may yield both trade distortions and less trust online. I argue that policy-makers should address these issues if they believe trade agreements should build trust in cross-border data flows. Moreover, I argue how policy-makers respond to user concerns is as important as what they include in trade agreements. Finally, I note that trade negotiators will need to rethink how they involve the broad public in digital trade policy-making, while recognizing that trade policy agreements may not be the best place to address these problems.
- Open Access
- 26 January 2021
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Intereconomics
- Vol. 56 (1) , 59-60
Transatlantic Priorities: Data Governance
- 26 January 2021
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Intereconomics
- Vol. 56 (1) , 59-60
Open AccessTransatlantic Priorities: Data Governance
- Top Cited Papers
- 6 August 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in World Trade Review
- Vol. 18 (4) , 541-577
What Are We Talking about When We Talk about Digital Protectionism?
For almost a decade, executives, scholars, and trade diplomats have argued that filtering, censorship, localization requirements, and domestic regulations are distorting the cross-border information flows that underpin the internet. Herein I use process tracing to examine the state and implications of digital protectionism. I make five points: First, I note that digital protectionism differs from protectionism of goods and other services. Information is intangible, highly tradable, and some information is a public good. Secondly, I argue that it will not be easy to set international rules to limit digital protectionism without shared norms and definitions. Thirdly, the US, EU, and Canada have labeled other countries policies’ protectionist, yet their arguments and actions sometimes appear hypocritical. Fourth, I discuss the challenge of Chinese failure to follow key internet governance norms. China allegedly has used a wide range of cyber strategies, including distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks (bombarding a web site with service requests) to censor information flows and impede online market access beyond its borders. WTO members have yet to discuss this issue and the threat it poses to trade norms and rules. Finally, I note that digital protectionism may be self-defeating. I then draw conclusions and make policy recommendations.
- 6 August 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in World Trade Review
- Vol. 18 (4) , 541-577
Top Cited PapersWhat Are We Talking about When We Talk about Digital Protectionism?
For almost a decade, executives, scholars, and trade diplomats have argued that filtering, censorship, localization requirements, and domestic regulations are distorting the cross-border information flows that underpin the internet. Herein I use process tracing to examine the state and implications of digital protectionism. I make five points: First, I note that digital protectionism differs from protectionism of goods and other services. Information is intangible, highly tradable, and some information is a public good. Secondly, I argue that it will not be easy to set international rules to limit digital protectionism without shared norms and definitions. Thirdly, the US, EU, and Canada have labeled other countries policies’ protectionist, yet their arguments and actions sometimes appear hypocritical. Fourth, I discuss the challenge of Chinese failure to follow key internet governance norms. China allegedly has used a wide range of cyber strategies, including distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks (bombarding a web site with service requests) to censor information flows and impede online market access beyond its borders. WTO members have yet to discuss this issue and the threat it poses to trade norms and rules. Finally, I note that digital protectionism may be self-defeating. I then draw conclusions and make policy recommendations.
- 4 May 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Cyber Policy
- Vol. 2 (2) , 232-254
What might have been and could still be: the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s potential to encourage an open internet and digital rights
- 4 May 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Cyber Policy
- Vol. 2 (2) , 232-254
What might have been and could still be: the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s potential to encourage an open internet and digital rights
- 1 January 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in World Trade Review
- Vol. 14 (4) , 671-700
Why Trade Agreements are not Setting Information Free: The Lost History and Reinvigorated Debate over Cross-Border Data Flows, Human Rights, and National Security
Herein, we examine how the United States and the European Union use trade agreements to advance the free flow of information and to promote digital rights online. In the 1980s and 1990s, after US policymakers tried to include language governing the free flow of information in trade agreements, other nations feared a threat to their sovereignty and their ability to restrict cross-border data flows in the interest of privacy or national security. In the twenty-first century, again many states have not responded positively to US and EU efforts to facilitate the free flow of information. They worry that the US dominates both the Internet economy and Internet governance in ways that benefit its interests. After the Snowden allegations, many states adopted strategies that restricted rather than enhanced the free flow of information. Without deliberate intent, efforts to set information free through trade liberalization may be making the Internet less free. Finally, the two trade giants are not fully in agreement on Internet freedom, but neither has linked policies to promote the free flow of information with policies to advance digital rights. Moreover, they do not agree as to when restrictions on information are necessary and when they are protectionist.
- 1 January 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in World Trade Review
- Vol. 14 (4) , 671-700
Why Trade Agreements are not Setting Information Free: The Lost History and Reinvigorated Debate over Cross-Border Data Flows, Human Rights, and National Security
Herein, we examine how the United States and the European Union use trade agreements to advance the free flow of information and to promote digital rights online. In the 1980s and 1990s, after US policymakers tried to include language governing the free flow of information in trade agreements, other nations feared a threat to their sovereignty and their ability to restrict cross-border data flows in the interest of privacy or national security. In the twenty-first century, again many states have not responded positively to US and EU efforts to facilitate the free flow of information. They worry that the US dominates both the Internet economy and Internet governance in ways that benefit its interests. After the Snowden allegations, many states adopted strategies that restricted rather than enhanced the free flow of information. Without deliberate intent, efforts to set information free through trade liberalization may be making the Internet less free. Finally, the two trade giants are not fully in agreement on Internet freedom, but neither has linked policies to promote the free flow of information with policies to advance digital rights. Moreover, they do not agree as to when restrictions on information are necessary and when they are protectionist.
- 17 October 2013
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in World Trade Review
- Vol. 13 (3) , 547-582
Does the WTO help member states improve governance?
On 16 December 2011, Russia gained the approval of 153 other member states to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). During its arduous eighteen-year accession, Russian officials reformed a wide range of laws and policies that could affect trade.1Russia made these changes because senior Russian officials believed that improved governance would pay off in greater foreign investment, and that investment in turn would stimulate economic growth.2President Vladimir Putin acknowledged ‘countries compete in the attractiveness of their business climate … quality of state institutions and effectiveness of the court and legal system’. Ivan Tchakarov, chief economist at the Russian brokerage Renaissance Capital, asserted ‘By becoming a WTO member, Russia will have to import … rules and regulations that will address the very issues that foreign investors usually complain about, like corruption, the protection of minority shareholders, the independence of the judiciary.’3
- 17 October 2013
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in World Trade Review
- Vol. 13 (3) , 547-582
Does the WTO help member states improve governance?
On 16 December 2011, Russia gained the approval of 153 other member states to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). During its arduous eighteen-year accession, Russian officials reformed a wide range of laws and policies that could affect trade.1Russia made these changes because senior Russian officials believed that improved governance would pay off in greater foreign investment, and that investment in turn would stimulate economic growth.2President Vladimir Putin acknowledged ‘countries compete in the attractiveness of their business climate … quality of state institutions and effectiveness of the court and legal system’. Ivan Tchakarov, chief economist at the Russian brokerage Renaissance Capital, asserted ‘By becoming a WTO member, Russia will have to import … rules and regulations that will address the very issues that foreign investors usually complain about, like corruption, the protection of minority shareholders, the independence of the judiciary.’3
- Top Cited Papers
- 25 January 2011
- Published by Wiley in Public Administration and Development
- Vol. 31 (1) , 50-63
Limited partnership: Business, government, civil society, and the public in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)
This article assesses the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a public‐private partnership designed to help resource‐rich countries avoid corruption in the management of extractive industry revenues. Thirty‐two nations have adopted EITI, and the numbers of implementing nations are rapidly increasing. However, the EITI partnership is not as effective as it could be for three reasons. First, the partners (governments, civil society, and business) have different visions of EITI. Second, some implementing governments have not allowed civil society to participate fully in the process or have not consistently provided civil society with the information they need to hold their governments to account. In this regard it is a limited partnership. Third, in many participating countries, the public and legislators may not be aware of EITI. Thus, although public participation is essential to the success and potential positive spillovers of EITI, the public is essentially a silent partner, limiting the ability of the EITI to succeed as a counterweight to corruption. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
- 25 January 2011
- Published by Wiley in Public Administration and Development
- Vol. 31 (1) , 50-63
Top Cited PapersLimited partnership: Business, government, civil society, and the public in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)
This article assesses the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a public‐private partnership designed to help resource‐rich countries avoid corruption in the management of extractive industry revenues. Thirty‐two nations have adopted EITI, and the numbers of implementing nations are rapidly increasing. However, the EITI partnership is not as effective as it could be for three reasons. First, the partners (governments, civil society, and business) have different visions of EITI. Second, some implementing governments have not allowed civil society to participate fully in the process or have not consistently provided civil society with the information they need to hold their governments to account. In this regard it is a limited partnership. Third, in many participating countries, the public and legislators may not be aware of EITI. Thus, although public participation is essential to the success and potential positive spillovers of EITI, the public is essentially a silent partner, limiting the ability of the EITI to succeed as a counterweight to corruption. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
- 8 October 2007
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 209-216
Appendix: Interviews for Righting Trade, 2005–2007
Trade Imbalance - October 2007
- 8 October 2007
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 209-216
Appendix: Interviews for Righting Trade, 2005–2007
Trade Imbalance - October 2007
- 8 October 2007
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 1-31
Introduction: The Struggle to Weigh Human Rights in Trade Policymaking
Trade Imbalance - October 2007
- 8 October 2007
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 1-31
Introduction: The Struggle to Weigh Human Rights in Trade Policymaking
Trade Imbalance - October 2007