Massimiliano Agovino
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Massimiliano Agovino has a total of 29 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Massimiliano Cerciello
Department of Economic and Legal Studies, University of Naples Parthenope, Napoli, Italy
21 shared publications - Gaetano Musella
University of Naples Parthenope
11 shared publications Michele Bevilacqua
University of Salerno
10 shared publications- Aniello Ferraro
University of Naples “Parthenope
7 shared publications - Antonio Garofalo
Department of Economic and Legal Studies University of Naples “Parthenope” Naples Italy
5 shared publications - Katia Marchesano
University of Naples Parthenope, Naples, Italy
5 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 26 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Economics of Governance
- Vol. 27 (1) , 37
The political economy of influence: how lobbying shapes institutions and social welfare at the local level
This paper examines how lobbying shapes institutional quality and social welfare at the local level. We develop a political-economy framework in which lobbying does not directly alter government objectives but erodes institutional integrity, thereby weakening the capacity of public policy to generate welfare gains. Social welfare is modelled as a function of institutional quality, which is strengthened by public spending and undermined by lobbying pressure within a multi-level governance structure linking organization-level influence, municipal institutions, and regional well-being. Empirically, we assemble an unbalanced multi-level panel for Italy over 2011–2022, combining lobbyist-level lobbying expenditures, municipal institutional quality (MAQI), regional public spending, and regional multidimensional well-being (BES). To address endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity across lobbyists, municipalities, regions, and time, we estimate a fixed-effects two-stage least squares model. Results show that lobbying intensity is negatively associated with institutional quality, whereas public spending is positively associated with institutional performance. Institutional quality, in turn, is positively and robustly related to social welfare, supporting an institutional mediation mechanism. Overall, the findings indicate that fiscal resources translate into welfare improvements primarily when institutional resilience is preserved, highlighting governance quality as a key determinant of welfare outcomes in decentralized systems.
- 26 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Economics of Governance
- Vol. 27 (1) , 37
Open AccessThe political economy of influence: how lobbying shapes institutions and social welfare at the local level
This paper examines how lobbying shapes institutional quality and social welfare at the local level. We develop a political-economy framework in which lobbying does not directly alter government objectives but erodes institutional integrity, thereby weakening the capacity of public policy to generate welfare gains. Social welfare is modelled as a function of institutional quality, which is strengthened by public spending and undermined by lobbying pressure within a multi-level governance structure linking organization-level influence, municipal institutions, and regional well-being. Empirically, we assemble an unbalanced multi-level panel for Italy over 2011–2022, combining lobbyist-level lobbying expenditures, municipal institutional quality (MAQI), regional public spending, and regional multidimensional well-being (BES). To address endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity across lobbyists, municipalities, regions, and time, we estimate a fixed-effects two-stage least squares model. Results show that lobbying intensity is negatively associated with institutional quality, whereas public spending is positively associated with institutional performance. Institutional quality, in turn, is positively and robustly related to social welfare, supporting an institutional mediation mechanism. Overall, the findings indicate that fiscal resources translate into welfare improvements primarily when institutional resilience is preserved, highlighting governance quality as a key determinant of welfare outcomes in decentralized systems.
- 10 June 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Empirical Economics
- Vol. 70 (6)
Evidence of horizontal yardstick competition in the Italian waste sector: Do the type of neighbour and benchmark matter?
- 10 June 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Empirical Economics
- Vol. 70 (6)
Evidence of horizontal yardstick competition in the Italian waste sector: Do the type of neighbour and benchmark matter?
- 23 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Economics of Governance
- Vol. 27 (1) , 14
Territorial inequalities in school accessibility: public and private governance in Italy
- 23 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Economics of Governance
- Vol. 27 (1) , 14
Territorial inequalities in school accessibility: public and private governance in Italy
- 13 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics
- Vol. 26 (2) , 363-385
Structural constraints and environmental convergence: multilevel governance and ${CO}_{2}$reduction in Italian provinces- 13 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics
- Vol. 26 (2) , 363-385
Structural constraints and environmental convergence: multilevel governance and ${CO}_{2}$reduction in Italian provinces- 25 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 73-89
The Economy of Digital Platforms: A Performance Analysis from 2012 to 2021
- 25 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 73-89
The Economy of Digital Platforms: A Performance Analysis from 2012 to 2021
- 25 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 61-72
A Composite Indicator to Measure the Economic and Financial Health of Digital Platforms
- 25 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 61-72
A Composite Indicator to Measure the Economic and Financial Health of Digital Platforms
- 21 January 2026
- Published by Wiley in Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management
- Vol. 33 (4) , 4903-4915
Selection Bias in ESG Reporting: Implications for Environmental Performance and Firm Valuation
This paper investigates the relationship between environmental performance and firm valuation, accounting for the strategic nature of ESG disclosure. Using a panel of Italian listed firms (2013–2023), we implement a two‐step Heckman correction model to address self‐selection bias in environmental reporting. Our analysis reveals that firms with stronger governance structures—especially board attendance, independence, and CSR committees—are more likely to disclose environmental data. Correcting for this bias, we find a positive and significant association between environmental commitment and Tobin's Q. The results are robust across different thresholds of environmental commitment. These findings highlight the financial relevance of environmental responsibility and underscore the need for supportive policies in mandatory ESG disclosure regimes. Without addressing self‐selection, naïve estimates would systematically underestimate the true economic value of environmental engagement. JEL Classification: G30, Q56, M14, C24, G32.
- 21 January 2026
- Published by Wiley in Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management
- Vol. 33 (4) , 4903-4915
Selection Bias in ESG Reporting: Implications for Environmental Performance and Firm Valuation
This paper investigates the relationship between environmental performance and firm valuation, accounting for the strategic nature of ESG disclosure. Using a panel of Italian listed firms (2013–2023), we implement a two‐step Heckman correction model to address self‐selection bias in environmental reporting. Our analysis reveals that firms with stronger governance structures—especially board attendance, independence, and CSR committees—are more likely to disclose environmental data. Correcting for this bias, we find a positive and significant association between environmental commitment and Tobin's Q. The results are robust across different thresholds of environmental commitment. These findings highlight the financial relevance of environmental responsibility and underscore the need for supportive policies in mandatory ESG disclosure regimes. Without addressing self‐selection, naïve estimates would systematically underestimate the true economic value of environmental engagement. JEL Classification: G30, Q56, M14, C24, G32.
- 9 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 61-74
The Economic Effects of Linguistic Discrimination
- 9 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 155-171
The Effect of Discrimination on Economic Performance
- 9 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 155-171
The Effect of Discrimination on Economic Performance