Rasha Abdel Rahman
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Rasha Abdel Rahman has a total of 113 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Milena Rabovsky
University of Potsdam
13 shared publications - Alissa Melinger
University of Dundee, Scotland, UK
11 shared publications Werner Sommer
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany
11 shared publications- Werner Sommer
Department of Psychology, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany; Department of Physics and Life Science Imaging Center, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong; Faculty of Education, National University of Malaysia, Kula Lumpur, Malaysia
8 shared publications - Anna Eiserbeck
Department of Psychology, Faculty of Life Sciences, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany
7 shared publications - Anna K. Kuhlen
Department of Psychology, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany
7 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 15 October 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
A Computational Swinging Lexical Network: Cohort Concentration Predicts Semantic Interference in a Large-Scale Picture–Word Interference Dataset
The Swinging Lexical Network (SLN) model explains semantic context effects in word production through the lexical cohort that a target and distractor co-activate: whether naming is facilitated or slowed depends on the balance between semantic priming and lexical competition within this cohort. As a verbal theory the SLN leaves open what counts as a competitor: any co-activated word, or only words whose activation stands out. We implemented the SLN computationally, letting activation spread through a 30,000-word distributional semantic network. From this process we derived two measures. Cohort concentration is the degree to which co-activation falls on a few words instead of being spread thinly across many. The swing is how much the activation pattern still changes over later spreading steps. In a harmonized picture--word interference dataset of 392,156 trials from 86 English and German experiments, cohort concentration was the only semantic predictor with a reliable effect in both languages: naming was slower when a few words stood out as strongly activated competitors and faster when activation was diffuse. Competitors are thus the words whose activation stands out from the background, not every word that receives some activation. Adding the swing improved fit, but its effect could not be separated from cohort concentration, with which it was strongly correlated. Because spreading converges on the same network-wide state for every word pair, later steps largely re-express the initial cohort. In line with the SLN, our computational implementation shows that semantic interference depends on how co-activation is distributed across the cohort.
- 15 October 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessA Computational Swinging Lexical Network: Cohort Concentration Predicts Semantic Interference in a Large-Scale Picture–Word Interference Dataset
The Swinging Lexical Network (SLN) model explains semantic context effects in word production through the lexical cohort that a target and distractor co-activate: whether naming is facilitated or slowed depends on the balance between semantic priming and lexical competition within this cohort. As a verbal theory the SLN leaves open what counts as a competitor: any co-activated word, or only words whose activation stands out. We implemented the SLN computationally, letting activation spread through a 30,000-word distributional semantic network. From this process we derived two measures. Cohort concentration is the degree to which co-activation falls on a few words instead of being spread thinly across many. The swing is how much the activation pattern still changes over later spreading steps. In a harmonized picture--word interference dataset of 392,156 trials from 86 English and German experiments, cohort concentration was the only semantic predictor with a reliable effect in both languages: naming was slower when a few words stood out as strongly activated competitors and faster when activation was diffuse. Competitors are thus the words whose activation stands out from the background, not every word that receives some activation. Adding the swing improved fit, but its effect could not be separated from cohort concentration, with which it was strongly correlated. Because spreading converges on the same network-wide state for every word pair, later steps largely re-express the initial cohort. In line with the SLN, our computational implementation shows that semantic interference depends on how co-activation is distributed across the cohort.
- Open Access
- 4 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Social Robotics
- Vol. 18 (7) , 97
Signals of Communicative Intent Enhance the Impact of Emotional Messages from Human Speakers, While Effects for Robots are Attenuated
The present work investigated humans’ responses to robots’ verbal emotional expressions. To this end, the interplay of agent characteristics and signals of communicative intent on emotional word processing was examined. In two behavioral studies (N1 = 36, N2 = 72), participants watched short videos featuring different agents (humans, androids, and humanoid robots) alongside the auditory presentation of single words of varying valence (negative, neutral, and positive). In the communicative condition, the agent signaled communicative intent by looking at the participant while speaking; in the non-communicative condition, the audio played while the agent remained passive with eyes and mouth closed. After each video, participants rated the valence and arousal of the presented word. The results of both studies revealed a consistent pattern, with differences in emotional word processing based on agent type: For human agents, signals of communicative intent enhanced the emotional impact (arousal dimension) of emotional words. In contrast, for android and humanoid robot agents, the corresponding effects were smaller and statistically non-significant, indicating a relatively lower perceived relevance of direct emotional speech from robots. For all agents, the emotional meaning (valence dimension) of words was robustly conveyed without being affected by the communication manipulation. Further analyses identified the dimension of perceived animacy as a basis for the observed arousal effects. In line with theories that emphasize contextual influences on language processing, our results highlight the role of mind attribution and perceived relevance for emotional language processing in human–robot interaction.
- 4 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Social Robotics
- Vol. 18 (7) , 97
Open AccessSignals of Communicative Intent Enhance the Impact of Emotional Messages from Human Speakers, While Effects for Robots are Attenuated
The present work investigated humans’ responses to robots’ verbal emotional expressions. To this end, the interplay of agent characteristics and signals of communicative intent on emotional word processing was examined. In two behavioral studies (N1 = 36, N2 = 72), participants watched short videos featuring different agents (humans, androids, and humanoid robots) alongside the auditory presentation of single words of varying valence (negative, neutral, and positive). In the communicative condition, the agent signaled communicative intent by looking at the participant while speaking; in the non-communicative condition, the audio played while the agent remained passive with eyes and mouth closed. After each video, participants rated the valence and arousal of the presented word. The results of both studies revealed a consistent pattern, with differences in emotional word processing based on agent type: For human agents, signals of communicative intent enhanced the emotional impact (arousal dimension) of emotional words. In contrast, for android and humanoid robot agents, the corresponding effects were smaller and statistically non-significant, indicating a relatively lower perceived relevance of direct emotional speech from robots. For all agents, the emotional meaning (valence dimension) of words was robustly conveyed without being affected by the communication manipulation. Further analyses identified the dimension of perceived animacy as a basis for the observed arousal effects. In line with theories that emphasize contextual influences on language processing, our results highlight the role of mind attribution and perceived relevance for emotional language processing in human–robot interaction.
- Open Access
- 8 May 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
A harmonized trial-level dataset of picture-word interference
The picture-word interference (PWI) paradigm is among the most widely used experimental tools for studying lexical access during language production. Despite decades of research, trial-level data from individual PWI studies remain fragmented across laboratories, repositories, and formats, limiting large-scale reuse and cross-study comparison. Here we present a harmonized, openly accessible dataset comprising 688,976 trials from 86 experiments across 42 studies, involving 3,353 participants naming pictures in English or German. Data were collected from five sources: an in-house dataset, raw data from a prior meta-analysis, systematic literature searches (OpenAlex, PubMed), direct author contributions, and the Open Science Framework. All datasets were cleaned and harmonized into a common 28-variable schema covering trial-level responses, experimental design characteristics, and basic psycholinguistic properties of target and distractor words. The full data-collection and cleaning pipeline is openly released, so that the resource can be readily extended with additional studies, languages, or harmonized variables in future releases. The dataset enables mega-analyses, computational modeling of naming latencies, replication studies, and methodological investigations that require statistical power beyond what individual studies can provide.
- 8 May 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessA harmonized trial-level dataset of picture-word interference
The picture-word interference (PWI) paradigm is among the most widely used experimental tools for studying lexical access during language production. Despite decades of research, trial-level data from individual PWI studies remain fragmented across laboratories, repositories, and formats, limiting large-scale reuse and cross-study comparison. Here we present a harmonized, openly accessible dataset comprising 688,976 trials from 86 experiments across 42 studies, involving 3,353 participants naming pictures in English or German. Data were collected from five sources: an in-house dataset, raw data from a prior meta-analysis, systematic literature searches (OpenAlex, PubMed), direct author contributions, and the Open Science Framework. All datasets were cleaned and harmonized into a common 28-variable schema covering trial-level responses, experimental design characteristics, and basic psycholinguistic properties of target and distractor words. The full data-collection and cleaning pipeline is openly released, so that the resource can be readily extended with additional studies, languages, or harmonized variables in future releases. The dataset enables mega-analyses, computational modeling of naming latencies, replication studies, and methodological investigations that require statistical power beyond what individual studies can provide.
- Open Access
From Sensory Details to Verbal Codes: Visual Memory Reinstatement of Location and Color Features
Successful episodic memory depends on the reinstatement of encoding content and processes during retrieval. However, it remains unclear how such reinstatement (1) differs for various perceptual features, (2) supports subjective versus objective memory retrieval, and (3) relies on linguistic information. To investigate these three issues, we designed an fMRI study in which participants encoded and recalled the colors and spatial locations of object pictures, and provided subjective vividness and objective precision measures. We used encoding-retrieval similarity (ERS) to identify feature-level reinstatement for location or color features, and trial-specific reinstatement for individual location trials or individual color trials. The study yielded three main findings. First, feature-level reinstatement in frontoparietal and visual regions supported both location and color memory, whereas trial-specific reinstatement in early visual cortex contributed to location memory and feature-level reinstatement in lateral/anterior temporal cortices, to color memory. Second, trial-specific reinstatement in early visual cortex supported both location vividness and precision, while feature-level reinstatement in inferior frontal gyrus contributed to color vividness, and trial-specific reinstatement in posterior inferior temporal gyrus (including the color area), to color precision. Finally, color name richness (the number of names associated with a particular color) enhanced color memory precision and modulated trial-specific color reinstatement in right anterior inferior temporal gyrus. Together, these findings suggest that perceptual and linguistic reinstatement play complementary roles in visual episodic memory: perceptual replay provides fine-grained sensory details, whereas linguistic replay can scaffold and refine these representations, especially for features that are easier to verbalize such as colors. Significance Statement: Neural reinstatement has been associated with the quality of episodic memory for complex visual images. However, it remains unclear how neural reinstatement varies across perceptual features, memory subjectivity, and linguistic accessibility. Here, we examine how neural reinstatement supports memory for color and location, whether it plays different roles in memory vividness versus precision, and the role of language in color memory. We showed that location memory relies primarily on trial-specific reinstatement in early visual cortex, supporting precise and vivid recall, whereas color memory is supported by a more complex and complementary interplay between perceptual and linguistic reinstatement. Together, these results advance our understanding of how distinct reinstatement mechanisms support the precision and vividness of episodic memory for basic visual features.
Open AccessFrom Sensory Details to Verbal Codes: Visual Memory Reinstatement of Location and Color Features
Successful episodic memory depends on the reinstatement of encoding content and processes during retrieval. However, it remains unclear how such reinstatement (1) differs for various perceptual features, (2) supports subjective versus objective memory retrieval, and (3) relies on linguistic information. To investigate these three issues, we designed an fMRI study in which participants encoded and recalled the colors and spatial locations of object pictures, and provided subjective vividness and objective precision measures. We used encoding-retrieval similarity (ERS) to identify feature-level reinstatement for location or color features, and trial-specific reinstatement for individual location trials or individual color trials. The study yielded three main findings. First, feature-level reinstatement in frontoparietal and visual regions supported both location and color memory, whereas trial-specific reinstatement in early visual cortex contributed to location memory and feature-level reinstatement in lateral/anterior temporal cortices, to color memory. Second, trial-specific reinstatement in early visual cortex supported both location vividness and precision, while feature-level reinstatement in inferior frontal gyrus contributed to color vividness, and trial-specific reinstatement in posterior inferior temporal gyrus (including the color area), to color precision. Finally, color name richness (the number of names associated with a particular color) enhanced color memory precision and modulated trial-specific color reinstatement in right anterior inferior temporal gyrus. Together, these findings suggest that perceptual and linguistic reinstatement play complementary roles in visual episodic memory: perceptual replay provides fine-grained sensory details, whereas linguistic replay can scaffold and refine these representations, especially for features that are easier to verbalize such as colors. Significance Statement: Neural reinstatement has been associated with the quality of episodic memory for complex visual images. However, it remains unclear how neural reinstatement varies across perceptual features, memory subjectivity, and linguistic accessibility. Here, we examine how neural reinstatement supports memory for color and location, whether it plays different roles in memory vividness versus precision, and the role of language in color memory. We showed that location memory relies primarily on trial-specific reinstatement in early visual cortex, supporting precise and vivid recall, whereas color memory is supported by a more complex and complementary interplay between perceptual and linguistic reinstatement. Together, these results advance our understanding of how distinct reinstatement mechanisms support the precision and vividness of episodic memory for basic visual features.
- Open Access
- 8 September 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Acta Psychologica
- Vol. 260, 105498
Expressing experiences: Sensorimotor activations and interoceptive sensibility influence which words we choose when speaking
- 8 September 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Acta Psychologica
- Vol. 260, 105498
Open AccessExpressing experiences: Sensorimotor activations and interoceptive sensibility influence which words we choose when speaking
- 24 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 20-36
How Do You Perceive My Face? Recognizing Facial Expressions in Multi-modal Context by Modeling Mental Representations
- 24 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 20-36
How Do You Perceive My Face? Recognizing Facial Expressions in Multi-modal Context by Modeling Mental Representations
- Open Access
- 11 March 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience
- Vol. 20 (1)
Neural dynamics of mental state attribution to social robot faces
The interplay of mind attribution and emotional responses is considered crucial in shaping human trust and acceptance of social robots. Understanding this interplay can help us create the right conditions for successful human–robot social interaction in alignment with societal goals. Our study shows that affective information about robots describing positive, negative, or neutral behaviour leads participants (N = 90) to attribute mental states to robot faces, modulating impressions of trustworthiness, facial expression, and intentionality. Electroencephalography recordings from 30 participants revealed that affective information influenced specific processing stages in the brain associated with early face perception (N170 component) and more elaborate stimulus evaluation (late positive potential). However, a modulation of fast emotional brain responses, typically found for human faces (early posterior negativity), was not observed. These findings suggest that neural processing of robot faces alternates between being perceived as mindless machines and intentional agents: people rapidly attribute mental states during perception, literally seeing good or bad intentions in robot faces, but are emotionally less affected than when facing humans. These nuanced insights into the fundamental psychological and neural processes underlying mind attribution can enhance our understanding of human–robot social interactions and inform policies surrounding the moral responsibility of artificial agents.
- 11 March 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience
- Vol. 20 (1)
Open AccessNeural dynamics of mental state attribution to social robot faces
The interplay of mind attribution and emotional responses is considered crucial in shaping human trust and acceptance of social robots. Understanding this interplay can help us create the right conditions for successful human–robot social interaction in alignment with societal goals. Our study shows that affective information about robots describing positive, negative, or neutral behaviour leads participants (N = 90) to attribute mental states to robot faces, modulating impressions of trustworthiness, facial expression, and intentionality. Electroencephalography recordings from 30 participants revealed that affective information influenced specific processing stages in the brain associated with early face perception (N170 component) and more elaborate stimulus evaluation (late positive potential). However, a modulation of fast emotional brain responses, typically found for human faces (early posterior negativity), was not observed. These findings suggest that neural processing of robot faces alternates between being perceived as mindless machines and intentional agents: people rapidly attribute mental states during perception, literally seeing good or bad intentions in robot faces, but are emotionally less affected than when facing humans. These nuanced insights into the fundamental psychological and neural processes underlying mind attribution can enhance our understanding of human–robot social interactions and inform policies surrounding the moral responsibility of artificial agents.
- Open Access
- 3 March 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Neural Dynamics of Mental State Attribution to Social Robot Faces
The interplay of mind attribution and emotional responses is considered crucial in shaping human trust and acceptance of social robots. Understanding this interplay can help us create the right conditions for successful human-robot social interaction in alignment with societal goals. Our study shows that affective information about robots describing positive, negative or neutral behavior leads participants (N=90) to attribute mental states to robot faces, modulating impressions of trustworthiness, facial expression and intentionality. EEG recordings from 30 participants revealed that affective information influenced specific processing stages in the brain associated with early face perception (N170 component) and more elaborate stimulus evaluation (late positive potential, LPP). However, a modulation of fast emotional brain responses, typically found for human faces (early posterior negativity, EPN), was not observed. These findings suggest that neural processing of robot faces alternates between being perceived as mindless machines and intentional agents: people rapidly attribute mental states during perception, literally seeing good or bad intentions in robot faces, but are emotionally less affected than when facing humans. These nuanced insights into the fundamental psychological and neural processes underlying mind attribution can enhance our understanding of human-robot social interactions and inform policies surrounding the moral responsibility of artificial agents.
- 3 March 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessNeural Dynamics of Mental State Attribution to Social Robot Faces
The interplay of mind attribution and emotional responses is considered crucial in shaping human trust and acceptance of social robots. Understanding this interplay can help us create the right conditions for successful human-robot social interaction in alignment with societal goals. Our study shows that affective information about robots describing positive, negative or neutral behavior leads participants (N=90) to attribute mental states to robot faces, modulating impressions of trustworthiness, facial expression and intentionality. EEG recordings from 30 participants revealed that affective information influenced specific processing stages in the brain associated with early face perception (N170 component) and more elaborate stimulus evaluation (late positive potential, LPP). However, a modulation of fast emotional brain responses, typically found for human faces (early posterior negativity, EPN), was not observed. These findings suggest that neural processing of robot faces alternates between being perceived as mindless machines and intentional agents: people rapidly attribute mental states during perception, literally seeing good or bad intentions in robot faces, but are emotionally less affected than when facing humans. These nuanced insights into the fundamental psychological and neural processes underlying mind attribution can enhance our understanding of human-robot social interactions and inform policies surrounding the moral responsibility of artificial agents.
- Open Access
- 17 October 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience
- Vol. 20 (1)
A beautiful face is good when we’re judged by others, a moral character is better
Moral beauty, reflected in one’s actions, and facial beauty both affect how we are judged. Here, we investigated how moral and facial beauty interact to affect social judgments and emotional responses, employing event-related brain potentials (ERPs). All participants (female) associated positive, neutral, or negative verbal information with faces scoring high or low on attractiveness and performed ratings of the faces as manipulation checks. In a separate test phase, the faces were presented again, and participants made valenced social judgments of the persons. Results show a dominance of moral beauty in valenced social judgments as well as ERPs related to reflexive and evaluative emotional responses (early posterior negativity and late positive potential), whereas facial attractiveness mattered little. In contrast, facial attractiveness affected visual processing (N170). Similarly, relatively shallow impressions of attractiveness and likability that require no knowledge about the person were influenced by both facial attractiveness and social-emotional information. This pattern of dominant effects of social-emotional information regardless of attractiveness shows that when it comes to our emotional responses and social judgments, moral beauty is what matters most, even in the face of physical beauty.
- 17 October 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience
- Vol. 20 (1)
Open AccessA beautiful face is good when we’re judged by others, a moral character is better
Moral beauty, reflected in one’s actions, and facial beauty both affect how we are judged. Here, we investigated how moral and facial beauty interact to affect social judgments and emotional responses, employing event-related brain potentials (ERPs). All participants (female) associated positive, neutral, or negative verbal information with faces scoring high or low on attractiveness and performed ratings of the faces as manipulation checks. In a separate test phase, the faces were presented again, and participants made valenced social judgments of the persons. Results show a dominance of moral beauty in valenced social judgments as well as ERPs related to reflexive and evaluative emotional responses (early posterior negativity and late positive potential), whereas facial attractiveness mattered little. In contrast, facial attractiveness affected visual processing (N170). Similarly, relatively shallow impressions of attractiveness and likability that require no knowledge about the person were influenced by both facial attractiveness and social-emotional information. This pattern of dominant effects of social-emotional information regardless of attractiveness shows that when it comes to our emotional responses and social judgments, moral beauty is what matters most, even in the face of physical beauty.
- Open Access
- 2 July 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Effects of Moral-Emotional Behavior and Intentionality on Mind Attribution and Evaluation of Social Robots
Robots are generally not considered full moral agents and therefore not appropriate loci of moral responsibility; however, research suggests that people may attribute mental capacities associated with moral agency as well as moral responsibility to robots. We investigate the extent to which descriptions of social robots as minded agents or mechanical machines differentially impact moral judgments of robots’ morally and emotionally relevant actions. In two experiments we considered cognitive and emotional aspects of moral judgments: mind attribution and moral evaluations as well as people’s emotional response, a key component in accounts of moral responsibility. Participants (N = 82) read and subsequently rated 42 stories about robots’ actions, which differed in level of intentionality and moral-emotional quality of information. Although minded as opposed to mechanical descriptions positively influenced mind attribution and attributed moral responsibility, participants’ emotional response and moral evaluations were largely dominated by the moral-emotional content of information. In addition, the presentation of an image alongside information negatively affected the influence of minded descriptions of robots on mind attribution. Our findings demonstrate that robots are ascribed moral responsibility even though by current theoretical accounts they are not suitable moral agents. Robots that are described as minded are furthermore attributed greater agency and moral responsibility. We discuss the impact of our findings for theoretical discussions about the ethics of AI and robots.
- 2 July 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessEffects of Moral-Emotional Behavior and Intentionality on Mind Attribution and Evaluation of Social Robots
Robots are generally not considered full moral agents and therefore not appropriate loci of moral responsibility; however, research suggests that people may attribute mental capacities associated with moral agency as well as moral responsibility to robots. We investigate the extent to which descriptions of social robots as minded agents or mechanical machines differentially impact moral judgments of robots’ morally and emotionally relevant actions. In two experiments we considered cognitive and emotional aspects of moral judgments: mind attribution and moral evaluations as well as people’s emotional response, a key component in accounts of moral responsibility. Participants (N = 82) read and subsequently rated 42 stories about robots’ actions, which differed in level of intentionality and moral-emotional quality of information. Although minded as opposed to mechanical descriptions positively influenced mind attribution and attributed moral responsibility, participants’ emotional response and moral evaluations were largely dominated by the moral-emotional content of information. In addition, the presentation of an image alongside information negatively affected the influence of minded descriptions of robots on mind attribution. Our findings demonstrate that robots are ascribed moral responsibility even though by current theoretical accounts they are not suitable moral agents. Robots that are described as minded are furthermore attributed greater agency and moral responsibility. We discuss the impact of our findings for theoretical discussions about the ethics of AI and robots.