JCJianqing Chen

Jianqing Chen

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Jianqing Chen has a total of 27 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Helping Oneself by Helping a Rival: Social-Media Platforms’ Policies on Enabling Features for Influencers

    by Yan Zhu, Jianqing Chen, Srinivasan Raghunathan

    Social-media platforms and influencers are often seen as collaborators. However, both rely primarily on advertising services, introducing a competitive dimension to their relationship. As the dominant players in this relationship, platforms have used design features, which they control, to manage this dynamic. Some platforms have adopted an antagonistic approach by disabling certain features (e.g., clickable shopping-related hyperlinks) for influencers, while others take a more cooperative stance, allowing influencers to use these features for free or for a fee. We develop a game-theoretic model to explore the competition between the two parties and study the platform’s decision to enable or disable a feature that enhances the effectiveness of an influencer’s service. We show that even when the platform cannot charge the influencers for using the feature, it can still benefit if the advertisers’ valuation of the platform’s service is not significantly lower than that of the influencer’s service. While enabling the feature may result in a loss of market share, the platform can potentially offset this loss by raising its prices. A win–win situation for the platform and the influencer may come at the expense of some advertisers, suggesting the platform’s helping the influencer can lead to a “collusive” outcome, despite the competition for advertisers. If the platform can charge a fee for using the feature, it should always enable the feature at an appropriate fee, as this will benefit the platform. The additional fee revenue may come with no change in the platform’s advertising revenue, with an increase in the advertising revenue, or at the expense of some advertising revenue. The platform strategically uses the fee to influence the influencer’s service offering, which affects the platform’s revenue mix under the new business model.

  • Buy Online, Pick Up, or Deliver from Store: Why Would an Online Retail Platform with Third-Party Sellers Offer It?

    by Ping Tang, Jianqing Chen, Srinivasan Raghunathan

    Digital technologies are enabling online retail platforms to connect consumers not only to sellers’ online offerings but also to sellers’ physical stores through options such as local pickup and store-based delivery, which we refer to as local selling. This study examines why a platform would adopt such a strategy even when it gives up fulfillment-related revenue. We show that local selling can still increase platform profits by raising sales commission revenue. By allowing some consumers to pick up orders locally, the platform reveals geographic differences among consumers that traditional online fulfillment masks. This can soften price competition between sellers, increase prices, and benefit both the platform and sellers. Consumers, however, do not necessarily benefit, even when they are offered more fulfillment options. The findings suggest that local selling is not merely a service innovation that improves convenience. It can also be a strategic tool that helps platforms manage seller competition and extract surplus. For practice, the results indicate that platforms should tailor local-selling strategies to product and market conditions rather than apply them uniformly. For policy, the study highlights that expanding consumer choice does not necessarily improve consumer welfare, and that platform innovations should also be evaluated based on their effects on competition, pricing, and surplus allocation.

  • Sponsored Tasks and Solver Participation in Crowdsourcing Contests

    by Jiahui Mo, Sumit Sarkar, Jianqing Chen

    Crowdsourcing platforms provide venues for firms looking for solutions (seekers) to interact with individuals who can provide solutions (solvers). As crowdsourcing contest platforms have grown in popularity, with numerous tasks being posted on a daily basis, a concern that has emerged is that many similar tasks compete for solver attention, with some tasks failing to attract sufficient solver participation. To alleviate this concern, in addition to regular task listings, many crowdsourcing platforms offer sponsorship programs under which seekers pay an extra fee for highlighting their tasks to draw solvers’ attention. We examine the effect of sponsorship on solver participation using a unique data set collected from a leading crowdsourcing platform. In contrast to platforms’ claims about the effect of sponsorship on participation, we find that sponsorship does not always boost participation in crowdsourcing contests; sponsorship increases the number of participants only when the task’s prize amount is already high. Furthermore, even when the number of participants increases, the increase comes primarily from low-ability solvers. We also find that when sponsorship increases the total number of submissions, it does so only by increasing the number of participants; sponsorship does not increase the number of submissions that individual solvers submit after joining a task. More granular analyses reveal an effect of anticipated increased competition caused by sponsorship on high-ability solvers that is not observed on those of low ability, explaining the difference in their participation decisions when facing sponsored tasks. We also find that the effect of sponsorship weakens over the duration of a task for high-ability solvers and is also weaker for solvers with more experience on the platform. History: Yong Tan, Senior Editor; Wenjing Duan, Associate Editor. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.2021.0246 .


  • Voluntary Technology Sharing to Rivals

    by Jianqing Chen, Weijun Zeng

    This study examines a firm’s incentive to share its proprietary technology to help a rival develop a new product. Whereas the rival’s product introduction increases competitive pressure on the firm, it also turns the rival into a multiproduct firm, raising cannibalization concerns that affect its pricing strategy. We find that the rival’s internal cannibalization may soften competition in the existing product market, creating a positive externality for the focal firm and, thus, motivating voluntary technology sharing. We characterize the conditions under which the firm benefits from sharing: generally, the firm is incentivized to share if the new product’s valuation is neither too high nor too low. A high valuation of the new product deters sharing because of excessive competition, whereas a low valuation fails to trigger cannibalization, eliminating the firm’s incentive to share. Our analysis further shows that new product introduction generally enhances social welfare except when the existing product has high valuation and the new product has relatively low valuation. Consumer surplus increases only when the existing product’s valuation is low. These findings offer guidance for policymakers, suggesting when favorable policies should be implemented to promote technology sharing in cases in which social welfare or consumer surplus is not maximized.


  • The Economics of Password Sharing

    by Jianqing Chen, Jianchao Sheng

    Password sharing is widespread across subscription-based industries, such as streaming services like Netflix. Although sharing reduces out-of-pocket costs for users, it also creates sharing-related burdens, such as privacy concerns and coordination hassles. We develop a game-theoretic model in which a firm serves two consumer segments—password sharers and nonsharers—to analyze how password sharing affects firm performance and consumer outcomes. Our results show that sharing enables groups of users to “self-bundle” by aggregating their valuations and subscribing through a single shared account. It also creates implicit price discrimination; sharers self-select between sharing and subscribing individually under a uniform price. These mechanisms can increase a firm’s revenue when sharing costs are low. In addition, password sharing reshapes the disparity between sharers and nonsharers. When nonsharers have sufficiently higher willingness to pay, the firm is even more likely to benefit from sharing. However, password sharing poses policy concerns. We find that it reduces social welfare and consumer surplus across a broad range of conditions—especially when sharing costs are moderate. Moreover, the firm’s profit-maximizing strategy, particularly when it chooses to accommodate sharing, often conflicts with what is best for consumers or society. These insights highlight the need for firms to carefully evaluate sharing policies and in some cases, for regulators to intervene to protect consumer welfare.

  • On-Demand, Long-Term, or Hybrid? An Economic Analysis of Optimal Rental Models on Sharing Platforms

    by Jianqing Chen, Nan Feng, Zhiling Guo, Wenyi Zhang

    This study examines three rental models—long-term, on-demand, and hybrid—in the sharing economy and evaluates their impacts on social welfare and consumer surplus. Our analysis reveals the significance of consumers’ setup and transaction costs in determining the optimal rental-model for platforms. We find that the relative setup cost and the relative transaction cost between owners and renters play a crucial role in shaping the equilibrium market price and optimality of the three rental models, whereas the total costs determine the equilibrium transaction volume and sustainability of the three models, with high costs posing barriers to the viability of on-demand and hybrid models. In practice, platforms can maximize consumer surplus by selecting an optimal rental model that narrows the gap in setup costs between renters and owners. Policymakers should implement favorable policies or subsidies to balance consumers’ participation incentives on both sides of the market, leading to mutually beneficial social outcomes.


  • Platform Loophole Exploitation, Recovery Measures, and User Engagement: A Quasi-Natural Experiment in Online Gaming

    by Jianqing Chen, Shu He, Xue Yang

    Online platforms often encounter the challenge of system vulnerabilities, such as bugs, which can be exploited by certain users for illicit gains. These platforms face a dilemma when devising countermeasures, particularly in deciding whether to penalize rule breakers. Different countermeasures can lead to varying economic impacts, including subsequent user engagement. In this study, based on unique field data from a prominent online gaming platform, we discovered that the occurrence of bugs has a negative effect on the online duration and consumption of observing players. Surprisingly, although the platform is responsible for the bugs, not penalizing rule breakers results in more substantial reductions in platform engagement among observing players compared with penalizing them. This effect is particularly pronounced for observers who are directly affected by rule violations. Our findings emphasize the essential role of the platform in fairly punishing rule breakers. To ensure the long-term prosperity of an online platform and the overall welfare of its participants, it is crucial for the platform to maintain high-quality system control and implement effective governance mechanisms for rule enforcement, thereby restoring justice and order to the online community.


  • When Sharing Economy Meets Traditional Business: Coopetition Between Ride-Sharing Platforms and Car-Rental Firms

    by Chenglong Zhang, Jianqing Chen, Srinivasan Raghunathan

    Coopetition has been a common practice, especially among emerging markets. The coopetition relationship between a ride-sharing platform and a car-rental firm is distinct in that they operate under two different business models. Although the platform controls both its demand and supply by setting rider prices and driver wages, the car-rental firm operates under the traditional model with a fixed supply and cost structure. Both the platform and car-rental firm compete for riders seeking transportation. If the two cooperate, a driver is allowed to rent from the rental firm and drive for the platform; otherwise, only those owning personal vehicles are allowed to drive for the platform. We show that such supply-side cooperation intensifies demand-side price competition and decreases total revenue. Therefore, coopetition is mutually beneficial only when it leads to a significant decrease in supply costs. We find that the two firms are likely to form a coopetition relationship when the total rider market size is not high, the degree of rider substitutability between the two firms is low, and the platform has a significant market-size advantage over the rental firm. Coopetition between the platform and the rental firm benefits riders and hurts drivers, but it benefits society overall.


  • Physical Stores as Warehouses for Online Channels: Implications for Channel Choices Under Competition

    by Ping Tang, Jianqing Chen, Srinivasan Raghunathan

    With the development of new technology and business innovation, firms are actively adjusting their channel choices. Some retailers operate a hybrid and special omnichannel structure referred to as New Retail promising to tightly integrate online and physical channels. In the meanwhile, some retailers such as Ross choose to only operate physical channels. In this paper, we provide insights into competing firms’ retail-channel choices among online channel, physical channel, and omnichannel under the New Retail model. We find that firms’ channel choices determine which channels compete directly with each other and hence the intensity of competition between firms. Firms’ channel choices also give rise to three other effects-market expansion, consumer segmentation, and intrafirm cannibalization. The tradeoff among these effects along with the nature and intensity of competition determine the equilibrium channel structure in the market.


  • Top Cited Papers

    Two-Sided Platform Competition in a Sharing Economy

    by Chenglong Zhang, Jianqing Chen, Srinivasan Raghunathan

    We examine competition between two-sided platforms in a sharing economy. In sharing economies, workers self-schedule their supply based on the wage they receive. The platforms compete for workers as well as consumers. To attract workers, platforms use diverse wage schemes, including fixed commission rate, dynamic commission rate, and fixed wage. We develop a model to examine the impacts of the self-scheduled nature of the supply on competing platforms and the role of the wage scheme in the platform competition. We find that the price competition between platforms is more intense in a sharing economy compared with an economy with a fixed supply of workers if and only if the platforms serve more consumers and workers in the sharing economy than in the traditional economy, regardless of the wage scheme employed by the platforms. Further, any of the three wage schemes can be the best for the platforms and the worst for consumers and workers, depending on the market characteristics. In markets where the competition is more fierce on the demand side than on the supply side, the fixed-wage scheme results in the highest profits for the platforms and lowest surpluses for consumers and workers. In contrast, in markets where the competition on the supply side is more competitive, when the supply is highly (mildly) more competitive, the fixed-commission-rate (dynamic-commission-rate) scheme generates the highest profits for platforms, leading to the lowest surpluses for consumers and workers and the lowest social welfare. The differential impacts of the wage scheme on the price (demand side) and quantity (supply side) competition explain our findings. This paper was accepted by Kartik Hosanagar, information systems. Supplemental Material: The e-companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4302 .