Philip Andrews-Speed

The International Atomic Energy Agency asserts that the regulation of the safety of civil nuclear power requires national regulatory agencies to be effectively independent. However, in the early years of national civil nuclear power programs national nuclear industries were dominated by iron triangles or subgovernments of powerful actors with an interest in promoting the industry. The creation of an independent safety regulator requires a radical restructuring of the national governance framework. Windows of opportunity or critical junctures for such reform occur only occasionally. This paper examines the cases of France, Japan, and India to identify the factors that determine the degree of success in attempts to break the power of nuclear iron triangles or subgovernments and create an effectively independent regulator. This analysis shows a serious nuclear accident can create the opportunity to dismantle an iron triangle. The extent and speed with which reforms can be implemented depend greatly on pre‐existing and prevailing conditions. Key determinants include the power structures and attitudes toward nuclear power in elite politics, the degree of engagement of civil society, and pressures from international organizations. Of these, the first, elite politics, appears to be the most important in these three cases.

France’s civil nuclear power industry emerged from the earlier military nuclear programme as a programme owned and controlled by the state. This was in line with the nation’s longstanding style of economic and industrial governance. Such an approach had the advantage that the capacity of nuclear power grew rapidly, with generous funding and close coordination by the state. During the 1980s and 1990s, the nuclear power industry succeeding in resisting broader moves to reduce the role of the state in French industry. Links between the government, the regulator and the industry remained close, aided by longstanding informal networks between key individuals. The first decade of the 2000s saw the start of significant reform of the nuclear regulatory infrastructure. However, by this time the disadvantages of long-term state control of the nuclear industry were becoming increasingly apparent. These included deficiencies in policy making, industry regulation and corporate management which have brought France’s nuclear industry to a crisis. This analysis applies institutional theory to show how the nation’s longstanding approach to economic and industrial governance has shaped the development of its nuclear industry and thus provides a salutary example for other countries pursuing a similar path.

Purpose: This paper aims to identify the factors that are constraining technological innovation to support the development of coalbed methane in China. Design/methodology/approach: The analysis applies ideas relating to national and sector systems of innovation to explain why China’s strategies to support research and technological innovation have failed to stimulate the desired progress in coalbed methane production. It also provides a counter-example of the USA that implemented a number of measures in the 1970s that proved very effective. Findings: The deficiencies of China’s research and development strategies in support of coalbed methane development reflect the national and sectoral systems of innovation. They are exacerbated by the structure of the national oil and gas industry. Key constraints include the excessively top-down management of the national R&D agenda, insufficient support for basic research, limited collaboration networks between companies, research institutes and universities and weak mechanisms for diffusion of knowledge. The success of the USA was based on entirely different systems for innovation and in quite a different industrial setting. Originality/value: The originality of this analysis lies in placing the challenges facing research and innovation for China’s coalbed methane development in the context of the national and sectoral systems for innovation and comparing with the approach and success of the USA.

Several international norms oblige governments of countries planning to build nuclear installations to proactively consult potentially affected countries in a timely manner. These norms arise from customary international law, the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS), the guidelines of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and regional treaties and international environmental law. This study has examined 15 examples to assess (i) the extent to which such consultation has taken place and (ii) the effectiveness of measures taken by potentially affected countries in those cases where prior consultation had not taken place. Examples range in vintage from the 1960s to the present day and include both newbuild and newcomer countries. In only 3 of these 15 cases, prior consultation had taken place and all the involved nations had good bilateral relations and/or common interests in the project. Nevertheless, disputes arose later in two of these cases. In the other examples, the degree of success of the potentially affected state in changing the behaviour of the newbuild or newcomer state depended on a number of factors; for example, the state of bilateral relations, the availability of a regional organization to resolve the dispute, the validity of the arguments of both parties and the goodwill of the newbuild or newcomer state. Whilst the CNS and the actions of the IAEA have raised nuclear safety standards substantially over recent decades, the unwillingness of most nations to adhere to the obligation to consult would seem to be a significant weakness.

Official Japanese reports into the causes of the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident identified significant weaknesses in the country's structures and systems for governing nuclear safety. As a result, the government undertook a number of legal and structural reforms. One of the most important was to establish a Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) in 2012 and grant it a high degree of independence and authority. Despite scepticism at the time over the likely effectiveness of this new agency, the NRA has taken a robust approach to permitting restarts after all nuclear reactors were shut down following the accident. This style of safety regulation owes much to the personality of the NRA Chairman and has been criticised as being unpredictable and overly strict. In late 2019, only 8 GWe of capacity was operating out of a pre-accident total of 48 GWe. As a result, the current government's preference that nuclear power provide a significant, though gradually declining share of the energy mix is under threat. In institutional terminology, Japan's nuclear power industry is at a juncture that could become critical, but the outcome is unpredictable at present. The rapid demise of the nuclear industry is quite possible, but a range of political and economic interests may prevent this. Much will depend on the actions of the next government.