Eugene Soltes
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Eugene Soltes has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Christian Leuz
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
2 shared publications - Maximilian Muhn
Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois 60637
2 shared publications - Steffen Meyer
Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University, 8000 Aarhus, Denmark; and Danish Finance Institute, 2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
2 shared publications Alexandra Scherf
Harvard University
1 shared publication- Amir Amel-Zadeh
Said Business School, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
1 shared publication Andreas Hackethal
Goethe University Frankfurt, 60323 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 14 November 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (8) , 6603-6631
Who Falls Prey to the Wolf of Wall Street? Investor Participation in Market Manipulation
Price distortions created by so-called “pump-and-dump” schemes are well documented, but relatively little is known about the investors in these schemes. By examining 470 pump-and-dump schemes and a large data set of trading records for over 110,000 individual investors from a major German bank, we provide comprehensive evidence on the participation rate, the magnitude of the investments, the losses, and the characteristics of the individuals who invest in such schemes. Participation is quite common, with nearly 8% of active retail investors participating in at least one pump-and-dump losing on average nearly 30%. We identify several distinct types of participating investors, some of which (e.g., speculating day trader) should not be viewed as falling prey to the schemes. We also show that portfolio composition and past trading behavior better explain scheme participation than demographics. Last, we document longer-lasting effects on participating investors beyond their immediate financial losses. Our analysis highlights that an effective regulatory response to pump-and-dump schemes requires understanding who invests in such schemes and why, as, for instance, not all investors are likely to be dissuaded from investing by traditional regulatory disclosures. This paper was accepted by Eric So, accounting. Funding: This work was supported by the Clark Center for Global Markets at the University of Chicago and the Danish Finance Institute. Supplemental Material: The internet appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03181 .
- 14 November 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (8) , 6603-6631
Who Falls Prey to the Wolf of Wall Street? Investor Participation in Market Manipulation
Price distortions created by so-called “pump-and-dump” schemes are well documented, but relatively little is known about the investors in these schemes. By examining 470 pump-and-dump schemes and a large data set of trading records for over 110,000 individual investors from a major German bank, we provide comprehensive evidence on the participation rate, the magnitude of the investments, the losses, and the characteristics of the individuals who invest in such schemes. Participation is quite common, with nearly 8% of active retail investors participating in at least one pump-and-dump losing on average nearly 30%. We identify several distinct types of participating investors, some of which (e.g., speculating day trader) should not be viewed as falling prey to the schemes. We also show that portfolio composition and past trading behavior better explain scheme participation than demographics. Last, we document longer-lasting effects on participating investors beyond their immediate financial losses. Our analysis highlights that an effective regulatory response to pump-and-dump schemes requires understanding who invests in such schemes and why, as, for instance, not all investors are likely to be dissuaded from investing by traditional regulatory disclosures. This paper was accepted by Eric So, accounting. Funding: This work was supported by the Clark Center for Global Markets at the University of Chicago and the Danish Finance Institute. Supplemental Material: The internet appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03181 .
- 28 February 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 137-152
Measuring Compliance Risk and the Emergence of Analytics
Measuring Compliance - February 2022
- 28 February 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 137-152
Measuring Compliance Risk and the Emergence of Analytics
Measuring Compliance - February 2022
- Open Access
- 7 June 2021
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
- Vol. 18 (2) , 287-327
Is “Not Guilty” the Same as “Innocent”? Evidence from SEC Financial Fraud Investigations
When the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigates firms for financial fraud, investors learn about the investigation only if managers disclose it, or regulators sanction the firm. We investigate the effects of such disclosures using confidential records on all investigations, regardless of outcome. Even when no charges are brought, firms that voluntarily disclose an investigation underperform non‐disclosing firms by 11.7 percent over the following year. Disclosure is associated with a higher chance of shareholder class action lawsuits, and more prominent disclosures are associated with worse returns. CEOs who disclose an investigation are 14 percent more likely to experience turnover. Our results are consistent with transparency about bad news being punished by financial and labor markets.
- 7 June 2021
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
- Vol. 18 (2) , 287-327
Open AccessIs “Not Guilty” the Same as “Innocent”? Evidence from SEC Financial Fraud Investigations
When the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigates firms for financial fraud, investors learn about the investigation only if managers disclose it, or regulators sanction the firm. We investigate the effects of such disclosures using confidential records on all investigations, regardless of outcome. Even when no charges are brought, firms that voluntarily disclose an investigation underperform non‐disclosing firms by 11.7 percent over the following year. Disclosure is associated with a higher chance of shareholder class action lawsuits, and more prominent disclosures are associated with worse returns. CEOs who disclose an investigation are 14 percent more likely to experience turnover. Our results are consistent with transparency about bad news being punished by financial and labor markets.
- 10 April 2020
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Accounting Research
- Vol. 58 (2) , 429-472
Paper Versus Practice: A Field Investigation of Integrity Hotlines
- 10 April 2020
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Accounting Research
- Vol. 58 (2) , 429-472
Paper Versus Practice: A Field Investigation of Integrity Hotlines
- 1 September 2019
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Financial Reporting
- Vol. 4 (2) , 1-31
Creating Firm Disclosures
Managers expend significant time and effort preparing disclosures about firm performance and strategy. Although prior literature has explored how variation in the style and presentation of disclosures impacts investors' perceptions of firms, little is known about how firms actually create these disclosures and how this process impacts presentation. Based on field data collected from nearly 200 firms, we show that there is considerable variation in who prepares disclosures, when they are prepared, and the amount of effort expended by different types of managers (e.g., legal, public relations/marketing, finance, investor relations, senior leadership). We find that these differences in organizational processes are associated with differences in the structure, style, and tone of 10-Ks and conference calls. Ultimately, our investigation begins to illuminate how individual managerial efforts vary across firms and contribute to differences in public disclosures.
- 1 September 2019
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Financial Reporting
- Vol. 4 (2) , 1-31
Creating Firm Disclosures
Managers expend significant time and effort preparing disclosures about firm performance and strategy. Although prior literature has explored how variation in the style and presentation of disclosures impacts investors' perceptions of firms, little is known about how firms actually create these disclosures and how this process impacts presentation. Based on field data collected from nearly 200 firms, we show that there is considerable variation in who prepares disclosures, when they are prepared, and the amount of effort expended by different types of managers (e.g., legal, public relations/marketing, finance, investor relations, senior leadership). We find that these differences in organizational processes are associated with differences in the structure, style, and tone of 10-Ks and conference calls. Ultimately, our investigation begins to illuminate how individual managerial efforts vary across firms and contribute to differences in public disclosures.
- Open Access
- 15 April 2019
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Who Falls Prey to the Wolf of Wall Street? Investor Participation in Market Manipulation
Price distortions created by so-called “pump-and-dump” schemes are well known, but relatively little is known about the investors in these frauds. By examining 470 “pump-and-dump” schemes and a large data set of trading records for over 110,000 individual investors from a major German bank, we provide comprehensive evidence on the participation rate, magnitude of the investments, the losses, and the characteristics of the individuals who invest in such schemes. Participation is quite common with nearly 8% of active retail investors participating in at least one “pump-and-dump” losing on average nearly 30%. Next, we identify several distinct types among participating investors, some of which (i.e., speculating day trader) should not be viewed as falling prey to the schemes. Recognizing this heterogeneity is key when designing investor protections because we find investor types respond differently to market manipulation. We also show that portfolio composition and past trading behavior better explain scheme participation than demographics. Lastly, we document longer lasting effects on participating investors that go beyond the immediate financial losses.
- 15 April 2019
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Open AccessWho Falls Prey to the Wolf of Wall Street? Investor Participation in Market Manipulation
Price distortions created by so-called “pump-and-dump” schemes are well known, but relatively little is known about the investors in these frauds. By examining 470 “pump-and-dump” schemes and a large data set of trading records for over 110,000 individual investors from a major German bank, we provide comprehensive evidence on the participation rate, magnitude of the investments, the losses, and the characteristics of the individuals who invest in such schemes. Participation is quite common with nearly 8% of active retail investors participating in at least one “pump-and-dump” losing on average nearly 30%. Next, we identify several distinct types among participating investors, some of which (i.e., speculating day trader) should not be viewed as falling prey to the schemes. Recognizing this heterogeneity is key when designing investor protections because we find investor types respond differently to market manipulation. We also show that portfolio composition and past trading behavior better explain scheme participation than demographics. Lastly, we document longer lasting effects on participating investors that go beyond the immediate financial losses.
- 1 August 2018
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 94 (3) , 205-231
Who Consumes Firm Disclosures? Evidence from Earnings Conference Calls
Using a set of proprietary records, we examine who consumes quarterly earnings conference calls and under which circumstances the calls are consumed. While there is significant interest in calls by institutional investors and sell-side analysts, we find that investors who do not hold a position in the firm are a leading consumer. We show that buy-side non-holders who consume calls are more likely to hold positions in competitors and to purchase the stock in the future. In addition, many investors who hold large positions only consume calls periodically. We also document a benefit of consuming calls by finding that the consumption of calls is associated with more informed trading decisions. Overall, our investigation illuminates the actual consumption of conference calls by different consumers and the potential benefits of consuming additional firm disclosures.
- 1 August 2018
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 94 (3) , 205-231
Who Consumes Firm Disclosures? Evidence from Earnings Conference Calls
Using a set of proprietary records, we examine who consumes quarterly earnings conference calls and under which circumstances the calls are consumed. While there is significant interest in calls by institutional investors and sell-side analysts, we find that investors who do not hold a position in the firm are a leading consumer. We show that buy-side non-holders who consume calls are more likely to hold positions in competitors and to purchase the stock in the future. In addition, many investors who hold large positions only consume calls periodically. We also document a benefit of consuming calls by finding that the consumption of calls is associated with more informed trading decisions. Overall, our investigation illuminates the actual consumption of conference calls by different consumers and the potential benefits of consuming additional firm disclosures.
- 17 March 2017
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Management Education
- Vol. 41 (4) , 455-468
Teaching Versus Living: Managerial Decision Making in the Gray
Preparing students for the consequential ethical decisions that they will face in their careers is among the most difficult tasks of management education. I describe some of these challenges based on my book Why They Do It: Inside the Mind of the White-Collar Criminal and recent work in behavioral ethics. I explore why some decisions are much more easily resolved in the classroom than in practice and offer three ways to more effectively prepare students: integrating ethical decision making with core-discipline teaching, cultivating moral humility rather than moral confidence, and creating opportunities for norm reinforcement.
- 17 March 2017
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Management Education
- Vol. 41 (4) , 455-468
Teaching Versus Living: Managerial Decision Making in the Gray
Preparing students for the consequential ethical decisions that they will face in their careers is among the most difficult tasks of management education. I describe some of these challenges based on my book Why They Do It: Inside the Mind of the White-Collar Criminal and recent work in behavioral ethics. I explore why some decisions are much more easily resolved in the classroom than in practice and offer three ways to more effectively prepare students: integrating ethical decision making with core-discipline teaching, cultivating moral humility rather than moral confidence, and creating opportunities for norm reinforcement.
- Top Cited Papers
- 14 March 2016
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Accounting Research
- Vol. 54 (2) , 341-395
Gathering Data for Archival, Field, Survey, and Experimental Accounting Research
In the published proceedings of the first Journal of Accounting Research Conference, Vatter [1966] lamented that “Gathering direct and original facts is a tedious and difficult task, and it is not surprising that such work is avoided.” For the fiftieth JAR Conference, we introduce a framework to help researchers understand the complementary value of seven empirical methods that gather data in different ways: prestructured archives, unstructured (“hand‐collected”) archives, field studies, field experiments, surveys, laboratory studies, and laboratory experiments. The framework spells out five goals of an empirical literature and defines the seven methods according to researchers’ choices with respect to five data gathering tasks. We use the framework and examples of successful research studies in the financial reporting literature to clarify how data gathering choices affect a study's ability to achieve its goals, and conclude by showing how the complementary nature of different methods allows researchers to build a literature more effectively than they could with less diverse approaches to gathering data.
- 14 March 2016
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Accounting Research
- Vol. 54 (2) , 341-395
Top Cited PapersGathering Data for Archival, Field, Survey, and Experimental Accounting Research
In the published proceedings of the first Journal of Accounting Research Conference, Vatter [1966] lamented that “Gathering direct and original facts is a tedious and difficult task, and it is not surprising that such work is avoided.” For the fiftieth JAR Conference, we introduce a framework to help researchers understand the complementary value of seven empirical methods that gather data in different ways: prestructured archives, unstructured (“hand‐collected”) archives, field studies, field experiments, surveys, laboratory studies, and laboratory experiments. The framework spells out five goals of an empirical literature and defines the seven methods according to researchers’ choices with respect to five data gathering tasks. We use the framework and examples of successful research studies in the financial reporting literature to clarify how data gathering choices affect a study's ability to achieve its goals, and conclude by showing how the complementary nature of different methods allows researchers to build a literature more effectively than they could with less diverse approaches to gathering data.
- 25 September 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 16 (1) , 1-28
What do dividends tell us about earnings quality?
- 25 September 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 16 (1) , 1-28
What do dividends tell us about earnings quality?