Vincent Man
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Vincent Man has a total of 58 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- John P. O'DOherty
Division of Humanities & Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA, USA
5 shared publications - William Andrew Cunningham
University of Toronto, Department of Psychology
4 shared publications - Buddhika Bellana
Department of Psychology, Glendon College, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada
3 shared publications - Christopher K. Kovach
University of Nebraska Medical Center, Omaha, NE, USA
2 shared publications - Cooper D. Grossman
Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA, USA
2 shared publications - Hiroyuki Oya
Department of Neurosurgery, University of Iowa
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
The neural computations underlying context dependent attribute-based valuation of complex stimuli
Adaptive decision making requires value computations to be flexible because we often need to value a stimulus differently as the context changes. A stimulus might be highly desirable in one context but completely unappealing in another. However, it is not known how the brain can support such flexible modulation of overall stimulus value. Here we test a model of flexible value construction whereby individual attributes of a stimulus are converted into contextually dependent attribute-specific value representations before being combined into an overall integrated stimulus value. To test this framework, human participants (online n=95, MRI n=35) provided ratings for 75 unique high-dimensional clothing stimuli under three instructed ‘goal-contexts’ designed to elicit differences in overall value judgments for the items. Integrated value ratings for each stimulus were found to be goal-context dependent, while individual stimulus-attributes varied markedly in how they contributed to value ratings across goal contexts. In the fMRI data, representations of the absolute levels of particular attributes were revealed in visual areas. In contrast, encoding of individual attributes in value space, alongside integrated overall stimulus value, was present within distinct regions of prefrontal cortex. More specifically, behaviorally relevant attributes in value space and integrated stimulus value were found in vmPFC and dmPFC respectively. These findings indicate that the construction of value for high-dimensional stimuli is achieved through the computation of goal-context-dependent attributes in value space, providing mechanistic insight into how the brain can flexibly modulate stimulus-values as context changes.
Open AccessThe neural computations underlying context dependent attribute-based valuation of complex stimuli
Adaptive decision making requires value computations to be flexible because we often need to value a stimulus differently as the context changes. A stimulus might be highly desirable in one context but completely unappealing in another. However, it is not known how the brain can support such flexible modulation of overall stimulus value. Here we test a model of flexible value construction whereby individual attributes of a stimulus are converted into contextually dependent attribute-specific value representations before being combined into an overall integrated stimulus value. To test this framework, human participants (online n=95, MRI n=35) provided ratings for 75 unique high-dimensional clothing stimuli under three instructed ‘goal-contexts’ designed to elicit differences in overall value judgments for the items. Integrated value ratings for each stimulus were found to be goal-context dependent, while individual stimulus-attributes varied markedly in how they contributed to value ratings across goal contexts. In the fMRI data, representations of the absolute levels of particular attributes were revealed in visual areas. In contrast, encoding of individual attributes in value space, alongside integrated overall stimulus value, was present within distinct regions of prefrontal cortex. More specifically, behaviorally relevant attributes in value space and integrated stimulus value were found in vmPFC and dmPFC respectively. These findings indicate that the construction of value for high-dimensional stimuli is achieved through the computation of goal-context-dependent attributes in value space, providing mechanistic insight into how the brain can flexibly modulate stimulus-values as context changes.
- Open Access
The representation and valuation of subgoals in the human brain during model-based hierarchical behavior
The human capacity to plan and perform long, complex sequences of behavior to achieve distant goals depends in part on a hierarchical organization that divides behavior into structured segments. Such a mechanism requires the internal designation of certain states as subgoals to mark the successful implementation of a behavioral segment. How the brain represents subgoals over time and computes decision values as a function of subgoals is unknown. While most characterizations of hierarchical behavior lack knowledge of the environment, human decision-making also relies on planning with an internal model of the world. Consequently, it remains to be determined how the brain computes values of subgoals using model-based planning in order to drive hierarchical, model-based decisions. Using a sequential-subgoal decision-making task designed to evoke hierarchical, model-based behavior in combination with fMRI, we decoded a representation of the current subgoal in insula and ventromedial prefrontal cortex during decision-making that persisted over time–a critical, latent representation for computing values and orienting behavior in the correct sequence. Using a model-based, hierarchical reinforcement learning model, we also found key decision signals based on values from the model in several regions of frontal cortex. These findings thereby shed light on the neural correlates of subgoal representation and illustrate how value signals can be computed on the basis of these subgoals and knowledge of the environment structure.
Open AccessThe representation and valuation of subgoals in the human brain during model-based hierarchical behavior
The human capacity to plan and perform long, complex sequences of behavior to achieve distant goals depends in part on a hierarchical organization that divides behavior into structured segments. Such a mechanism requires the internal designation of certain states as subgoals to mark the successful implementation of a behavioral segment. How the brain represents subgoals over time and computes decision values as a function of subgoals is unknown. While most characterizations of hierarchical behavior lack knowledge of the environment, human decision-making also relies on planning with an internal model of the world. Consequently, it remains to be determined how the brain computes values of subgoals using model-based planning in order to drive hierarchical, model-based decisions. Using a sequential-subgoal decision-making task designed to evoke hierarchical, model-based behavior in combination with fMRI, we decoded a representation of the current subgoal in insula and ventromedial prefrontal cortex during decision-making that persisted over time–a critical, latent representation for computing values and orienting behavior in the correct sequence. Using a model-based, hierarchical reinforcement learning model, we also found key decision signals based on values from the model in several regions of frontal cortex. These findings thereby shed light on the neural correlates of subgoal representation and illustrate how value signals can be computed on the basis of these subgoals and knowledge of the environment structure.
- Open Access
- 13 March 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
The Neural Basis of Habit Formation Measured in Goal-Directed Response Switching
To override ongoing habitual responses requires switching well-learned actions with new goal-directed processing. However, the neural circuits responsible for these processes remain unclear. This study infers habit strength by introducing a novel task capturing the increased cost associated with switching a habitual response. We employed neuroimaging and brain stimulation to examine the dynamic interactions between human brain regions involved in habits and their interference with ongoing incompatible goal-directed behavior. Training S-R links in overtrained stimuli (compared to less trained ones, termed standard-trained stimuli) increased RT switch costs, explained by drift diffusion computations governing both the training and outcome devaluation phases. Training engaged sensorimotor areas and the posterior putamen, whereas standard trained behaviors, recruited the posterior caudate, insula, and prefrontal regions. A cortical network orchestrated habit expression (right S1 with the left anterior insula/prefrontal areas) while also implicating basal ganglia when overriding habits (left premotor with the putamen). Importantly, stimulation of the left premotor played a causal role in habit control, enhancing performance across both the training and devaluation phases. Our findings reveal an interaction between habitual and goal-directed brain regions, highlighting shared neural dynamics when overriding habitual behaviors.
- 13 March 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessThe Neural Basis of Habit Formation Measured in Goal-Directed Response Switching
To override ongoing habitual responses requires switching well-learned actions with new goal-directed processing. However, the neural circuits responsible for these processes remain unclear. This study infers habit strength by introducing a novel task capturing the increased cost associated with switching a habitual response. We employed neuroimaging and brain stimulation to examine the dynamic interactions between human brain regions involved in habits and their interference with ongoing incompatible goal-directed behavior. Training S-R links in overtrained stimuli (compared to less trained ones, termed standard-trained stimuli) increased RT switch costs, explained by drift diffusion computations governing both the training and outcome devaluation phases. Training engaged sensorimotor areas and the posterior putamen, whereas standard trained behaviors, recruited the posterior caudate, insula, and prefrontal regions. A cortical network orchestrated habit expression (right S1 with the left anterior insula/prefrontal areas) while also implicating basal ganglia when overriding habits (left premotor with the putamen). Importantly, stimulation of the left premotor played a causal role in habit control, enhancing performance across both the training and devaluation phases. Our findings reveal an interaction between habitual and goal-directed brain regions, highlighting shared neural dynamics when overriding habitual behaviors.
- Open Access
- 9 March 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Communications
- Vol. 15 (1) , 1-16
Temporally organized representations of reward and risk in the human brain
The value and uncertainty associated with choice alternatives constitute critical features relevant for decisions. However, the manner in which reward and risk representations are temporally organized in the brain remains elusive. Here we leverage the spatiotemporal precision of intracranial electroencephalography, along with a simple card game designed to elicit the unfolding computation of a set of reward and risk variables, to uncover this temporal organization. Reward outcome representations across wide-spread regions follow a sequential order along the anteroposterior axis of the brain. In contrast, expected value can be decoded from multiple regions at the same time, and error signals in both reward and risk domains reflect a mixture of sequential and parallel encoding. We further highlight the role of the anterior insula in generalizing between reward prediction error and risk prediction error codes. Together our results emphasize the importance of neural dynamics for understanding value-based decisions under uncertainty.
- 9 March 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Communications
- Vol. 15 (1) , 1-16
Open AccessTemporally organized representations of reward and risk in the human brain
The value and uncertainty associated with choice alternatives constitute critical features relevant for decisions. However, the manner in which reward and risk representations are temporally organized in the brain remains elusive. Here we leverage the spatiotemporal precision of intracranial electroencephalography, along with a simple card game designed to elicit the unfolding computation of a set of reward and risk variables, to uncover this temporal organization. Reward outcome representations across wide-spread regions follow a sequential order along the anteroposterior axis of the brain. In contrast, expected value can be decoded from multiple regions at the same time, and error signals in both reward and risk domains reflect a mixture of sequential and parallel encoding. We further highlight the role of the anterior insula in generalizing between reward prediction error and risk prediction error codes. Together our results emphasize the importance of neural dynamics for understanding value-based decisions under uncertainty.
- 20 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 39-65
Reinforcement Learning
- Open Access
Temporally organized representations of reward and risk in the human brain
A bstract: The value and uncertainty associated with choice alternatives constitute critical features along which decisions are made. While the neural substrates supporting reward and risk processing have been investigated, the temporal organization by which these computations are encoded remains elusive. Here we leverage the high spatiotemporal precision of intracranial electroencephalography (iEEG) to uncover how representations of decision-related computations unfold in time. We present evidence of locally distributed representations of reward and risk variables that are temporally organized across multiple regions of interest. Reward outcome representations across wide-spread regions follow a temporally cascading order along the anteroposterior axis of the brain. In contrast, expected value can be decoded from multiple regions at the same time, and error signals in both reward and risk domains reflect a mixture of sequential and parallel encoding. We highlight the role of the anterior insula in generalizing between reward prediction error (RePE) and risk prediction error (RiPE), within which the encoding of RePE in the distributed iEEG signal predicts RiPE. Together our results emphasize the utility of uncovering temporal dynamics in the human brain for understanding how computational processes critical for value-based decisions under uncertainty unfold.
Open AccessTemporally organized representations of reward and risk in the human brain
A bstract: The value and uncertainty associated with choice alternatives constitute critical features along which decisions are made. While the neural substrates supporting reward and risk processing have been investigated, the temporal organization by which these computations are encoded remains elusive. Here we leverage the high spatiotemporal precision of intracranial electroencephalography (iEEG) to uncover how representations of decision-related computations unfold in time. We present evidence of locally distributed representations of reward and risk variables that are temporally organized across multiple regions of interest. Reward outcome representations across wide-spread regions follow a temporally cascading order along the anteroposterior axis of the brain. In contrast, expected value can be decoded from multiple regions at the same time, and error signals in both reward and risk domains reflect a mixture of sequential and parallel encoding. We highlight the role of the anterior insula in generalizing between reward prediction error (RePE) and risk prediction error (RiPE), within which the encoding of RePE in the distributed iEEG signal predicts RiPE. Together our results emphasize the utility of uncovering temporal dynamics in the human brain for understanding how computational processes critical for value-based decisions under uncertainty unfold.
- 21 November 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Social Neuroscience
- Vol. 16 (1) , 57-67
Multiple scales of valence processing in the brain
Psychological theories posit that affective experiences can be decomposed into component constituents, yet disagree on the level of representation of these components. Affective experiences have been previously described as emerging from core dimensions of valence and arousal. However, this view needs to be reconciled with accounts of valence processing in appetitive and aversive circuits from the neuroscience literature. Here we offer an account of affect that allows for both perspectives but compares across levels of analysis. At one level of analysis, valence and arousal are observed already in the properties of encountered stimuli and the appetitive and aversive neural circuits that engage accordingly. At another level of analysis, the explicit experiential aspect of affective processes are compressed and appraised in a manner that allows these experiences to be organised along valence and arousal axes. We review both the behavioural neuroscience evidence on appetitive and aversive circuits as well as the cognitive neuroscience literature on compression in information coding across multiple domains of processing. We argue that these processes are domain-general and adapt these principles to provide a perspective on how valence can be represented at multiple scales in the brain.
- 21 November 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Social Neuroscience
- Vol. 16 (1) , 57-67
Multiple scales of valence processing in the brain
Psychological theories posit that affective experiences can be decomposed into component constituents, yet disagree on the level of representation of these components. Affective experiences have been previously described as emerging from core dimensions of valence and arousal. However, this view needs to be reconciled with accounts of valence processing in appetitive and aversive circuits from the neuroscience literature. Here we offer an account of affect that allows for both perspectives but compares across levels of analysis. At one level of analysis, valence and arousal are observed already in the properties of encountered stimuli and the appetitive and aversive neural circuits that engage accordingly. At another level of analysis, the explicit experiential aspect of affective processes are compressed and appraised in a manner that allows these experiences to be organised along valence and arousal axes. We review both the behavioural neuroscience evidence on appetitive and aversive circuits as well as the cognitive neuroscience literature on compression in information coding across multiple domains of processing. We argue that these processes are domain-general and adapt these principles to provide a perspective on how valence can be represented at multiple scales in the brain.
- 1 February 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Affective Disorders
- Vol. 245, 394-402
Altered amygdala circuits underlying valence processing among manic and depressed phases in bipolar adults
- 1 February 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Affective Disorders
- Vol. 245, 394-402
Altered amygdala circuits underlying valence processing among manic and depressed phases in bipolar adults
- 1 July 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Current Biology
- Vol. 28 (13) , 2129-2135.e6
Multiple Scales of Representation along the Hippocampal Anteroposterior Axis in Humans
- 1 July 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Current Biology
- Vol. 28 (13) , 2129-2135.e6
Multiple Scales of Representation along the Hippocampal Anteroposterior Axis in Humans