David Galindo
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
David Galindo has a total of 76 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Eike Kiltz
Ruhr University Bochum
5 shared publications - Javier Herranz
Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya
5 shared publications - Jorge Luis Villar
Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya
5 shared publications Paz Morillo
4 shared publicationsVeronique Cortier
3 shared publicationsVéronique Cortier
LORIA, CNRS & INRIA & Université de Lorraine, Vandoeuvre-lès-Nancy, France
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 March 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Distributed Ledger Technologies: Research and Practice
- Vol. 2 (1) , 1-14
Transparent Registration-Based Encryption through Blockchain
Garg et al. (TCC 2018) defined the notion of registration-based encryption (RBE) where the private key generator (PKG) is decoupled from key management and replaced by a key curator (KC). KC does not possess any cryptographic secrets and only plays the role of aggregating the public keys of all the registered users and updating the public parameters whenever a new user joins the system, which solves the key escrow issue. Notwithstanding, RBE still places a significant amount of trust in KC, whose actions are not accountable, e.g., it could secretly register multiple keys for already registered users. In this article, we propose a blockchain-based RBE framework, which provides total transparency and decentralization of KC by leveraging smart contracts. Our framework transfers the right of key management from KC to individual participants and keeps publicly upgradable parameters on-chain. We provide a basic construction that calculates the public parameter on-chain and an extended construction with better efficiency, which merely calculates the roots of trees on-chain. Our basic version is theoretically feasible, while the extended version is practically feasible. In particular, the enhanced scheme reduces computing complexity to a constant level. Our prototype implementation and evaluation results demonstrate that our extended construction is satisfactorily efficient.
- 14 March 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Distributed Ledger Technologies: Research and Practice
- Vol. 2 (1) , 1-14
Open AccessTransparent Registration-Based Encryption through Blockchain
Garg et al. (TCC 2018) defined the notion of registration-based encryption (RBE) where the private key generator (PKG) is decoupled from key management and replaced by a key curator (KC). KC does not possess any cryptographic secrets and only plays the role of aggregating the public keys of all the registered users and updating the public parameters whenever a new user joins the system, which solves the key escrow issue. Notwithstanding, RBE still places a significant amount of trust in KC, whose actions are not accountable, e.g., it could secretly register multiple keys for already registered users. In this article, we propose a blockchain-based RBE framework, which provides total transparency and decentralization of KC by leveraging smart contracts. Our framework transfers the right of key management from KC to individual participants and keeps publicly upgradable parameters on-chain. We provide a basic construction that calculates the public parameter on-chain and an extended construction with better efficiency, which merely calculates the roots of trees on-chain. Our basic version is theoretically feasible, while the extended version is practically feasible. In particular, the enhanced scheme reduces computing complexity to a constant level. Our prototype implementation and evaluation results demonstrate that our extended construction is satisfactorily efficient.
- 25 November 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 372-390
An Accountable Decryption System Based on Privacy-Preserving Smart Contracts
- 25 November 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 372-390
An Accountable Decryption System Based on Privacy-Preserving Smart Contracts
- Open Access
Auditable Credential Anonymity Revocation Based on Privacy-Preserving Smart Contracts
Anonymity revocation is an essential component of credential issuing systems since unconditional anonymity is incompatible with pursuing and sanctioning credential misuse. However, current anonymity revocation approaches have shortcomings with respect to the auditability of the revocation process. In this paper, we propose a novel anonymity revocation approach based on privacy-preserving blockchain-based smart contracts, where the code self-execution property ensures availability and public ledger immutability provides auditability. We describe an instantiation of this approach, provide an implementation thereof and conduct a series of evaluations in terms of running time, gas cost and latency. The results show that our scheme is feasible and efficient.
Open AccessAuditable Credential Anonymity Revocation Based on Privacy-Preserving Smart Contracts
Anonymity revocation is an essential component of credential issuing systems since unconditional anonymity is incompatible with pursuing and sanctioning credential misuse. However, current anonymity revocation approaches have shortcomings with respect to the auditability of the revocation process. In this paper, we propose a novel anonymity revocation approach based on privacy-preserving blockchain-based smart contracts, where the code self-execution property ensures availability and public ledger immutability provides auditability. We describe an instantiation of this approach, provide an implementation thereof and conduct a series of evaluations in terms of running time, gas cost and latency. The results show that our scheme is feasible and efficient.
- Open Access
CAOS: Concurrent-Access Obfuscated Store
This paper proposes Concurrent-Access Obfuscated Store (CAOS), a construction for remote data storage that provides access-pattern obfuscation in a honest-but-curious adversarial model, while allowing for low bandwidth overhead and client storage. Compared to the state of the art, the main advantage of CAOS is that it supports concurrent access without a proxy, for multiple read-only clients and a single read-write client. Concurrent access is achieved by letting clients maintain independent maps that describe how the data is stored. These maps might diverge from client to client, but it is guaranteed that no client will ever lose track of current data. We achieve efficiency and concurrency at the expense of perfect obfuscation: in CAOS the extent to which access patterns are hidden is determined by the resources allocated to its built-in obfuscation mechanism. To assess this trade-off we provide both a security and a performance analysis of our protocol instance. We additionally provide a proof-of-concept implementation.
Open AccessCAOS: Concurrent-Access Obfuscated Store
This paper proposes Concurrent-Access Obfuscated Store (CAOS), a construction for remote data storage that provides access-pattern obfuscation in a honest-but-curious adversarial model, while allowing for low bandwidth overhead and client storage. Compared to the state of the art, the main advantage of CAOS is that it supports concurrent access without a proxy, for multiple read-only clients and a single read-write client. Concurrent access is achieved by letting clients maintain independent maps that describe how the data is stored. These maps might diverge from client to client, but it is guaranteed that no client will ever lose track of current data. We achieve efficiency and concurrency at the expense of perfect obfuscation: in CAOS the extent to which access patterns are hidden is determined by the resources allocated to its built-in obfuscation mechanism. To assess this trade-off we provide both a security and a performance analysis of our protocol instance. We additionally provide a proof-of-concept implementation.
- 1 June 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Risk Regulation
- Vol. 10 (2) , 359-375
Why do Public Blockchains Need Formal and Effective Internal Governance Mechanisms?
With the birth and rise of cryptocurrencies following the success of Bitcoin and the popularity of “Initial Coin Offerings”, public awareness of blockchain technologies has substantially increased in recent years. Many blockchain advocates claim that these software artefacts enable radically new forms of decentralised governance by relying upon computational trust created via cryptographic proof, obviating the need for reliance on conventional trusted third-party intermediaries. But these claims rest on some key assumptions, which this paper subjects to critical examination. It asks: can existing mechanisms and procedures for collective decision-making of public blockchains (which we refer to as internal blockchain governance) live up to these ambitions? By drawing upon HLA Hart’s Concept of Law, together with literature from regulatory governance studies, we argue that unless public blockchain systems establish formal and effective internal governance, they are unlikely to be taken up at scale as a tool for social coordination, and are thus likely to remain, at best, a marginal technology.
- 1 June 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Risk Regulation
- Vol. 10 (2) , 359-375
Why do Public Blockchains Need Formal and Effective Internal Governance Mechanisms?
With the birth and rise of cryptocurrencies following the success of Bitcoin and the popularity of “Initial Coin Offerings”, public awareness of blockchain technologies has substantially increased in recent years. Many blockchain advocates claim that these software artefacts enable radically new forms of decentralised governance by relying upon computational trust created via cryptographic proof, obviating the need for reliance on conventional trusted third-party intermediaries. But these claims rest on some key assumptions, which this paper subjects to critical examination. It asks: can existing mechanisms and procedures for collective decision-making of public blockchains (which we refer to as internal blockchain governance) live up to these ambitions? By drawing upon HLA Hart’s Concept of Law, together with literature from regulatory governance studies, we argue that unless public blockchain systems establish formal and effective internal governance, they are unlikely to be taken up at scale as a tool for social coordination, and are thus likely to remain, at best, a marginal technology.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Why Do Public Blockchains Need Formal and Effective Internal Governance Mechanisms?
With the birth and rise of cryptocurrencies following the success of Bitcoin and the popularity of 'Initial Coin Offerings,' public awareness of blockchain technologies has substantially increased in recent years. Many blockchain advocates claim that these software artefacts enable radically new forms of decentralised governance by relying upon computational trust created via cryptographic proof, obviating the need for reliance on conventional trusted third-party intermediaries. But these claims rest on some key assumptions, which this paper subjects to critical examination. It asks: can existing mechanisms and procedures for collective decision-making of public blockchains (which we refer to as internal blockchain governance) live up to these ambitions? By drawing upon HLA Hart's Concept of Law, together with literature from regulatory governance studies, we argue that unless public blockchain systems establish formal and effective internal governance, they are unlikely to be taken up at scale as a tool for social coordination, and are thus likely to remain, at best, a marginal technology.
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessWhy Do Public Blockchains Need Formal and Effective Internal Governance Mechanisms?
With the birth and rise of cryptocurrencies following the success of Bitcoin and the popularity of 'Initial Coin Offerings,' public awareness of blockchain technologies has substantially increased in recent years. Many blockchain advocates claim that these software artefacts enable radically new forms of decentralised governance by relying upon computational trust created via cryptographic proof, obviating the need for reliance on conventional trusted third-party intermediaries. But these claims rest on some key assumptions, which this paper subjects to critical examination. It asks: can existing mechanisms and procedures for collective decision-making of public blockchains (which we refer to as internal blockchain governance) live up to these ambitions? By drawing upon HLA Hart's Concept of Law, together with literature from regulatory governance studies, we argue that unless public blockchain systems establish formal and effective internal governance, they are unlikely to be taken up at scale as a tool for social coordination, and are thus likely to remain, at best, a marginal technology.
- 1 April 2018
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 430-442
A Formal Analysis of the Neuchatel e-Voting Protocol
Remote electronic voting is used in several countries for legally binding elections. Unlike academic voting protocols, these systems are not always documented and their security is rarely analysed rigorously. In this paper, we study a voting system that has been used for electing political representatives and in citizen-driven referenda in the Swiss canton of Neuchâtel. We design a detailed model of the protocol in ProVerif for both privacy and verifiability properties. Our analysis mostly confirms the security of the underlying protocol: we show that the Neuchâtel protocol guarantees ballot privacy, even against a corrupted server; it also ensures cast-as-intended and recorded-as-cast verifiability, even if the voter's device is compromised. To our knowledge, this is the first time a full-fledged automatic symbolic analysis of an e-voting system used for politicallybinding elections has been realized.
- 1 April 2018
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 430-442
A Formal Analysis of the Neuchatel e-Voting Protocol
Remote electronic voting is used in several countries for legally binding elections. Unlike academic voting protocols, these systems are not always documented and their security is rarely analysed rigorously. In this paper, we study a voting system that has been used for electing political representatives and in citizen-driven referenda in the Swiss canton of Neuchâtel. We design a detailed model of the protocol in ProVerif for both privacy and verifiability properties. Our analysis mostly confirms the security of the underlying protocol: we show that the Neuchâtel protocol guarantees ballot privacy, even against a corrupted server; it also ensures cast-as-intended and recorded-as-cast verifiability, even if the voter's device is compromised. To our knowledge, this is the first time a full-fledged automatic symbolic analysis of an e-voting system used for politicallybinding elections has been realized.
- Open Access
- 24 October 2016
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1614-1625
BeleniosRF
We propose a new voting scheme, BeleniosRF, that offers both receipt-freeness and end-to-end verifiability. It is receipt-free in a strong sense, meaning that even dishonest voters cannot prove how they voted. We provide a game-based definition of receipt-freeness for voting protocols with non-interactive ballot casting, which we name strong receipt-freeness (sRF). To our knowledge, sRF is the first game-based definition of receipt-freeness in the literature, and it has the merit of being particularly concise and simple. Built upon the Helios protocol, BeleniosRF inherits its simplicity and does not require any anti-coercion strategy from the voters. We implement BeleniosRF and show its feasibility on a number of platforms, including desktop computers and smartphones.
- 24 October 2016
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1614-1625
Open AccessBeleniosRF
We propose a new voting scheme, BeleniosRF, that offers both receipt-freeness and end-to-end verifiability. It is receipt-free in a strong sense, meaning that even dishonest voters cannot prove how they voted. We provide a game-based definition of receipt-freeness for voting protocols with non-interactive ballot casting, which we name strong receipt-freeness (sRF). To our knowledge, sRF is the first game-based definition of receipt-freeness in the literature, and it has the merit of being particularly concise and simple. Built upon the Helios protocol, BeleniosRF inherits its simplicity and does not require any anti-coercion strategy from the voters. We implement BeleniosRF and show its feasibility on a number of platforms, including desktop computers and smartphones.