Thomas J. Scotto
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Thomas J. Scotto has a total of 88 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jason Reifler
University of Southampton, UK
22 shared publications Allan Kornberg
B Duke University , Durham , USA
8 shared publicationsHarold D. Clarke
University of Texas at Dallas
8 shared publications- Timothy B. Gravelle
SurveyMonkey, Aurora, Ontario, Canada
7 shared publications Marianne C. Stewart
University of Texas at Dallas
6 shared publicationsDavid Sanders
Department of Political Science, University of Essex, Colchester, UK
4 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 27 May 2026
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 21 (5) , e0349884
Ethnic differences in healthcare trust and patient satisfaction in England: A cross-sectional survey
Trust in healthcare is an important component of patient experience, yet ethnic minority patients in England often report lower trust and satisfaction with the NHS than White patients. We examine these differences using data from a cross-sectional survey of 1,111 adults living in England, conducted in April–May 2023. Respondents rated their agreement with 18 statements covering five domains of healthcare experience: communication, ethical treatment, perceived competence, trust in providers, and perceived discrimination. We estimate a series of linear regression models comparing responses between ethnic minority and White participants, both before and after adjustment for demographic and attitudinal factors. Ethnic minority respondents reported significantly less positive perceptions on several items, particularly those relating to ethical behaviour, personal care, trust in front-line providers and perceived discrimination. They were less likely than White respondents to agree that the NHS behaves ethically, cares for patients, or goes out of its way to help people, and reported lower trust in GPs and hospital doctors and nurses. The largest differences were observed for perceptions that NHS care quality depends on ethnic background or country of origin. By contrast, we found no ethnic differences in perceptions of NHS honesty, promise-keeping, overall competence, or trust in NHS leadership or management. Overall, the findings indicate that ethnic differences in trust and satisfaction with the NHS are concentrated in relational and experiential aspects of care rather than in assessments of technical competence. Addressing these disparities may be important for improving equity and strengthening trust in healthcare services.
- 27 May 2026
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 21 (5) , e0349884
Open AccessEthnic differences in healthcare trust and patient satisfaction in England: A cross-sectional survey
Trust in healthcare is an important component of patient experience, yet ethnic minority patients in England often report lower trust and satisfaction with the NHS than White patients. We examine these differences using data from a cross-sectional survey of 1,111 adults living in England, conducted in April–May 2023. Respondents rated their agreement with 18 statements covering five domains of healthcare experience: communication, ethical treatment, perceived competence, trust in providers, and perceived discrimination. We estimate a series of linear regression models comparing responses between ethnic minority and White participants, both before and after adjustment for demographic and attitudinal factors. Ethnic minority respondents reported significantly less positive perceptions on several items, particularly those relating to ethical behaviour, personal care, trust in front-line providers and perceived discrimination. They were less likely than White respondents to agree that the NHS behaves ethically, cares for patients, or goes out of its way to help people, and reported lower trust in GPs and hospital doctors and nurses. The largest differences were observed for perceptions that NHS care quality depends on ethnic background or country of origin. By contrast, we found no ethnic differences in perceptions of NHS honesty, promise-keeping, overall competence, or trust in NHS leadership or management. Overall, the findings indicate that ethnic differences in trust and satisfaction with the NHS are concentrated in relational and experiential aspects of care rather than in assessments of technical competence. Addressing these disparities may be important for improving equity and strengthening trust in healthcare services.
- Open Access
- 16 November 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Public Understanding of Science
- Vol. 35 (3) , 352-366
Trust in scientists and doctors: The roles of faith, politics, education and gender
This article examines trust in science in England, focusing on variation across demographic and ideological groups. Using survey data from 11,173 respondents, we compare trust in two domains, medical doctors and scientists, to explore whether predictors operate similarly across these professional groups. We find higher education is associated with greater trust, while right-wing political orientation predicts lower trust. Religious affiliation also matters, with some faith groups reporting lower trust relative to the non-religious baseline. Gender differences emerge as well, particularly in trust in medical doctors. Respondents selecting ‘Prefer not to say’ on the religion item report significantly lower trust in both doctors and scientists, consistent with a broader privacy-motivated disclosure style. Our results highlight the importance of considering not just overall levels of trust in science, but variation across education, ideology, religion and gender, and they suggest that trust in doctors and trust in scientists, while related, are not interchangeable.
- 16 November 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Public Understanding of Science
- Vol. 35 (3) , 352-366
Open AccessTrust in scientists and doctors: The roles of faith, politics, education and gender
This article examines trust in science in England, focusing on variation across demographic and ideological groups. Using survey data from 11,173 respondents, we compare trust in two domains, medical doctors and scientists, to explore whether predictors operate similarly across these professional groups. We find higher education is associated with greater trust, while right-wing political orientation predicts lower trust. Religious affiliation also matters, with some faith groups reporting lower trust relative to the non-religious baseline. Gender differences emerge as well, particularly in trust in medical doctors. Respondents selecting ‘Prefer not to say’ on the religion item report significantly lower trust in both doctors and scientists, consistent with a broader privacy-motivated disclosure style. Our results highlight the importance of considering not just overall levels of trust in science, but variation across education, ideology, religion and gender, and they suggest that trust in doctors and trust in scientists, while related, are not interchangeable.
- Open Access
- 6 March 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Public Health in Practice
- Vol. 7, 100484
The influence of waiting times and sociopolitical variables on public trust in healthcare: A cross-sectional study of the NHS in England
- 6 March 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Public Health in Practice
- Vol. 7, 100484
Open AccessThe influence of waiting times and sociopolitical variables on public trust in healthcare: A cross-sectional study of the NHS in England
- Open Access
- 31 January 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Human Vaccines & Immunotherapeutics
- Vol. 18 (1) , 2008214
Estimating the size of “anti-vax” and vaccine hesitant populations in the US, UK, and Canada: comparative latent class modeling of vaccine attitudes
Vaccine hesitancy is a significant impediment to global efforts to vaccinate against the SARS-CoV-2 virus at levels that generate herd immunity. In this article, we show the utility of an inductive approach – latent class analysis (LCA) – that allows us to characterize the size and nature of different vaccine attitude groups; and to compare how these groups differ across countries as well as across demographic subgroups within countries. We perform this analysis using original survey data collected in the US, UK, and Canada. We also show that these classes are strongly associated with SARS-CoV-2 vaccination intent and perceptions of the efficacy and safety of the COVID-19 vaccines, suggesting that attitudes about vaccines to fight the novel coronavirus pandemic are well explained by latent vaccine attitudes that precede the pandemic. More specifically, we find four substantive classes of vaccine attitudes: strong supporters, supporters with concerns, vaccine hesitant, and “anti-vax” as well as a fifth measurement error class. The strong “anti-vax” sentiment class is small in all three countries, while the strong supporter class is the largest across all three countries. We observe different distributions of class assignments in different demographic groups – most notably education and political leaning (partisanship and ideology).
- 31 January 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Human Vaccines & Immunotherapeutics
- Vol. 18 (1) , 2008214
Open AccessEstimating the size of “anti-vax” and vaccine hesitant populations in the US, UK, and Canada: comparative latent class modeling of vaccine attitudes
Vaccine hesitancy is a significant impediment to global efforts to vaccinate against the SARS-CoV-2 virus at levels that generate herd immunity. In this article, we show the utility of an inductive approach – latent class analysis (LCA) – that allows us to characterize the size and nature of different vaccine attitude groups; and to compare how these groups differ across countries as well as across demographic subgroups within countries. We perform this analysis using original survey data collected in the US, UK, and Canada. We also show that these classes are strongly associated with SARS-CoV-2 vaccination intent and perceptions of the efficacy and safety of the COVID-19 vaccines, suggesting that attitudes about vaccines to fight the novel coronavirus pandemic are well explained by latent vaccine attitudes that precede the pandemic. More specifically, we find four substantive classes of vaccine attitudes: strong supporters, supporters with concerns, vaccine hesitant, and “anti-vax” as well as a fifth measurement error class. The strong “anti-vax” sentiment class is small in all three countries, while the strong supporter class is the largest across all three countries. We observe different distributions of class assignments in different demographic groups – most notably education and political leaning (partisanship and ideology).
- Open Access
- 22 May 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Foreign Policy Analysis
- Vol. 17 (3)
Going Nativist: How Nativism and Economic Ideology Interact to Shape Beliefs about Global Trade
Existing research explains variation in trade attitudes by pitting explanations rooted in the foreign part of foreign economic policy, like nativism, against economic beliefs like a commitment to free market principles. But what happens when these factors create significant cross-pressures—how do free market-oriented nativists think about trade? We argue that nativism is a higher-order belief that constrains the relationship between lower-order economic attitudes and beliefs about international trade. We test our argument using representative samples from the United States and United Kingdom. First, we analyze observational data and find a significant interaction whereby nativism moderates the relationship between free market attitudes and beliefs that trade provides national and global benefits. Second, we report results from a survey experiment to show that a message about the long-term benefits from free trade increases support for free trade in both samples. Importantly, we also find that nativist values weaken the treatment effect in the US sample. As long as international relations scholars focus on cultural or economic antecedents on their own, we miss much about how elements in belief systems interact.
- 22 May 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Foreign Policy Analysis
- Vol. 17 (3)
Open AccessGoing Nativist: How Nativism and Economic Ideology Interact to Shape Beliefs about Global Trade
Existing research explains variation in trade attitudes by pitting explanations rooted in the foreign part of foreign economic policy, like nativism, against economic beliefs like a commitment to free market principles. But what happens when these factors create significant cross-pressures—how do free market-oriented nativists think about trade? We argue that nativism is a higher-order belief that constrains the relationship between lower-order economic attitudes and beliefs about international trade. We test our argument using representative samples from the United States and United Kingdom. First, we analyze observational data and find a significant interaction whereby nativism moderates the relationship between free market attitudes and beliefs that trade provides national and global benefits. Second, we report results from a survey experiment to show that a message about the long-term benefits from free trade increases support for free trade in both samples. Importantly, we also find that nativist values weaken the treatment effect in the US sample. As long as international relations scholars focus on cultural or economic antecedents on their own, we miss much about how elements in belief systems interact.
- 22 February 2021
- Published by The Royal Society in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Vol. 376 (1822) , 20200147
Some people just want to watch the world burn: the prevalence, psychology and politics of the ‘Need for Chaos’
People form political attitudes to serve psychological needs. Recent research shows that some individuals have a strong desire to incite chaos when they perceive themselves to be marginalized by society. These individuals tend to see chaos as a way to invert the power structure and gain social status in the process. Analysing data drawn from large-scale representative surveys conducted in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, we identify the prevalence of Need for Chaos across Anglo-Saxon societies. Using Latent Profile Analysis, we explore whether different subtypes underlie the uni-dimensional construct and find evidence that some people may be motivated to seek out chaos because they want to rebuild society, while others enjoy destruction for its own sake. We demonstrate that chaos-seekers are not a unified political group but a divergent set of malcontents. Multiple pathways can lead individuals to ‘want to watch the world burn’. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The political brain: neurocognitive and computational mechanisms’.
- 22 February 2021
- Published by The Royal Society in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Vol. 376 (1822) , 20200147
Some people just want to watch the world burn: the prevalence, psychology and politics of the ‘Need for Chaos’
People form political attitudes to serve psychological needs. Recent research shows that some individuals have a strong desire to incite chaos when they perceive themselves to be marginalized by society. These individuals tend to see chaos as a way to invert the power structure and gain social status in the process. Analysing data drawn from large-scale representative surveys conducted in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, we identify the prevalence of Need for Chaos across Anglo-Saxon societies. Using Latent Profile Analysis, we explore whether different subtypes underlie the uni-dimensional construct and find evidence that some people may be motivated to seek out chaos because they want to rebuild society, while others enjoy destruction for its own sake. We demonstrate that chaos-seekers are not a unified political group but a divergent set of malcontents. Multiple pathways can lead individuals to ‘want to watch the world burn’. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The political brain: neurocognitive and computational mechanisms’.
- 28 October 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australian Journal of International Affairs
- Vol. 75 (2) , 217-236
The structure of foreign policy attitudes among middle power publics: a transpacific replication
- 28 October 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australian Journal of International Affairs
- Vol. 75 (2) , 217-236
The structure of foreign policy attitudes among middle power publics: a transpacific replication
- Open Access
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Political Research Exchange
- Vol. 2 (1)
A new measure of the ‘democratic peace’: what country feeling thermometer data can teach us about the drivers of American and Western European foreign policy
While the existence of a ‘Democratic Peace’ (DP) is widely accepted, the various DP theories that seek to explain why democracies rarely fight one another are highly contested. A ‘commercial/capitalist peace’ counterargument maintains that the relationship between democratic politics and peace is spurious: the actual driver is greater trade among democracies. Meanwhile, Realists counter that it is alliances among democratic states, not their democratic nature, that causes peace among them. This research note utilizes novel country feeling thermometer data to explore the debate’s micro-foundations: the underlying drivers of international amity and enmity among democratic citizens in the US, UK, France, and Germany. Utilizing Freedom House and other quantitative measures of freedom, trade, military strength, and racial and cultural difference, it pits the micro-foundations of the DP against its rivals to explain attitude formation among a group of Western democratic publics. Given the resurgence of authoritarianism around the world today, a better understanding of the role of regime type in shaping public opinion – and subsequently war and peace – is urgently needed.
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Political Research Exchange
- Vol. 2 (1)
Open AccessA new measure of the ‘democratic peace’: what country feeling thermometer data can teach us about the drivers of American and Western European foreign policy
While the existence of a ‘Democratic Peace’ (DP) is widely accepted, the various DP theories that seek to explain why democracies rarely fight one another are highly contested. A ‘commercial/capitalist peace’ counterargument maintains that the relationship between democratic politics and peace is spurious: the actual driver is greater trade among democracies. Meanwhile, Realists counter that it is alliances among democratic states, not their democratic nature, that causes peace among them. This research note utilizes novel country feeling thermometer data to explore the debate’s micro-foundations: the underlying drivers of international amity and enmity among democratic citizens in the US, UK, France, and Germany. Utilizing Freedom House and other quantitative measures of freedom, trade, military strength, and racial and cultural difference, it pits the micro-foundations of the DP against its rivals to explain attitude formation among a group of Western democratic publics. Given the resurgence of authoritarianism around the world today, a better understanding of the role of regime type in shaping public opinion – and subsequently war and peace – is urgently needed.
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Personality and Individual Differences
- Vol. 153
Personality traits and foreign policy attitudes: A cross-national exploratory study
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Personality and Individual Differences
- Vol. 153
Personality traits and foreign policy attitudes: A cross-national exploratory study
- Open Access
- 1 July 2018
- Published by SAGE Publications in Research & Politics
- Vol. 5 (3)
How political are national identities? A comparison of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany in the 2010s
Research demonstrates the multi-dimensional nature of American identity arguing that the normative content of American identity relates to political ideologies in the United States, but the sense of belonging to the nation does not. This paper replicates that analysis and extends it to the German and British cases. Exploratory structural equation modeling attests to cross-cultural validity of measures of the sense of belonging and norms of uncritical loyalty and engagement for positive change. In the 2010s, we find partisanship and ideology in all three nations explains levels of belonging and the two content dimensions. Interestingly, those identifying with major parties of the left and right in all three countries have a higher sense of belonging and uncritical loyalty than their moderate counterparts. The relationship between partisanship, ideology, and national identity seems to wax and wane over time, presumably because elite political discourse linking party or ideology to identity varies from one political moment to the next.
- 1 July 2018
- Published by SAGE Publications in Research & Politics
- Vol. 5 (3)
Open AccessHow political are national identities? A comparison of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany in the 2010s
Research demonstrates the multi-dimensional nature of American identity arguing that the normative content of American identity relates to political ideologies in the United States, but the sense of belonging to the nation does not. This paper replicates that analysis and extends it to the German and British cases. Exploratory structural equation modeling attests to cross-cultural validity of measures of the sense of belonging and norms of uncritical loyalty and engagement for positive change. In the 2010s, we find partisanship and ideology in all three nations explains levels of belonging and the two content dimensions. Interestingly, those identifying with major parties of the left and right in all three countries have a higher sense of belonging and uncritical loyalty than their moderate counterparts. The relationship between partisanship, ideology, and national identity seems to wax and wane over time, presumably because elite political discourse linking party or ideology to identity varies from one political moment to the next.