Michael Michael
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Michael Michael has a total of 18 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Panos Hatzipanayotou
Department of International and European Economic Studies Athens University of Economics and Business
20 shared publications- Panos Hatzipanayotou
Department of International and European Economic Studies Athens University of Economics and Business Athens Greece
13 shared publications - Sajal Lahiri
Southern Illinois University Carbondale
4 shared publications - Costas Hadjiyiannis
Department of Economics, University of Cyprus
3 shared publications Nikos Tsakiris
Department of Economics University of Ioannina
3 shared publicationsStephen M. Miller
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 28 January 2024
- Published by Wiley in Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique
- Vol. 57 (1) , 276-296
Strategic capital taxation, tradable emission permits and global pollution
The paper considers a two‐country model with international capital mobility and production‐generated cross‐border pollution. It examines the effectiveness of alternative policy combinations consisting of capital taxes and nationally or internationally tradable emissions permits in reducing global pollution. The internationally mobile capital is taxed according to three different rules, namely, capital tax exemptions, capital tax credits and capital tax deductions. Our key result is that, under certain conditions, the lowest Nash equilibrium level of global pollution is achieved with a policy mix combining either capital tax exemptions or capital tax credits with internationally, rather than nationally, tradable emission permits.
- 28 January 2024
- Published by Wiley in Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique
- Vol. 57 (1) , 276-296
Open AccessStrategic capital taxation, tradable emission permits and global pollution
The paper considers a two‐country model with international capital mobility and production‐generated cross‐border pollution. It examines the effectiveness of alternative policy combinations consisting of capital taxes and nationally or internationally tradable emissions permits in reducing global pollution. The internationally mobile capital is taxed according to three different rules, namely, capital tax exemptions, capital tax credits and capital tax deductions. Our key result is that, under certain conditions, the lowest Nash equilibrium level of global pollution is achieved with a policy mix combining either capital tax exemptions or capital tax credits with internationally, rather than nationally, tradable emission permits.
- 14 July 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 29 (3) , 600-626
Tax competition in the presence of environmental spillovers
- 14 July 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 29 (3) , 600-626
Tax competition in the presence of environmental spillovers
- Open Access
- 24 May 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The European Journal of Finance
- Vol. 28 (8) , 825-847
International financial integration in the presence of an international duopoly
We revisit the debate on the benefits of international financial integration. We build a partial equilibrium imperfectly competitive model with two countries, where each country has one firm. Firms are Cournot competitors. Within this framework, we examine how the liberalization of international capital flows affects the welfare of each country and their joint welfare. Our results show that international capital flows' liberalization cannot guarantee the improvement in each country's welfare and their joint welfare. Overall, we find that international financial integration has very heterogeneous effects, depending on the market size, the initial level of capital stock and the degree of product competition.
- 24 May 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The European Journal of Finance
- Vol. 28 (8) , 825-847
Open AccessInternational financial integration in the presence of an international duopoly
We revisit the debate on the benefits of international financial integration. We build a partial equilibrium imperfectly competitive model with two countries, where each country has one firm. Firms are Cournot competitors. Within this framework, we examine how the liberalization of international capital flows affects the welfare of each country and their joint welfare. Our results show that international capital flows' liberalization cannot guarantee the improvement in each country's welfare and their joint welfare. Overall, we find that international financial integration has very heterogeneous effects, depending on the market size, the initial level of capital stock and the degree of product competition.
- 6 April 2018
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 20 (4) , 541-556
The efficiency of decentralized environmental policies under global pollution and tradable emission permits
We build a two asymmetric regions model with cross‐border pollution related to production. Each region issues emission permits and revenues from their sales finance public pollution abatement. The decentralized level of emission permits is efficient when permits are interregionally tradable and cross‐border pollution is perfect. This result is robust in a variety of cases—for example, when (i) capital is immobile or internationally mobile or only mobile between the two regions, and (ii) revenue from permits sales is transferred to a federal authority.
- 6 April 2018
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 20 (4) , 541-556
The efficiency of decentralized environmental policies under global pollution and tradable emission permits
We build a two asymmetric regions model with cross‐border pollution related to production. Each region issues emission permits and revenues from their sales finance public pollution abatement. The decentralized level of emission permits is efficient when permits are interregionally tradable and cross‐border pollution is perfect. This result is robust in a variety of cases—for example, when (i) capital is immobile or internationally mobile or only mobile between the two regions, and (ii) revenue from permits sales is transferred to a federal authority.
- 12 March 2015
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 17 (2) , 174-195
Piecemeal Reform of Domestic Indirect Taxes toward Uniformity in the Presence of Pollution: with and without a Revenue Constraint
- 12 March 2015
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 17 (2) , 174-195
Piecemeal Reform of Domestic Indirect Taxes toward Uniformity in the Presence of Pollution: with and without a Revenue Constraint
- 3 July 2014
- Published by Wiley in Review of International Economics
- Vol. 22 (4) , 808-824
Controlling Illegal Immigration: On the Scope for Cooperation with a Transit Country
We consider the implications of cooperation with respect to immigration control between a final‐destination country (D) and its poorer neighbor (T). Assuming that the latter serves as a transit country for undocumented immigrants, a key question is how much aid shouldDprovide toTfor the purpose of strengthening its immigration controls. The problem forTis to determine what proportion of aid to use strictly for immigration control rather than trying to meet other border‐security objectives. We examine theNash equilibrium values of the policy instruments of both countries and compare them with those which are optimal when international cooperation on immigration control extends to maximization of joint welfare. We also consider a two‐stage game in whichDfirst decides on how much aid to transfer toT, with the latter subsequently choosing how to use it.
- 3 July 2014
- Published by Wiley in Review of International Economics
- Vol. 22 (4) , 808-824
Controlling Illegal Immigration: On the Scope for Cooperation with a Transit Country
We consider the implications of cooperation with respect to immigration control between a final‐destination country (D) and its poorer neighbor (T). Assuming that the latter serves as a transit country for undocumented immigrants, a key question is how much aid shouldDprovide toTfor the purpose of strengthening its immigration controls. The problem forTis to determine what proportion of aid to use strictly for immigration control rather than trying to meet other border‐security objectives. We examine theNash equilibrium values of the policy instruments of both countries and compare them with those which are optimal when international cooperation on immigration control extends to maximization of joint welfare. We also consider a two‐stage game in whichDfirst decides on how much aid to transfer toT, with the latter subsequently choosing how to use it.
- 13 August 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 58 (4) , 563-578
Asymmetric Tax Policy Responses in Large Economies With Cross-Border Pollution
- 13 August 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 58 (4) , 563-578
Asymmetric Tax Policy Responses in Large Economies With Cross-Border Pollution
- 1 April 2013
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development
- Vol. 22 (3) , 454-475
Guest worker programs: A theoretical analysis of welfare of the host and source countries*
This article examines the interaction between migration policies of the host and source countries in the context of a model of guest-worker migration. For the host, the objective is to provide low-cost labor for its employers while avoiding illegal immigration. It optimizes over these objectives by setting the time limit of a guest-worker permit. The source country seeks remittance flows and return migration by offering fiscal benefits to returnees. Within this framework, we solve for the Nash equilibrium values of the migration policy instruments and compare them, to the extent possible, with the ones that emerge in a cooperative setting.
- 1 April 2013
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development
- Vol. 22 (3) , 454-475
Guest worker programs: A theoretical analysis of welfare of the host and source countries*
This article examines the interaction between migration policies of the host and source countries in the context of a model of guest-worker migration. For the host, the objective is to provide low-cost labor for its employers while avoiding illegal immigration. It optimizes over these objectives by setting the time limit of a guest-worker permit. The source country seeks remittance flows and return migration by offering fiscal benefits to returnees. Within this framework, we solve for the Nash equilibrium values of the migration policy instruments and compare them, to the extent possible, with the ones that emerge in a cooperative setting.
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
- Vol. 65 (1) , 1-11
Competition for environmental aid and aid fungibility
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
- Vol. 65 (1) , 1-11
Competition for environmental aid and aid fungibility
- 1 December 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 96 (11-12) , 1015-1024
Migration of skilled workers: Policy interaction between host and source countries
- 1 December 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 96 (11-12) , 1015-1024
Migration of skilled workers: Policy interaction between host and source countries