Costas Panagopoulos
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Costas Panagopoulos has a total of 283 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Donald Philip Green
Columbia University
4 shared publications - Timothy Fraser
Systems Engineering Program, Cornell University, Ithaca, USA
4 shared publications - Daniel Kim
Department of Public Health and Health Sciences, School of Community Health and Behavioral Sciences, Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts, USA
3 shared publications - Kyle Endres
University of Northern Iowa Kyle Endres is associate director at the Center for Social and Behavioral Research and assistant professor in the School of Public Affairs and Service Cedar Falls, IA 50614, USA
3 shared publications - Philip Moniz
Department of Political Science, Northeastern University
3 shared publications - Daniel P. Aldrich
Northeastern University
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Campaign Donations, Judicial Recusal, and Disclosure: A Field Experiment
This article reports results from a field experiment exploring how judicial behavior is affected by complaints about conflicts of interest. The conflicts of interest studied here arise in Wisconsin civil trial cases. Using public records, we identify instances in which one party's attorney contributed to the presiding judge's previous election campaign. We send a random subset of these judges a letter identifying the potential conflict and requesting recusal. We find that highlighting the potential conflict and asking judges to recuse sharply increases the rate at which judges disclose this relationship in court records but does not lead them to recuse. Furthermore, treated judges are no more likely to disclose or recuse in subsequent cases that present a similar conflict of interest. This experiment, which is the first to test possible remedies to judicial conflicts of interest, suggests that light touch interventions are insufficient to change judges' behavior.
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCampaign Donations, Judicial Recusal, and Disclosure: A Field Experiment
This article reports results from a field experiment exploring how judicial behavior is affected by complaints about conflicts of interest. The conflicts of interest studied here arise in Wisconsin civil trial cases. Using public records, we identify instances in which one party's attorney contributed to the presiding judge's previous election campaign. We send a random subset of these judges a letter identifying the potential conflict and requesting recusal. We find that highlighting the potential conflict and asking judges to recuse sharply increases the rate at which judges disclose this relationship in court records but does not lead them to recuse. Furthermore, treated judges are no more likely to disclose or recuse in subsequent cases that present a similar conflict of interest. This experiment, which is the first to test possible remedies to judicial conflicts of interest, suggests that light touch interventions are insufficient to change judges' behavior.
- Open Access
- 19 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Political Behavior
Tesla Takedown: Brand Politicization and Partisan Consumerism in the Trump Era
During the 2024 U.S. presidential election, Tesla CEO Elon Musk endorsed the Republican nominee Donald Trump, contributed nearly $250 million to PACs supporting his candidacy, and grew close to Trump as a prominent figure in his second administration through his involvement with the Department of Government Efficiency, prior to his withdrawal from the Trump inner circle in May 2025. We contend his alliance with Trump politicized his electric vehicle company Tesla, polarized the carmaker’s brand image and reputation, and likely resulted in partisan consumerism. Using daily brand tracking data, we find support for these contentions across a variety of brand perception metrics including quality, value, employment reputation, and purchase considerations. Specifically, we show that, on average, Democrats grew to view Tesla more negatively while Republicans warmed to the brand in the aftermath of Musk’s endorsement of Trump and in the early months of his second administration. Consumers are responsive to partisan activity by corporate leaders and appear willing to adapt their views of corporate brands and purchasing behaviors to align with and express their partisan allegiances. Corporate leaders engage in partisan politics at the peril of their brand images and, ultimately, even the bottom line.
- 19 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Political Behavior
Open AccessTesla Takedown: Brand Politicization and Partisan Consumerism in the Trump Era
During the 2024 U.S. presidential election, Tesla CEO Elon Musk endorsed the Republican nominee Donald Trump, contributed nearly $250 million to PACs supporting his candidacy, and grew close to Trump as a prominent figure in his second administration through his involvement with the Department of Government Efficiency, prior to his withdrawal from the Trump inner circle in May 2025. We contend his alliance with Trump politicized his electric vehicle company Tesla, polarized the carmaker’s brand image and reputation, and likely resulted in partisan consumerism. Using daily brand tracking data, we find support for these contentions across a variety of brand perception metrics including quality, value, employment reputation, and purchase considerations. Specifically, we show that, on average, Democrats grew to view Tesla more negatively while Republicans warmed to the brand in the aftermath of Musk’s endorsement of Trump and in the early months of his second administration. Consumers are responsive to partisan activity by corporate leaders and appear willing to adapt their views of corporate brands and purchasing behaviors to align with and express their partisan allegiances. Corporate leaders engage in partisan politics at the peril of their brand images and, ultimately, even the bottom line.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Research & Politics
- Vol. 13 (1)
The opportunities and limits of microtargeting cross-pressured voters
Technological advancements have ushered in the promise of targeting potentially persuadable voters with personalized messages. One class of persuadable voters is those who are cross-pressured: they identify with one party but agree with policy positions of another. For political campaigns, targeting cross-pressured voters usually involves working with commercial vendors to infer voters’ party identity and policy positions. The effectiveness of microtargeted messages thus depends on the accuracy of those predictions. We analyze the accuracy of a leading US commercial vendor’s predicted policy positions using an original 2017 survey ( N = 397) asking voters their actual positions on 20 issues. We find a strong negative relationship between cross-pressure and predictive accuracy, at both the issue- and individual-level. Issues on which voters are cross-pressured are predicted with less accuracy. And the percentage of correct inferences about a voter’s positions decreases the more cross-pressured they are. While persuadable voters are a valuable target, reaching them is complicated by the difficulty in predicting their party-atypical stances.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Research & Politics
- Vol. 13 (1)
Open AccessThe opportunities and limits of microtargeting cross-pressured voters
Technological advancements have ushered in the promise of targeting potentially persuadable voters with personalized messages. One class of persuadable voters is those who are cross-pressured: they identify with one party but agree with policy positions of another. For political campaigns, targeting cross-pressured voters usually involves working with commercial vendors to infer voters’ party identity and policy positions. The effectiveness of microtargeted messages thus depends on the accuracy of those predictions. We analyze the accuracy of a leading US commercial vendor’s predicted policy positions using an original 2017 survey ( N = 397) asking voters their actual positions on 20 issues. We find a strong negative relationship between cross-pressure and predictive accuracy, at both the issue- and individual-level. Issues on which voters are cross-pressured are predicted with less accuracy. And the percentage of correct inferences about a voter’s positions decreases the more cross-pressured they are. While persuadable voters are a valuable target, reaching them is complicated by the difficulty in predicting their party-atypical stances.
- Open Access
- 1 October 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Research & Politics
- Vol. 12 (4)
Revisiting name recognition and candidate support: Experimental tests of the mere exposure hypothesis
Often lacking adequate information to guide their votes, voters may be susceptible to subtle psychological influences, including name recognition. For decades, scholars have found that voters are more likely to cast ballots for candidates whose names they recognize. These arguments imply that exposure to little-known candidates’ names increases electoral support. But research has seldom demonstrated a causal effect consistent with this “mere exposure” hypothesis, particularly under real-world conditions. We conduct three sets of experiments exposing subjects to the names of challengers in a range of electoral contexts across the United States. Results yield little support for the hypothesis that exposure increases electoral support. As name recognition may be insufficient without party labels, we also conduct experiments providing the candidates’ party affiliations, again finding little evidence of an effect. These findings cast doubt on the hypothesis that candidates, particularly challengers, who merely make their names known will thereby win more votes.
- 1 October 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Research & Politics
- Vol. 12 (4)
Open AccessRevisiting name recognition and candidate support: Experimental tests of the mere exposure hypothesis
Often lacking adequate information to guide their votes, voters may be susceptible to subtle psychological influences, including name recognition. For decades, scholars have found that voters are more likely to cast ballots for candidates whose names they recognize. These arguments imply that exposure to little-known candidates’ names increases electoral support. But research has seldom demonstrated a causal effect consistent with this “mere exposure” hypothesis, particularly under real-world conditions. We conduct three sets of experiments exposing subjects to the names of challengers in a range of electoral contexts across the United States. Results yield little support for the hypothesis that exposure increases electoral support. As name recognition may be insufficient without party labels, we also conduct experiments providing the candidates’ party affiliations, again finding little evidence of an effect. These findings cast doubt on the hypothesis that candidates, particularly challengers, who merely make their names known will thereby win more votes.
- 29 April 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in American Politics Research
- Vol. 53 (4) , 291-292
Hahn-Sigelman Prizes 2020-2024
- 29 April 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in American Politics Research
- Vol. 53 (4) , 291-292
Hahn-Sigelman Prizes 2020-2024
- 25 November 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Political Science Quarterly
- Vol. 140 (4) , 687-704
Perceptions, Reality, and Tolerance for Voting Wait Times in American Elections and Their Consequences for Democracy
Since 2012, voters in U.S. presidential elections have faced increasingly long wait times, depressing turnout, and undermining public confidence in the vote. While past studies have quantified differing levels of actual wait times, voters' perceptions about these wait times, which could directly influence their decision to vote, remain a black box. Using a novel nationally representative survey of the U.S. population, this study measures voters' perceptions of wait times, actual wait times, and willingness to wait. We ask whether some groups of voters expect longer waits and whether some are willing to wait longer than others. We also examine whether Americans who expect longer waits are actually less likely to vote. Overall, there seems to be more than willing to wait at the polls: 78 percent say they would wait over 30 minutes, while only 17 percent said they actually waited that long. At the individual level, women and nonwhite voters expect longer wait times, while lower-education voters marginally do. Women and less-educated voters, but not nonwhite voters, are less willing to wait at the polls. And the longer voters expect to wait, the less likely they are to vote. A voter who expects to wait 3 hours as opposed to not at all is 2.6 percentage points less likely to turn out. These findings highlight discrepancies between who expects and who is willing to wait through longer lines to cast their ballot. They bring with them important implications for policymakers.
- 25 November 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Political Science Quarterly
- Vol. 140 (4) , 687-704
Perceptions, Reality, and Tolerance for Voting Wait Times in American Elections and Their Consequences for Democracy
Since 2012, voters in U.S. presidential elections have faced increasingly long wait times, depressing turnout, and undermining public confidence in the vote. While past studies have quantified differing levels of actual wait times, voters' perceptions about these wait times, which could directly influence their decision to vote, remain a black box. Using a novel nationally representative survey of the U.S. population, this study measures voters' perceptions of wait times, actual wait times, and willingness to wait. We ask whether some groups of voters expect longer waits and whether some are willing to wait longer than others. We also examine whether Americans who expect longer waits are actually less likely to vote. Overall, there seems to be more than willing to wait at the polls: 78 percent say they would wait over 30 minutes, while only 17 percent said they actually waited that long. At the individual level, women and nonwhite voters expect longer wait times, while lower-education voters marginally do. Women and less-educated voters, but not nonwhite voters, are less willing to wait at the polls. And the longer voters expect to wait, the less likely they are to vote. A voter who expects to wait 3 hours as opposed to not at all is 2.6 percentage points less likely to turn out. These findings highlight discrepancies between who expects and who is willing to wait through longer lines to cast their ballot. They bring with them important implications for policymakers.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 9 February 2024
- Published by American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in Science Advances
- Vol. 10 (6) , eadj5778
Addressing climate change with behavioral science: A global intervention tournament in 63 countries
Effectively reducing climate change requires marked, global behavior change. However, it is unclear which strategies are most likely to motivate people to change their climate beliefs and behaviors. Here, we tested 11 expert-crowdsourced interventions on four climate mitigation outcomes: beliefs, policy support, information sharing intention, and an effortful tree-planting behavioral task. Across 59,440 participants from 63 countries, the interventions’ effectiveness was small, largely limited to nonclimate skeptics, and differed across outcomes: Beliefs were strengthened mostly by decreasing psychological distance (by 2.3%), policy support by writing a letter to a future-generation member (2.6%), information sharing by negative emotion induction (12.1%), and no intervention increased the more effortful behavior—several interventions even reduced tree planting. Last, the effects of each intervention differed depending on people’s initial climate beliefs. These findings suggest that the impact of behavioral climate interventions varies across audiences and target behaviors.
- 9 February 2024
- Published by American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in Science Advances
- Vol. 10 (6) , eadj5778
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessAddressing climate change with behavioral science: A global intervention tournament in 63 countries
Effectively reducing climate change requires marked, global behavior change. However, it is unclear which strategies are most likely to motivate people to change their climate beliefs and behaviors. Here, we tested 11 expert-crowdsourced interventions on four climate mitigation outcomes: beliefs, policy support, information sharing intention, and an effortful tree-planting behavioral task. Across 59,440 participants from 63 countries, the interventions’ effectiveness was small, largely limited to nonclimate skeptics, and differed across outcomes: Beliefs were strengthened mostly by decreasing psychological distance (by 2.3%), policy support by writing a letter to a future-generation member (2.6%), information sharing by negative emotion induction (12.1%), and no intervention increased the more effortful behavior—several interventions even reduced tree planting. Last, the effects of each intervention differed depending on people’s initial climate beliefs. These findings suggest that the impact of behavioral climate interventions varies across audiences and target behaviors.
- Open Access
- 15 May 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Politics and the Life Sciences
- Vol. 42 (2) , 179-204
Election-Related Post-Traumatic Stress: Evidence from the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election
The 2020 U.S. presidential election saw rising political tensions among ordinary voters and political elites, with fears of election violence culminating in the January 6 riot. We hypothesized that the 2020 election might have been traumatic for some voters, producing measurable symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). We also hypothesized that negative sentiment toward the opposing party correlates with PTSD. We measured PTSD using a modified version of the PCL-5, a validated PTSD screener, for 573 individuals from a nationally representative YouGov sample. We modeled the association between affective polarization and PTSD, controlling for political, demographic, and psychological traits. We estimate that 12.5% of American adults (95% CI: 9.2% to 15.9%) experienced election-related PTSD, far higher than the annual PTSD prevalence of 3.5%. Additionally, negativity toward opposing partisans correlated with PTSD symptoms. These findings highlight a potential need to support Americans affected by election-related trauma.
- 15 May 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Politics and the Life Sciences
- Vol. 42 (2) , 179-204
Open AccessElection-Related Post-Traumatic Stress: Evidence from the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election
The 2020 U.S. presidential election saw rising political tensions among ordinary voters and political elites, with fears of election violence culminating in the January 6 riot. We hypothesized that the 2020 election might have been traumatic for some voters, producing measurable symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). We also hypothesized that negative sentiment toward the opposing party correlates with PTSD. We measured PTSD using a modified version of the PCL-5, a validated PTSD screener, for 573 individuals from a nationally representative YouGov sample. We modeled the association between affective polarization and PTSD, controlling for political, demographic, and psychological traits. We estimate that 12.5% of American adults (95% CI: 9.2% to 15.9%) experienced election-related PTSD, far higher than the annual PTSD prevalence of 3.5%. Additionally, negativity toward opposing partisans correlated with PTSD symptoms. These findings highlight a potential need to support Americans affected by election-related trauma.
- 27 May 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in PS: Political Science & Politics
- Vol. 55 (4) , 749-753
Organizational Identity and Positionality in Randomized Control Trials: Considerations and Advice for Collaborative Research Teams
- 27 May 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in PS: Political Science & Politics
- Vol. 55 (4) , 749-753
Organizational Identity and Positionality in Randomized Control Trials: Considerations and Advice for Collaborative Research Teams
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 9 March 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in PNAS Nexus
- Vol. 1 (1) , pgac011
The harmful effects of partisan polarization on health
Partisan polarization significantly drives stress and anxiety among Americans, and recent aggregate-level studies suggest polarization may be shaping their health. This individual-level study uses a new representative dataset of 2,752 US residents surveyed between December 2019 and January 2020, some US residents report more days of poor physical and mental health per month than others. Using negative binomial models, zero inflated models, and visualizations, we find evidence that polarization is linked to declines in physical health: the more distant an individual feels politically from the average voter in their state, the worse health outcomes he or she reports. By uncovering the individual-level political correlates of health, this study aims to encourage further study and attention to the broader consequences of political polarization on American communities.
- 9 March 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in PNAS Nexus
- Vol. 1 (1) , pgac011
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessThe harmful effects of partisan polarization on health
Partisan polarization significantly drives stress and anxiety among Americans, and recent aggregate-level studies suggest polarization may be shaping their health. This individual-level study uses a new representative dataset of 2,752 US residents surveyed between December 2019 and January 2020, some US residents report more days of poor physical and mental health per month than others. Using negative binomial models, zero inflated models, and visualizations, we find evidence that polarization is linked to declines in physical health: the more distant an individual feels politically from the average voter in their state, the worse health outcomes he or she reports. By uncovering the individual-level political correlates of health, this study aims to encourage further study and attention to the broader consequences of political polarization on American communities.