Lidiya Vladislavna Zhukovskaya
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Lidiya Vladislavna Zhukovskaya has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Vladislav I. Zhukovskiy
Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia
7 shared publications - Konstantin Nikolaevich Kudryavtsev
Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation
5 shared publications - Lidiya V. Smirnova
State University of Humanities and Technology, Orekhovo-Zuevo, Russian Federation
3 shared publications E.N. Sachkova
State University of Humanities and Technology
1 shared publication- I. S. Stabulit
South Ural State University, Chelyabinsk, Russia
1 shared publication Irina Stabulit
South Ural State University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 8 December 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Computational Mathematics and Modeling
- Vol. 37 (3) , 508-517
The Coalition Rationality in Mixed Strategies
- 8 December 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Computational Mathematics and Modeling
- Vol. 37 (3) , 508-517
The Coalition Rationality in Mixed Strategies
- Open Access
- 16 September 2025
- Published by RPO for the Promotion of Institutes DE RAS in Economics of Contemporary Russia
- Vol. 28 (3) , 78-82
Presentation of the Monograph “Intelligent Technologies in Micro- and Mesoeconomics”
On May 30, 2025, at the regular meeting of the scientific seminar “Problems of modeling and development of production systems”, under the leadership of Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Professor, Doctor of Economics, head of the scientific direction “Mesoeconomics, Microeconomics, Corporate Economics” G.B. Kleiner, a presentation of the collective monograph “Intelligent Technologies in micro‑ and mesoeconomics” was held. edited by G.B. Kleiner and with a preface by Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of the Central Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences A.R. Bakhtizin. The reviewers were: Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences V.I. Mayevsky, PhD, Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Member.‑ Correspondent. RAN V.E. Dementiev, Head of the research department “Macroeconomics and Institutional Theory” at the Central Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The monograph containing the results of research performed at the Central Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences was approved by the Scientific Council of the Central Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The monograph’s author’s team consisted mainly of employees of the Department of Modeling of Production Facilities and Complexes at the Central Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Intelligent technologies in micro- and mesoeconomics: monograph. Ed. by G.B. Kleiner, A.R. Bakhtizina; Central Economic and Mathematical Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Moscow: SCIENTIFIC LIBRARY Publishing House, 2025. 324 p. ISBN 978-5-907954-80-9
- 16 September 2025
- Published by RPO for the Promotion of Institutes DE RAS in Economics of Contemporary Russia
- Vol. 28 (3) , 78-82
Open AccessPresentation of the Monograph “Intelligent Technologies in Micro- and Mesoeconomics”
On May 30, 2025, at the regular meeting of the scientific seminar “Problems of modeling and development of production systems”, under the leadership of Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Professor, Doctor of Economics, head of the scientific direction “Mesoeconomics, Microeconomics, Corporate Economics” G.B. Kleiner, a presentation of the collective monograph “Intelligent Technologies in micro‑ and mesoeconomics” was held. edited by G.B. Kleiner and with a preface by Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of the Central Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences A.R. Bakhtizin. The reviewers were: Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences V.I. Mayevsky, PhD, Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Member.‑ Correspondent. RAN V.E. Dementiev, Head of the research department “Macroeconomics and Institutional Theory” at the Central Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The monograph containing the results of research performed at the Central Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences was approved by the Scientific Council of the Central Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The monograph’s author’s team consisted mainly of employees of the Department of Modeling of Production Facilities and Complexes at the Central Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Intelligent technologies in micro- and mesoeconomics: monograph. Ed. by G.B. Kleiner, A.R. Bakhtizina; Central Economic and Mathematical Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Moscow: SCIENTIFIC LIBRARY Publishing House, 2025. 324 p. ISBN 978-5-907954-80-9
- 21 January 2025
- Published by Central Economic Mathematical Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences - Cifra
О сбалансированности экономической, правовой и социальной макросистем
Жуковская Л.В. О сбалансированности экономической, правовой и социальной макросистем. Секция 1 «Теоретические проблемы стратегического планирования на
- 21 January 2025
- Published by Central Economic Mathematical Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences - Cifra
О сбалансированности экономической, правовой и социальной макросистем
Жуковская Л.В. О сбалансированности экономической, правовой и социальной макросистем. Секция 1 «Теоретические проблемы стратегического планирования на
- 21 January 2025
- Published by Central Economic Mathematical Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences - Cifra
Концепция равновесия санкций и контрсанкций в одной дифференциальной игре n >= 2 лиц
Жуковский В.И., Жуковская Л.В. Концепция равновесия санкций и контрсанкций в одной дифференциальной игре n 2 лиц. Секция 1. «Теоретические проблемы
- 21 January 2025
- Published by Central Economic Mathematical Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences - Cifra
Концепция равновесия санкций и контрсанкций в одной дифференциальной игре n >= 2 лиц
Жуковский В.И., Жуковская Л.В. Концепция равновесия санкций и контрсанкций в одной дифференциальной игре n 2 лиц. Секция 1. «Теоретические проблемы
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by FSAEIHE South Ural State University (National Research University) in Bulletin of the South Ural State University Series "Mathematics. Mechanics. Physics"
- Vol. 17 (1) , 5-20
THE PARETO EQUILIBRIUM OF OBJECTIONS AND COUNTEROBJECTIONS IN LINEAR-QUADRATIC GAMES OF N PERSON
Publications on mathematical game theory with many (not less than 2) players can be conditionally distributed in four directions: non-cooperative, hierarchical, cooperative and coalition games. The last two, in turn, are divided into games with side and non-side payments and games with transferable and nontransferable payoffs, respectively. If the first ones are actively studied (St. Petersburg State Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes, St. Petersburg Institute of Economics and Mathematics, Institute of Applied Mathematical Research of Karelian Research Centre RAS), the games with non-transferable payoffs are not covered. The paper proposes the conception of objections and counter-objections. The initial investigations were published in two monographs of E.I. Vilkas, the Lithuanian mathematician (the student of N.N. Vorobjev, the professor of St. Petersburg University). For the differential games this conception was first applied by E.M. Waisbord in 1974, then it was continued by the first author of the present article together with E.M. Waisbord in the book Introduction to the theory of differential games of n-persons and its application (1980), and in the monograph Equilibrium of objections and counterobjections (2010) by V.I. Zhukovskiy. The paper proves that in еру mathematical model there is no Nash equilibrium but there are equilibria of objections and conterobjections and simultaneously Pareto maximality.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by FSAEIHE South Ural State University (National Research University) in Bulletin of the South Ural State University Series "Mathematics. Mechanics. Physics"
- Vol. 17 (1) , 5-20
Open AccessTHE PARETO EQUILIBRIUM OF OBJECTIONS AND COUNTEROBJECTIONS IN LINEAR-QUADRATIC GAMES OF N PERSON
Publications on mathematical game theory with many (not less than 2) players can be conditionally distributed in four directions: non-cooperative, hierarchical, cooperative and coalition games. The last two, in turn, are divided into games with side and non-side payments and games with transferable and nontransferable payoffs, respectively. If the first ones are actively studied (St. Petersburg State Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes, St. Petersburg Institute of Economics and Mathematics, Institute of Applied Mathematical Research of Karelian Research Centre RAS), the games with non-transferable payoffs are not covered. The paper proposes the conception of objections and counter-objections. The initial investigations were published in two monographs of E.I. Vilkas, the Lithuanian mathematician (the student of N.N. Vorobjev, the professor of St. Petersburg University). For the differential games this conception was first applied by E.M. Waisbord in 1974, then it was continued by the first author of the present article together with E.M. Waisbord in the book Introduction to the theory of differential games of n-persons and its application (1980), and in the monograph Equilibrium of objections and counterobjections (2010) by V.I. Zhukovskiy. The paper proves that in еру mathematical model there is no Nash equilibrium but there are equilibria of objections and conterobjections and simultaneously Pareto maximality.
- 1 December 2024
- Published by Pleiades Publishing Ltd in Doklady Mathematics
- Vol. 110 (S2) , S409-S421
Coalition Pareto-Optimal Solution in a Nontransferable Game
By the end of the last century, four directions had been established in the mathematical theory of positional differential games (PDGs): a noncoalition version of PDG, a cooperative, hierarchical, and, finally, the least studied, a coalition version of PDG. In turn, within the coalition, there are usually games with transferable payoffs (with side payments, when players can share their winnings during the game) and nontransferable payoffs (games with side payments, when such redistributions are absent for one reason or another). Studies of coalition games with side payments are concentrated and actively conducted at the Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Management Processes of St. Petersburg University and Institute of Applied Mathematical Research of the Karelian Research Centre of Russian Academy of Sciences (L.A. Petrosyan, V.V. Mazalov, E.M. Parilina, A.N. Rettieva, and their numerous domestic and foreign students). However, side payments are not always present even in economic interactions; moreover, side payments may be generally prohibited by law. The studies we have undertaken in recent years on the balance of threats and counterthreats (sanctions and countersanctions) in noncoalition differential games allow, in our opinion, covering some aspects of the nontransferable version of coalition games. This article is devoted to the issues of internal and external stability of coalitions in the PDG class. It reveals the coefficient constraints in the mathematical model of the positional differential linear-quadratic game of six persons with a two-coalition structure, in which this coalition structure is internally and externally stable.
- 1 December 2024
- Published by Pleiades Publishing Ltd in Doklady Mathematics
- Vol. 110 (S2) , S409-S421
Coalition Pareto-Optimal Solution in a Nontransferable Game
By the end of the last century, four directions had been established in the mathematical theory of positional differential games (PDGs): a noncoalition version of PDG, a cooperative, hierarchical, and, finally, the least studied, a coalition version of PDG. In turn, within the coalition, there are usually games with transferable payoffs (with side payments, when players can share their winnings during the game) and nontransferable payoffs (games with side payments, when such redistributions are absent for one reason or another). Studies of coalition games with side payments are concentrated and actively conducted at the Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Management Processes of St. Petersburg University and Institute of Applied Mathematical Research of the Karelian Research Centre of Russian Academy of Sciences (L.A. Petrosyan, V.V. Mazalov, E.M. Parilina, A.N. Rettieva, and their numerous domestic and foreign students). However, side payments are not always present even in economic interactions; moreover, side payments may be generally prohibited by law. The studies we have undertaken in recent years on the balance of threats and counterthreats (sanctions and countersanctions) in noncoalition differential games allow, in our opinion, covering some aspects of the nontransferable version of coalition games. This article is devoted to the issues of internal and external stability of coalitions in the PDG class. It reveals the coefficient constraints in the mathematical model of the positional differential linear-quadratic game of six persons with a two-coalition structure, in which this coalition structure is internally and externally stable.
- 15 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 58-69
On Strong Solutions in Linear Programming Problems with a Fuzzy Goal
- 15 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 58-69
On Strong Solutions in Linear Programming Problems with a Fuzzy Goal
- 1 December 2023
- Published by Pleiades Publishing Ltd in Doklady Mathematics
- Vol. 108 (S1) , S50-S55
Individual Stability of Pareto Equilibrium of Threats and Counterthreats in a Coalition Differential Game without Side Payments
The notion of individual stability of a Pareto equilibrium of threats and counterthreats in a three-person linear-quadratic differential game without side payments is used. The corresponding equilibrium is found in explicit form.
- 1 December 2023
- Published by Pleiades Publishing Ltd in Doklady Mathematics
- Vol. 108 (S1) , S50-S55
Individual Stability of Pareto Equilibrium of Threats and Counterthreats in a Coalition Differential Game without Side Payments
The notion of individual stability of a Pareto equilibrium of threats and counterthreats in a three-person linear-quadratic differential game without side payments is used. The corresponding equilibrium is found in explicit form.
- Open Access
- 23 October 2023
- Published by MDPI AG in Mathematics
- Vol. 11 (20) , 4402
On the Concept of Equilibrium in Sanctions and Countersanctions in a Differential Game
This paper develops the methodology for modeling decision processes in complex controlled dynamic systems. The idea of balancing such systems (driving them to equilibrium) is implemented, and a new mechanism for the equilibria’s stability is proposed. Such an approach involves economic–mathematical modeling jointly with systems analysis methods, economics, law, sociology, game theory, management, and performance measurement. A linear-quadratic positional differential game of several players is considered. Coefficient criteria under which the game has an equilibrium in sanctions and countersanctions and, simultaneously, no Nash equilibrium are derived. The economic and legal model of active equilibrium is studied through the legal concept of sanctions, which enlarges the practical application of this class of problems.
- 23 October 2023
- Published by MDPI AG in Mathematics
- Vol. 11 (20) , 4402
Open AccessOn the Concept of Equilibrium in Sanctions and Countersanctions in a Differential Game
This paper develops the methodology for modeling decision processes in complex controlled dynamic systems. The idea of balancing such systems (driving them to equilibrium) is implemented, and a new mechanism for the equilibria’s stability is proposed. Such an approach involves economic–mathematical modeling jointly with systems analysis methods, economics, law, sociology, game theory, management, and performance measurement. A linear-quadratic positional differential game of several players is considered. Coefficient criteria under which the game has an equilibrium in sanctions and countersanctions and, simultaneously, no Nash equilibrium are derived. The economic and legal model of active equilibrium is studied through the legal concept of sanctions, which enlarges the practical application of this class of problems.