Keita Emura
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Keita Emura has a total of 73 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Goichiro Hanaoka
National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology, Tokyo, Japan
7 shared publications - Atsushi Takayasu
The University of Tokyo
6 shared publications Kazumasa Omote
5 shared publications- Jae Hong Seo
Myongji University
4 shared publications - Takuya Hayashi
National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT)
4 shared publications - Takahiro Matsuda
National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST)
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 23 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 620-625
POSTER: Security Analysis on a Secure Medical Data Sharing System in Digital Twin Environments
- 23 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 620-625
POSTER: Security Analysis on a Secure Medical Data Sharing System in Digital Twin Environments
- 19 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 388-399
Generic Construction of CCA-Secure PKE from Key-Insulated and Privacy-Preserving Signatures with Publicly Derived Public Key
- 19 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 388-399
Generic Construction of CCA-Secure PKE from Key-Insulated and Privacy-Preserving Signatures with Publicly Derived Public Key
- 18 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 127-138
On Publicly Verifiable Tokens in Group Signatures with Message-Dependent Opening
- 18 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 127-138
On Publicly Verifiable Tokens in Group Signatures with Message-Dependent Opening
- 24 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 111-129
Search-Efficient Public-Key Authenticated Encryption with Keyword Search Made Easy
- 24 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 111-129
Search-Efficient Public-Key Authenticated Encryption with Keyword Search Made Easy
- Open Access
- 6 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Designs, Codes and Cryptography
- Vol. 94 (9) , 197
On the BUFF security of ECDSA with key recovery
In the usual syntax of digital signatures, the verification algorithm takes a verification key in addition to a signature and a message, whereas in ECDSA with key recovery, which is used in Ethereum, no verification key is input to the verification algorithm. Instead, a verification key is recovered from a signature and a message. In this paper, we explore the BUFF security of ECDSA with key recovery (KR-ECDSA), where BUFF stands for Beyond UnForgeability Features [7]. As a result, we show that KR-ECDSA provides BUFF security, except weak non-resignability (wNR). It is particularly noteworthy that the KR-ECDSA verification algorithm takes an Ethereum address $$\textsf{addr}$$ as input. This address is defined as the rightmost 160 bits of the Keccak-256 hash of the corresponding ECDSA verification key. Crucially, the algorithm verifies that the hash of the recovered verification key matches $$\textsf{addr}$$ . Our security analysis shows that the procedure, namely checking whether the hash value of the recovered verification key matches the address, is essential for achieving provide BUFF security. We also discuss whether wNR is mandatory in Ethereum or not. To clarify which part is mandatory to provide BUFF security in KR-ECDSA, we show that the original ECDSA does not provide any BUFF security. As a by-product of the analysis, we show that one of our BUFF attacks also works against Aumayr et al.’s ECDSA-based adaptor signature scheme [2] and Qin et al.’s blind adaptor signature scheme [35], which is based on Aumayr et al.’s scheme. We emphasize that the attack lies outside their security models.- 6 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Designs, Codes and Cryptography
- Vol. 94 (9) , 197
Open AccessOn the BUFF security of ECDSA with key recovery
In the usual syntax of digital signatures, the verification algorithm takes a verification key in addition to a signature and a message, whereas in ECDSA with key recovery, which is used in Ethereum, no verification key is input to the verification algorithm. Instead, a verification key is recovered from a signature and a message. In this paper, we explore the BUFF security of ECDSA with key recovery (KR-ECDSA), where BUFF stands for Beyond UnForgeability Features [7]. As a result, we show that KR-ECDSA provides BUFF security, except weak non-resignability (wNR). It is particularly noteworthy that the KR-ECDSA verification algorithm takes an Ethereum address $$\textsf{addr}$$ as input. This address is defined as the rightmost 160 bits of the Keccak-256 hash of the corresponding ECDSA verification key. Crucially, the algorithm verifies that the hash of the recovered verification key matches $$\textsf{addr}$$ . Our security analysis shows that the procedure, namely checking whether the hash value of the recovered verification key matches the address, is essential for achieving provide BUFF security. We also discuss whether wNR is mandatory in Ethereum or not. To clarify which part is mandatory to provide BUFF security in KR-ECDSA, we show that the original ECDSA does not provide any BUFF security. As a by-product of the analysis, we show that one of our BUFF attacks also works against Aumayr et al.’s ECDSA-based adaptor signature scheme [2] and Qin et al.’s blind adaptor signature scheme [35], which is based on Aumayr et al.’s scheme. We emphasize that the attack lies outside their security models. - Open Access
- 25 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Information Security and Applications
- Vol. 102
Security analysis on blockchain-based public key encryption with keyword search for medical data sharing in cloud environment
- 25 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Information Security and Applications
- Vol. 102
Open AccessSecurity analysis on blockchain-based public key encryption with keyword search for medical data sharing in cloud environment
- Open Access
- 1 July 2026
- Published by Institute of Electronics, Information and Communications Engineers (IEICE) in IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
- Vol. E109.A (7) , 1314-1315
Comments on “Identity-Based Group Encryption with Keyword Search against Keyword Guessing Attack”
Wang et al. (IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 2024) introduced Identity-Based Group Encryption with Keyword Search (IBGEKS). In this short note, we give two keyword guessing attacks against the IBGEKS scheme.
- 1 July 2026
- Published by Institute of Electronics, Information and Communications Engineers (IEICE) in IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
- Vol. E109.A (7) , 1314-1315
Open AccessComments on “Identity-Based Group Encryption with Keyword Search against Keyword Guessing Attack”
Wang et al. (IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 2024) introduced Identity-Based Group Encryption with Keyword Search (IBGEKS). In this short note, we give two keyword guessing attacks against the IBGEKS scheme.
- Open Access
- 18 May 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 21 (15566013) , 5108-5109
Comments on “Lightweight Multi-User Public-Key Authenticated Encryption With Keyword Search”
Xu et al. (IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 2025) proposed a lightweight multi-user public-key authenticated encryption with keyword search (LM-PAEKS) scheme. In this short note, we demonstrate that keyword information can be leaked from ciphertexts in the scheme. We further note that there are shortcomings in the security proof as well.
- 18 May 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 21 (15566013) , 5108-5109
Open AccessComments on “Lightweight Multi-User Public-Key Authenticated Encryption With Keyword Search”
Xu et al. (IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 2025) proposed a lightweight multi-user public-key authenticated encryption with keyword search (LM-PAEKS) scheme. In this short note, we demonstrate that keyword information can be leaked from ciphertexts in the scheme. We further note that there are shortcomings in the security proof as well.
- 16 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Computer Science
- Vol. 1073
On the traceability of group signatures: Uncorrupted user must exist
- 16 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Computer Science
- Vol. 1073
On the traceability of group signatures: Uncorrupted user must exist
- 13 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Information Security and Applications
- Vol. 98
Security analysis on a public-key inverted-index keyword search scheme with designated tester
- 13 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Information Security and Applications
- Vol. 98
Security analysis on a public-key inverted-index keyword search scheme with designated tester