Jonathan Lewis
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Jonathan Lewis has a total of 18 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Søren Holm
The University of Manchester
17 shared publications - Brian David Earp
Centre for Biomedical Ethics, Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
9 shared publications - Ivar Rodriguez Hannikainen
Department of Philosophy I, University of Granada, Granada, Spain
6 shared publications - James Toomey
The University of Iowa College of Law, Iowa City, Iowa, USA
5 shared publications Brian D. Earp
University of Oxford
2 shared publicationsCarl L. Hart
Columbia Univerity
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 7 July 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics
- Vol. 35 (3) , 1
Neural Organoids: How Should We Handle the Possibility of Sentience? – CORRIGENDUM
- 7 July 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics
- Vol. 35 (3) , 1
Open AccessNeural Organoids: How Should We Handle the Possibility of Sentience? – CORRIGENDUM
- Open Access
- 27 April 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics
- Vol. 34 (4) , 586-596
Neural Organoids: How Should We Handle the Possibility of Sentience?
Neural organoids derived from pluripotent stem cells have sparked ethical debate because, it is claimed, they could be sentient, or could develop sentience. We critically assess three routes for defending such a possibility: analogy with known sentient organisms, inference from neural function using leading theories of consciousness, and foundational philosophical commitments. Current cortical organoids lack nociceptors, sensory integration, and behavioral repertoires necessary for analogical arguments; they also fall short of the structural differentiation presupposed by most empirically grounded consciousness theories, rendering existing neural metrics unreliable. Even if constitutive panpsychism were accepted, the moral relevance of any putative micro experiences would remain undetermined. Precautionary appeals, therefore, hinge on how the term “possible” is interpreted. We argue that regulatory or experimental restrictions are warranted only once there is a non-trivial empirical likelihood that a given organoid type can generate valenced experience. Given present technological limits on size, complexity, and vascularization, that threshold has not been reached, nor is it likely to be met in the near to medium term. This claim is contingent on the current state of research, but we believe it to be justified. Our analysis clarifies conceptual ambiguities surrounding organoid sentience and offers a principled framework for proportionate precaution.
- 27 April 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics
- Vol. 34 (4) , 586-596
Open AccessNeural Organoids: How Should We Handle the Possibility of Sentience?
Neural organoids derived from pluripotent stem cells have sparked ethical debate because, it is claimed, they could be sentient, or could develop sentience. We critically assess three routes for defending such a possibility: analogy with known sentient organisms, inference from neural function using leading theories of consciousness, and foundational philosophical commitments. Current cortical organoids lack nociceptors, sensory integration, and behavioral repertoires necessary for analogical arguments; they also fall short of the structural differentiation presupposed by most empirically grounded consciousness theories, rendering existing neural metrics unreliable. Even if constitutive panpsychism were accepted, the moral relevance of any putative micro experiences would remain undetermined. Precautionary appeals, therefore, hinge on how the term “possible” is interpreted. We argue that regulatory or experimental restrictions are warranted only once there is a non-trivial empirical likelihood that a given organoid type can generate valenced experience. Given present technological limits on size, complexity, and vascularization, that threshold has not been reached, nor is it likely to be met in the near to medium term. This claim is contingent on the current state of research, but we believe it to be justified. Our analysis clarifies conceptual ambiguities surrounding organoid sentience and offers a principled framework for proportionate precaution.
- Open Access
- 3 April 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in AJOB Neuroscience
- Vol. 17 (2) , 103-105
Looking Under the Lamppost – Organoid Intelligence and the Ethics of Neural Organoids
- 3 April 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in AJOB Neuroscience
- Vol. 17 (2) , 103-105
Open AccessLooking Under the Lamppost – Organoid Intelligence and the Ethics of Neural Organoids
- Open Access
- 20 February 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Research Ethics
- Vol. 22 (4) , 748-767
Reconceptualizing the right to withdraw in stem cell research: Striking a balance between donor autonomy and scientific utility
This paper seeks to address the challenges with applying a right to withdraw to pluripotent stem cell (PSC) research. PSC lines are unique in that they can be expanded indefinitely, disseminated globally, transformed into multiple derivatives, and employed as therapeutic products, rendering withdrawal not only logistically unfeasible, but also a substantive risk to research stability. Following an analysis of whether the classical right to withdraw can be suitably modified to address the tensions between donor freedoms and transformative biomedical research, we argue for a recalibration of donor control. Specifically, we present a hybrid model that combines up-front broad consent (including an expression of initial preferences for currently known ethically contentious areas of stem cell research), ongoing dynamic consent, and robust governance. While the paper reviews existing consent and withdrawal models, its primary contribution is to show why these models fail to adequately address the PSC-specific tension between respect for donor autonomy and provision of research certainty and to propose a hybrid, autonomy-preserving alternative that is designed to deliver greater research stability than a modified right to withdraw.
- 20 February 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Research Ethics
- Vol. 22 (4) , 748-767
Open AccessReconceptualizing the right to withdraw in stem cell research: Striking a balance between donor autonomy and scientific utility
This paper seeks to address the challenges with applying a right to withdraw to pluripotent stem cell (PSC) research. PSC lines are unique in that they can be expanded indefinitely, disseminated globally, transformed into multiple derivatives, and employed as therapeutic products, rendering withdrawal not only logistically unfeasible, but also a substantive risk to research stability. Following an analysis of whether the classical right to withdraw can be suitably modified to address the tensions between donor freedoms and transformative biomedical research, we argue for a recalibration of donor control. Specifically, we present a hybrid model that combines up-front broad consent (including an expression of initial preferences for currently known ethically contentious areas of stem cell research), ongoing dynamic consent, and robust governance. While the paper reviews existing consent and withdrawal models, its primary contribution is to show why these models fail to adequately address the PSC-specific tension between respect for donor autonomy and provision of research certainty and to propose a hybrid, autonomy-preserving alternative that is designed to deliver greater research stability than a modified right to withdraw.
- Open Access
- 14 August 2025
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
- Vol. 52 (6) , 364-368
Manipulating embryogenesis and testing for potential: two real problems for the regulation of stem cell-based embryo models
Stem cell-based human embryo models (SCBEMs), generated in vitro from stem cells, currently exist outside the scope of regulatory frameworks that govern in vitro embryo research in most jurisdictions. A widely discussed proposal suggests using a ‘Turing test’ framework, whereby regulatory oversight is triggered if an SCBEM is found to be ‘equivalent’ to a human embryo. In this paper, we argue that such a proposal faces two major complications. First, sophisticated laboratory techniques such as trophoblast replacement allow researchers to manipulate normal embryogenesis, obscuring whether a given SCBEM meets embryo-like regulatory thresholds. Second, attempts to assess SCBEMs’ developmental potential—especially through non-human analogues—rest on tenuous epistemic assumptions that may not align with human-specific developmental trajectories. Given SCBEMs’ potential manipulability and uncertain biological and potentiality benchmarks, we argue that reliance on equivalence-based frameworks alone is highly problematic. We conclude by urging a cautious, flexible approach that recognises both the scientific promise of SCBEMs and the normative need to prevent the circumvention of regulatory safeguards.
- 14 August 2025
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
- Vol. 52 (6) , 364-368
Open AccessManipulating embryogenesis and testing for potential: two real problems for the regulation of stem cell-based embryo models
Stem cell-based human embryo models (SCBEMs), generated in vitro from stem cells, currently exist outside the scope of regulatory frameworks that govern in vitro embryo research in most jurisdictions. A widely discussed proposal suggests using a ‘Turing test’ framework, whereby regulatory oversight is triggered if an SCBEM is found to be ‘equivalent’ to a human embryo. In this paper, we argue that such a proposal faces two major complications. First, sophisticated laboratory techniques such as trophoblast replacement allow researchers to manipulate normal embryogenesis, obscuring whether a given SCBEM meets embryo-like regulatory thresholds. Second, attempts to assess SCBEMs’ developmental potential—especially through non-human analogues—rest on tenuous epistemic assumptions that may not align with human-specific developmental trajectories. Given SCBEMs’ potential manipulability and uncertain biological and potentiality benchmarks, we argue that reliance on equivalence-based frameworks alone is highly problematic. We conclude by urging a cautious, flexible approach that recognises both the scientific promise of SCBEMs and the normative need to prevent the circumvention of regulatory safeguards.
- Open Access
- 17 July 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Manipulating Embryogenesis and Testing for Potential: Two Real Problems for the Regulation of Stem Cell-based Embryo Models
Stem cell-based human embryo models (SCBEMs), generated in vitro from stem cells, currently exist outside the scope of regulatory frameworks that govern in vitro embryo research in most jurisdictions. A widely discussed proposal suggests using a "Turing test" framework, whereby regulatory oversight is triggered if a SCBEM is found to be “equivalent” to a human embryo. In this paper, we argue that such a proposal faces two major complications. First, sophisticated laboratory techniques such as trophoblast replacement allow researchers to manipulate normal embryogenesis, obscuring whether a given SCBEM meets embryo-like thresholds. Second, attempts to assess SCBEMs’ developmental potential—especially through non-human analogues—rest on tenuous epistemic assumptions that may not align with human-specific developmental trajectories. Given SCBEMs’ potential manipulability and uncertain biological and potentiality benchmarks, we argue that reliance on equivalence-based frameworks alone is highly problematic. We conclude by urging a cautious, flexible approach that recognizes both the scientific promise of SCBEMs and the normative need to prevent the circumvention of regulatory safeguards.
- 17 July 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessManipulating Embryogenesis and Testing for Potential: Two Real Problems for the Regulation of Stem Cell-based Embryo Models
Stem cell-based human embryo models (SCBEMs), generated in vitro from stem cells, currently exist outside the scope of regulatory frameworks that govern in vitro embryo research in most jurisdictions. A widely discussed proposal suggests using a "Turing test" framework, whereby regulatory oversight is triggered if a SCBEM is found to be “equivalent” to a human embryo. In this paper, we argue that such a proposal faces two major complications. First, sophisticated laboratory techniques such as trophoblast replacement allow researchers to manipulate normal embryogenesis, obscuring whether a given SCBEM meets embryo-like thresholds. Second, attempts to assess SCBEMs’ developmental potential—especially through non-human analogues—rest on tenuous epistemic assumptions that may not align with human-specific developmental trajectories. Given SCBEMs’ potential manipulability and uncertain biological and potentiality benchmarks, we argue that reliance on equivalence-based frameworks alone is highly problematic. We conclude by urging a cautious, flexible approach that recognizes both the scientific promise of SCBEMs and the normative need to prevent the circumvention of regulatory safeguards.
- 1 July 2025
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
- Vol. 52 (7) , 453-458
A qualitative study of true self judgments, epistemic access, and medical decision-making
Background: Toomey et al (2024) found that US participants were more likely to follow a medical treatment preference—expressed after substantial cognitive decline—of a third person rather than their own future self. This correlated with a greater tendency to see the third person as still their true self. We hypothesised that the greater epistemic access one has to one’s own true self as opposed to others might drive this difference. Methods: A codebook designed to capture different kinds of evidence and reasoning was developed, and participants’ explanations for their treatment decisions in Toomey et al ’s study were coded and qualitatively analysed. Results: In first-person cases, participants were more likely to explain their treatment decision with reference to perceived direct access to their own true self. In contrast, in third-person cases, participants more often relied on proxies or heuristics, such as the presumption that an expressed preference is an authentic one or that preferences expressed with greater cognition tend to better reflect the true self. Conclusions: These findings support the hypothesis that differential epistemic access to the true self in first- and third-person cases may drive different medical treatment decisions. Participants may be trying to follow the patient’s ‘true’ or ‘authentic’ preference in all cases, but relying on different kinds of evidence in so doing.
- 1 July 2025
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
- Vol. 52 (7) , 453-458
A qualitative study of true self judgments, epistemic access, and medical decision-making
Background: Toomey et al (2024) found that US participants were more likely to follow a medical treatment preference—expressed after substantial cognitive decline—of a third person rather than their own future self. This correlated with a greater tendency to see the third person as still their true self. We hypothesised that the greater epistemic access one has to one’s own true self as opposed to others might drive this difference. Methods: A codebook designed to capture different kinds of evidence and reasoning was developed, and participants’ explanations for their treatment decisions in Toomey et al ’s study were coded and qualitatively analysed. Results: In first-person cases, participants were more likely to explain their treatment decision with reference to perceived direct access to their own true self. In contrast, in third-person cases, participants more often relied on proxies or heuristics, such as the presumption that an expressed preference is an authentic one or that preferences expressed with greater cognition tend to better reflect the true self. Conclusions: These findings support the hypothesis that differential epistemic access to the true self in first- and third-person cases may drive different medical treatment decisions. Participants may be trying to follow the patient’s ‘true’ or ‘authentic’ preference in all cases, but relying on different kinds of evidence in so doing.
- 3 April 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 25 (4) , 71-74
Experimental Bioethics, Linguistic Pragmatism, and Public Attitudes Toward Brain Organoids Research
- 3 April 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 25 (4) , 71-74
Experimental Bioethics, Linguistic Pragmatism, and Public Attitudes Toward Brain Organoids Research
- 24 February 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Clinical Ethics
- Vol. 20 (1) , 1-3
Re-envisioning autonomy: From consent and cognitive capacity to embodied, relational, and authentic selfhood
- 24 February 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Clinical Ethics
- Vol. 20 (1) , 1-3
Re-envisioning autonomy: From consent and cognitive capacity to embodied, relational, and authentic selfhood
- Open Access
- 2 August 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 24 (8) , 86-88
The True Self and Decision-Making Capacity
- 2 August 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 24 (8) , 86-88
Open AccessThe True Self and Decision-Making Capacity