Javier Sajuria
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Javier Sajuria has a total of 24 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Sofia Collignon
Queen Mary University of London
3 shared publications Jorge Fábrega
2 shared publications- Lisa Zanotti
Universidad Diego Portales
2 shared publications - Noam Titelman
London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK
2 shared publications - Yannis Theocharis
Technical University of Munich, Germany
2 shared publications - Carlos Meléndez
Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon, Portugal
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 28 October 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
Is sidestepping the judiciary seen as democratic? Evidence from Great Britain and Spain
Executives often bypass the courts without public backlash and, sometimes, with public support. This research note evaluates one strategy employed by politicians for securing public backing when bypassing the courts: a majoritarian framing. We evaluate this strategy through candidate survey experiments in Great Britain ( n = 957) and Spain ( n = 995) that contrast this framing with institutional checks and balances. On average, respondents rate the candidate pushing for court bypassing as less democratic. Nevertheless, a sizeable minority in both countries judges this option as more democratic. These results indicate that heterogeneous understandings of what counts as democratic can sustain public tolerance for executive bypass of the courts.
- 28 October 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
Open AccessIs sidestepping the judiciary seen as democratic? Evidence from Great Britain and Spain
Executives often bypass the courts without public backlash and, sometimes, with public support. This research note evaluates one strategy employed by politicians for securing public backing when bypassing the courts: a majoritarian framing. We evaluate this strategy through candidate survey experiments in Great Britain ( n = 957) and Spain ( n = 995) that contrast this framing with institutional checks and balances. On average, respondents rate the candidate pushing for court bypassing as less democratic. Nevertheless, a sizeable minority in both countries judges this option as more democratic. These results indicate that heterogeneous understandings of what counts as democratic can sustain public tolerance for executive bypass of the courts.
- Open Access
- 20 October 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
What Is the Far Right? Rethinking Its Core Across Regions
What defines the far right across regions? The dominant account identifies nativism and authoritarianism as its ideological core. We argue that nativism, in all of its dimensions, is not a universal feature of the far right, but one contextually specific articulation of a broader exclusionary logic. We define the far right instead as a relational configuration of two mutually constitutive attitudinal dimensions: authoritarianism, understood as the demand that political authority enforce conformity to a collective order, and exclusionary national identity, understood as a bounded conception of legitimate national membership. The relation between the two is constant, while the content of the boundary and the order it sustains varies across political and historical contexts. We further distinguish between deviants, disciplined for what they do, and others, excluded for what they are, providing an observable criterion for identifying the two dimensions and tracking their transformation over time. Illustrations from India, the United States, and Brazil, together with cases at the margins of the family, show how the framework clarifies contested classifications that a nativism-centred definition leaves unresolved. The approach provides a cross-regional definition of the far right while separating its attitudinal core from behavioural manifestations and strategic alignment.
- 20 October 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessWhat Is the Far Right? Rethinking Its Core Across Regions
What defines the far right across regions? The dominant account identifies nativism and authoritarianism as its ideological core. We argue that nativism, in all of its dimensions, is not a universal feature of the far right, but one contextually specific articulation of a broader exclusionary logic. We define the far right instead as a relational configuration of two mutually constitutive attitudinal dimensions: authoritarianism, understood as the demand that political authority enforce conformity to a collective order, and exclusionary national identity, understood as a bounded conception of legitimate national membership. The relation between the two is constant, while the content of the boundary and the order it sustains varies across political and historical contexts. We further distinguish between deviants, disciplined for what they do, and others, excluded for what they are, providing an observable criterion for identifying the two dimensions and tracking their transformation over time. Illustrations from India, the United States, and Brazil, together with cases at the margins of the family, show how the framework clarifies contested classifications that a nativism-centred definition leaves unresolved. The approach provides a cross-regional definition of the far right while separating its attitudinal core from behavioural manifestations and strategic alignment.
- 3 September 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 116-132
Is London's Electoral Landscape Becoming Increasingly Fragmented?
This chapter examines whether London's electoral landscape is becoming increasingly fragmented, exploring how institutional design shapes political diversity. Drawing on aggregate electoral data and individual-level survey responses from the British Election Study, it analyses fragmentation under two contrasting electoral systems: the First-Past-the-Post system used in UK general elections and the Additional Member System (AMS) governing London Assembly elections. It finds that London's political fragmentation is real but institutionally conditioned. Under First-Past-the-Post, a persistent and growing gap between vote and seat fragmentation is observed, with rising voter dispersion suppressed by the system's mechanical and psychological disincentives. In contrast, the AMS produces a more proportional, and therefore more visible, distribution of party competition, allowing smaller parties to gain representation and reinforcing their electoral viability. The same electorate can, then, appear either stable or fragmented depending on how votes are counted and translated into seats. The chapter reflects on the implications of this for democratic representation and legitimacy in the capital.
- 3 September 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 116-132
Is London's Electoral Landscape Becoming Increasingly Fragmented?
This chapter examines whether London's electoral landscape is becoming increasingly fragmented, exploring how institutional design shapes political diversity. Drawing on aggregate electoral data and individual-level survey responses from the British Election Study, it analyses fragmentation under two contrasting electoral systems: the First-Past-the-Post system used in UK general elections and the Additional Member System (AMS) governing London Assembly elections. It finds that London's political fragmentation is real but institutionally conditioned. Under First-Past-the-Post, a persistent and growing gap between vote and seat fragmentation is observed, with rising voter dispersion suppressed by the system's mechanical and psychological disincentives. In contrast, the AMS produces a more proportional, and therefore more visible, distribution of party competition, allowing smaller parties to gain representation and reinforcing their electoral viability. The same electorate can, then, appear either stable or fragmented depending on how votes are counted and translated into seats. The chapter reflects on the implications of this for democratic representation and legitimacy in the capital.
- Open Access
- 12 September 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
La Demanda por Populismo
Uno de los principales dilemas políticos de los últimos años, al menos desde la crisis económicoque azotó con particular intensidad a la Eurozona el 2008, se refiere al derrumbe del apoyo delas fuerzas políticas tradicionales (Moffitt 2015; Caiani y Graziano 2021). Primero la socialde-mocracia, y ahora la derecha tradicional (Bale y Kaltwasser 2021) han tenido que lidiar conla pérdida de las confianzas ciudadanas y la amenaza electoral desde los extremos.El surgimiento de estos extremos, como respuesta a la percepción de similaridad ideológicay a la incapacidad de hacer frente a las consecuencias de esta crisis, está íntimamente ligadoal surgimiento de posturas populistas. El populismo, en su versión ideacional (Mudde 2017;Mudde y Rovira Kaltwasser 2018), se ha convertido en una de las herramientas ideológicaspreferidas de estos sectores. La simpleza de la argumentación dialéctica entre pueblo y élite,sumado a la ventaja ética que trae la acusación de corrupción de las élites a la luz de losestragos de la crisis económica de 2008, le han dado una ventaja estratégica en los últimos15 años. Sin embargo, el camino del surgimiento de partidos populistas en Europa no ha sidoun salto directo al estrellato. Como han documentado van Kessel, Pirro y Taggart (2018), elcrecimiento de una oferta populista ha tenido destinos disimiles en diversos países. Si bienla tendencia ha sido a la alza1, no es una trayectoria linear. Como cualquier otra altern
- 12 September 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessLa Demanda por Populismo
Uno de los principales dilemas políticos de los últimos años, al menos desde la crisis económicoque azotó con particular intensidad a la Eurozona el 2008, se refiere al derrumbe del apoyo delas fuerzas políticas tradicionales (Moffitt 2015; Caiani y Graziano 2021). Primero la socialde-mocracia, y ahora la derecha tradicional (Bale y Kaltwasser 2021) han tenido que lidiar conla pérdida de las confianzas ciudadanas y la amenaza electoral desde los extremos.El surgimiento de estos extremos, como respuesta a la percepción de similaridad ideológicay a la incapacidad de hacer frente a las consecuencias de esta crisis, está íntimamente ligadoal surgimiento de posturas populistas. El populismo, en su versión ideacional (Mudde 2017;Mudde y Rovira Kaltwasser 2018), se ha convertido en una de las herramientas ideológicaspreferidas de estos sectores. La simpleza de la argumentación dialéctica entre pueblo y élite,sumado a la ventaja ética que trae la acusación de corrupción de las élites a la luz de losestragos de la crisis económica de 2008, le han dado una ventaja estratégica en los últimos15 años. Sin embargo, el camino del surgimiento de partidos populistas en Europa no ha sidoun salto directo al estrellato. Como han documentado van Kessel, Pirro y Taggart (2018), elcrecimiento de una oferta populista ha tenido destinos disimiles en diversos países. Si bienla tendencia ha sido a la alza1, no es una trayectoria linear. Como cualquier otra altern
- Open Access
- 15 February 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Political Research Exchange
- Vol. 7 (1)
Local media, local candidates and preference formation
- 15 February 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Political Research Exchange
- Vol. 7 (1)
Open AccessLocal media, local candidates and preference formation
- Open Access
- 12 November 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
When citizens support democratic backsliding in the name of democracy
According to recent studies, liberal democracies around the globe are facing the threat of undemo-cratic reforms carried out by elected officials (e.g. Wunsch and Blachard, 2023). Often, these reformsare caried out without a backlash in public opinion, and even with some support. We study one mech-anism through which political leaders engage with citizens to promote support for antidemocraticmeasures: the democratic framing of undemocratic reforms. We asses this mechanism through threeconjoint experiments in the UK and Spain. We find that a large number of citizens in the UK and Spainare open to support undemocratic reforms when these are framed in ‘pro-democratic’ ways. Our find-ings suggest that popular support for democratic erosion might be more widespread than previouslyassumed
- 12 November 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessWhen citizens support democratic backsliding in the name of democracy
According to recent studies, liberal democracies around the globe are facing the threat of undemo-cratic reforms carried out by elected officials (e.g. Wunsch and Blachard, 2023). Often, these reformsare caried out without a backlash in public opinion, and even with some support. We study one mech-anism through which political leaders engage with citizens to promote support for antidemocraticmeasures: the democratic framing of undemocratic reforms. We asses this mechanism through threeconjoint experiments in the UK and Spain. We find that a large number of citizens in the UK and Spainare open to support undemocratic reforms when these are framed in ‘pro-democratic’ ways. Our find-ings suggest that popular support for democratic erosion might be more widespread than previouslyassumed
- Open Access
- 30 August 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
- Vol. 30 (6) , 997-1013
Why vote for an independent? The relevance of negative identity, independent identity, and dealignment in a pro-independent political environment
We know that political parties play a crucial role in the electoral processes of established democracies. However, we know much less about how this role fades away. In this paper, we study the case of Chile, a country that, until a few years ago, was cited as an example of a stable and institutionalized party system. We study how the phenomenon of independent candidates has shaken the national party system. We use two separate strategies to study this phenomenon. First, we measure the marginal effect of the independent label, compared to other party labels, using a conjoint experiment. Our findings show that candidates who are presented as independents have a significant increase in their probability of being chosen. Second, we measure whether this electoral effect relates to party identification. We find that respondents show low animosity towards independent candidates and high animosity towards traditional parties. Furthermore, a majority of the studied population can be classified as negative partisans. These findings suggest that the recent emergence of independent candidates is a result of negative views on parties.
- 30 August 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
- Vol. 30 (6) , 997-1013
Open AccessWhy vote for an independent? The relevance of negative identity, independent identity, and dealignment in a pro-independent political environment
We know that political parties play a crucial role in the electoral processes of established democracies. However, we know much less about how this role fades away. In this paper, we study the case of Chile, a country that, until a few years ago, was cited as an example of a stable and institutionalized party system. We study how the phenomenon of independent candidates has shaken the national party system. We use two separate strategies to study this phenomenon. First, we measure the marginal effect of the independent label, compared to other party labels, using a conjoint experiment. Our findings show that candidates who are presented as independents have a significant increase in their probability of being chosen. Second, we measure whether this electoral effect relates to party identification. We find that respondents show low animosity towards independent candidates and high animosity towards traditional parties. Furthermore, a majority of the studied population can be classified as negative partisans. These findings suggest that the recent emergence of independent candidates is a result of negative views on parties.
- Open Access
- 17 May 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Se nos rompió el amor: cambios en la opinión pública durante el proceso constituyente chileno
El fracaso del proceso constituyente en el plebiscito de septiembre de 2022 merece ser analizado desde la perspectiva de la opinión pública. En particular, es importante comprender cómo las percepciones de la ciudadanía fueron cambiando desde el inicio del proceso hasta su conclusión. Hay varias razones para embarcarse en este propósito, ya sea desde la perspectiva académica como política.En términos académicos, los plebiscitos constitucionales son rarezas entre los mecanismos de democracia directa. Si bien existen países y regiones que cuentan con experiencia en referéndums, no es común que un país concurra a las urnas para decidir por un nuevo texto constitucional. En ese sentido, el proceso chileno es aún más relevante para el análisis académico, ya que se convierte en un caso crucial en el que un país decide rechazar el producto del trabajo de una asamblea constituyente.En términos políticos, el análisis de las preferencias de la ciudadanía es esencial para entender la calidad de la representación democrática. La Convención Constitucional (CC) chilena consistió en 155 personas electas usando una combinación de sistema proporcional paritario y escaños reservados para pueblos indígenas. Con ello, se buscaba asegurar la representación de distintos territorios, grupos, y posiciones en el espectro ideológico. Inicialmente, el resultado de la elección de convencionales fue recibido con cierto optimismo por el aumento en representación descriptiva , pero la fotografía al final de una elección no es suficiente para asegurar la legitimidad del órgano. En ese sentido, es relevante comprender cómo esas preferencias cambian, así como la habilidad de los actores políticos de reaccionar a esos cambios.En este capítulo ocupamos datos de las distintas encuestas realizadas por el centro de Estudios Espacio Público en colabooración con Ipsos Chile. Los datos disponibles nos permiten plantear dos conclusiones claras sobre la opinión pública en el proceso constituyente:Primero, la positiva respuesta que tuvo la ciudadanía al inicio del proceso, reflejada en el tipo de sentimientos que declaraban los encuestados, así como en las visiones respecto a la representatividad y confianza en la Convención, fueron sistemáticamente bajando durante el proceso. Esta reducción fue, además, permanente y no existió una regresión de esos indicadores durante las olas de la encuesta. Poco a poco, la Convención Constitucional y su trabajo dejaron de contar con aprobación ciudadana, y pasaron a engrosar la lista de instituciones políticas que son miradas con desconfianza.Segundo, una parte de esta caída en los indicadores se explica por una creciente brecha entre las expectativas ciudadanas sobre el trabajo de la Convención, y las percepciones sobre cómo sus miembros desarrollaron su trabajo. Inicialmente, los datos muestran que la opinión pública esperaba representantes dispuestos a llegar a acuerdos y ceder en sus posiciones, pero consideran que actuaron de forma contraria.Las razones que llevaron al resultado de septiembre de 2022 no terminan en los análisis que podamos realizar sobre el estado de la opinión pública sobre el órgano constituyente. La evaluación del proyecto de constitución también obedece a su contenido. Es sensato plantear que una parte importante de la decisión de voto está relacionada con el acuerdo o desacuerdo con las normas propuestas, pero eso escapa del propósito de este trabajo.El capítulo continúa con una revisión de la literatura preferencias electorals en el contexto de democracia directa y procesos constituyentes. Después procede con una descripción de las encuestas de Espacio Público, así como los temas revisados en sus distintas olas. Finalmente, presentamos los principales resultados y explicamos cómo se relacionan con los dos argumentos presentados anteriormente.
- 17 May 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessSe nos rompió el amor: cambios en la opinión pública durante el proceso constituyente chileno
El fracaso del proceso constituyente en el plebiscito de septiembre de 2022 merece ser analizado desde la perspectiva de la opinión pública. En particular, es importante comprender cómo las percepciones de la ciudadanía fueron cambiando desde el inicio del proceso hasta su conclusión. Hay varias razones para embarcarse en este propósito, ya sea desde la perspectiva académica como política.En términos académicos, los plebiscitos constitucionales son rarezas entre los mecanismos de democracia directa. Si bien existen países y regiones que cuentan con experiencia en referéndums, no es común que un país concurra a las urnas para decidir por un nuevo texto constitucional. En ese sentido, el proceso chileno es aún más relevante para el análisis académico, ya que se convierte en un caso crucial en el que un país decide rechazar el producto del trabajo de una asamblea constituyente.En términos políticos, el análisis de las preferencias de la ciudadanía es esencial para entender la calidad de la representación democrática. La Convención Constitucional (CC) chilena consistió en 155 personas electas usando una combinación de sistema proporcional paritario y escaños reservados para pueblos indígenas. Con ello, se buscaba asegurar la representación de distintos territorios, grupos, y posiciones en el espectro ideológico. Inicialmente, el resultado de la elección de convencionales fue recibido con cierto optimismo por el aumento en representación descriptiva , pero la fotografía al final de una elección no es suficiente para asegurar la legitimidad del órgano. En ese sentido, es relevante comprender cómo esas preferencias cambian, así como la habilidad de los actores políticos de reaccionar a esos cambios.En este capítulo ocupamos datos de las distintas encuestas realizadas por el centro de Estudios Espacio Público en colabooración con Ipsos Chile. Los datos disponibles nos permiten plantear dos conclusiones claras sobre la opinión pública en el proceso constituyente:Primero, la positiva respuesta que tuvo la ciudadanía al inicio del proceso, reflejada en el tipo de sentimientos que declaraban los encuestados, así como en las visiones respecto a la representatividad y confianza en la Convención, fueron sistemáticamente bajando durante el proceso. Esta reducción fue, además, permanente y no existió una regresión de esos indicadores durante las olas de la encuesta. Poco a poco, la Convención Constitucional y su trabajo dejaron de contar con aprobación ciudadana, y pasaron a engrosar la lista de instituciones políticas que son miradas con desconfianza.Segundo, una parte de esta caída en los indicadores se explica por una creciente brecha entre las expectativas ciudadanas sobre el trabajo de la Convención, y las percepciones sobre cómo sus miembros desarrollaron su trabajo. Inicialmente, los datos muestran que la opinión pública esperaba representantes dispuestos a llegar a acuerdos y ceder en sus posiciones, pero consideran que actuaron de forma contraria.Las razones que llevaron al resultado de septiembre de 2022 no terminan en los análisis que podamos realizar sobre el estado de la opinión pública sobre el órgano constituyente. La evaluación del proyecto de constitución también obedece a su contenido. Es sensato plantear que una parte importante de la decisión de voto está relacionada con el acuerdo o desacuerdo con las normas propuestas, pero eso escapa del propósito de este trabajo.El capítulo continúa con una revisión de la literatura preferencias electorals en el contexto de democracia directa y procesos constituyentes. Después procede con una descripción de las encuestas de Espacio Público, así como los temas revisados en sus distintas olas. Finalmente, presentamos los principales resultados y explicamos cómo se relacionan con los dos argumentos presentados anteriormente.
- Open Access
- 11 June 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
- Vol. 29 (5) , 840-852
Intertwined fates? Members switching between niche and mainstream parties
Little attention has been paid to the process of members leaving parties in order to support other parties. Party developments in the UK in the 2010s provide an opportunity to analyse the determinants of members giving up their current party and joining a rival. We examine this issue using an original panel survey of 2,679 members of the Green Party of England and Wales. Our results show that members who joined the Greens motivated by concern about social justice are more likely to leave and support Labour after Jeremy Corbyn’s election as party leader. Members who joined to protect the environment are less likely to leave. Niche parties can attract members predominantly motivated by issues traditionally represented by a mainstream party but these members are more likely to leave the party again following a position change by the mainstream party.
- 11 June 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
- Vol. 29 (5) , 840-852
Open AccessIntertwined fates? Members switching between niche and mainstream parties
Little attention has been paid to the process of members leaving parties in order to support other parties. Party developments in the UK in the 2010s provide an opportunity to analyse the determinants of members giving up their current party and joining a rival. We examine this issue using an original panel survey of 2,679 members of the Green Party of England and Wales. Our results show that members who joined the Greens motivated by concern about social justice are more likely to leave and support Labour after Jeremy Corbyn’s election as party leader. Members who joined to protect the environment are less likely to leave. Niche parties can attract members predominantly motivated by issues traditionally represented by a mainstream party but these members are more likely to leave the party again following a position change by the mainstream party.
- Open Access
- 31 May 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties
- Vol. 31 (sup1) , 245-258
Parenthood, employment, anxiety, gender, and race: drivers of non-compliance with lockdown measures
Since the COVID-19 pandemic started, there has been increasing evidence suggesting that current gendered and racially biased structures put in place to deal with the crises lead women and BAME population to be disproportionately affected by the pandemic. Yet, there is less information on how different groups respond to the pandemic in terms of compliance with the measures implemented by the government, and the role that parenthood and employment play in explaining compliance for such groups. We take insights from the literature on policy preferences and compliance to argue that gender, ethnicity, parenthood and employment are associated with high levels of worry about the consequences of the pandemic, leading to variations in compliance with social distancing measures. We test our argument using data from an original nationally representative survey. Results indicate that women and BAME respondents present important challenges to manage anxiety, stress and worry but they manifest differently in their compliance with social distancing measures. We also find that parenthood and employment affect compliance but in an unexpected direction. Together, results indicate that compliance is not only a matter of individual choice but also a matter of structural and contextual factors.
- 31 May 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties
- Vol. 31 (sup1) , 245-258
Open AccessParenthood, employment, anxiety, gender, and race: drivers of non-compliance with lockdown measures
Since the COVID-19 pandemic started, there has been increasing evidence suggesting that current gendered and racially biased structures put in place to deal with the crises lead women and BAME population to be disproportionately affected by the pandemic. Yet, there is less information on how different groups respond to the pandemic in terms of compliance with the measures implemented by the government, and the role that parenthood and employment play in explaining compliance for such groups. We take insights from the literature on policy preferences and compliance to argue that gender, ethnicity, parenthood and employment are associated with high levels of worry about the consequences of the pandemic, leading to variations in compliance with social distancing measures. We test our argument using data from an original nationally representative survey. Results indicate that women and BAME respondents present important challenges to manage anxiety, stress and worry but they manifest differently in their compliance with social distancing measures. We also find that parenthood and employment affect compliance but in an unexpected direction. Together, results indicate that compliance is not only a matter of individual choice but also a matter of structural and contextual factors.