Peter Godfrey-Smith
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Peter Godfrey-Smith has a total of 36 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Matthew Lawrence
Affiliation Huskisson, NSW, Australia
6 shared publicationsBenjamin Kerr
4 shared publicationsDavid Scheel
Affiliation Institute of Culture & Environment, Alaska Pacific University, University Drive, Anchorage, AK, United States of America
3 shared publications- Gáspár Jékely
Living Systems Institute, University of Exeter
3 shared publications Stefan Linquist
Affiliation Philosophy Department, University of Guelph, Guelph, ON, Canada
3 shared publicationsStephanie Chancellor
Affiliation Department of Biological Sciences, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL, United States of America
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 17 September 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 49, e337
Biological naturalism without the primacy of prediction
Seth’s defense of biological naturalism is valuable and timely. But his endorsement of the predictive processing framework, in an ambitious form that aims to cover more than perception itself, is probably a wrong turn.
- 17 September 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 49, e337
Biological naturalism without the primacy of prediction
Seth’s defense of biological naturalism is valuable and timely. But his endorsement of the predictive processing framework, in an ambitious form that aims to cover more than perception itself, is probably a wrong turn.
- Open Access
- 1 July 2024
- Published by MIT Press in Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience
- Vol. 36 (8) , 1660-1666
Inferring Consciousness in Phylogenetically Distant Organisms
The neural dynamics of subjectivity (NDS) approach to the biological explanation of consciousness is outlined and applied to the problem of inferring consciousness in animals phylogenetically distant from ourselves. The NDS approach holds that consciousness or felt experience is characteristic of systems whose nervous systems have been shaped to realize subjectivity through a combination of network interactions and large-scale dynamic patterns. Features of the vertebrate brain architecture that figure in other accounts of the biology of consciousness are viewed as inessential. Deep phylogenetic branchings in the animal kingdom occurred before the evolution of complex behavior, cognition, and sensing. These capacities arose independently in brain architectures that differ widely across arthropods, vertebrates, and cephalopods, but with conservation of large-scale dynamic patterns of a kind that have an apparent link to felt experience in humans. An evolutionary perspective also motivates a strongly gradualist view of consciousness; a simple distinction between conscious and nonconscious animals will probably be replaced with a view that admits differences of degree, perhaps on many dimensions.
- 1 July 2024
- Published by MIT Press in Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience
- Vol. 36 (8) , 1660-1666
Open AccessInferring Consciousness in Phylogenetically Distant Organisms
The neural dynamics of subjectivity (NDS) approach to the biological explanation of consciousness is outlined and applied to the problem of inferring consciousness in animals phylogenetically distant from ourselves. The NDS approach holds that consciousness or felt experience is characteristic of systems whose nervous systems have been shaped to realize subjectivity through a combination of network interactions and large-scale dynamic patterns. Features of the vertebrate brain architecture that figure in other accounts of the biology of consciousness are viewed as inessential. Deep phylogenetic branchings in the animal kingdom occurred before the evolution of complex behavior, cognition, and sensing. These capacities arose independently in brain architectures that differ widely across arthropods, vertebrates, and cephalopods, but with conservation of large-scale dynamic patterns of a kind that have an apparent link to felt experience in humans. An evolutionary perspective also motivates a strongly gradualist view of consciousness; a simple distinction between conscious and nonconscious animals will probably be replaced with a view that admits differences of degree, perhaps on many dimensions.
- Open Access
- 9 November 2022
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 17 (11) , e0276482
In the line of fire: Debris throwing by wild octopuses
Wild Octopus tetricus frequently propel shells, silt, and algae through the water by releasing these materials from their arms while creating a forceful jet from the siphon held under the arm web. These "throws" occur in several contexts at a site in Jervis Bay, Australia, including in interactions with other octopuses. Material thrown in interactive contexts frequently hits other octopuses. Some throws appear to be targeted on other individuals, as suggested by several kinds of evidence: Throws in interactive contexts were more vigorous than others, and more often used silt, rather than shells or algae. High vigor throws were more often accompanied by uniform or dark body patterns than other throws. Some throws were directed differently from beneath the arms and such throws were more likely to hit other octopuses. Throwing at other individuals in the same population, as apparently seen in these octopuses, is a rare form of nonhuman projectile use, previously seen only in some social mammals.
- 9 November 2022
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 17 (11) , e0276482
Open AccessIn the line of fire: Debris throwing by wild octopuses
Wild Octopus tetricus frequently propel shells, silt, and algae through the water by releasing these materials from their arms while creating a forceful jet from the siphon held under the arm web. These "throws" occur in several contexts at a site in Jervis Bay, Australia, including in interactions with other octopuses. Material thrown in interactive contexts frequently hits other octopuses. Some throws appear to be targeted on other individuals, as suggested by several kinds of evidence: Throws in interactive contexts were more vigorous than others, and more often used silt, rather than shells or algae. High vigor throws were more often accompanied by uniform or dark body patterns than other throws. Some throws were directed differently from beneath the arms and such throws were more likely to hit other octopuses. Throwing at other individuals in the same population, as apparently seen in these octopuses, is a rare form of nonhuman projectile use, previously seen only in some social mammals.
- 15 January 2022
- Published by Imprint Academic Ltd in Journal of Consciousness Studies
- Vol. 29 (1) , 153-159
Human Brains and Animal Minds : Comments on Schechter's Self-Consciousness and 'Split' Brains
- 15 January 2022
- Published by Imprint Academic Ltd in Journal of Consciousness Studies
- Vol. 29 (1) , 153-159
Human Brains and Animal Minds : Comments on Schechter's Self-Consciousness and 'Split' Brains
- 27 November 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Monash Bioethics Review
- Vol. 40 (1) , 17-39
Covid heterodoxy in three layers
Lockdowns and related policies of behavioral and economic restriction introduced in response to the COVID-19 pandemic are criticized, drawing on three sets of ideas and arguments that are organized in accordance with the likely degree of controversy associated with their guiding assumptions. The first set of arguments makes use of cost–benefit reasoning within a broadly utilitarian framework, emphasizing uncertainty, the role of worst-case scenarios, and the need to consider at least the medium term as well as immediate effects. The second draws on assumptions about the political value of basic liberties. The third draws on ideas about the roles of different stages within human life.
- 27 November 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Monash Bioethics Review
- Vol. 40 (1) , 17-39
Covid heterodoxy in three layers
Lockdowns and related policies of behavioral and economic restriction introduced in response to the COVID-19 pandemic are criticized, drawing on three sets of ideas and arguments that are organized in accordance with the likely degree of controversy associated with their guiding assumptions. The first set of arguments makes use of cost–benefit reasoning within a broadly utilitarian framework, emphasizing uncertainty, the role of worst-case scenarios, and the need to consider at least the medium term as well as immediate effects. The second draws on assumptions about the political value of basic liberties. The third draws on ideas about the roles of different stages within human life.
- 25 November 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Biological Theory
- Vol. 16 (4) , 257-267
Remembering Richard Lewontin (1929–2021)
- 25 November 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Biological Theory
- Vol. 16 (4) , 257-267
Remembering Richard Lewontin (1929–2021)
- 13 September 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Biology & Philosophy
- Vol. 36 (5) , 1-4
Learning and the biology of consciousness: a commentary on Birch, Ginsburg, and Jablonka
- 13 September 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Biology & Philosophy
- Vol. 36 (5) , 1-4
Learning and the biology of consciousness: a commentary on Birch, Ginsburg, and Jablonka
- Open Access
In the Line of Fire: Debris Throwing by Wild Octopuses
Wild octopuses at an Australian site frequently propel shells, silt, and algae through the water by releasing these materials from their arms while creating a forceful jet from the siphon held under the arm web. These “throws” occur in several contexts, including interactions with conspecifics, and material thrown in conspecific contexts frequently hits other octopuses. Some throws appear to be targeted on other individuals and play a social role, as suggested by several kinds of evidence. Such throws were significantly more vigorous and more often used silt, rather than shells or algae, and high vigor throws were significantly more often accompanied by uniform or dark body patterns. Some throws were directed differently from beneath the arms and such throws were significantly more likely to hit other octopuses. Throws targeted at other individuals in the same population, as these appear to be, are the least common form of nonhuman throwing.
Open AccessIn the Line of Fire: Debris Throwing by Wild Octopuses
Wild octopuses at an Australian site frequently propel shells, silt, and algae through the water by releasing these materials from their arms while creating a forceful jet from the siphon held under the arm web. These “throws” occur in several contexts, including interactions with conspecifics, and material thrown in conspecific contexts frequently hits other octopuses. Some throws appear to be targeted on other individuals and play a social role, as suggested by several kinds of evidence. Such throws were significantly more vigorous and more often used silt, rather than shells or algae, and high vigor throws were significantly more often accompanied by uniform or dark body patterns. Some throws were directed differently from beneath the arms and such throws were significantly more likely to hit other octopuses. Throws targeted at other individuals in the same population, as these appear to be, are the least common form of nonhuman throwing.
- Open Access
- 8 February 2021
- Published by The Royal Society in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Vol. 376 (1821) , 20190764
Reafference and the origin of the self in early nervous system evolution
Discussions of the function of early nervous systems usually focus on a causal flow from sensors to effectors, by which an animal coordinates its actions with exogenous changes in its environment. We propose, instead, that much early sensing was reafferent; it was responsive to the consequences of the animal's own actions. We distinguish two general categories of reafference—translocational and deformational—and use these to survey the distribution of several often-neglected forms of sensing, including gravity sensing, flow sensing and proprioception. We discuss sensing of these kinds in sponges, ctenophores, placozoans, cnidarians and bilaterians. Reafference is ubiquitous, as ongoing action, especially whole-body motility, will almost inevitably influence the senses. Corollary discharge—a pathway or circuit by which an animal tracks its own actions and their reafferent consequences—is not a necessary feature of reafferent sensing but a later-evolving mechanism. We also argue for the importance of reafferent sensing to the evolution of the body-self, a form of organization that enables an animal to sense and act as a single unit. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Basal cognition: multicellularity, neurons and the cognitive lens’.
- 8 February 2021
- Published by The Royal Society in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Vol. 376 (1821) , 20190764
Open AccessReafference and the origin of the self in early nervous system evolution
Discussions of the function of early nervous systems usually focus on a causal flow from sensors to effectors, by which an animal coordinates its actions with exogenous changes in its environment. We propose, instead, that much early sensing was reafferent; it was responsive to the consequences of the animal's own actions. We distinguish two general categories of reafference—translocational and deformational—and use these to survey the distribution of several often-neglected forms of sensing, including gravity sensing, flow sensing and proprioception. We discuss sensing of these kinds in sponges, ctenophores, placozoans, cnidarians and bilaterians. Reafference is ubiquitous, as ongoing action, especially whole-body motility, will almost inevitably influence the senses. Corollary discharge—a pathway or circuit by which an animal tracks its own actions and their reafferent consequences—is not a necessary feature of reafferent sensing but a later-evolving mechanism. We also argue for the importance of reafferent sensing to the evolution of the body-self, a form of organization that enables an animal to sense and act as a single unit. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Basal cognition: multicellularity, neurons and the cognitive lens’.
- 18 January 2021
- Published by Wiley in Mind & Language
- Vol. 36 (2) , 285-296
Integration, lateralization, and animal experience
Many vertebrate animals approximate, to various degrees, the “split‐brain” condition that results from surgery done in humans to treat severe epilepsy, with very limited connection between the left and right sides of the upper parts of the brain. The split‐brain condition has been the topic of extensive philosophical discussion, because it appears, in some circumstances, to give rise to two minds within one body. Is the same true of these animals? This article attempts to make progress on two difficult topics—animal experience, and the consequences of the human split‐brain condition—by considering both at once.
- 18 January 2021
- Published by Wiley in Mind & Language
- Vol. 36 (2) , 285-296
Integration, lateralization, and animal experience
Many vertebrate animals approximate, to various degrees, the “split‐brain” condition that results from surgery done in humans to treat severe epilepsy, with very limited connection between the left and right sides of the upper parts of the brain. The split‐brain condition has been the topic of extensive philosophical discussion, because it appears, in some circumstances, to give rise to two minds within one body. Is the same true of these animals? This article attempts to make progress on two difficult topics—animal experience, and the consequences of the human split‐brain condition—by considering both at once.