Marco Sahm
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Marco Sahm has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Arne Lauber
2 shared publications- Christoph March
Department of Economics, University of Bamberg
2 shared publications - Christian Deutscher
Bielefeld University
1 shared publication Christoph March
1 shared publication- Fabian Dietz
Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg
1 shared publication - Hendrik Sonnabend
University of Hagen
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 9 October 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Sports Economics
- Vol. 27 (8) , 839-882
Fairness in Round-Robin Tournaments with Four Players and Endogenous Sequences
We examine the effects of endogenous sequences on fairness in round-robin tournaments with four players, multiple prizes, and general contest technologies. A tournament is called horizontally ex-ante fair if symmetric contestants have the same expected payoffs when the tournament starts, independent from their position in the schedule. It is called perfectly fair if the winning probabilities in each match depend only on the players’ characteristics but not on the position of the match in the course of the tournament. We show that there is no sequence that implies perfect fairness. By contrast, some endogenous sequences imply horizontal ex-ante fairness irrespective of the prize structure. In winner-take-all tournaments, additional endogenous sequences are horizontally ex-ante fair. Our findings question the prevalent use of exogenous sequences in four-player round-robin tournaments in commercial sports despite the existence of horizontally ex-ante fair alternatives.
- 9 October 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Sports Economics
- Vol. 27 (8) , 839-882
Open AccessFairness in Round-Robin Tournaments with Four Players and Endogenous Sequences
We examine the effects of endogenous sequences on fairness in round-robin tournaments with four players, multiple prizes, and general contest technologies. A tournament is called horizontally ex-ante fair if symmetric contestants have the same expected payoffs when the tournament starts, independent from their position in the schedule. It is called perfectly fair if the winning probabilities in each match depend only on the players’ characteristics but not on the position of the match in the course of the tournament. We show that there is no sequence that implies perfect fairness. By contrast, some endogenous sequences imply horizontal ex-ante fairness irrespective of the prize structure. In winner-take-all tournaments, additional endogenous sequences are horizontally ex-ante fair. Our findings question the prevalent use of exogenous sequences in four-player round-robin tournaments in commercial sports despite the existence of horizontally ex-ante fair alternatives.
- Open Access
- 26 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 124
Three-player round-robin tournaments in the lab: Lottery contests vs. all-pay auctions
- 26 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 124
Open AccessThree-player round-robin tournaments in the lab: Lottery contests vs. all-pay auctions
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek Bamberg
Environmental Awards in a Duopoly with Green Consumers
We investigate the impact of an environmental award in a Bertrand duopoly with green consumers considering a three-stage game. First, the regulator designs the environmental contest. Second, firms choose their green investments, and the winner of the contest is awarded. Third, firms compete in prices, and consumption takes place. We illustrate that the award not only incentivizes green investments and may thus reduce environmental externalities. As consumers perceive the product of the awarded firm to be of superior quality, it also gives rise to vertical product differentiation. This induces market power, and thus anti-competitive effects: Rents shift from consumers to producers, and consumer surplus may decrease, particularly if marginal investment costs in green technologies are high compared to the strength of environmental damage.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek Bamberg
Open AccessEnvironmental Awards in a Duopoly with Green Consumers
We investigate the impact of an environmental award in a Bertrand duopoly with green consumers considering a three-stage game. First, the regulator designs the environmental contest. Second, firms choose their green investments, and the winner of the contest is awarded. Third, firms compete in prices, and consumption takes place. We illustrate that the award not only incentivizes green investments and may thus reduce environmental externalities. As consumers perceive the product of the awarded firm to be of superior quality, it also gives rise to vertical product differentiation. This induces market power, and thus anti-competitive effects: Rents shift from consumers to producers, and consumer surplus may decrease, particularly if marginal investment costs in green technologies are high compared to the strength of environmental damage.
- Open Access
- 24 June 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Economic Design
- Vol. 29 (3) , 585-610
The perks of being in the smaller team: incentives in overlapping contests
We investigate overlapping contests in multi-divisional organizations in which an individual’s effort simultaneously determines the outcome of several contests on different hierarchical levels. We show that individuals in smaller units are advantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for two reasons: First, the incentive to free-ride is smaller in inter-divisional contests. Second, competition in the intra-divisional contest is less fierce. Both effects induce a higher marginal utility of effort provision. We test the model in a laboratory experiment and confirm its main predictions. Our results have important consequences for the provision of incentives in organizations and the design of sports competitions.
- 24 June 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Economic Design
- Vol. 29 (3) , 585-610
Open AccessThe perks of being in the smaller team: incentives in overlapping contests
We investigate overlapping contests in multi-divisional organizations in which an individual’s effort simultaneously determines the outcome of several contests on different hierarchical levels. We show that individuals in smaller units are advantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for two reasons: First, the incentive to free-ride is smaller in inter-divisional contests. Second, competition in the intra-divisional contest is less fierce. Both effects induce a higher marginal utility of effort provision. We test the model in a laboratory experiment and confirm its main predictions. Our results have important consequences for the provision of incentives in organizations and the design of sports competitions.
- 7 June 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 141, 30-51
Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: Experimental evidence
- 7 June 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 141, 30-51
Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: Experimental evidence
- Open Access
Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players
I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner’s expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium (). By contrast, if she aims at maximizing the expected aggregate effort or the winner’s expected effort, she will choose a contest with a pure-strategy equilibrium, and the optimal accuracy level decreases in the players’ heterogeneity. Finally, a contest designer who faces a tradeoff between selection quality and minimum (maximum) effort will never choose a contest with a semi-mixed equilibrium.Open AccessOptimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players
I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner’s expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium (). By contrast, if she aims at maximizing the expected aggregate effort or the winner’s expected effort, she will choose a contest with a pure-strategy equilibrium, and the optimal accuracy level decreases in the players’ heterogeneity. Finally, a contest designer who faces a tradeoff between selection quality and minimum (maximum) effort will never choose a contest with a semi-mixed equilibrium. - Open Access
- 29 September 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 93 (2) , 281-317
Strategic investment decisions in multi-stage contests with heterogeneous players
When heterogeneous players make strategic investment decisions in multi-stage contests, they might conserve resources in a current contest to spend more in a subsequent contest, if the degree of heterogeneity in the current (subsequent) contest is sufficiently large (small). We confirm these predictions using data from German professional soccer, in which players are subject to a one-match ban if they accumulate five yellow cards. Players with four yellow cards facing the risk of being suspended for the next match are (i) less likely to be fielded when the heterogeneity in the current match increases and (ii) more likely to receive a fifth yellow card in the current match when heterogeneity in the next match increases or heterogeneity in the next match but one (when they return from their ban) decreases.
- 29 September 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 93 (2) , 281-317
Open AccessStrategic investment decisions in multi-stage contests with heterogeneous players
When heterogeneous players make strategic investment decisions in multi-stage contests, they might conserve resources in a current contest to spend more in a subsequent contest, if the degree of heterogeneity in the current (subsequent) contest is sufficiently large (small). We confirm these predictions using data from German professional soccer, in which players are subject to a one-match ban if they accumulate five yellow cards. Players with four yellow cards facing the risk of being suspended for the next match are (i) less likely to be fielded when the heterogeneity in the current match increases and (ii) more likely to receive a fifth yellow card in the current match when heterogeneity in the next match increases or heterogeneity in the next match but one (when they return from their ban) decreases.
- 26 November 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 57 (4) , 909-933
Advance-Purchase Financing of Projects with Few Buyers
- 26 November 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 57 (4) , 909-933
Advance-Purchase Financing of Projects with Few Buyers
- 27 April 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economics
- Vol. 129 (1) , 79-101
Strategic corporate social responsibility, imperfect competition, and market concentration
- 27 April 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economics
- Vol. 129 (1) , 79-101
Strategic corporate social responsibility, imperfect competition, and market concentration
- 1 June 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Information Economics and Policy
- Vol. 43, 48-60
How effective are advertising bans? On the demand for quality in two-sided media markets
- 1 June 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Information Economics and Policy
- Vol. 43, 48-60
How effective are advertising bans? On the demand for quality in two-sided media markets