Gianluca Grimalda
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Gianluca Grimalda has a total of 203 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Marilynn Brewer
University of New South Wales
6 shared publicationsNancy R. Buchan
Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiel, Germany
6 shared publications- Francesco Bogliacino
Dipartimento di Politica Economica, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 20123 Milan, Italy
5 shared publications Margaret Foddy
5 shared publicationsFrancesco Bogliacino
Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá, Colombia
4 shared publications- Louis Putterman
Brown University, USA
4 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 8 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Why do Preferences for Redistribution Differ across Countries? Experimental Results from four Welfare State Models
Income redistribution varies considerably between industrialized countries, yet we ignore the underlying reasons. Using standardized experimental choices, we test for differences in preferences for redistribution in four countries that are representative of different welfare state models. We find that (a) US Americans and Italians demand less redistribution than Norwegians and Germans, regardless of whether self-interest is relevant. (b) Those who earn (or expect to earn) below-median incomes in the experiment behave like "libertarians"thus allowing the rich to keep their earnings-more frequently in the US and Italy than in Germany and Norway. (c) Conversely, above-median earners exhibit similar behavior across countries. (d) US Americans and Italians are significantly more overconfident than Norwegians and Germans, further reducing their demand for redistribution under uncertainty. (e) Other theories (risk aversion, prospect of upward mobility, reward of merit) receive some support, but do not explain international differences in redistribution. Corroborating recent macroeconomic evidence, these results suggest that international differences in redistribution depend more on the leniency of the poor in allowing the rich to retain their earnings than on the solidarity of the rich toward the
- 8 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessWhy do Preferences for Redistribution Differ across Countries? Experimental Results from four Welfare State Models
Income redistribution varies considerably between industrialized countries, yet we ignore the underlying reasons. Using standardized experimental choices, we test for differences in preferences for redistribution in four countries that are representative of different welfare state models. We find that (a) US Americans and Italians demand less redistribution than Norwegians and Germans, regardless of whether self-interest is relevant. (b) Those who earn (or expect to earn) below-median incomes in the experiment behave like "libertarians"thus allowing the rich to keep their earnings-more frequently in the US and Italy than in Germany and Norway. (c) Conversely, above-median earners exhibit similar behavior across countries. (d) US Americans and Italians are significantly more overconfident than Norwegians and Germans, further reducing their demand for redistribution under uncertainty. (e) Other theories (risk aversion, prospect of upward mobility, reward of merit) receive some support, but do not explain international differences in redistribution. Corroborating recent macroeconomic evidence, these results suggest that international differences in redistribution depend more on the leniency of the poor in allowing the rich to retain their earnings than on the solidarity of the rich toward the
- 1 July 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (7) , 5528-5543
No Gifts Returned: Surprise Bonuses Reduce Productivity in a Natural Field Experiment
The gift exchange hypothesis posits that workers reciprocate above-market wages with increased productivity. This paper tests this hypothesis in a natural field experiment where one or both workers in a pair received a discretionary bonus after an initial round of data entry tasks. Bonuses were assigned based on one of three criteria: (i) relative productivity in the initial round, (ii) economic need, or (iii) an arbitrary decision. Two conditions where neither or both workers received a bonus served as the baseline. Contrary to the gift exchange hypothesis, we found a significant decline in postbonus productivity, especially when both workers received the bonus. This result suggests that workers interpreted the bonus as a signal of employer contentment, allowing them to reduce their effort. We conjectured that the postbonus productivity decline may result from either (a) a lower perceived risk of repercussions from slacking, such as early dismissal, or (b) a reduced sense of obligation to reciprocate the employer’s kindness. A follow-up experiment replicated the primary result, providing moderate evidence for the explanation based on reduced fear of dismissal. The main effect of bonuses on productivity was substantial, with effort reductions of 15.1% in the first experiment and 8.4% in the follow-up relative to baseline. In cases where only one worker received a bonus, nonrecipients’ inequality aversion appeared to decrease productivity markedly in the economic need treatment, whereas status-seeking behavior slightly increased productivity by bonus recipients in the productivity treatment. This paper was accepted by Dorothea Kübler, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: F. Bogliacino acknowledges funding from the Fundación Universitaria Konrad Lorenz [Internal Grant 7INV1141], Open Evidence [Research Grant 009], and the Universidad Nacional [Internal Grant 26007]. G. Grimalda and D. Pipke gratefully acknowledge funding for the follow-up experiment from the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.04085 .
- 1 July 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (7) , 5528-5543
No Gifts Returned: Surprise Bonuses Reduce Productivity in a Natural Field Experiment
The gift exchange hypothesis posits that workers reciprocate above-market wages with increased productivity. This paper tests this hypothesis in a natural field experiment where one or both workers in a pair received a discretionary bonus after an initial round of data entry tasks. Bonuses were assigned based on one of three criteria: (i) relative productivity in the initial round, (ii) economic need, or (iii) an arbitrary decision. Two conditions where neither or both workers received a bonus served as the baseline. Contrary to the gift exchange hypothesis, we found a significant decline in postbonus productivity, especially when both workers received the bonus. This result suggests that workers interpreted the bonus as a signal of employer contentment, allowing them to reduce their effort. We conjectured that the postbonus productivity decline may result from either (a) a lower perceived risk of repercussions from slacking, such as early dismissal, or (b) a reduced sense of obligation to reciprocate the employer’s kindness. A follow-up experiment replicated the primary result, providing moderate evidence for the explanation based on reduced fear of dismissal. The main effect of bonuses on productivity was substantial, with effort reductions of 15.1% in the first experiment and 8.4% in the follow-up relative to baseline. In cases where only one worker received a bonus, nonrecipients’ inequality aversion appeared to decrease productivity markedly in the economic need treatment, whereas status-seeking behavior slightly increased productivity by bonus recipients in the productivity treatment. This paper was accepted by Dorothea Kübler, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: F. Bogliacino acknowledges funding from the Fundación Universitaria Konrad Lorenz [Internal Grant 7INV1141], Open Evidence [Research Grant 009], and the Universidad Nacional [Internal Grant 26007]. G. Grimalda and D. Pipke gratefully acknowledge funding for the follow-up experiment from the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.04085 .
- Open Access
- 20 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Culture, religiosity and citizenship: Exploring in-group favouritism among Italian Muslim Migrants and Converts
Integration of migrant generations into the receiving countries is a fundamental aspect of social cohesion and can radically shift the political spectrum in the receiving country. Previous research shows that individuals of the Muslim faith present distinctive patterns of altruism. In stark contrast with traditional altruistic theories, Muslim believers tend to be out-group rather than in-group oriented, i.e., favouring others belonging to the same group as the individual, and prefer to donate privately rather than publicly. In this paper, we investigate patterns of pro-sociality among immigrants and converted Muslims in Italy. We examine whether cultural integration, religiosity, and citizenship affect altruistic preferences among generation groups. We focus on three groups: first and second-generation immigrants and Italian-converted Muslims. We find that altruism is overwhelmingly in-group oriented in an experimental decision in which participants choose to donate towards either a Muslim or a Christian charity, and in donations directed to the local Muslim community or an Italian or a non-Italian Muslim community. In this regard, no differences affect generation groups' preferences. However, Italian-converted Muslims' altruistic behaviour is closer to first-generation than second-generation Muslims. Their generosity is closer to the former group despite the second-generation group being culturally closer to them. We find no significant relationship between greater cultural integration and patterns of altruism. Conversely, having acquired national citizenship and upholding religious values significantly correlates with donations, with Italian citizens donating more when they are first rather than second migrant generations.
- 20 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCulture, religiosity and citizenship: Exploring in-group favouritism among Italian Muslim Migrants and Converts
Integration of migrant generations into the receiving countries is a fundamental aspect of social cohesion and can radically shift the political spectrum in the receiving country. Previous research shows that individuals of the Muslim faith present distinctive patterns of altruism. In stark contrast with traditional altruistic theories, Muslim believers tend to be out-group rather than in-group oriented, i.e., favouring others belonging to the same group as the individual, and prefer to donate privately rather than publicly. In this paper, we investigate patterns of pro-sociality among immigrants and converted Muslims in Italy. We examine whether cultural integration, religiosity, and citizenship affect altruistic preferences among generation groups. We focus on three groups: first and second-generation immigrants and Italian-converted Muslims. We find that altruism is overwhelmingly in-group oriented in an experimental decision in which participants choose to donate towards either a Muslim or a Christian charity, and in donations directed to the local Muslim community or an Italian or a non-Italian Muslim community. In this regard, no differences affect generation groups' preferences. However, Italian-converted Muslims' altruistic behaviour is closer to first-generation than second-generation Muslims. Their generosity is closer to the former group despite the second-generation group being culturally closer to them. We find no significant relationship between greater cultural integration and patterns of altruism. Conversely, having acquired national citizenship and upholding religious values significantly correlates with donations, with Italian citizens donating more when they are first rather than second migrant generations.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 20 April 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- p. 1-25
What explains trust in institutions? Multi-disciplinary evidence from an international survey
In many countries, trust in institutions has eroded, undermining civic engagement, social cohesion, and political stability. This study analyzes the determinants of trust in government, civil servants, the judicial system, and the police, drawing on representative samples from six OECD countries (Germany, Italy, Japan, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) between 2017 and early 2020. It employs survey data, experimental methods, and psychometric techniques to measure various dimensions of trust. The findings indicate that self-reported trust in institutions hinges primarily on perceived governance quality, encompassing both competence (responsiveness, effectiveness, and reliability) and integrity (values and ethical conduct). Specifically, perceived government reliability in the event of a natural disaster and the integrity of high-level officials emerge as the strongest predictors of self-reported trust in government, followed by satisfaction with security and education services. Although partisan affiliation also exerts some influence, its effect is comparatively modest. Overall, these results suggest that trust in institutions is amenable to policy interventions that enhance governance performance, thereby fostering higher levels of public trust through repeated, positive interactions with well-functioning public services.
- 20 April 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- p. 1-25
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessWhat explains trust in institutions? Multi-disciplinary evidence from an international survey
In many countries, trust in institutions has eroded, undermining civic engagement, social cohesion, and political stability. This study analyzes the determinants of trust in government, civil servants, the judicial system, and the police, drawing on representative samples from six OECD countries (Germany, Italy, Japan, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) between 2017 and early 2020. It employs survey data, experimental methods, and psychometric techniques to measure various dimensions of trust. The findings indicate that self-reported trust in institutions hinges primarily on perceived governance quality, encompassing both competence (responsiveness, effectiveness, and reliability) and integrity (values and ethical conduct). Specifically, perceived government reliability in the event of a natural disaster and the integrity of high-level officials emerge as the strongest predictors of self-reported trust in government, followed by satisfaction with security and education services. Although partisan affiliation also exerts some influence, its effect is comparatively modest. Overall, these results suggest that trust in institutions is amenable to policy interventions that enhance governance performance, thereby fostering higher levels of public trust through repeated, positive interactions with well-functioning public services.
- Open Access
- 22 September 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
No gifts returned: Surprise bonuses reduce productivity in a natural field experiment
The gift exchange hypothesis posits that workers reciprocate above-market wages with increased productivity. This paper tests this hypothesis in a natural field experiment where one or both workers in a pair received a discretionary bonus after an initial round of data-entry tasks. Bonuses were assigned based on one of three criteria: (i) relative productivity in the initial round, (ii) economic need, or (iii) an arbitrary decision. Two conditions where neither or both workers received a bonus served as the baseline. Contrary to the gift exchange hypothesis, we found a significant decline in post-bonus productivity, especially when both workers received the bonus. This result suggests that workers interpreted the bonus as a signal of employer contentment, allowing them to reduce their effort. We conjectured that the post-bonus productivity decline may result from either (a) a lower perceived risk of repercussions from slacking, such as early dismissal, or (b) a reduced sense of obligation to reciprocate the employer's kindness. A follow-up experiment replicated the primary result, providing moderate evidence for the explanation based on reduced fear of dismissal. The main effect of bonuses on productivity was substantial, with effort reductions of 15.1% in the first experiment and 8.4% in the follow-up relative to baseline. In cases where only one worker received a bonus, non-recipients' inequality aversion appeared to decrease productivity markedly in the economic need treatment, while status-seeking behavior slightly increased productivity by bonus recipients in the productivity treatment.
- 22 September 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessNo gifts returned: Surprise bonuses reduce productivity in a natural field experiment
The gift exchange hypothesis posits that workers reciprocate above-market wages with increased productivity. This paper tests this hypothesis in a natural field experiment where one or both workers in a pair received a discretionary bonus after an initial round of data-entry tasks. Bonuses were assigned based on one of three criteria: (i) relative productivity in the initial round, (ii) economic need, or (iii) an arbitrary decision. Two conditions where neither or both workers received a bonus served as the baseline. Contrary to the gift exchange hypothesis, we found a significant decline in post-bonus productivity, especially when both workers received the bonus. This result suggests that workers interpreted the bonus as a signal of employer contentment, allowing them to reduce their effort. We conjectured that the post-bonus productivity decline may result from either (a) a lower perceived risk of repercussions from slacking, such as early dismissal, or (b) a reduced sense of obligation to reciprocate the employer's kindness. A follow-up experiment replicated the primary result, providing moderate evidence for the explanation based on reduced fear of dismissal. The main effect of bonuses on productivity was substantial, with effort reductions of 15.1% in the first experiment and 8.4% in the follow-up relative to baseline. In cases where only one worker received a bonus, non-recipients' inequality aversion appeared to decrease productivity markedly in the economic need treatment, while status-seeking behavior slightly increased productivity by bonus recipients in the productivity treatment.
- Open Access
- 11 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Psychological Research
- Vol. 89 (2) , 1-19
Money counts: effects of monetary vs. purely numerical values on the mental representation of quantities
It has been established that humans use different cognitive models to represent and process numerical quantities. In this study, we investigated whether the representation of monetary values fundamentally differs from the representation of numbers. We also examined the influence of both socio/economic factors and mathematical ability on such representation. A group of adults (N = 272) were tested anonymously with a variant of the number-to-position task (Siegler & Opfer, 2003). They were asked to position on a horizontal line quantities expressed either in numerical format (e.g., 50) in the “Number” conditions or as monetary values (e.g., 50€) in the “Money” conditions. The extremes of the line consisted either of specific values (i.e. “2 or 2€” and “503 or 503€”) in the “Fixed” conditions or of unspecific concepts of quantity (e.g., “little” and ”a lot”) in the “Fuzzy” conditions. A linear model, as opposed to a logarithmic one, provided the best fit of group average data in all experimental conditions except for the “Money-Fuzzy” condition. The percentages of absolute error were significantly larger for Money stimuli than Number stimuli in both Fixed and Fuzzy conditions. This is consistent with the law of diminishing marginal utility, which entails that the value of monetary quantities is described by a concave curve rather than a linear relationship. As expected from previous research, participants who were more used to spending large quantities of money were closer to the linear representation model. Participants with higher mathematical abilities represented numerical values more closely to a linear model, but no such effect was found for monetary quantities.
- 11 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Psychological Research
- Vol. 89 (2) , 1-19
Open AccessMoney counts: effects of monetary vs. purely numerical values on the mental representation of quantities
It has been established that humans use different cognitive models to represent and process numerical quantities. In this study, we investigated whether the representation of monetary values fundamentally differs from the representation of numbers. We also examined the influence of both socio/economic factors and mathematical ability on such representation. A group of adults (N = 272) were tested anonymously with a variant of the number-to-position task (Siegler & Opfer, 2003). They were asked to position on a horizontal line quantities expressed either in numerical format (e.g., 50) in the “Number” conditions or as monetary values (e.g., 50€) in the “Money” conditions. The extremes of the line consisted either of specific values (i.e. “2 or 2€” and “503 or 503€”) in the “Fixed” conditions or of unspecific concepts of quantity (e.g., “little” and ”a lot”) in the “Fuzzy” conditions. A linear model, as opposed to a logarithmic one, provided the best fit of group average data in all experimental conditions except for the “Money-Fuzzy” condition. The percentages of absolute error were significantly larger for Money stimuli than Number stimuli in both Fixed and Fuzzy conditions. This is consistent with the law of diminishing marginal utility, which entails that the value of monetary quantities is described by a concave curve rather than a linear relationship. As expected from previous research, participants who were more used to spending large quantities of money were closer to the linear representation model. Participants with higher mathematical abilities represented numerical values more closely to a linear model, but no such effect was found for monetary quantities.
- 13 July 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 224, 996-1021
Ethnic bias, economic achievement and trust between large ethnic groups: A study in Germany and the U.S
- 13 July 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 224, 996-1021
Ethnic bias, economic achievement and trust between large ethnic groups: A study in Germany and the U.S
- Open Access
- 16 October 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Preference for Redistribution: Does the Recipient's Residency Status, Education, and Volunteering Matter?
It has been argued that ethnic heterogeneity negatively affects the willingness of the wealthier ethnic majority to redistribute resources to the typically less affluent ethnic minority. Using a general population sample of German citizens, we analyze how redistribution preferences depend on the recipients’ characteristics. We systematically vary information on (i) the recipient’s residency status (asylum seekers, economic migrants, German citizens) and (ii) their characteristics (educational attainment, engagement in voluntary work). These variations allow us to disentangle the effect of the recipient’s residency status and characteristics on redistribution preferences. Overall, wefind discrimination against foreign recipients, with German citizens receiving significantly higher transfers. While having a university degree does not affect redistribution on average, participation in voluntary work significantly increases redistribution. This effect is particularly strong for asylum seekers compared to German citizens and economic migrants. However, information having a university degree can reduce discrimination, particularly for asylum seekers.
- 16 October 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessPreference for Redistribution: Does the Recipient's Residency Status, Education, and Volunteering Matter?
It has been argued that ethnic heterogeneity negatively affects the willingness of the wealthier ethnic majority to redistribute resources to the typically less affluent ethnic minority. Using a general population sample of German citizens, we analyze how redistribution preferences depend on the recipients’ characteristics. We systematically vary information on (i) the recipient’s residency status (asylum seekers, economic migrants, German citizens) and (ii) their characteristics (educational attainment, engagement in voluntary work). These variations allow us to disentangle the effect of the recipient’s residency status and characteristics on redistribution preferences. Overall, wefind discrimination against foreign recipients, with German citizens receiving significantly higher transfers. While having a university degree does not affect redistribution on average, participation in voluntary work significantly increases redistribution. This effect is particularly strong for asylum seekers compared to German citizens and economic migrants. However, information having a university degree can reduce discrimination, particularly for asylum seekers.
- Open Access
- 30 June 2023
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Psychology
- Vol. 14, 1008567
Global social identity predicts cooperation at local, national, and global levels: Results from international experiments
Individuals who identify themselves with humanity as a whole tend to be more prosocial in a number of different domains, from giving to international charities to volunteering for humanitarian causes. In this paper, we show that global identity is “inclusive” in character. That is, rather than neglecting or diminishing attachments to local and national groups, identification with all of humanity encourages individuals to embrace local and national goals at no lesser intensity than they embrace global goals. We have done so using experimental data on social dilemmas at the local level and nested social dilemmas at the local and national level, as well as at the local and world levels. Experiments were conducted with adult samples in the United States, Italy, Russia, Argentina, South Africa, and Iran. We show that the higher the identification with global collectives, net of identification with local and national collectives, the higher the cooperation at the local, national, and world levels. Conversely, local social identity is not significantly associated with cooperation at any level of interaction, while national social identity, net of local and global identification, tends overall to have a negative correlation with cooperation, particularly at the local level. We also show that individuals with strong global identity are significantly more optimistic of others’ contributions than individuals with lower levels of global identification, but they are as accurate as others in predicting others’ cooperation at the local and national levels. Their forecast error is instead systematically larger than that of all others for cooperation at the world level.
- 30 June 2023
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Psychology
- Vol. 14, 1008567
Open AccessGlobal social identity predicts cooperation at local, national, and global levels: Results from international experiments
Individuals who identify themselves with humanity as a whole tend to be more prosocial in a number of different domains, from giving to international charities to volunteering for humanitarian causes. In this paper, we show that global identity is “inclusive” in character. That is, rather than neglecting or diminishing attachments to local and national groups, identification with all of humanity encourages individuals to embrace local and national goals at no lesser intensity than they embrace global goals. We have done so using experimental data on social dilemmas at the local level and nested social dilemmas at the local and national level, as well as at the local and world levels. Experiments were conducted with adult samples in the United States, Italy, Russia, Argentina, South Africa, and Iran. We show that the higher the identification with global collectives, net of identification with local and national collectives, the higher the cooperation at the local, national, and world levels. Conversely, local social identity is not significantly associated with cooperation at any level of interaction, while national social identity, net of local and global identification, tends overall to have a negative correlation with cooperation, particularly at the local level. We also show that individuals with strong global identity are significantly more optimistic of others’ contributions than individuals with lower levels of global identification, but they are as accurate as others in predicting others’ cooperation at the local and national levels. Their forecast error is instead systematically larger than that of all others for cooperation at the world level.