APAlexander Konstantinovich Petrenko

Alexander Konstantinovich Petrenko

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Alexander Konstantinovich Petrenko has a total of 69 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • CLOS Operating System Family

    by I. B. Burdonov, A. S. Kossatchev, A. K. Petrenko, A. V. Khoroshilov, V. Yu. Cheptsov

    CLOS is a technology and family of embedded operating systems supporting multicore architectures, with enhanced safety (DO-178C) and secure software development lifecycle (SSDL) requirements. CLOS provides spatial (memory) and temporal (response time guarantees) isolation of functional and system software. RTOS overhead is minimized through static memory configuration and nonperiodic timers with quantization. This article briefly describes the history of work on operating systems based on the microkernel approach, which began under the leadership of Academician V.P. Ivannikov in the 1970s and the development they have undergone to date. The main architectural solutions used in CLOS versions developed at the Institute of System Programming of the Russian Academy of Sciences for aerospace systems over the past ten years are described in more detail.

  • Software Security by Design

    by V. V. Kuliamin, A. K. Petrenko, E. A. Rudina

    Secure by Design is an important approach to ensure software security and reliability. It has already been developing for more than 50 years, but its principles and techniques are still not well known among the wide community of software developers. To make this approach more popular, we need to redefine its goals and problems, classify and explain its techniques, as well as outline trends for its future development. This paper reformulates the main Secure by Design principles, provides some examples of secure design patterns and anti-patterns, and explores relationships between this approach and software architecture analysis methods, hardening techniques, and secure programming languages.


  • Software Model Checking for Memory Consistency Verification

    by P. S. Andrianov, S. V. Zelenov, V. S. Mutilin, A. K. Petrenko

    Optimization transformations performed by a compiler may violate memory consistency requirements for a multithreaded program. This leads to errors, when the program behavior will differ from expected. The memory consistency requirements for a particular programming language are called the memory model. An example of an error of this class may be an incorrect change in the order of execution of instructions, which does not affect the behavior of a single-threaded program, but leads to unpredictable results in the multithreaded case. Such errors are often difficult to detect, as they occur rarely and depend significantly on the hardware and the state of the computer system. Although there are formal methods for verifying the consistency of shared memory usage, their scalability for industrial software remains a major challenge. To verify multithreaded programs, the MCC tool was previously proposed, which used a simple type of static analysis. In this article, we present a modification of the MCC tool, which implements a model verification method to verify the correctness of memory access consistency. The proposed method combines the methods of generating test programs and the method of static program analysis. The OTK tool is used to generate test programs. For static analysis, a modified version of the MCC tool is used, which checks all possible execution options for the generated test program, regardless of the specifics of a particular hardware. The tool was tested on an ARK industrial virtual machine and successfully identified two real errors in compiler optimizations.


  • Динамическая верификация промышленных средств защиты информации на основе формальных моделей управления доступом

    by А.к. Петренко, A.K. Petrenko, Д.в. Ефремов, D.V. Efremov, Е.в. Корныхин, E.V. Kornykhin., В.в. Кулямин, V.V. Kulyamin, В.а. Семенов, V.A. Semenov

  • SOFTWARE MODEL CHECKING FOR MEMORY CONSISTENCY VERIFICATION

    by S.A. Andrianov, S.V. Zelenov, V.S. Mutilin, A.K. Petrenko

    Optimization transformations performed by a compiler may violate memory consistency requirements for a multithreaded program. This leads to errors, when the program behavior will differ from expected. The memory consistency requirements for a particular programming language are called the memory model. An example of an error of this class may be an incorrect change in the order of execution of instructions, which does not affect the behavior of a single- threaded program, but leads to unpredictable results in the multithreaded case. Such errors are often difficult to detect, as they occur rarely and depend significantly on the hardware and the state of the computer system. Although there are formal methods for verifying the consistency of shared memory usage, their scalability for industrial software remains a major challenge. To verify multithreaded programs, the MCC tool was previously proposed, which used a simple type of static analysis. In this article, we present a modification of the MCC tool, which implements a model verification method to verify the correctness of memory access consistency. The proposed method combines the methods of generating test programs and the method of static program analysis. The OTK tool is used to generate test programs. For static analysis, a modified version of the MCC tool is used, which checks all possible execution options for the generated test program, regardless of the specifics of a particular hardware. The tool was tested on an ARK industrial virtual machine and successfully identified two real errors in compiler optimizations.

  • Open Access

    Software Security by Design

    by Victor Viatcheslavovitch Kuliamin, Alexander Konstantinovich Petrenko, Екатерина Александровна Рудина, Виктор Вячеславович Кулямин

    Security-by-Design is an important approach to ensure software security and reliability. It has been developing already for more than 50 years, but its principles and techniques are still not well known among wide society of software developers. To make the approach more familiar and popular we need to reestablish its goals and problems, to classify and explain its techniques, and formulate trends of its future development. This paper reformulates the main principles of Security-by-Design, provides some examples of security design patterns and anti-patterns, and also explores relations between the approach and software architecture analysis methods, hardening techniques, and safe programming languages.


  • Runtime Verification of Operating Systems Based on Abstract Models

    by D. V. Efremov, V. V. Kopach, E. V. Kornykhin, V. V. Kuliamin, A. K. Petrenko, A. V. Khoroshilov, I. V. Shchepetkov

    Because of high complexity of a modern operating system (OS) one has to use complex models in high-level languages even when specifying some separate aspects of OS functionality, such as, security functions. The problem of verifying the conformity between an OS and these models requires the establishment of a rather complex relationship between elements of OS implementation and elements of the model. In this paper, we present a method to establish and support this relationship, which can be effectively used in OS testing and monitoring. This method was successfully used in testing and monitoring the conformity between Linux kernel components and Event-B models.

  • Open Access

    Мониторинг и тестирование модулей операционных систем на основе абстрактных моделей поведения системы

    by Denis Valentinovich Efremov, Viktoria Vladimirovna Kopach, Eugeny Valerievich Kornykhin, Viktor Vyacheslavovich Kuliamin, Alexander Konstantinovich Petrenko, Alexey Vladimirovich Khoroshilov, Ilya Viktorovich Shchepetkov, Евгений Валерьевич Корныхин

    Мониторинг и тестирование модулей операционных систем на основе абстрактных моделей поведения системы


  • Open Access

    Modeling of operational, software and technical systems in RFBR projects

    by Ekaterina Mikhailovna Lavrischeva, Alexander Konstantinovich Petrenko

    Рассмотрен широкий круг вопросов теории и практики разработки крупномасштабного программного обеспечения и гибридных программно-аппаратных систем, в том числе операционных систем. Затрагиваются вопросы управления конфигурацией, моделирования и верификации таких систем, построения онтологических моделей предметных областей, связанных с прикладным и системным программным обеспечением. Такое многостороннее рассмотрение необходимо для обеспечения надежности, безопасности и элволюционного развития в течение многолетнего периода эксплуатации инфраструктурных и критически важных систем. Статья основана на материалах исследований, выполненных в рамках двух проектов РФФИ. Помимо недавних результатов, авторы уделяют внимание истории развития исследований в соответствующих областях в Советском Союзе.

  • Integrating RBAC, MIC, and MLS in Verified Hierarchical Security Model for Operating System

    by P. N. Devyanin, A. V. Khoroshilov, V. V. Kuliamin, A. K. Petrenko, I. V. Shchepetkov

    Designing a trusted access control mechanism of an operating system (OS) is a complex task if the goal is to achieve high level of security assurance and guarantees of unwanted information flows absence. Even more complex it becomes when the integration of several heterogeneous mechanisms, like role-based access control (RBAC), mandatory integrity control (MIC), and multi-level security (MLS) is considered. This paper presents results of development of a hierarchical integrated model of access control and information flows (HIMACF), which provides a holistic integration of RBAC, MIC, and MLS preserving key security properties of all those mechanisms. Previous version of this model is called MROSL DP-model. Now the model is formalized using Event-B formal method and its correctness is formally verified. In the hierarchical representation of the model, each hierarchy level (module) corresponds to a separate security control mechanism, so the model can be verified with less effort reusing the results of verification of lower level modules. The model is implemented in a Linux-based operating system using the Linux Security Modules infrastructure.