Philip T. Fliers
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Philip T. Fliers has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Abe de Jong
Monash University Melbourne Australia
4 shared publications Abe de Jong
Department of Banking and Finance, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
2 shared publications- Christopher L. Colvin
Queen's University Belfast
2 shared publications Bert S. van Stiphout‐Kramer
CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
1 shared publication- Christie Swanepoel
University of the Western Cape
1 shared publication Christopher L. Colvin
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 18 July 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Business History
- Vol. 68 (3) , 699-727
Why are corporations terminated? A century of evidence from the Netherlands
- 18 July 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Business History
- Vol. 68 (3) , 699-727
Open AccessWhy are corporations terminated? A century of evidence from the Netherlands
- Open Access
- 31 October 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Business History Review
- Vol. 98 (2) , 359-387
British CEOs in the Twentieth Century: Aristocratic Amateurs to Fat Cats?
This article uses a prosopographical methodology and new dataset of 1,558 CEOs from Britain’s largest public companies between 1900 and 2009 to analyze how the role, social background, and career pathways of corporate leaders changed. We have four main findings. First, the designation of CEO only prevailed in the 1990s. Second, the proportion of socially elite CEOs was highest before 1940, but they were not dominant. Third, most CEOs did not have a degree before the 1980s, or professional qualification until the 1990s. Fourth, liberal market reforms in the 1980s were associated with an increase in the likelihood of CEO dismissal by a factor of three.
- 31 October 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Business History Review
- Vol. 98 (2) , 359-387
Open AccessBritish CEOs in the Twentieth Century: Aristocratic Amateurs to Fat Cats?
This article uses a prosopographical methodology and new dataset of 1,558 CEOs from Britain’s largest public companies between 1900 and 2009 to analyze how the role, social background, and career pathways of corporate leaders changed. We have four main findings. First, the designation of CEO only prevailed in the 1990s. Second, the proportion of socially elite CEOs was highest before 1940, but they were not dominant. Third, most CEOs did not have a degree before the 1980s, or professional qualification until the 1990s. Fourth, liberal market reforms in the 1980s were associated with an increase in the likelihood of CEO dismissal by a factor of three.
- Open Access
- 21 September 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Applied Economics
- Vol. 57 (52) , 8710-8725
The impact of market power and financial flexibility on corporate investment policy
- 21 September 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Applied Economics
- Vol. 57 (52) , 8710-8725
Open AccessThe impact of market power and financial flexibility on corporate investment policy
- Open Access
- 7 March 2024
- Published by Wiley in The Economic History Review
- Vol. 77 (4) , 1477-1508
Corporate taxes, leverage, and investment: Evidence from Nazi‐occupied Netherlands
We examine the Netherlands around the Second World War, where the occupying Nazi regime overhauled the country's corporate tax regime and introduced a profit tax of 55 per cent. We estimate that the new tax regime cost investors at least 300 million guilders, an amount equivalent to 5 per cent of Dutch GDP in 1940. We demonstrate that the tax introduction changed the financing of Dutch businesses. In particular, we find strong evidence that debt financing increased because it provides a tax shelter. The changes in taxation also led to an after‐tax reduction in the cost of debt, which had large real effects on firm investment. After the end of the war, firms with more leverage had higher capital expenditures.
- 7 March 2024
- Published by Wiley in The Economic History Review
- Vol. 77 (4) , 1477-1508
Open AccessCorporate taxes, leverage, and investment: Evidence from Nazi‐occupied Netherlands
We examine the Netherlands around the Second World War, where the occupying Nazi regime overhauled the country's corporate tax regime and introduced a profit tax of 55 per cent. We estimate that the new tax regime cost investors at least 300 million guilders, an amount equivalent to 5 per cent of Dutch GDP in 1940. We demonstrate that the tax introduction changed the financing of Dutch businesses. In particular, we find strong evidence that debt financing increased because it provides a tax shelter. The changes in taxation also led to an after‐tax reduction in the cost of debt, which had large real effects on firm investment. After the end of the war, firms with more leverage had higher capital expenditures.
- Open Access
- 9 January 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Journal of Economic History
- Vol. 83 (1) , 131-165
Was Marshall Right? Managerial Failure and Corporate Ownership in Edwardian Britain
Alfred Marshall argued that the malaise of public companies in Edwardian Britain was due to the separation of ownership from control and a lack of professional management. In this paper, we examine the ownership and control of the c.1,700 largest British companies in 1911. We find that most public companies had a separation of ownership and control, but that this had little effect on their performance. We also find that manager characteristics that proxy for amateurism are uncorrelated with performance. Ultimately, our evidence suggests that, if Marshall was correct in identifying a corporate malaise in Britain, its source lay elsewhere.
- 9 January 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Journal of Economic History
- Vol. 83 (1) , 131-165
Open AccessWas Marshall Right? Managerial Failure and Corporate Ownership in Edwardian Britain
Alfred Marshall argued that the malaise of public companies in Edwardian Britain was due to the separation of ownership from control and a lack of professional management. In this paper, we examine the ownership and control of the c.1,700 largest British companies in 1911. We find that most public companies had a separation of ownership and control, but that this had little effect on their performance. We also find that manager characteristics that proxy for amateurism are uncorrelated with performance. Ultimately, our evidence suggests that, if Marshall was correct in identifying a corporate malaise in Britain, its source lay elsewhere.
- Open Access
- 5 May 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Financial History Review
- Vol. 29 (2) , 121-151
Going Dutch: monetary policy in the Netherlands during the interwar gold standard, 1925–1936
Our study of the day-to-day management of monetary policy in the Netherlands between 1925 and 1936 reveals that policy leaders and central bankers were both willing and able to deviate from the monetary policy paths set by other countries, all while remaining firmly within the gold bloc. The Netherlands wielded an independent monetary policy while remaining on gold thanks to its central bank's plentiful gold reserves. Central bankers quelled any speculation against the guilder by exploiting their domestic policy influence and international reputation to restrict capital mobility. However, maintaining pre-war parity until the collapse of the gold standard in September 1936 came at a cost. Our international comparisons and counterfactual analysis suggest that Dutch officials would have avoided a deepening of the Great Depression by leaving gold alongside the UK in 1931.
- 5 May 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Financial History Review
- Vol. 29 (2) , 121-151
Open AccessGoing Dutch: monetary policy in the Netherlands during the interwar gold standard, 1925–1936
Our study of the day-to-day management of monetary policy in the Netherlands between 1925 and 1936 reveals that policy leaders and central bankers were both willing and able to deviate from the monetary policy paths set by other countries, all while remaining firmly within the gold bloc. The Netherlands wielded an independent monetary policy while remaining on gold thanks to its central bank's plentiful gold reserves. Central bankers quelled any speculation against the guilder by exploiting their domestic policy influence and international reputation to restrict capital mobility. However, maintaining pre-war parity until the collapse of the gold standard in September 1936 came at a cost. Our international comparisons and counterfactual analysis suggest that Dutch officials would have avoided a deepening of the Great Depression by leaving gold alongside the UK in 1931.
- Open Access
- 4 May 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Economic History of Developing Regions
- Vol. 36 (2) , 213-244
The fuel of unparalleled recovery: Monetary policy in South Africa between 1925 and 1936
The newly established South African Reserve Bank (SARB) was tasked to protect the currency by navigating the interwar gold standard, and, from March 1933, maintaining parity with the Pound Sterling. We find that South Africa’s exit from gold secured an unparalleled and rapid recovery from the Great Depression. South Africa’s exit was accompanied by an inextricable link of the SARB’s policy rate to the interest rate set by the Bank of England (BoE). This sacrifice of independent monetary policy allowed the SARB to fix the country’s exchange rate without impeding the flow of gold to London. The SARB fuelled the economy by reducing its policy rates and accumulating gold. Had South Africa not devalued, the country would have suffered a severe depression and persistent deflation. An alternative to the devaluation was for the SARB to pursue a cheap money strategy. By setting interest rates historically low, we find that South Africa could have achieved higher levels of economic growth, at the cost of higher inflation. Ultimately, South Africa’s unparalleled recovery can be ascribed to the devaluation; however the change in the SARB monetary policy and the bank’s control over the gold markets were of paramount importance.
- 4 May 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Economic History of Developing Regions
- Vol. 36 (2) , 213-244
Open AccessThe fuel of unparalleled recovery: Monetary policy in South Africa between 1925 and 1936
The newly established South African Reserve Bank (SARB) was tasked to protect the currency by navigating the interwar gold standard, and, from March 1933, maintaining parity with the Pound Sterling. We find that South Africa’s exit from gold secured an unparalleled and rapid recovery from the Great Depression. South Africa’s exit was accompanied by an inextricable link of the SARB’s policy rate to the interest rate set by the Bank of England (BoE). This sacrifice of independent monetary policy allowed the SARB to fix the country’s exchange rate without impeding the flow of gold to London. The SARB fuelled the economy by reducing its policy rates and accumulating gold. Had South Africa not devalued, the country would have suffered a severe depression and persistent deflation. An alternative to the devaluation was for the SARB to pursue a cheap money strategy. By setting interest rates historically low, we find that South Africa could have achieved higher levels of economic growth, at the cost of higher inflation. Ultimately, South Africa’s unparalleled recovery can be ascribed to the devaluation; however the change in the SARB monetary policy and the bank’s control over the gold markets were of paramount importance.
- 28 April 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in De Economist
- Vol. 168 (3) , 343-368
Predicting Takeover Targets: Long-Run Evidence from the Netherlands
- 28 April 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in De Economist
- Vol. 168 (3) , 343-368
Predicting Takeover Targets: Long-Run Evidence from the Netherlands
- Open Access
- 1 December 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Financial History Review
- Vol. 26 (3) , 321-358
Catering and dividend policy: evidence from the Netherlands over the twentieth century
This article investigates the determinants of Dutch firms’ dividend policies in the twentieth century. We identify three distinct episodes and document shifts in dividend policies in the 1930s and 1980s, because firm managers cater to the changing preferences of shareholders. The first episode, prior to World War II, was characterised by dividends that were fixed contracts between shareholder and management and the payouts were mechanically determined by earnings. The second epoch of Dutch dividend policy, until the 1980s, was characterised by dividend smoothing. Dividends were still strongly related to earnings, but because of shareholder's preferences for stable dividend income, earnings changes are incorporated in dividends with a lag. Finally, dividend policy in the most recent episode is inspired by shareholder wealth maximisation, based on agency and signalling motives. In this period, dividends have become largely decoupled from earnings.
- 1 December 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Financial History Review
- Vol. 26 (3) , 321-358
Open AccessCatering and dividend policy: evidence from the Netherlands over the twentieth century
This article investigates the determinants of Dutch firms’ dividend policies in the twentieth century. We identify three distinct episodes and document shifts in dividend policies in the 1930s and 1980s, because firm managers cater to the changing preferences of shareholders. The first episode, prior to World War II, was characterised by dividends that were fixed contracts between shareholder and management and the payouts were mechanically determined by earnings. The second epoch of Dutch dividend policy, until the 1980s, was characterised by dividend smoothing. Dividends were still strongly related to earnings, but because of shareholder's preferences for stable dividend income, earnings changes are incorporated in dividends with a lag. Finally, dividend policy in the most recent episode is inspired by shareholder wealth maximisation, based on agency and signalling motives. In this period, dividends have become largely decoupled from earnings.
- Open Access
- 3 October 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Business History
- Vol. 63 (7) , 1144-1174
Exceptional big linkers: Dutch evidence from the 20th century
This article investigates the effects of individual directors for corporate strategies and firm performance over the course of the 20th century for Dutch exchange-listed firms. We apply a multi-method approach on directors with many executive and supervisory roles in multiple firms – so-called big linkers. We first identify exceptional big linkers, board members whose presence is systematically related with firm characteristics. Our approach allows us to identify a number of exceptional individuals who were previously overlooked by business historians. Then we investigate the backgrounds of these exceptional big linkers. We find that their biographies and other archival materials provide explanations for their systematic relation with corporate outcome variables such as performance, debt and investments. Using additional information about these directors, including network centrality, bank relations and family histories, we are able to shed light on the multitude of explanations for the roles of exceptional big linkers.
- 3 October 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Business History
- Vol. 63 (7) , 1144-1174
Open AccessExceptional big linkers: Dutch evidence from the 20th century
This article investigates the effects of individual directors for corporate strategies and firm performance over the course of the 20th century for Dutch exchange-listed firms. We apply a multi-method approach on directors with many executive and supervisory roles in multiple firms – so-called big linkers. We first identify exceptional big linkers, board members whose presence is systematically related with firm characteristics. Our approach allows us to identify a number of exceptional individuals who were previously overlooked by business historians. Then we investigate the backgrounds of these exceptional big linkers. We find that their biographies and other archival materials provide explanations for their systematic relation with corporate outcome variables such as performance, debt and investments. Using additional information about these directors, including network centrality, bank relations and family histories, we are able to shed light on the multitude of explanations for the roles of exceptional big linkers.