APAndrzej Pietruszczak

Andrzej Pietruszczak

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Andrzej Pietruszczak has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Frege and Russell as Inspirers of Leśniewski's Formalisation of the Concept of Collective Set

    by Andrzej Pietruszczak

    In this paper, we show that Frege's approach to classes and the relation of being an element was influential in Leśniewski's formalisation of these notions in a collective version. This was further influenced by Leśniewski's attempt to solve Russell's paradox. This happened even though Frege and Russell wrote about distributive classes, while Leśniewski recognised collective classes. We will present this in terms of Frege's approach to classes and the relation of being an element of. It allows us to discuss Russell's paradox in its form as Leśniewski saw it.

  • Open Access

    On Non-Deterministic Four-Valued Semantics for Some Normal and Very Weak T-Normal Logics

    by Andrzej Pietruszczak

    In this paper, for some modal logics, we analyse eight sets of non-deterministic four-valued truth tables with two pairs of truths and falsehoods—necessary and contingent. Three of them were given by Kearns for S5 , S4 , KT . Two of them were given by Coniglio, Fariñas del Cerro, and Peron for S4 , KTB . To these five sets, we add three new ones for S5 and KT . We show that these eight sets are the only ones of this kind that satisfy certain additional natural conditions. From these eight sets of tables, one can create sixteen non-deterministic matrices, depending on whether we distinguish only the necessary truth or both truths. From these matrices, one can create various semantics by adding to them an appropriate set of valuations. Kearns singled out a countably infinite decreasing sequence of sets of valuations of a given level. For S5 , S4 , KT , Kearns applied valuations with infinite level, which belong to all these sets (for these valuations, the choice of the set of distinguished values is not important). Omori and Skurt prove that Kearns’ tables for S5 and S4 can be used with 1st-level valuations. We add the set of PL-valuations (which assign necessary truth to all substitution instances of classical tautologies), which generally contains the set of 1st-level valuations. We showed that only for Kearns’ tables for S5 , the sets of PL- and 1st-level valuations are equal. We prove that the remaining seven tables with two distinguished values and PL-valuations are adequate for S0.5 and six very weak logics containing it. We show that three of these seven tables with 1st-level valuations are adequate for S5 and S4 . The remaining four sets of tables with the infinite level valuations are adequate for S5 , KTB , KT .

  • Open Access

    Semantic Investigations of De Re Modal Logics of Terms

    by Andrzej Pietruszczak

    In this paper, by a de re modal logic of terms, we mean a set of tautologies determined by a given semantics. We present a comprehensive study of several such semantics. First, we analyse semantics with a natural interpretation of de re modal propositions. We use the Johnson–Thomason models, but reject their four artificial conditions. Second, we discuss Johnson–Thomason semantics, which—with the unnatural interpretation of some modal propositions—is adequate for McCall’s axiomatic system L-X-M of Aristotle’s assertoric and apodeictic syllogistic. Finally, by weakening Johnson’s two controversial conditions for models and adopting the natural interpretation of modal propositions, we achieve an effect similar to that obtained by Johnson and Thomason. The phrases ‘is necessarily’ and ‘is possibly’ used in de re modal propositions can be interpreted in two ways: either literally, or as ‘is essentially’ and ‘is potentially’, respectively. The first interpretation Thomason uses in [23, 24], and the second one Johnson uses in [4]. With the second interpretation, following Thom’s lead, we consider the so-called Principle of Predication regarding properties. In the paper, we refer to the works of Johnson, Thom, and Thomason. The final part of the paper is devoted to providing suitable axiomatic systems for all previously given semantics. Proven adequacy theorems confirm that these systems express and derive all valid formulas under a given semantics.

  • Open Access

    The Calculus of Names—The Legacy of Jan Łukasiewicz

    by Andrzej Pietruszczak

    With his research on Aristotle’s syllogistic, Jan Łukasiewicz initiates the branch of logic known as the calculus of names. This field deals with axiomatic systems that analyse various fragments of the logic of names, i.e., that branch of logic that studies various forms of names and functors acting on them, as well as logical relationships between sentences in which these names and functors occur. In this work, we want not only to present the genesis of the calculus of names and its first system created by Łukasiewicz, but we also want to deliver systems that extend the first. In this work, we will also show that, from the point of view of modern logic, Łukasiewicz’s approach to the syllogistic is not the only possible one. However, this does not diminish Łukasiewicz’s role in the study of syllogism. We believe that the calculus of names is undoubtedly the legacy of Łukasiewicz.


  • Modal Discussive Logics

    by Krystyna Mruczek-Nasieniewska, Marek Nasieniewski, Andrzej Pietruszczak


  • Open Access

    Różne teorie części

    by Andrzej Pietruszczak

    Mereology is as a theory of collective sets (or mereological sums). It was formulated by the Polish logician Stanisław Leśniewski. Collective sets are wholes composed of parts, and the concept of being a collective set itself can be defined with the help of the concept of being a part. Mereology may therefore be considered as a theory of „the relation of a part to the whole” (from the Greek: μέρος – „part”). Leśniewski’s mereology was an untypical conception, for it differed from the standard formulations. However, it can be reformulated in the language of structure theory. In the paper, firstly, I examine existentially neutral theories, in which one may prove the existence of only those mereological sums that it is possible to obtain exclusively via the definition of and fundamental properties of the concept of being a part. Moreover, I examine some existentially involved theories of parts (Grzegorczykian mereology and Leśniewskian mereology). One of the main principles of mereology is the transitivity of the concept being a part. This property is often called into question in the literature. Finally, I present an analysis without the assumed transitivity.

  • Open Access

    Some Additional Axioms for T-normal Logics. Defining K45, KB4, KD45 and S5 without Using Modal Rules

    by Andrzej Pietruszczak

    The paper studies extensions of t-normal logics S0.5o and S0.5 obtained by means of some axioms of normal logics. We will prove determination theorems for these extensions by appropriate Kripke-style models. It will allow us to obtain the determinations of the logics K45, KB4 (= KB5), KD45 and S5 without using modal rules.


  • Open Access

    From the History of Leśniewski’s Mereology

    by Andrzej Pietruszczak

    In this paper, we want to present the genesis of Stanisław Leśniewski’s mereology. Although ‘mereology’ comes from theword ‘part’, mereology arose as a theory of collective classes. That is why we present the differences between the concepts of being a distributive class and being a collective class . Next, we present Leśniewski’s original mereology from 1927, but with a modern approach. Leśniewski was inspired to create his concept of classes and their elements by Russell’s antinomy. To face it, Leśniewski had to define the concept of being an element of based on the concept of being part of . Leśniewski showed that in his theory, there is no equivalent to Russell’s antinomy. We will show that his solution has nothing to do with the original approach because, in both cases, we are talking about objects of a different kind. Russell’s original antinomy concerned distributive classes, and Leśsniewski’s considerations concerned collective classes.