WYWei Yan

Wei Yan

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Wei Yan has a total of 27 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Sustainable Marketing: Can Retailers’ Profit-Motivated Consumer Education Enhance Green R&D and Production?

    by Zixi He, Junqiang Zhang, Wei Yan

    Drawing from practices at Walmart, we model a supply chain where the manufacturer conducts product R&D while the retailer distributes products to two distinct consumer segments: green-conscious consumers who translate environmental principles into purchasing decisions, and non-green-conscious consumers who are deterred by perceived high costs and information deficits. The retailer engages in green education targeted at non-green-conscious consumers, providing clear product explanations to improve their willingness to pay for sustainable products, though this education is motivated by profit maximization rather than altruistic environmental responsibility. Our analysis reveals that while retailer green education can boost product R&D and adoption under certain conditions, this creates a ‘consumer education paradox’—a situation where green education could further enhance product R&D and adoption, but the retailer forgoes it because doing so does not contribute to profit. This occurs because profit-driven retailers limit education to self-beneficial ranges, creating tension between individual profit maximization and overall environmental performance. We then propose two government subsidy solutions—green product quantity subsidies and product R&D subsidies—to resolve this paradox. Both effectively alleviate the tension, but green innovation subsidies, despite requiring greater government investment, consistently outperform in fostering innovation and adoption, offering superior environmental outcomes.


  • Open Access

    The Implications of the Spillover Effect Related to Green Co-Creation in a Supply Chain

    by Weijia Kong, Yunfei Shao, Simeng Wang, Wei Yan, Yawen Liu

    Driven by environmental concerns, firms close to end-users are increasingly co-creating with customers for green product development within their supply chains. However, a challenge called “spillover” can hinder the incentive for green co-creation by these firms. This paper examines the spillover issue in a dual-channel structure, where downstream firms implement co-creation with customers for green product development. Our findings indicate that spillover from green investments can negatively impact the investing firm’s profits. However, in low-competition scenarios, spillover benefits the supplier and customers within the supply chain. Additionally, under specific circumstances, it can improve overall supply chain performance. Crucially, to safeguard the sustainability of green co-creation in supply chains and prevent detrimental co-destruction, we propose implementing revenue-sharing contracts that can generate Pareto improvements, benefiting all green supply chain members. As a result, unlike traditional intellectual property protection, which hinders spillover, this study offers an alternative strategy that is also somewhat complementary, promoting collaboration over restrictions to leverage the positive aspects of spillover.


  • Managing collecting or remarketing channels: different choice for cannibalisation in remanufacturing outsourcing

    by Feng Zhang, Hong Chen, Yu Xiong, Wei Yan, Meilian Liu

    Cannibalisation is still a concern for original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) when they outsource remanufacturing operations to the authorised remanufacturers (ARs). In dealing with the cannibalisation in remanufacturing outsourcing, many OEMs (such as Sun, Apple, Hewlett Packard, Bosch Tools, and Gateway) use core collecting or remanufactured product remarketing. Motivated by examples from industry, we develop two models in which an OEM produces new products but outsources remanufacturing operations to a AR. The two potential strategies for dealing with the cannibalisation from remanufacturing outsourcing are: (1) collecting used cores from consumers, or (2) remarketing all remanufactured products to consumers. Among other results, we find that minimising cannibalisation problems does not equate with maximising profits. In particular, if the collection cost coefficient is not pronounced, the aggressive response by the OEM can effectively minimise the cannibalisation problems, but will reduce the profitability for the OEM on the other hand. Further, as the collection cost coefficient is moderate, remarketing remanufactured products can secure Pareto improvements. As such, we suggest that, practising managers should combine the cannibalisation problems of remanufacturing with the costs of collecting used cores.


  • Should a retailer sell its own extended warranties or resell those from the manufacturer when confronting supplier encroachment?

    by Junwu Chai, Hengyu Li, Wei Yan, Youwei Li

    Due to fierce competition in the product market under conditions of supplier encroachment, many brand name retailers, including Sears, Best Buy, and Circuit City, depend on the extended warranty contracts that they sell along with the products. The distribution of extended warranties through an intermediary can be characterized in terms of two basic forms. A large proportion of retailers sell their own extended warranty, whilst others choose to resell the extended warranty provided by upstream agents. Several questions arise from these conditions. How will optimum decisions vary under different strategic choice? Is it profitable for a retailer to engage in selling extended warranties? And finally, which strategy is more profitable for related players? We answer these questions using a game theoretic model where the retailer has the flexibility to choose between offering its own extended warranties (Model ER) or reselling extended warranties provided by a manufacturer (Model EM). Our analysis reveals that it is indeed a profitable business for both parties when the retailer engages in selling extended warranty, irrespective of whether they are owned by the retailer or by the manufacturer. Surprisingly, we find that, when marketing cost of the extended warranty is high, the retailer benefits more from reselling the extended warranty, a strategy that is always beneficial for the manufacturer. Put differently, when marketing cost of the extended warranty is high, reselling extended warranties from the manufacturer can secure Pareto improvements. However, when marketing cost of the extended warranty is not pronounced, a preference confliction arises between both parties: The retailer prefers to sell its own extended warranty, while the manufacturer would be fond of the other one. Extending both models to the case where the manufacturer encroaches into retail market with selling both products and extended warranty reveals that the preference confliction between both parties is quite robust.


  • Selling vertically differentiated products under one channel or two? A quality segmentation model for differentiated distribution channels

    by Junwu Chai, Wei Yan, Youwei Li, Mark Palmer, Qilin Huang

    Many manufacturers have adopted differentiated distribution channels to market vertically differentiated products. However, there is scant literature addressing the quality differentiation in the presence of differentiated channel policies. We, therefore, examine whether (how) differentiated channel policies affect manufacturers’ quality differentiation and all parties’ performance. Specifically, we consider a manufacturer who produces high- and low products together, but with two marketing options: (1) distributing both products through one retailer (Model O), or (2) providing high quality products through one channel but low-tier products through another (Model T). Our results show that the manufacturer is more likely to decrease the level of quality differentiation in Model T than in Model O. Moreover, we show that “quality distortion” is not limited to low-tier products but can occur with high-tier products. We also comment on how the additional horizontal consumer heterogeneity affects our results and the implications of the competition at the manufacturer level.


  • Open Access

    Operational Decisions on Remanufacturing Outsourcing Involved with Corporate Environmental and Social Responsibility—A Sustainable Perspective

    by Wei Yan, Junwu Chai, Zhifeng Qian, Sang-Bing Tsai, Hong Chen, Yu Xiong

    Due to increasing consciousness of sustainability and pressure from legislation, numerous studies and managers have sought to integrate traditional operations management with green environment and social responsibility. One such effort is remanufacturing, which has emerged as a growing topic. Although outsourcing remanufacturing operations to third-party remanufacturers (TPRs) has been well studied in the literature, the research has paid little attention to the fact that original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) have the flexibility of outsourcing to other agents but not TPRs. In practice, besides TPRs, many brand-name OEMs have outsourced remanufacturing operations to their suppliers. The question this raises is: TPR vs. supplier, which remanufacturer is better for the economic, environment and social responsibility? To understand this fundamental question, in this paper, we develop two models that allow an OEM to have potential flexibility to (1) outsource remanufacturing operations to a TPR (Model T) or (2) outsource remanufacturing operations to a supplier (Model S). Among other results, we find that, although the Model T creates more potentially sustainable economic, social, and environmental situations, this strategy is not supported by the supplier because it always leaves the supplier worse off. In order to achieve a “win-win-win” outcome that meets economic, social, and environmental requirements for all parties, a revenue-sharing contract is proposed and incorporated into Model T.


  • Open Access

    Owning or Outsourcing? Strategic Choice on Take-Back Operations for Third-Party Remanufacturing

    by Wei Yan, Hengyu Li, Junwu Chai, Zhifeng Qian, Hong Chen

    Despite the remanufacturing process having demonstrated economic, social, and environmental benefits, many original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) have not engaged in the remanufacturing process themselves, as they often outsource it to a third party. In practice, such outsourcing usually involves two different options/modes for OEMs with consideration of take-back operations: (1) owning the reverse channel and collecting cores directly (Model D) or (2) outsourcing these operations to a third-party remanufacturer (TPR) and collecting cores indirectly (Model I). However, this raises the important question of whether OEMs should also outsource their reverse channels to third-party remanufacturers when outsourcing remanufacturing. Furthermore, there needs to be an investigation of which method is more beneficial in terms of economic, social, and environmental outcomes. This paper uses modelling to investigate the costs and benefits of these options in terms of sustainability. We found that, compared to Model I, the OEM conducting take-back operations itself can achieve the overall better outcomes for all economic, social, and environmental situations.


  • Open Access

    Should a Manufacturer Encroach on Its Retailer’s Operations with Quality Differentiated Products?

    by Junwu Chai, Huan Chen, Qilin Huang, Wei Yan

    Despite the fact that manufacturers are progressively encroaching into the retail market by selling products that differ in quality from the products that are already on the market, this issue has received little attention in the literature on dual-channel supply chains. We fill this gap by first considering that a manufacturer sells higher- (lower-) quality products through its own direct channel, whereas all lower- (higher-) quality products are distributed by an independent retailer, and then comparing our equilibrium outcomes with those in the literature of the manufacturer who distributes homogeneous products through both channels. Our results show that, compared to selling lower-quality products directly or offering homogeneous products through both channels, an effort by the manufacturer that is too aggressive in its attempt to encroach on the retail market (i.e., selling higher-quality products directly) not only decreases the retailer’s profits but also reduces the manufacturer’s own profitability. Furthermore, we find that, compared with offering homogeneous products through both channels, selling lower-quality products directly is always beneficial for the retailer but hurts consumers.