Raymond Freeman
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Raymond Freeman has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Angela Summers
SIS‐Tech 12621 Featherwood Dr, Suite 120 Houston TX 77034
1 shared publication- Ronald J. Willey
Department of Chemical Engineering Northeastern University Boston Massachusetts USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 10 February 2021
- Published by Wiley in Process Safety Progress
- Vol. 40 (1) , e12242
Process safety manuscript archives available to the practitioner
Since 1967, the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) has sponsored a series of safety symposia. The goal of these symposia is to reduce the frequency and severity of accidents in the Chemical Process Industries (CPI). The Safety and Health Division of AIChE was established to serve as a central hub for the collection and dissemination of this process of safety information. Over the years, this dissemination expanded to several process safety symposia tracks at the Global Congress on Process Safety. Three symposia manuscripts have been assembled and archived into a database accessible on the Internet through the AIChE Academy. Loss prevention symposium (LPS) Process plant safety symposium (PPSS) Center for chemical process safety (CCPS) symposium The technical papers presented at these symposia cover a wide range of topics such as fire protection, risk reduction, explosion analysis, plant maintenance practices, process safety management, and many other topics. A total of 2524 papers were scanned and organized into a form which can be used to search for information on process safety topics. A spreadsheet of the contents of the archives was created. This paper describes the organization of the process safety archives and presents an example of how the archives can be used to find information.
- 10 February 2021
- Published by Wiley in Process Safety Progress
- Vol. 40 (1) , e12242
Process safety manuscript archives available to the practitioner
Since 1967, the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) has sponsored a series of safety symposia. The goal of these symposia is to reduce the frequency and severity of accidents in the Chemical Process Industries (CPI). The Safety and Health Division of AIChE was established to serve as a central hub for the collection and dissemination of this process of safety information. Over the years, this dissemination expanded to several process safety symposia tracks at the Global Congress on Process Safety. Three symposia manuscripts have been assembled and archived into a database accessible on the Internet through the AIChE Academy. Loss prevention symposium (LPS) Process plant safety symposium (PPSS) Center for chemical process safety (CCPS) symposium The technical papers presented at these symposia cover a wide range of topics such as fire protection, risk reduction, explosion analysis, plant maintenance practices, process safety management, and many other topics. A total of 2524 papers were scanned and organized into a form which can be used to search for information on process safety topics. A spreadsheet of the contents of the archives was created. This paper describes the organization of the process safety archives and presents an example of how the archives can be used to find information.
- 16 November 2020
- Published by Wiley in Process Safety Progress
- Vol. 40 (3) , 50-62
A novel method for fault tree uncertainty analysis using error propagation methods
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a widely used methodology in the process industries. FTA is used for the development of failure mechanisms, computation of failure frequencies and the determination of the probability of failure on demand of safety systems. Much of the data used in a FTA study are uncertain. For example, the failure rate of a pump is often not known with great precision. Likewise the failure rates of instrumentation are often known only within some defined limits. The common practice, used by analysts in the quantification of a fault tree, is to use the most likely or best guess as to the needed failure rate data. The use of best guess values as data inputs to the quantification of a fault tree creates uncertainty in the computed results. This paper presents a general methodology for the determination of the impact of uncertainty on the results of a fault tree study. The general methodology is based on the mathematics of propagation of error and variance contribution analysis. For a fault tree that contains 10 event minimal cut sets, the methodology will compute the variance in the probability (or frequency) of the top event with a maximum error of 5%. For five event minimal cut sets the error in variance of the top event probability (or frequency) will be no more than 2%. An example is presented to illustrate the application of the fault tree uncertainty analysis methodology to a real world problem.
- 16 November 2020
- Published by Wiley in Process Safety Progress
- Vol. 40 (3) , 50-62
A novel method for fault tree uncertainty analysis using error propagation methods
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a widely used methodology in the process industries. FTA is used for the development of failure mechanisms, computation of failure frequencies and the determination of the probability of failure on demand of safety systems. Much of the data used in a FTA study are uncertain. For example, the failure rate of a pump is often not known with great precision. Likewise the failure rates of instrumentation are often known only within some defined limits. The common practice, used by analysts in the quantification of a fault tree, is to use the most likely or best guess as to the needed failure rate data. The use of best guess values as data inputs to the quantification of a fault tree creates uncertainty in the computed results. This paper presents a general methodology for the determination of the impact of uncertainty on the results of a fault tree study. The general methodology is based on the mathematics of propagation of error and variance contribution analysis. For a fault tree that contains 10 event minimal cut sets, the methodology will compute the variance in the probability (or frequency) of the top event with a maximum error of 5%. For five event minimal cut sets the error in variance of the top event probability (or frequency) will be no more than 2%. An example is presented to illustrate the application of the fault tree uncertainty analysis methodology to a real world problem.
- 5 August 2019
- Published by Wiley in Process Safety Progress
- Vol. 39 (2) , e12080
Error propagation and uncertainty analysis: Application to fault tree analysis
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a widely used method for the evaluation of safety systems. FTA is based on modeling the behavior of a system by a combination of logic gates (AND, OR) in a logic tree that describes the system. Failure data of low‐level events are used to compute the frequency of the top event of concern. The failure rate data describe the failure of the system components such as pumps, valves, vessels, and instruments. All of the failure rate data are uncertain. This article presents a methodology for the evaluation of uncertainty in the top event of concern using propagation of error and uncertainty analysis methods. The fundamental theory is presented, and a simple fault tree uncertainty analysis is completed to demonstrate the methodology. The uncertainty analysis methodology allows for the identification of the components or assumptions that dominate the risk.
- 5 August 2019
- Published by Wiley in Process Safety Progress
- Vol. 39 (2) , e12080
Error propagation and uncertainty analysis: Application to fault tree analysis
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a widely used method for the evaluation of safety systems. FTA is based on modeling the behavior of a system by a combination of logic gates (AND, OR) in a logic tree that describes the system. Failure data of low‐level events are used to compute the frequency of the top event of concern. The failure rate data describe the failure of the system components such as pumps, valves, vessels, and instruments. All of the failure rate data are uncertain. This article presents a methodology for the evaluation of uncertainty in the top event of concern using propagation of error and uncertainty analysis methods. The fundamental theory is presented, and a simple fault tree uncertainty analysis is completed to demonstrate the methodology. The uncertainty analysis methodology allows for the identification of the components or assumptions that dominate the risk.
- 9 October 2017
- Published by Wiley in Process Safety Progress
- Vol. 37 (2) , 153-160
General method for uncertainty evaluation of safety integrity level calculations – part 2 analytical methods
The IEC 61511 standard requires a verification calculation that a proposed design for a safety instrumented function (SIF) achieves the desired safety integrity level (SIL). The evaluation of the SIL of a new or existing safety instrumented system requires detailed calculations based on the failure rates of the device and the planned maintenance/testing cycle for the system. The failure rates of the devices are often taken from standard failure rate tabulations of equipment. The maintenance and testing plans are developed based on plant experience. All of the data used in the SIL calculations are uncertain. This article develops a general method for uncertainty analysis of the SIL calculations. The general method is based on the application of probability theory—variance contribution analysis—to the equations presented in ISA TR 84.00.02‐2115. An example is worked to demonstrate the methodology. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 37: 153–160, 2018
- 9 October 2017
- Published by Wiley in Process Safety Progress
- Vol. 37 (2) , 153-160
General method for uncertainty evaluation of safety integrity level calculations – part 2 analytical methods
The IEC 61511 standard requires a verification calculation that a proposed design for a safety instrumented function (SIF) achieves the desired safety integrity level (SIL). The evaluation of the SIL of a new or existing safety instrumented system requires detailed calculations based on the failure rates of the device and the planned maintenance/testing cycle for the system. The failure rates of the devices are often taken from standard failure rate tabulations of equipment. The maintenance and testing plans are developed based on plant experience. All of the data used in the SIL calculations are uncertain. This article develops a general method for uncertainty analysis of the SIL calculations. The general method is based on the application of probability theory—variance contribution analysis—to the equations presented in ISA TR 84.00.02‐2115. An example is worked to demonstrate the methodology. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 37: 153–160, 2018
- 16 February 2016
- Published by Wiley in Process Safety Progress
- Vol. 35 (1) , 32-35
History of the loss prevention symposium: The first 50 years—“there are no secrets in safety”
This article presents a short history of the AIChE Loss Prevention Symposium (LPS) from its founding in 1967 to the present. The article gives the reader a general understanding of the development of the LPS along with published references to more detailed accounts of various aspects of the history of process safety efforts in the United States. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 35: 32–35, 2016
- 16 February 2016
- Published by Wiley in Process Safety Progress
- Vol. 35 (1) , 32-35
History of the loss prevention symposium: The first 50 years—“there are no secrets in safety”
This article presents a short history of the AIChE Loss Prevention Symposium (LPS) from its founding in 1967 to the present. The article gives the reader a general understanding of the development of the LPS along with published references to more detailed accounts of various aspects of the history of process safety efforts in the United States. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 35: 32–35, 2016
- 23 January 2016
- Published by Wiley in Process Safety Progress
- Vol. 35 (4) , 341-348
Evaluation of uncertainty in safety integrity level calculations
The evaluation of the safety integrity level (SIL) of a new or existing safety instrumented system (SIS) requires detailed calculations based on the failure rates of the device and the planned maintenance‐testing cycle for the system. The failure rates of the devices are taken from standard failure rate tabulations of equipment. The maintenance and testing plans are developed based on plant experience. The quantitative evaluation determines the probability of failure on demand (PFD) for a demand mode SIS and yields the SIL of the SIS. All of the data used in the SIL calculations are uncertain. This article explores the impact of uncertainty on the PFD calculation for a SIS. The “70%” rule of thumb from IEC 61508 is compared to results obtained using probability theory such as variance contribution analysis (VCA). A proposed methodology for handling the uncertainty in the PFD calculations is presented based on the application of the VCA method. An example is worked to demonstrate the methodology. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 35: 341–348, 2016
- 23 January 2016
- Published by Wiley in Process Safety Progress
- Vol. 35 (4) , 341-348
Evaluation of uncertainty in safety integrity level calculations
The evaluation of the safety integrity level (SIL) of a new or existing safety instrumented system (SIS) requires detailed calculations based on the failure rates of the device and the planned maintenance‐testing cycle for the system. The failure rates of the devices are taken from standard failure rate tabulations of equipment. The maintenance and testing plans are developed based on plant experience. The quantitative evaluation determines the probability of failure on demand (PFD) for a demand mode SIS and yields the SIL of the SIS. All of the data used in the SIL calculations are uncertain. This article explores the impact of uncertainty on the PFD calculation for a SIS. The “70%” rule of thumb from IEC 61508 is compared to results obtained using probability theory such as variance contribution analysis (VCA). A proposed methodology for handling the uncertainty in the PFD calculations is presented based on the application of the VCA method. An example is worked to demonstrate the methodology. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 35: 341–348, 2016
- 4 June 2013
- Published by Wiley in Process Safety Progress
- Vol. 32 (4) , 351-360
Simplified uncertainty analysis of layer of protection analysis results
Layer of protection analysis (LOPA) is a semiquantitative risk evaluation tool. The methodology is widely used in setting safety integrity level targets for safety instrumented systems. The methodology is often used to evaluate the adequacy of existing protective systems against corporate risk targets. The LOPA method is based on the use of conservative estimates of the failure probability of protective systems. Freeman previously presented a method for the quantification of uncertainty in a LOPA study based on the application of variance contribution analysis (VCA) techniques. The use of VCA to evaluate the uncertainty in a LOPA study requires the evaluation of the sensitivity of the LOPA equation to changes in each of the variables. Freeman used direct analytical computation of the partial derivatives of the LOPA equation for each of the uncertain variables. Faster and easier methods are needed if LOPA uncertainty analysis is to be applied by practicing engineers. This article explores the use of approximations to compute the required uncertainty information without the use of the partial derivative computations. Numerical approximations (perturbation methods) are found to allow for the estimate of the partial derivatives with a maximum error of 16%. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 351–360, 2013
- 4 June 2013
- Published by Wiley in Process Safety Progress
- Vol. 32 (4) , 351-360
Simplified uncertainty analysis of layer of protection analysis results
Layer of protection analysis (LOPA) is a semiquantitative risk evaluation tool. The methodology is widely used in setting safety integrity level targets for safety instrumented systems. The methodology is often used to evaluate the adequacy of existing protective systems against corporate risk targets. The LOPA method is based on the use of conservative estimates of the failure probability of protective systems. Freeman previously presented a method for the quantification of uncertainty in a LOPA study based on the application of variance contribution analysis (VCA) techniques. The use of VCA to evaluate the uncertainty in a LOPA study requires the evaluation of the sensitivity of the LOPA equation to changes in each of the variables. Freeman used direct analytical computation of the partial derivatives of the LOPA equation for each of the uncertain variables. Faster and easier methods are needed if LOPA uncertainty analysis is to be applied by practicing engineers. This article explores the use of approximations to compute the required uncertainty information without the use of the partial derivative computations. Numerical approximations (perturbation methods) are found to allow for the estimate of the partial derivatives with a maximum error of 16%. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 351–360, 2013
- 19 June 2012
- Published by Wiley in Process Safety Progress
- Vol. 31 (3) , 240-247
Quantifying LOPA uncertainty
Layer of protection analysis (LOPA) is a semi‐quantitative risk evaluation tool. The methodology is widely used in setting safety integrity level (SIL) targets for safety instrumented systems (SIS). The methodology is often used to evaluate the adequacy of existing protective systems against corporate risk targets. The LOPA method is based on the use of conservative but representative estimates of the failure probability of protective systems. The results of these studies are presented to management for concurrence with the conclusions and for funding of recommendations. Management sometimes asks questions such as: What is the uncertainty in the results? How sensitive are the results to the underlying data and assumptions? How conservative is the LOPA methodology? Should additional independent protection layers be recommended from the LOPA study to compensate for uncertainty in the results? There is no existing method for the analysis of uncertainty in a LOPA study. This article presents a framework to answer management questions related to the LOPA uncertainty. Guidance is presented on methods to incorporate an uncertainty analysis into a LOPA or quantitative risk analysis study. © 2012 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2012
- 19 June 2012
- Published by Wiley in Process Safety Progress
- Vol. 31 (3) , 240-247
Quantifying LOPA uncertainty
Layer of protection analysis (LOPA) is a semi‐quantitative risk evaluation tool. The methodology is widely used in setting safety integrity level (SIL) targets for safety instrumented systems (SIS). The methodology is often used to evaluate the adequacy of existing protective systems against corporate risk targets. The LOPA method is based on the use of conservative but representative estimates of the failure probability of protective systems. The results of these studies are presented to management for concurrence with the conclusions and for funding of recommendations. Management sometimes asks questions such as: What is the uncertainty in the results? How sensitive are the results to the underlying data and assumptions? How conservative is the LOPA methodology? Should additional independent protection layers be recommended from the LOPA study to compensate for uncertainty in the results? There is no existing method for the analysis of uncertainty in a LOPA study. This article presents a framework to answer management questions related to the LOPA uncertainty. Guidance is presented on methods to incorporate an uncertainty analysis into a LOPA or quantitative risk analysis study. © 2012 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2012
- 28 June 2011
- Published by Wiley in Process Safety Progress
- Vol. 30 (3) , 204-211
What to do when nothing has happened?
Often, during a layer of protection analysis (LOPA) or a quantitative risk analysis (QRA) study, historical information indicates no occurrences of a particular undesired event in the plant or system. The simple reply that the frequency or rate is zero because the event has never happened is sometimes heard by the analyst during review meetings. The analyst must then decide on an appropriate measure of the frequency of the undesired event. This article presents methods based on statistical tools for developing a measure of the frequency or failure rate of an event when the historical information includes no occurrences of the event. The article compares the various available statistical tools. Guidance is presented on methods to incorporate historical information of no failures into a LOPA or QRA study. Examples on the application of the recommended methods to deal with the problem are presented. © 2011 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2011
- 28 June 2011
- Published by Wiley in Process Safety Progress
- Vol. 30 (3) , 204-211
What to do when nothing has happened?
Often, during a layer of protection analysis (LOPA) or a quantitative risk analysis (QRA) study, historical information indicates no occurrences of a particular undesired event in the plant or system. The simple reply that the frequency or rate is zero because the event has never happened is sometimes heard by the analyst during review meetings. The analyst must then decide on an appropriate measure of the frequency of the undesired event. This article presents methods based on statistical tools for developing a measure of the frequency or failure rate of an event when the historical information includes no occurrences of the event. The article compares the various available statistical tools. Guidance is presented on methods to incorporate historical information of no failures into a LOPA or QRA study. Examples on the application of the recommended methods to deal with the problem are presented. © 2011 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2011
- 26 September 2008
- Published by Wiley in Process Safety Progress
- Vol. 27 (4) , 306-312
Procedural‐based controls in layer of protection analysis
The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) book on the LOPA (layer of protection analysis) methodology gives little credit for procedural controls. In batch operations, startups or process shutdowns, the procedural controls are often the only available means of controlling the potential hazards. This article presents a methodology for the evaluation of procedural‐based controls as potential independent layers of protection during a LOPA study. A checklist for the evaluation of procedural controls is presented as well as a few examples to demonstrate the methodology. © 2008 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2008
- 26 September 2008
- Published by Wiley in Process Safety Progress
- Vol. 27 (4) , 306-312
Procedural‐based controls in layer of protection analysis
The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) book on the LOPA (layer of protection analysis) methodology gives little credit for procedural controls. In batch operations, startups or process shutdowns, the procedural controls are often the only available means of controlling the potential hazards. This article presents a methodology for the evaluation of procedural‐based controls as potential independent layers of protection during a LOPA study. A checklist for the evaluation of procedural controls is presented as well as a few examples to demonstrate the methodology. © 2008 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2008