Paul Edward Engelhardt
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Paul Edward Engelhardt has a total of 41 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Eugen Fischer
School of Politics, Philosophy, and Area Studies University of East Anglia Norwich UK
9 shared publications Fernanda Ferreira
C Department of Psychology , University of California , Davis, Davis , CA , USA
3 shared publications- Keith Allen
Department of Philosophy University of York
3 shared publications - Aimee O’shea
School of Psychology, University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK
2 shared publications Joel T. Nigg
B Department of Psychiatry , Oregon Health and Science University , Portland , OR , USA
2 shared publications- Justin Sytsma
Victoria University of Wellington
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 5 November 2026
- Published by Wiley in Mind & Language
When stereotypical inferences prevail in polysemy processing: Explaining fallacies of equivocation
This paper develops and examines the first psycholinguistic explanation of fallacies of equivocation. On this basis, it addresses questions about polysemy processing. The paper proceeds from a case study on fallacies involving polysemous appearance verbs. Three studies provide evidence that subordinate uses of these verbs are interpreted through selective suppression of features from an event knowledge schema that overspecifies the relevant information, and that a comprehension bias interferes with the execution of this strategy and prevents the contextualisation of stereotypical inferences from the verbs. These contextualisation failures result in fallacies of equivocation, for example, in philosophically influential “arguments from illusion”.
- 5 November 2026
- Published by Wiley in Mind & Language
Open AccessWhen stereotypical inferences prevail in polysemy processing: Explaining fallacies of equivocation
This paper develops and examines the first psycholinguistic explanation of fallacies of equivocation. On this basis, it addresses questions about polysemy processing. The paper proceeds from a case study on fallacies involving polysemous appearance verbs. Three studies provide evidence that subordinate uses of these verbs are interpreted through selective suppression of features from an event knowledge schema that overspecifies the relevant information, and that a comprehension bias interferes with the execution of this strategy and prevents the contextualisation of stereotypical inferences from the verbs. These contextualisation failures result in fallacies of equivocation, for example, in philosophically influential “arguments from illusion”.
- Open Access
- 21 April 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 207 (5) , 185
Direct or indirect realism? Assessing conflicting folk conceptions of vision
Longstanding philosophical debates about the nature of perception revolve around a clash between Direct Realist and Indirect Realist conceptions of vision. These deny and affirm, respectively, that vision involves awareness of mental images which represent the physical objects of sight. The assumption that ‘the’ common-sense conception of vision is Direct Realist shapes these debates. Against this key assumption, recent studies in experimental philosophy have provided first evidence that laypeople are, collectively and often individually, torn between Direct Realist and Indirect Realist conceptions, and regard both as naïve. These findings raise a general methodological issue: Does agreement with two such patently incompatible conceptions reflect genuine beliefs? This paper crucially extends first findings, examines whether agreement ratings are indicative of beliefs, and offers an explanation of how the conflicting beliefs involved could be acquired and maintained. Three studies develop and validate the new Direct/Indirect Realist Belief Inventory (DIRBI) which uses agreement ratings with verbal and pictorial stimuli to assess the prevalence of the two conflicting conceptions among laypeople. Findings confirm that laypeople hold relevant beliefs and are, collectively and individually, torn between the two conceptions. We suggest these beliefs are ultimately anchored in ubiquitous implicit knowledge structures, namely, experiential event knowledge about vision and an implicit model of endogenous attention. We conclude that there is no such thing as ‘the’ common-sense conception of vision that could enjoy the epistemic default status accorded to common sense in many philosophical debates.
- 21 April 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 207 (5) , 185
Open AccessDirect or indirect realism? Assessing conflicting folk conceptions of vision
Longstanding philosophical debates about the nature of perception revolve around a clash between Direct Realist and Indirect Realist conceptions of vision. These deny and affirm, respectively, that vision involves awareness of mental images which represent the physical objects of sight. The assumption that ‘the’ common-sense conception of vision is Direct Realist shapes these debates. Against this key assumption, recent studies in experimental philosophy have provided first evidence that laypeople are, collectively and often individually, torn between Direct Realist and Indirect Realist conceptions, and regard both as naïve. These findings raise a general methodological issue: Does agreement with two such patently incompatible conceptions reflect genuine beliefs? This paper crucially extends first findings, examines whether agreement ratings are indicative of beliefs, and offers an explanation of how the conflicting beliefs involved could be acquired and maintained. Three studies develop and validate the new Direct/Indirect Realist Belief Inventory (DIRBI) which uses agreement ratings with verbal and pictorial stimuli to assess the prevalence of the two conflicting conceptions among laypeople. Findings confirm that laypeople hold relevant beliefs and are, collectively and individually, torn between the two conceptions. We suggest these beliefs are ultimately anchored in ubiquitous implicit knowledge structures, namely, experiential event knowledge about vision and an implicit model of endogenous attention. We conclude that there is no such thing as ‘the’ common-sense conception of vision that could enjoy the epistemic default status accorded to common sense in many philosophical debates.
- Open Access
- 15 October 2025
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Scientific or naïve? Perceptions of direct and indirect realism, and why they matter
Philosophical debates about the nature of perception are standardly informed by an empirical assumption about folk beliefs: They assume there is such a thing as “the” common‐sense conception of vision, and that this conception is captured by Direct Realism. This naïve theory is thought to compete with scientifically informed Indirect Realism. This paper discusses how to render these claims empirically tractable and reports a scientific accuracy rating study whose findings suggest instead that both Direct Realism and Indirect Realism capture prescientific conceptions. We discuss two philosophical consequences: “Common sense” is too conflicted about vision to deserve epistemic default status in philosophical debates about perception, and the “problem of perception” needs to be reconceptualized as arising not from a challenge to our ordinary understanding of vision, but from a patent conflict within this understanding. Together, these two upshots facilitate a fresh approach to the problem which can usefully be transferred to further “aporetic” problems that arise from conflicts between beliefs to which we are pretheoretically attracted.
- 15 October 2025
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Open AccessScientific or naïve? Perceptions of direct and indirect realism, and why they matter
Philosophical debates about the nature of perception are standardly informed by an empirical assumption about folk beliefs: They assume there is such a thing as “the” common‐sense conception of vision, and that this conception is captured by Direct Realism. This naïve theory is thought to compete with scientifically informed Indirect Realism. This paper discusses how to render these claims empirically tractable and reports a scientific accuracy rating study whose findings suggest instead that both Direct Realism and Indirect Realism capture prescientific conceptions. We discuss two philosophical consequences: “Common sense” is too conflicted about vision to deserve epistemic default status in philosophical debates about perception, and the “problem of perception” needs to be reconceptualized as arising not from a challenge to our ordinary understanding of vision, but from a patent conflict within this understanding. Together, these two upshots facilitate a fresh approach to the problem which can usefully be transferred to further “aporetic” problems that arise from conflicts between beliefs to which we are pretheoretically attracted.
- Open Access
- 10 February 2025
- Published by MDPI AG in Brain Sciences
- Vol. 15 (2) , 175
Linguistic Prediction in Autism Spectrum Disorder
Background: Autism spectrum disorder has been argued to involve impairments in domain-general predictive abilities. There is strong evidence that individuals with ASD have trouble navigating the dynamic world due to an inability to predict the outcomes of particular events. There is also evidence that this is apparent across the diagnostic criteria of ASD and common among correlates of ASD. However, the question remains as to whether this impairment in predictive abilities is domain-specific or domain-general, with little research investigating prediction in linguistic measures. Methods: The current study investigated whether individuals with ASD showed atypicalities in linguistic prediction using a cloze probability task. In Experiment 1, 33 individuals with ASD were compared to 64 typically developing individuals in an offline cloze task. Results: There was no significant effect of an ASD diagnosis on the cloze probability. However, individuals with higher levels of autistic traits were significantly more likely to produce lower-probability (non-modal) cloze responses. In Experiment 2, 19 individuals with ASD were compared to 22 typically developing individuals in a lab-based cloze task, in which we also measured the reaction times to begin speaking (i.e., voice onset time). The results showed that individuals with ASD had significantly slower reaction times (~200 ms) but, similarly to Experiment 1, did not show differences in the cloze probability of the responses produced. Conclusions: We conclude that individuals with ASD do show inefficiency in linguistic prediction, as well as indicating which ASD traits most strongly correlate with these inefficiencies.
- 10 February 2025
- Published by MDPI AG in Brain Sciences
- Vol. 15 (2) , 175
Open AccessLinguistic Prediction in Autism Spectrum Disorder
Background: Autism spectrum disorder has been argued to involve impairments in domain-general predictive abilities. There is strong evidence that individuals with ASD have trouble navigating the dynamic world due to an inability to predict the outcomes of particular events. There is also evidence that this is apparent across the diagnostic criteria of ASD and common among correlates of ASD. However, the question remains as to whether this impairment in predictive abilities is domain-specific or domain-general, with little research investigating prediction in linguistic measures. Methods: The current study investigated whether individuals with ASD showed atypicalities in linguistic prediction using a cloze probability task. In Experiment 1, 33 individuals with ASD were compared to 64 typically developing individuals in an offline cloze task. Results: There was no significant effect of an ASD diagnosis on the cloze probability. However, individuals with higher levels of autistic traits were significantly more likely to produce lower-probability (non-modal) cloze responses. In Experiment 2, 19 individuals with ASD were compared to 22 typically developing individuals in a lab-based cloze task, in which we also measured the reaction times to begin speaking (i.e., voice onset time). The results showed that individuals with ASD had significantly slower reaction times (~200 ms) but, similarly to Experiment 1, did not show differences in the cloze probability of the responses produced. Conclusions: We conclude that individuals with ASD do show inefficiency in linguistic prediction, as well as indicating which ASD traits most strongly correlate with these inefficiencies.
- Open Access
- 21 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders
- Vol. 56 (1) , 56-70
Online Metaphor Comprehension in Adults with Autism Spectrum Disorders: An Eye Tracking Study
The aim of this study was to investigate novel metaphor comprehension in adults with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Previous literature is conflicting about whether individuals with ASD have impairment in this particular type of figurative language. Participants in the study completed a visual world paradigm eye-tracking task, which involved selecting an interpretation of an auditorily presented sentence (i.e. a picture-sentence matching task), where images corresponded to literal and metaphorical interpretations. Thus, the study also investigated online processing, via reaction times and eye movements. Forty adults participated in the study (18 with ASD and 22 typically-developing controls). Each participant completed the AQ questionnaire and had their vocabulary assessed. Results showed that participants with ASD comprehended metaphorical utterances with the same accuracy as controls. However, they had significantly slower reaction times, and specifically, were approximately 800 ms slower. Analysis of eye movements revealed that participants with ASD showed significantly longer fixation times on both the target and distractor image, the latter of which suggests difficulty overcoming the literal interpretation. Consistent with some prior studies, we showed that adults with ASD are not impaired in novel metaphor comprehension, but they were clearly less efficient. Verbal abilities did not significantly relate to performance. Finally, our online processing measure (eye tracking) provided us with insights into the nature of the ASD inefficiency (i.e. a literality bias).
- 21 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders
- Vol. 56 (1) , 56-70
Open AccessOnline Metaphor Comprehension in Adults with Autism Spectrum Disorders: An Eye Tracking Study
The aim of this study was to investigate novel metaphor comprehension in adults with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Previous literature is conflicting about whether individuals with ASD have impairment in this particular type of figurative language. Participants in the study completed a visual world paradigm eye-tracking task, which involved selecting an interpretation of an auditorily presented sentence (i.e. a picture-sentence matching task), where images corresponded to literal and metaphorical interpretations. Thus, the study also investigated online processing, via reaction times and eye movements. Forty adults participated in the study (18 with ASD and 22 typically-developing controls). Each participant completed the AQ questionnaire and had their vocabulary assessed. Results showed that participants with ASD comprehended metaphorical utterances with the same accuracy as controls. However, they had significantly slower reaction times, and specifically, were approximately 800 ms slower. Analysis of eye movements revealed that participants with ASD showed significantly longer fixation times on both the target and distractor image, the latter of which suggests difficulty overcoming the literal interpretation. Consistent with some prior studies, we showed that adults with ASD are not impaired in novel metaphor comprehension, but they were clearly less efficient. Verbal abilities did not significantly relate to performance. Finally, our online processing measure (eye tracking) provided us with insights into the nature of the ASD inefficiency (i.e. a literality bias).
- 31 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-18
Introduction: Setting Out for New Shores
- 31 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 355-436
Psycholinguistic Experiments: A Case Study on Default Inferences in Philosophical Arguments—Analysing the Argument from Illusion
- 31 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 355-436
Psycholinguistic Experiments: A Case Study on Default Inferences in Philosophical Arguments—Analysing the Argument from Illusion
- Open Access
- 20 May 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Aging, Neuropsychology, and Cognition
- Vol. 32 (1) , 93-117
Disfluency across the lifespan: an individual differences investigation
This study had two research objectives. The first was to examine age-related differences in the fluency of speech outputs, as prior research contains conflicting findings concerning whether older adults produce more disfluency than younger adults. The second was to examine cognitive individual differences, and their relationship with the production of disfluency. One hundred and fifty-four adults completed a story re-telling task, and a battery of cognitive measures. Results showed that younger adults produced more um's and fewer repetitions. For individual differences, results showed that inhibition and set shifting were related to the production of repetitions, and inhibition and working memory were related to uh production. Our results provide clarification about mixed findings with respect age and disfluency production. The individual differences provide clarification on theoretical arguments for disfluent speech in aging (e.g. Inhibition Deficit Hypothesis), and also sheds light on the role of executive functions in models of language production.
- 20 May 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Aging, Neuropsychology, and Cognition
- Vol. 32 (1) , 93-117
Open AccessDisfluency across the lifespan: an individual differences investigation
This study had two research objectives. The first was to examine age-related differences in the fluency of speech outputs, as prior research contains conflicting findings concerning whether older adults produce more disfluency than younger adults. The second was to examine cognitive individual differences, and their relationship with the production of disfluency. One hundred and fifty-four adults completed a story re-telling task, and a battery of cognitive measures. Results showed that younger adults produced more um's and fewer repetitions. For individual differences, results showed that inhibition and set shifting were related to the production of repetitions, and inhibition and working memory were related to uh production. Our results provide clarification about mixed findings with respect age and disfluency production. The individual differences provide clarification on theoretical arguments for disfluent speech in aging (e.g. Inhibition Deficit Hypothesis), and also sheds light on the role of executive functions in models of language production.
- Open Access
- 28 December 2023
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Linguistics
- Vol. 62 (2) , 349-383
Prediction in SVO and SOV languages: processing and typological considerations
In this study, we tested the possibility that different word orders engender different processing preferences. Our key hypothesis was that a head-initial language like English (SVO) allows more prediction compared to a head-final language like Japanese (SOV). In Experiment 1, English and Japanese native speakers completed a cloze task in which they heard a sentence fragment (SV_ in English and SO_ in Japanese) and had to complete it with the word they thought best. We assessed cloze probability of the words produced and voice onset times. Experiment 2 examined written completions in English, in which we compared the cloze probabilities in SV_ fragments versus OS_ fragments. Following the central hypothesis, this experiment allowed us to determine (within language) whether there is more prediction from a noun and verb compared to two nouns. Finally, in Experiment 3, we compared written completions in English and Japanese, in which the stimuli given to participants were identical (SV_ in English and S_V in Japanese). Results across all three experiments were consistent with greater prediction in English. We argue that prediction is one important factor in processing, that it is relied on more in English than in Japanese, and that prediction will be especially favored in languages like English in which the verb regularly precedes its direct object.
- 28 December 2023
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Linguistics
- Vol. 62 (2) , 349-383
Open AccessPrediction in SVO and SOV languages: processing and typological considerations
In this study, we tested the possibility that different word orders engender different processing preferences. Our key hypothesis was that a head-initial language like English (SVO) allows more prediction compared to a head-final language like Japanese (SOV). In Experiment 1, English and Japanese native speakers completed a cloze task in which they heard a sentence fragment (SV_ in English and SO_ in Japanese) and had to complete it with the word they thought best. We assessed cloze probability of the words produced and voice onset times. Experiment 2 examined written completions in English, in which we compared the cloze probabilities in SV_ fragments versus OS_ fragments. Following the central hypothesis, this experiment allowed us to determine (within language) whether there is more prediction from a noun and verb compared to two nouns. Finally, in Experiment 3, we compared written completions in English and Japanese, in which the stimuli given to participants were identical (SV_ in English and S_V in Japanese). Results across all three experiments were consistent with greater prediction in English. We argue that prediction is one important factor in processing, that it is relied on more in English than in Japanese, and that prediction will be especially favored in languages like English in which the verb regularly precedes its direct object.
- Open Access
- 23 February 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 201 (3) , 1-33
Fragmented and conflicted: folk beliefs about vision
Many philosophical debates take for granted that there is such a thing as ‘the’ common-sense conception of the phenomenon of interest. Debates about the nature of perception tend to take for granted that there is a single, coherent common-sense conception of vision, consistent with Direct Realism. This conception is often accorded an epistemic default status. We draw on philosophical and psychological literature on naïve theories and belief fragmentation to motivate the hypothesis that untutored common sense encompasses conflicting Direct Realist and Indirect Realist conceptions: there is no such thing as ‘the’ common-sense conception of vision that could enjoy epistemic default status. To examine this hypothesis, a survey administered an agreement rating task with verbal and pictorial stimuli to lay participants. We found many laypeople simultaneously hold conflicting Direct Realist and Indirect Realist beliefs about vision. Against common assumptions, Direct Realist beliefs are not clearly dominant, and consistent adherence to Direct Realism is not the norm, but the exception. These findings are consistent with recent accounts of belief fragmentation. They forcefully challenge common methodology in philosophical debates about the nature of perception and beyond.
- 23 February 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 201 (3) , 1-33
Open AccessFragmented and conflicted: folk beliefs about vision
Many philosophical debates take for granted that there is such a thing as ‘the’ common-sense conception of the phenomenon of interest. Debates about the nature of perception tend to take for granted that there is a single, coherent common-sense conception of vision, consistent with Direct Realism. This conception is often accorded an epistemic default status. We draw on philosophical and psychological literature on naïve theories and belief fragmentation to motivate the hypothesis that untutored common sense encompasses conflicting Direct Realist and Indirect Realist conceptions: there is no such thing as ‘the’ common-sense conception of vision that could enjoy epistemic default status. To examine this hypothesis, a survey administered an agreement rating task with verbal and pictorial stimuli to lay participants. We found many laypeople simultaneously hold conflicting Direct Realist and Indirect Realist beliefs about vision. Against common assumptions, Direct Realist beliefs are not clearly dominant, and consistent adherence to Direct Realism is not the norm, but the exception. These findings are consistent with recent accounts of belief fragmentation. They forcefully challenge common methodology in philosophical debates about the nature of perception and beyond.