J. Aaron Simmons
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
J. Aaron Simmons has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Amber Bowen
Department of Philosophy, Redeemer University , Hamilton , Ontario , Canada
1 shared publication - John Sanders
Hendrix College
1 shared publication - Kevin Carnahan
Department of Philosophy and Religion, Central Methodist University, Fayette, MO 65248, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
On the Virtues and Vices of the Singular Will: Seeking “One Thing” with Kierkegaard
In this essay, I follow the example of recent Kierkegaard scholarship in the attempt to consider Kierkegaard’s work from a personal point of view. Accordingly, I begin with a biographical account of my first encounter with Kierkegaard’s notion that “purity of heart is to will one thing”. I explain that were it not for the intervention of one of my early professors, David Kangas, the idea might have prevented me from getting married. I then offer a reading of “An Occasional Discourse”, where that idea is worked out, and suggest that Kierkegaard faces a serious challenge of what I call “empty formalism”. The worry is that his account offers general suggestions without any practical direction on how to live. By showing how the notion of singularly willing the eternal can be productively understood as a kind of virtue, I contend that Kierkegaard both avoids empty formalism and also manages to resist an overly determinate model of ethical life that eliminates the ambiguity of morality and the riskiness of faith.
Open AccessOn the Virtues and Vices of the Singular Will: Seeking “One Thing” with Kierkegaard
In this essay, I follow the example of recent Kierkegaard scholarship in the attempt to consider Kierkegaard’s work from a personal point of view. Accordingly, I begin with a biographical account of my first encounter with Kierkegaard’s notion that “purity of heart is to will one thing”. I explain that were it not for the intervention of one of my early professors, David Kangas, the idea might have prevented me from getting married. I then offer a reading of “An Occasional Discourse”, where that idea is worked out, and suggest that Kierkegaard faces a serious challenge of what I call “empty formalism”. The worry is that his account offers general suggestions without any practical direction on how to live. By showing how the notion of singularly willing the eternal can be productively understood as a kind of virtue, I contend that Kierkegaard both avoids empty formalism and also manages to resist an overly determinate model of ethical life that eliminates the ambiguity of morality and the riskiness of faith.
- Open Access
- 21 December 2021
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Open Theology
- Vol. 8 (1) , 1-13
It Takes Two to Make a Thing Go Right: Phenomenology, Theology, and Janicaud
In his influential essay, “The Theological Turn of French Phenomenology,” Dominique Janicaud suggests that phenomenology and theology “make two.” On the thirtieth anniversary of that essay, here we consider some of the main lines of response that have been offered to his account. We suggest that there are three general approaches that have been the most prominent: indifferentism, integrationism, and pluralism. The indifferentists implicitly suggest that Janicaud is right about the divide between phenomenology and theology. The integrationists think that Janicaud is wrong about the divide because theology and philosophy are unable to be strictly distinguished. The pluralists suggest that Janicaud is right about the division, but wrong about how it works. For pluralists, philosophy and theology are distinguished due to the immediate evidential authorities that operate in the two discourses. As such, phenomenological theology and phenomenological philosophy of religion are importantly different. Defending pluralism as the best of the three options, we argue that it avoids the potential reductionism that is present in the other two. We conclude by turning to the ways in which, precisely because phenomenological philosophy and phenomenological theology make two, they can both benefit from being put into robust engagement with the other.
- 21 December 2021
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Open Theology
- Vol. 8 (1) , 1-13
Open AccessIt Takes Two to Make a Thing Go Right: Phenomenology, Theology, and Janicaud
In his influential essay, “The Theological Turn of French Phenomenology,” Dominique Janicaud suggests that phenomenology and theology “make two.” On the thirtieth anniversary of that essay, here we consider some of the main lines of response that have been offered to his account. We suggest that there are three general approaches that have been the most prominent: indifferentism, integrationism, and pluralism. The indifferentists implicitly suggest that Janicaud is right about the divide between phenomenology and theology. The integrationists think that Janicaud is wrong about the divide because theology and philosophy are unable to be strictly distinguished. The pluralists suggest that Janicaud is right about the division, but wrong about how it works. For pluralists, philosophy and theology are distinguished due to the immediate evidential authorities that operate in the two discourses. As such, phenomenological theology and phenomenological philosophy of religion are importantly different. Defending pluralism as the best of the three options, we argue that it avoids the potential reductionism that is present in the other two. We conclude by turning to the ways in which, precisely because phenomenological philosophy and phenomenological theology make two, they can both benefit from being put into robust engagement with the other.
- Open Access
Kierkegaard at the Intersections: The Single Individual and Identity Politics
Kierkegaard’s authorship is frequently charged with being so radically individualistic that his work is of little use to social theory. However, in this essay, I argue that Kierkegaard’s notion of “the single individual” actually offers important critical resources for some aspects of contemporary identity politics. Through a focused consideration of the two notes that form the little essay, “The Individual” (published with Point of View), I suggest that Kierkegaard does not ignore embodied historical existence, as is sometimes claimed, but instead simply rejects the idea that one’s moral dignity is determined by, or reducible to, such embodied differentiation. Instead, what we find in Kierkegaard is a rejection of the quantitative judgment of “the crowd” in favor of the qualitative neighbor-love of community. In light of Kierkegaard’s claim that it is the specifically religious category of the single individual that makes possible true human equality, I contend that we can develop a Kierkegaardian identity theory consistent with some aspects of the standpoint and intersectionality theory of Patricia Hill Collins and Kimberlé Crenshaw. Although Collins and Crenshaw operate at a structural level and Kierkegaard works at a theological level, they all offer important reminders to each other about the stakes of lives of meaning in light of the embodied task of social justice.
Open AccessKierkegaard at the Intersections: The Single Individual and Identity Politics
Kierkegaard’s authorship is frequently charged with being so radically individualistic that his work is of little use to social theory. However, in this essay, I argue that Kierkegaard’s notion of “the single individual” actually offers important critical resources for some aspects of contemporary identity politics. Through a focused consideration of the two notes that form the little essay, “The Individual” (published with Point of View), I suggest that Kierkegaard does not ignore embodied historical existence, as is sometimes claimed, but instead simply rejects the idea that one’s moral dignity is determined by, or reducible to, such embodied differentiation. Instead, what we find in Kierkegaard is a rejection of the quantitative judgment of “the crowd” in favor of the qualitative neighbor-love of community. In light of Kierkegaard’s claim that it is the specifically religious category of the single individual that makes possible true human equality, I contend that we can develop a Kierkegaardian identity theory consistent with some aspects of the standpoint and intersectionality theory of Patricia Hill Collins and Kimberlé Crenshaw. Although Collins and Crenshaw operate at a structural level and Kierkegaard works at a theological level, they all offer important reminders to each other about the stakes of lives of meaning in light of the embodied task of social justice.
- Open Access
Religious, but Not Spiritual: A Constructive Proposal
Often the debates in philosophy of religion are quite disconnected from the empirical data gathered in the sociology of religion. This is especially the case regarding the recent increase in prominence of those identifying as “spiritual but not religious” (SBNR) within an American context. In the attempt to bring these two fields into productive conversation, this essay offers a constructive account of the SBNR in terms of what they reject (i.e., their status as “not religious”) and also what they affirm (i.e., their identity as “spiritual”). In brief, the suggestion is that the SBNR do not reject theism or even common “religious” practices, but instead reject a particular mode of “religion” that is grounded in an authoritative and insular social presence. Alternatively, the SBNR at least seem to affirm a notion of “spirituality” that is broadly consistent with the idea found in historical Christian traditions. After surveying the empirical data and offering a new phenomenological analysis of it, the essay concludes with a suggestion that we need a new category—“religious, but not spiritual” (RBNS)—in order best to make sense of how the SBNR signify in relation to specific hermeneutic contexts and sociopolitical frameworks.
Open AccessReligious, but Not Spiritual: A Constructive Proposal
Often the debates in philosophy of religion are quite disconnected from the empirical data gathered in the sociology of religion. This is especially the case regarding the recent increase in prominence of those identifying as “spiritual but not religious” (SBNR) within an American context. In the attempt to bring these two fields into productive conversation, this essay offers a constructive account of the SBNR in terms of what they reject (i.e., their status as “not religious”) and also what they affirm (i.e., their identity as “spiritual”). In brief, the suggestion is that the SBNR do not reject theism or even common “religious” practices, but instead reject a particular mode of “religion” that is grounded in an authoritative and insular social presence. Alternatively, the SBNR at least seem to affirm a notion of “spirituality” that is broadly consistent with the idea found in historical Christian traditions. After surveying the empirical data and offering a new phenomenological analysis of it, the essay concludes with a suggestion that we need a new category—“religious, but not spiritual” (RBNS)—in order best to make sense of how the SBNR signify in relation to specific hermeneutic contexts and sociopolitical frameworks.
- Open Access
Militant Liturgies: Practicing Christianity with Kierkegaard, Bonhoeffer, and Weil
Traditional philosophy of religion has tended to focus on the doxastic dimension of religious life, which although a vitally important area of research, has often come at the cost of philosophical engagements with religious practice. Focusing particularly on Christian traditions, this essay offers a sustained reflection on one particular model of embodied Christian practice as presented in the work of Søren Kierkegaard. After a discussion of different notions of practice and perfection, the paper turns to Kierkegaard’s conception of the two churches: the Church Triumphant and the Church Militant. Then, in light of Kierkegaard’s defense of the latter and critique of the former, it is shown that Kierkegaard’s specific account gets appropriated and expanded in Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s account of “costly grace” and “religionless Christianity,” and Simone Weil’s conception of “afflicted love.” Ultimately, it is suggested that these three thinkers jointly present a notion of “militant liturgies” that offers critical and constructive resources for contemporary philosophy of religion.
Open AccessMilitant Liturgies: Practicing Christianity with Kierkegaard, Bonhoeffer, and Weil
Traditional philosophy of religion has tended to focus on the doxastic dimension of religious life, which although a vitally important area of research, has often come at the cost of philosophical engagements with religious practice. Focusing particularly on Christian traditions, this essay offers a sustained reflection on one particular model of embodied Christian practice as presented in the work of Søren Kierkegaard. After a discussion of different notions of practice and perfection, the paper turns to Kierkegaard’s conception of the two churches: the Church Triumphant and the Church Militant. Then, in light of Kierkegaard’s defense of the latter and critique of the former, it is shown that Kierkegaard’s specific account gets appropriated and expanded in Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s account of “costly grace” and “religionless Christianity,” and Simone Weil’s conception of “afflicted love.” Ultimately, it is suggested that these three thinkers jointly present a notion of “militant liturgies” that offers critical and constructive resources for contemporary philosophy of religion.
- 24 August 2020
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Pneuma
- Vol. 42 (2) , 312-314
Pentecostal Rationality: Epistemology and the Theological Hermeneutics in the Foursquare Tradition, by Simo Frestadius
"Pentecostal Rationality: Epistemology and the Theological Hermeneutics in the Foursquare Tradition, by Simo Frestadius" published on 24 Aug 2020 by Brill.
- 24 August 2020
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Pneuma
- Vol. 42 (2) , 312-314
Pentecostal Rationality: Epistemology and the Theological Hermeneutics in the Foursquare Tradition, by Simo Frestadius
"Pentecostal Rationality: Epistemology and the Theological Hermeneutics in the Foursquare Tradition, by Simo Frestadius" published on 24 Aug 2020 by Brill.
- 24 August 2020
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Pneuma
- Vol. 42 (2) , 175-200
Prospects for Pentecostal Philosophy
In this essay, I offer a constructive vision for the future of pentecostal philosophy. Specifically, I first offer a series of sociocultural challenges that pentecostal philosophy faces. Then I offer a short timeline of philosophical engagement from pentecostal thinkers over the past several decades. In order to open a more productive space for pentecostal philosophy moving forward, I argue that pentecostal philosophy needs to rethink its ties to Plantinga-type confessional Christian philosophy. In this way, pentecostal philosophy should not be reducible to a kind of pentecostal theology. Drawing on Sarah Coakley’s appropriation of feminism for philosophy of religion, I suggest that pentecostal philosophy can facilitate a way of responding appropriately to two audiences (theological and philosophical) without simply circumscribing one into the other. I conclude by contending that pentecostal philosophy should be affectively engaging, argumentatively rigorous, and existentially relevant.
- 24 August 2020
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Pneuma
- Vol. 42 (2) , 175-200
Prospects for Pentecostal Philosophy
In this essay, I offer a constructive vision for the future of pentecostal philosophy. Specifically, I first offer a series of sociocultural challenges that pentecostal philosophy faces. Then I offer a short timeline of philosophical engagement from pentecostal thinkers over the past several decades. In order to open a more productive space for pentecostal philosophy moving forward, I argue that pentecostal philosophy needs to rethink its ties to Plantinga-type confessional Christian philosophy. In this way, pentecostal philosophy should not be reducible to a kind of pentecostal theology. Drawing on Sarah Coakley’s appropriation of feminism for philosophy of religion, I suggest that pentecostal philosophy can facilitate a way of responding appropriately to two audiences (theological and philosophical) without simply circumscribing one into the other. I conclude by contending that pentecostal philosophy should be affectively engaging, argumentatively rigorous, and existentially relevant.
- Open Access
When Liberalism Is Not Enough: Political Theology after Reinhold Niebuhr and Emmanuel Levinas
In this paper, we are interested in extending out the dialectical models of religious ethics and political theology that Reinhold Niebuhr and Emmanuel Levinas began by enacting a conversation between these two theorists. We do this by presenting and critically comparing Niebuhr’s and Levinas’s thought as concerns three key issues in moral and political theory: (1) the nature of persons, (2) the source and content of the moral ideal of love and the political ideal of justice, and (3) the impossibility and yet continued practical relevance of ideals for social life. Ultimately, we conclude that they mutually offer reasons to find hope in the face of political cynicism.
Open AccessWhen Liberalism Is Not Enough: Political Theology after Reinhold Niebuhr and Emmanuel Levinas
In this paper, we are interested in extending out the dialectical models of religious ethics and political theology that Reinhold Niebuhr and Emmanuel Levinas began by enacting a conversation between these two theorists. We do this by presenting and critically comparing Niebuhr’s and Levinas’s thought as concerns three key issues in moral and political theory: (1) the nature of persons, (2) the source and content of the moral ideal of love and the political ideal of justice, and (3) the impossibility and yet continued practical relevance of ideals for social life. Ultimately, we conclude that they mutually offer reasons to find hope in the face of political cynicism.
- 12 February 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
- Vol. 85 (2) , 271-277
Robert Cummings Neville, Defining Religion: Essays in Philosophy of Religion
- 12 February 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
- Vol. 85 (2) , 271-277
Robert Cummings Neville, Defining Religion: Essays in Philosophy of Religion
- Open Access
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Open Theology
- Vol. 5 (1) , 147-157
Living in the Existential Margins: Reflections on the Relationship Between Philosophy and Theology
In this essay, I outline my view of an epistemic distinction between philosophy and theology along the lines of different evidential authorities operating in the two disciplines. I then go on to suggest that this epistemic view allows for a recognition of different discursive loyalties. In distinction from what I term “Plantinga-type” views, I contend that my broadly postmodern Thomistic account is preferable because of the way in which it better reflects the existential reality of a plurality of loyalties in our lived existence. In this way, I offer a defense of an existential relationship of philosophy to theology that serves as increased warrant for the epistemic account.
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Open Theology
- Vol. 5 (1) , 147-157
Open AccessLiving in the Existential Margins: Reflections on the Relationship Between Philosophy and Theology
In this essay, I outline my view of an epistemic distinction between philosophy and theology along the lines of different evidential authorities operating in the two disciplines. I then go on to suggest that this epistemic view allows for a recognition of different discursive loyalties. In distinction from what I term “Plantinga-type” views, I contend that my broadly postmodern Thomistic account is preferable because of the way in which it better reflects the existential reality of a plurality of loyalties in our lived existence. In this way, I offer a defense of an existential relationship of philosophy to theology that serves as increased warrant for the epistemic account.