Stefan Mangard
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Stefan Mangard has a total of 73 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Martin Unterguggenberger
Graz University of Technology, Graz, Austria
10 shared publications - David Schrammel
Rivos Inc
7 shared publications - Lukas Lamster
Graz University of Technology
6 shared publications - Pascal Nasahl
Graz University of Technology, Graz, Austria
6 shared publications - Moritz Waser
Graz University of Technology
5 shared publications - Robert Primas
Intel Labs
5 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 720-733
LeakyTree: Cross-VM Bit-by-Bit Deduplicated Page Leakage via Linux Kernel Samepage Merging Internals
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 720-733
Open AccessLeakyTree: Cross-VM Bit-by-Bit Deduplicated Page Leakage via Linux Kernel Samepage Merging Internals
- 7 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 467-487
Clone2Pwn: A Systematic Security Analysis of Data Migration Tools in the Android Ecosystem
- 7 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 467-487
Clone2Pwn: A Systematic Security Analysis of Data Migration Tools in the Android Ecosystem
- Open Access
- 4 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 577-590
CAGE-V: Confidential Computing Architecture supporting Guest Enclaves for RISC-V
- 4 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 577-590
Open AccessCAGE-V: Confidential Computing Architecture supporting Guest Enclaves for RISC-V
- 2 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 753-780
Efficient SPA Countermeasures Using Redundant Number Representation with Application to ML-KEM
- 2 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 753-780
Efficient SPA Countermeasures Using Redundant Number Representation with Application to ML-KEM
- 18 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 303-322
WaitWatcher and WaitGuard: Detecting Flush-Based Cache Side-Channels Through Spurious Wakeups
- 18 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 303-322
WaitWatcher and WaitGuard: Detecting Flush-Based Cache Side-Channels Through Spurious Wakeups
- Open Access
- 12 September 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems
- Vol. 24 (5) , 1-3
Special Issue on Open Hardware for Embedded System Security and Cryptography
- 12 September 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems
- Vol. 24 (5) , 1-3
Open AccessSpecial Issue on Open Hardware for Embedded System Security and Cryptography
- 10 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 127-148
FatPTE - Expanding Page Table Entries for Security
- 10 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 127-148
FatPTE - Expanding Page Table Entries for Security
- 10 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 149-170
CHERI UNCHAINED: Generic Instruction and Register Control for CHERI Capabilities
- 10 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 149-170
CHERI UNCHAINED: Generic Instruction and Register Control for CHERI Capabilities
- 10 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 297-315
FAULTLESS: Flexible and Transparent Fault Protection for Superscalar RISC-V Processors
- 10 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 297-315
FAULTLESS: Flexible and Transparent Fault Protection for Superscalar RISC-V Processors
- Open Access
- 13 January 2025
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 1 (4)
On Loopy Belief Propagation for SASCAs
Profiled power analysis is one of the most powerful forms of passive side-channel attacks. Over the last two decades, many works have analyzed their impact on cryptographic implementations as well as corresponding countermeasure techniques. To date, the most advanced variants of profiled power analysis are based on Soft-analytical Side-Channel Attacks (SASCA). After the initial profiling phase, a SASCA adversary creates a probabilistic graphical model, called a factor graph, of the target implementation and encodes the results of the previous step as prior information. Then, an inference algorithm such as loopy Belief Propagation (BP) can be used to recover the distribution of a target variable in the graph, i.e., sensitive data/keys. Designers of cryptographic implementations aim to reduce information leakage as much as possible and assess how much leakage can be allowed without compromising security requirements. Despite the existence of many works on profiled power analysis, it is still notoriously difficult to state under which conditions a cryptographic implementation provides sufficient protection against a profiling attacker with certain capabilities. In particular, it is unknown when a BP-based attack is optimal or whether tuning some heuristics in that algorithm may significant strengthen the attack. This knowledge gap led us to investigate the effectiveness of BP for SASCAs by studying the modes of failures of BP in the context of the SASCA, and systematically analyzing the behavior of BP on practically-relevant factor graphs. We use exact inference to gauge the quality of the approximation provided by BP. Through this assessment, we show that there exists a significant disparity between BP and exact inference in terms of guessing entropy when performing SASCAs on several classes of factor graphs. We further review and analyze various BP improvement heuristics from the literature.
- 13 January 2025
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 1 (4)
Open AccessOn Loopy Belief Propagation for SASCAs
Profiled power analysis is one of the most powerful forms of passive side-channel attacks. Over the last two decades, many works have analyzed their impact on cryptographic implementations as well as corresponding countermeasure techniques. To date, the most advanced variants of profiled power analysis are based on Soft-analytical Side-Channel Attacks (SASCA). After the initial profiling phase, a SASCA adversary creates a probabilistic graphical model, called a factor graph, of the target implementation and encodes the results of the previous step as prior information. Then, an inference algorithm such as loopy Belief Propagation (BP) can be used to recover the distribution of a target variable in the graph, i.e., sensitive data/keys. Designers of cryptographic implementations aim to reduce information leakage as much as possible and assess how much leakage can be allowed without compromising security requirements. Despite the existence of many works on profiled power analysis, it is still notoriously difficult to state under which conditions a cryptographic implementation provides sufficient protection against a profiling attacker with certain capabilities. In particular, it is unknown when a BP-based attack is optimal or whether tuning some heuristics in that algorithm may significant strengthen the attack. This knowledge gap led us to investigate the effectiveness of BP for SASCAs by studying the modes of failures of BP in the context of the SASCA, and systematically analyzing the behavior of BP on practically-relevant factor graphs. We use exact inference to gauge the quality of the approximation provided by BP. Through this assessment, we show that there exists a significant disparity between BP and exact inference in terms of guessing entropy when performing SASCAs on several classes of factor graphs. We further review and analyze various BP improvement heuristics from the literature.