Soo-Haeng Cho
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Soo-Haeng Cho has a total of 21 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Alan Scheller-Wolf
Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213
3 shared publications - Elina H. Hwang
Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington 98195
3 shared publications - Leela Nageswaran
Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington 98195
3 shared publications - Hai Wang
School of Computing and Information Systems, Singapore Management University, Singapore 178902
2 shared publications - Neda Mirzaeian
Jindal School of Management, The University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, Texas 75080
2 shared publications - Niels Agatz
Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam The Netherlands
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 18 February 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (10) , 9032-9051
Can Autonomous Vehicles Solve the Commuter Parking Problem?
This paper investigates how autonomous vehicles (AVs) may reshape morning commute travel patterns and impact parking in a central business district (CBD). We develop a continuous-time game-theoretic traffic model that takes into account key economic deterrents to driving, such as parking fees and traffic congestion, and characterize the departure time and parking location (inside or outside the CBD parking area) patterns of commuters in equilibrium. Our analysis shows that all AV commuters may choose to park outside the CBD in equilibrium, increasing both vehicle hours and vehicle miles traveled as compared with the case with all human-driven vehicles. This change increases the total system cost and suggests a potential for CBD land use changes (e.g., repurposing CBD parking spots as commercial and residential areas) after the mass adoption of AVs. To reduce the total system cost, an urban planner may regulate commuters’ decisions by adjusting parking fees and/or imposing congestion tolls as a short-term measure, or adjusting infrastructure, for example, converting CBD parking spaces to drop-off spots for AVs. Our results indicate that these measures can reduce the total system cost substantially (e.g., up to [ ] when calibrating our model to data from Pittsburgh). This paper was accepted by Chung Piaw Teo, optimization and decision analytics. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01213 .
- 18 February 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (10) , 9032-9051
Can Autonomous Vehicles Solve the Commuter Parking Problem?
This paper investigates how autonomous vehicles (AVs) may reshape morning commute travel patterns and impact parking in a central business district (CBD). We develop a continuous-time game-theoretic traffic model that takes into account key economic deterrents to driving, such as parking fees and traffic congestion, and characterize the departure time and parking location (inside or outside the CBD parking area) patterns of commuters in equilibrium. Our analysis shows that all AV commuters may choose to park outside the CBD in equilibrium, increasing both vehicle hours and vehicle miles traveled as compared with the case with all human-driven vehicles. This change increases the total system cost and suggests a potential for CBD land use changes (e.g., repurposing CBD parking spots as commercial and residential areas) after the mass adoption of AVs. To reduce the total system cost, an urban planner may regulate commuters’ decisions by adjusting parking fees and/or imposing congestion tolls as a short-term measure, or adjusting infrastructure, for example, converting CBD parking spaces to drop-off spots for AVs. Our results indicate that these measures can reduce the total system cost substantially (e.g., up to [ ] when calibrating our model to data from Pittsburgh). This paper was accepted by Chung Piaw Teo, optimization and decision analytics. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01213 .
- 3 April 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 71 (1)
Offline Returns for Online Retailers via Partnership
Online shoppers often prefer to return items to stores (i.e., “offline return”) rather than mail them back. We study a new business practice, return partnership, wherein online retailers partner with store retailers to offer offline returns. We seek to identify when return partnerships benefit both the store and online retailers. Customers choose between the online and store channels for their purchase and decide whether, and through which channel, to return an online purchase if needed. We find that store and online retailers who offer differentiated products have incentives to partner, as in the case of the return partnership between Everlane and Cost Plus World Market (formed via Happy Returns—a service provider that connects online retailers with store retailers). In this case, the online retailer’s benefit from the cost savings achieved by consolidating shipments of returned items from stores outweighs the loss associated with a high return rate. We show that, contrary to initial intuition, return partnerships may also feature retailers who offer similar products, as in the case of Amazon-Kohl’s. In this case, online customers’ migration to offline returns ensures a store retailer’s incentive to partner. However, it limits the incentive of an online retailer when the added convenience of an offline return induces more returns of online purchases. Thus, we caution that with limited differentiation in product offerings, store visits should not be too convenient for a partnership to form. This paper was accepted by Jay Swaminathan, operations management. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01291 .
- 3 April 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 71 (1)
Offline Returns for Online Retailers via Partnership
Online shoppers often prefer to return items to stores (i.e., “offline return”) rather than mail them back. We study a new business practice, return partnership, wherein online retailers partner with store retailers to offer offline returns. We seek to identify when return partnerships benefit both the store and online retailers. Customers choose between the online and store channels for their purchase and decide whether, and through which channel, to return an online purchase if needed. We find that store and online retailers who offer differentiated products have incentives to partner, as in the case of the return partnership between Everlane and Cost Plus World Market (formed via Happy Returns—a service provider that connects online retailers with store retailers). In this case, the online retailer’s benefit from the cost savings achieved by consolidating shipments of returned items from stores outweighs the loss associated with a high return rate. We show that, contrary to initial intuition, return partnerships may also feature retailers who offer similar products, as in the case of Amazon-Kohl’s. In this case, online customers’ migration to offline returns ensures a store retailer’s incentive to partner. However, it limits the incentive of an online retailer when the added convenience of an offline return induces more returns of online purchases. Thus, we caution that with limited differentiation in product offerings, store visits should not be too convenient for a partnership to form. This paper was accepted by Jay Swaminathan, operations management. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01291 .
- 1 March 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Service Science
- Vol. 16 (1) , 1-21
Transportation-Enabled Services: Concept, Framework, and Research Opportunities
As a result of rapid advancements in urban infrastructure and technology, transportation is transforming a variety of innovative and emerging services. This paper introduces the concept of transportation-enabled services (TRENS), which is a service model that uses transportation systems to enable and enhance the delivery, accessibility, and effectiveness of nontransportation services. We establish a general framework in which the transportation-enabled services involve four key stakeholders: customers, suppliers, TRENS providers, and transportation carriers. Within this general framework, we present five specific service models: a one-sided market, three variants of two-sided markets, and a three-sided market, each characterized by the interactions among suppliers, TRENS providers, and transportation carriers. Taking different models of transportation-enabled services into consideration, we highlight crucial research opportunities to enhance understanding of the planning, operations, evaluation, and regulation of transportation-enabled services. These research opportunities include demand and supply management, transportation system management and operations, coordination among stakeholders, and the evaluation and regulation of transportation-enabled services. We believe that the emergence, widespread adoption, and popularity of transportation-enabled services will significantly enhance and reshape many services and thus contribute to the overall improvement of future mobility in the broader context of smart cities. History: This paper has been accepted for the Service Science Special Issue on Innovation in Transportation-Enabled Urban Services. Funding: The work of Hai Wang was supported by the Lee Kong Chian Fellowship awarded by Singapore Management University. The work of Hao Sun was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72301179].
- 1 March 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Service Science
- Vol. 16 (1) , 1-21
Transportation-Enabled Services: Concept, Framework, and Research Opportunities
As a result of rapid advancements in urban infrastructure and technology, transportation is transforming a variety of innovative and emerging services. This paper introduces the concept of transportation-enabled services (TRENS), which is a service model that uses transportation systems to enable and enhance the delivery, accessibility, and effectiveness of nontransportation services. We establish a general framework in which the transportation-enabled services involve four key stakeholders: customers, suppliers, TRENS providers, and transportation carriers. Within this general framework, we present five specific service models: a one-sided market, three variants of two-sided markets, and a three-sided market, each characterized by the interactions among suppliers, TRENS providers, and transportation carriers. Taking different models of transportation-enabled services into consideration, we highlight crucial research opportunities to enhance understanding of the planning, operations, evaluation, and regulation of transportation-enabled services. These research opportunities include demand and supply management, transportation system management and operations, coordination among stakeholders, and the evaluation and regulation of transportation-enabled services. We believe that the emergence, widespread adoption, and popularity of transportation-enabled services will significantly enhance and reshape many services and thus contribute to the overall improvement of future mobility in the broader context of smart cities. History: This paper has been accepted for the Service Science Special Issue on Innovation in Transportation-Enabled Urban Services. Funding: The work of Hai Wang was supported by the Lee Kong Chian Fellowship awarded by Singapore Management University. The work of Hao Sun was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72301179].
- 1 March 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 26 (2) , 537-553
Popularity Bias in Online Dating Platforms: Theory and Empirical Evidence
Problem definition: Generating recommendations of compatible dating partners is a challenging task for online dating platforms because uncovering users’ idiosyncratic preferences is difficult. Thus, platforms tend to recommend popular users to others more frequently than unpopular users. This paper studies such popularity bias in an online dating platform’s recommendations and its consequences for users’ likelihood of finding dating partners. Methodology/results: Motivated by the empirical evidence that a user’s chance of being recommended by the platform’s algorithm increases significantly with the user’s popularity, we study an online dating platform’s incentive that generates popularity bias by modeling the platform’s recommendations and users’ subsequent interactions in a three-stage matching game. Our analysis shows that the recommendations that maximize the platform’s revenue and those that maximize the number of successful matches between users are not necessarily at odds, even though the former leads to a higher bias against unpopular users. Unbiased recommendations result in significantly lower revenue for the platform and fewer matches when users’ implicit cost of evaluating incoming messages is low. Popular users help the platform generate more revenue and a higher number of successful matches as long as these popular users do not become “out of reach.” We validate our theoretical results by running simulations of the platform based on a machine learning–based predictive model that estimates users’ behavior. Managerial implications: Our result indicates that an online dating platform can increase revenue and users’ chances of finding dating partners simultaneously with a certain degree of bias against unpopular users. Online dating platforms can use our theoretical results to understand user behavior and our predictive model to improve their recommendation systems (e.g., by selecting a set of users leading to the highest probabilities of matching or other revenue-generating interactions). Supplemental Material: The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.0132 .
- 1 March 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 26 (2) , 537-553
Popularity Bias in Online Dating Platforms: Theory and Empirical Evidence
Problem definition: Generating recommendations of compatible dating partners is a challenging task for online dating platforms because uncovering users’ idiosyncratic preferences is difficult. Thus, platforms tend to recommend popular users to others more frequently than unpopular users. This paper studies such popularity bias in an online dating platform’s recommendations and its consequences for users’ likelihood of finding dating partners. Methodology/results: Motivated by the empirical evidence that a user’s chance of being recommended by the platform’s algorithm increases significantly with the user’s popularity, we study an online dating platform’s incentive that generates popularity bias by modeling the platform’s recommendations and users’ subsequent interactions in a three-stage matching game. Our analysis shows that the recommendations that maximize the platform’s revenue and those that maximize the number of successful matches between users are not necessarily at odds, even though the former leads to a higher bias against unpopular users. Unbiased recommendations result in significantly lower revenue for the platform and fewer matches when users’ implicit cost of evaluating incoming messages is low. Popular users help the platform generate more revenue and a higher number of successful matches as long as these popular users do not become “out of reach.” We validate our theoretical results by running simulations of the platform based on a machine learning–based predictive model that estimates users’ behavior. Managerial implications: Our result indicates that an online dating platform can increase revenue and users’ chances of finding dating partners simultaneously with a certain degree of bias against unpopular users. Online dating platforms can use our theoretical results to understand user behavior and our predictive model to improve their recommendation systems (e.g., by selecting a set of users leading to the highest probabilities of matching or other revenue-generating interactions). Supplemental Material: The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.0132 .
- 1 May 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 24 (3) , 1630-1649
Value of Online–Off-line Return Partnership to Off-line Retailers
Problem definition: This paper examines whether and, if so, how much an online–off-line return partnership between online and third-party retailers with physical stores (or “location partners”) generates additional value to location partners. Academic/practical relevance: Online shoppers often prefer to return products to stores rather than mailing them back. Many online retailers have recently started to collaborate with location partners to offer the store return option to their customers, and we quantify its economic benefit to a location partner. Methodology: We analyze proprietary data sets from Happy Returns (which provides return services for more than 30 online retailers) and one of its location partners, using a panel difference-in-differences model. In our study, a treatment is the initiation of the return service at each of the location partner’s stores, and an outcome is the store and online channel performance of the location partner. We then explore the mechanisms of underlying customer behavior that drive these outcomes. Results: We find that the partnership increases the number of unique customers, items sold, and net revenue in both store and online channels. We identify two drivers for this improved performance: (1) the location partner acquires new customers in both store and online channels, and (2) existing customers change their shopping patterns only in the store channel after using the return service; in particular, they visit stores more often, purchase more items, and generate higher revenue after their first return service. Managerial implications: To our knowledge, we provide the first direct empirical evidence of value to location partners from a return partnership, and as these partnerships become more prevalent, our findings have important managerial implications for location partners and online retailers alike.
- 1 May 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 24 (3) , 1630-1649
Value of Online–Off-line Return Partnership to Off-line Retailers
Problem definition: This paper examines whether and, if so, how much an online–off-line return partnership between online and third-party retailers with physical stores (or “location partners”) generates additional value to location partners. Academic/practical relevance: Online shoppers often prefer to return products to stores rather than mailing them back. Many online retailers have recently started to collaborate with location partners to offer the store return option to their customers, and we quantify its economic benefit to a location partner. Methodology: We analyze proprietary data sets from Happy Returns (which provides return services for more than 30 online retailers) and one of its location partners, using a panel difference-in-differences model. In our study, a treatment is the initiation of the return service at each of the location partner’s stores, and an outcome is the store and online channel performance of the location partner. We then explore the mechanisms of underlying customer behavior that drive these outcomes. Results: We find that the partnership increases the number of unique customers, items sold, and net revenue in both store and online channels. We identify two drivers for this improved performance: (1) the location partner acquires new customers in both store and online channels, and (2) existing customers change their shopping patterns only in the store channel after using the return service; in particular, they visit stores more often, purchase more items, and generate higher revenue after their first return service. Managerial implications: To our knowledge, we provide the first direct empirical evidence of value to location partners from a return partnership, and as these partnerships become more prevalent, our findings have important managerial implications for location partners and online retailers alike.
- 1 June 2021
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 67 (6) , 3834-3852
Cover-Up of Vehicle Defects: The Role of Regulator Investigation Announcements
Automakers, including Toyota and General Motors, were recently caught by the U.S. regulator for deliberately hiding product defects in an attempt to avoid massive recalls. Interestingly, regulators in the United States and United Kingdom employ different policies in informing consumers about potential defects: the U.S. regulator publicly announces all ongoing investigations of potential defects to provide consumers with early information, whereas the UK regulator does not. To understand how these different announcement policies may affect cover-up decisions of automakers, we model the strategic interaction between a manufacturer and a regulator. We find that, under both countries’ policies, the manufacturer has an incentive to cover up a potential defect when there is a high chance that the defect indeed exists and it may inflict only moderate harm. However, if there is only a moderate chance that the defect exists, only under the U.S. policy does the manufacturer have an incentive to cover up a potential defect with significant harm. We show that the U.S. policy generates higher social welfare only for very serious issues for which both the expected harm and recall cost are very high and the defect is likely to exist. We make four policy recommendations that could help mitigate manufacturers’ cover-ups, including a hybrid policy in which the regulator conducts a confidential investigation of a potential defect only when it may inflict significant harm. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.
- 1 June 2021
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 67 (6) , 3834-3852
Cover-Up of Vehicle Defects: The Role of Regulator Investigation Announcements
Automakers, including Toyota and General Motors, were recently caught by the U.S. regulator for deliberately hiding product defects in an attempt to avoid massive recalls. Interestingly, regulators in the United States and United Kingdom employ different policies in informing consumers about potential defects: the U.S. regulator publicly announces all ongoing investigations of potential defects to provide consumers with early information, whereas the UK regulator does not. To understand how these different announcement policies may affect cover-up decisions of automakers, we model the strategic interaction between a manufacturer and a regulator. We find that, under both countries’ policies, the manufacturer has an incentive to cover up a potential defect when there is a high chance that the defect indeed exists and it may inflict only moderate harm. However, if there is only a moderate chance that the defect exists, only under the U.S. policy does the manufacturer have an incentive to cover up a potential defect with significant harm. We show that the U.S. policy generates higher social welfare only for very serious issues for which both the expected harm and recall cost are very high and the defect is likely to exist. We make four policy recommendations that could help mitigate manufacturers’ cover-ups, including a hybrid policy in which the regulator conducts a confidential investigation of a potential defect only when it may inflict significant harm. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.
- 1 May 2021
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 67 (5) , 2904-2923
A Queueing Model and Analysis for Autonomous Vehicles on Highways
We investigate the effects of autonomous vehicles (AVs) on highway congestion. AVs have the potential to significantly reduce highway congestion because they can maintain smaller intervehicle gaps and travel together in larger platoons than human-driven vehicles (HVs). Various policies have been proposed to regulate AV travel on highways, yet no in-depth comparison of these policies exists. To address this shortcoming, we develop a queueing model for a multilane highway and analyze two policies: the designated-lane policy (“D policy”), under which one lane is designated to AVs, and the integrated policy (“I policy”), under which AVs travel together with HVs in all lanes. We connect the service rate to intervehicle gaps (governed by a Markovian arrival process) and congestion, and measure the performance using mean travel time and throughput. Our analysis shows that although the I policy performs at least as well as a benchmark case with no AVs, the D policy outperforms the benchmark only when the highway is heavily congested and AVs constitute the majority of vehicles; in such a case, this policy may outperform the I policy only in terms of throughput. These findings caution against recent industry and government proposals that the D policy should be employed at the beginning of the mass appearance of AVs. Finally, we calibrate our model to data and show that for highly congested highways, a moderate number of AVs can make a substantial improvement (e.g., 22% AVs can improve throughput by 30%), and when all vehicles are AVs, throughput can be increased by over 400%. This paper was accepted by Jayashankar Swaminathan, operations management.
- 1 May 2021
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 67 (5) , 2904-2923
A Queueing Model and Analysis for Autonomous Vehicles on Highways
We investigate the effects of autonomous vehicles (AVs) on highway congestion. AVs have the potential to significantly reduce highway congestion because they can maintain smaller intervehicle gaps and travel together in larger platoons than human-driven vehicles (HVs). Various policies have been proposed to regulate AV travel on highways, yet no in-depth comparison of these policies exists. To address this shortcoming, we develop a queueing model for a multilane highway and analyze two policies: the designated-lane policy (“D policy”), under which one lane is designated to AVs, and the integrated policy (“I policy”), under which AVs travel together with HVs in all lanes. We connect the service rate to intervehicle gaps (governed by a Markovian arrival process) and congestion, and measure the performance using mean travel time and throughput. Our analysis shows that although the I policy performs at least as well as a benchmark case with no AVs, the D policy outperforms the benchmark only when the highway is heavily congested and AVs constitute the majority of vehicles; in such a case, this policy may outperform the I policy only in terms of throughput. These findings caution against recent industry and government proposals that the D policy should be employed at the beginning of the mass appearance of AVs. Finally, we calibrate our model to data and show that for highly congested highways, a moderate number of AVs can make a substantial improvement (e.g., 22% AVs can improve throughput by 30%), and when all vehicles are AVs, throughput can be increased by over 400%. This paper was accepted by Jayashankar Swaminathan, operations management.
- 1 March 2021
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Service Science
- Vol. 13 (1) , 51-52
Call for Papers—Special Issue of Service Science: Innovation in Transportation-Enabled Urban Services
- 1 March 2021
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Service Science
- Vol. 13 (1) , 51-52
Call for Papers—Special Issue of Service Science: Innovation in Transportation-Enabled Urban Services
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 67 (1) , 201-219
Green Technology Development and Adoption: Competition, Regulation, and Uncertainty—A Global Game Approach
When a government agency considers tightening a standard on a pollutant, the agency often takes into account the proportion of firms that are able to meet the new standard (what we refer to as the industry’s “voluntary adoption level”) because a higher proportion indicates a more feasible standard. We develop a novel model of regulation in which the probability of a stricter standard being enacted increases with an industry’s voluntary adoption level. In addition, in our model, the benefit of a new green technology is both uncertain and correlated across firms, and firms’ decisions exhibit both strategic substitutability (because the marketing benefit of a new green technology decreases as more firms adopt it) and complementarity (because the stricter standard is more likely to be enforced as more firms adopt it). To analyze such strategic interaction among firms’ decisions under correlated and uncertain payoffs, we use the global game framework recently developed in economics. Our analysis shows that regulation that considers an industry’s voluntary adoption level, compared with regulation that ignores it, can more effectively motivate development of a new green technology. Interestingly, uncertainty in the payoff can, in some situations, help promote development of a new green technology. Finally, we find that more aggressive regulation (a higher probability of enforcing a stricter standard for a given voluntary adoption level) encourages more firms to adopt a green technology once the technology becomes available but may discourage a firm from developing it in the first place when facing intense competition. Therefore, for an industry with intense competition, a government agency should exercise caution about being too aggressive with regulation, which could potentially stifle innovation.This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 67 (1) , 201-219
Top Cited PapersGreen Technology Development and Adoption: Competition, Regulation, and Uncertainty—A Global Game Approach
When a government agency considers tightening a standard on a pollutant, the agency often takes into account the proportion of firms that are able to meet the new standard (what we refer to as the industry’s “voluntary adoption level”) because a higher proportion indicates a more feasible standard. We develop a novel model of regulation in which the probability of a stricter standard being enacted increases with an industry’s voluntary adoption level. In addition, in our model, the benefit of a new green technology is both uncertain and correlated across firms, and firms’ decisions exhibit both strategic substitutability (because the marketing benefit of a new green technology decreases as more firms adopt it) and complementarity (because the stricter standard is more likely to be enforced as more firms adopt it). To analyze such strategic interaction among firms’ decisions under correlated and uncertain payoffs, we use the global game framework recently developed in economics. Our analysis shows that regulation that considers an industry’s voluntary adoption level, compared with regulation that ignores it, can more effectively motivate development of a new green technology. Interestingly, uncertainty in the payoff can, in some situations, help promote development of a new green technology. Finally, we find that more aggressive regulation (a higher probability of enforcing a stricter standard for a given voluntary adoption level) encourages more firms to adopt a green technology once the technology becomes available but may discourage a firm from developing it in the first place when facing intense competition. Therefore, for an industry with intense competition, a government agency should exercise caution about being too aggressive with regulation, which could potentially stifle innovation.This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.
- 1 December 2020
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 66 (12) , 5648-5664
Supply Chain Competition: A Market Game Approach
We study supply chains where multiple suppliers sell to multiple retailers through a wholesale market. In practice, we often observe that both suppliers and retailers tend to influence the wholesale market price that retailers pay to suppliers. However, existing models of supply chain competition do not capture retailers’ influence on the wholesale price (i.e., buyer power) and show that the wholesale price and the order quantity per retailer do not change with the number of retailers. To overcome this limitation, we develop a competition model based on the market game mechanism in which the wholesale price is determined based on both suppliers’ and retailers’ decisions. When taking into account retailers’ buyer power, we obtain the result that is consistent with the observed practice: As the number of retailers increases, each retailer’s buyer power decreases, and each retailer is willing to pay more for her order, so the wholesale price increases. In this case, supply chain expansion to include more retailers (or suppliers) turns out to be more beneficial in terms of supply chain efficiency than what the prior literature shows without considering buyer power. Finally, we analyze the integration of two local supply chains and show that although the profit of the integrated supply chain is greater than the sum of total profits of local supply chains, integration may reduce the total profit of firms in a retailer-oriented supply chain that has more retailers than suppliers. This paper was accepted by Charles Corbett, operations management.
- 1 December 2020
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 66 (12) , 5648-5664
Supply Chain Competition: A Market Game Approach
We study supply chains where multiple suppliers sell to multiple retailers through a wholesale market. In practice, we often observe that both suppliers and retailers tend to influence the wholesale market price that retailers pay to suppliers. However, existing models of supply chain competition do not capture retailers’ influence on the wholesale price (i.e., buyer power) and show that the wholesale price and the order quantity per retailer do not change with the number of retailers. To overcome this limitation, we develop a competition model based on the market game mechanism in which the wholesale price is determined based on both suppliers’ and retailers’ decisions. When taking into account retailers’ buyer power, we obtain the result that is consistent with the observed practice: As the number of retailers increases, each retailer’s buyer power decreases, and each retailer is willing to pay more for her order, so the wholesale price increases. In this case, supply chain expansion to include more retailers (or suppliers) turns out to be more beneficial in terms of supply chain efficiency than what the prior literature shows without considering buyer power. Finally, we analyze the integration of two local supply chains and show that although the profit of the integrated supply chain is greater than the sum of total profits of local supply chains, integration may reduce the total profit of firms in a retailer-oriented supply chain that has more retailers than suppliers. This paper was accepted by Charles Corbett, operations management.