Tyler Moore
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Tyler Moore has a total of 36 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Neil Gandal
Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
6 shared publications Noa Barnir
4 shared publicationsNeil Gandal
3 shared publicationsAmir Feder
2 shared publications- Bradley Brummel
University of Houston
2 shared publications Sal Aurigemma
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 21 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
How do Ransomware Groups Choose Their Targets? An Empirical Analysis
Ransomware groups vary in the types of organizations they compromise, yet little empirical work has examined whether these differences extend to the technology stacks of victims. We analyze 5,190 ransomware incidents across 151 groups, linking each victim to its observed technology stack from the SWDB Company Intelligence database. We find that some enterprise software is associated with greater ransomware risk than others, and that this association is often stronger for technologies carrying more known vulnerabilities. Next, by analyzing leaked chat logs of leading ransomware groups, we present direct evidence that some groups choose their victims based on observed technology use and revenue data gathered through opensource intelligence. Finally, examining the full population of victims, we find that some groups concentrate on particular technologies and revenue profiles, while others appear more opportunistic, with a victim profile close to the overall population.
- 21 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessHow do Ransomware Groups Choose Their Targets? An Empirical Analysis
Ransomware groups vary in the types of organizations they compromise, yet little empirical work has examined whether these differences extend to the technology stacks of victims. We analyze 5,190 ransomware incidents across 151 groups, linking each victim to its observed technology stack from the SWDB Company Intelligence database. We find that some enterprise software is associated with greater ransomware risk than others, and that this association is often stronger for technologies carrying more known vulnerabilities. Next, by analyzing leaked chat logs of leading ransomware groups, we present direct evidence that some groups choose their victims based on observed technology use and revenue data gathered through opensource intelligence. Finally, examining the full population of victims, we find that some groups concentrate on particular technologies and revenue profiles, while others appear more opportunistic, with a victim profile close to the overall population.
- 29 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Security
- Vol. 168
How security-related stress and self-efficacy influence actual behavior: An empirical study
- 29 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Security
- Vol. 168
How security-related stress and self-efficacy influence actual behavior: An empirical study
- Open Access
- 10 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Impact of Cyber Attacks on Security Portfolios: Firm-Level Panel Data
We study how firms adjust their cybersecurity postures after experiencing a cyber attack. We combine publicly disclosed cyber incidents with detailed data on security tool and vendor deployments from the SWZD Company Intelligence Database (CIDB) over multiple years. Our empirical approach compares attacked firms to similar nonattacked firms using a fixed effects (difference-indifference) model. We find that there was little difference between attacked and non-attacked firms regarding security posture before the attacks. Controlling for common changes made by all firms over time, in the "post attack" period, firms that were attacked increased the breadth of their security posture relative to non-attacked firms. They adopted more National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) functions and had broader category coverage than non-attacked firms in the "post attack" period. Attacked firms also dramatically increased the usage of security products from large and "platform" vendors relative to non-attacked firms in the "post attack" period. Interestingly, in contrast to security posture, however, non-attacked and attacked firms differed significantly in vendor portfolios before the attack. In particular, before the attacks, non-attacked firms used 36 percent more "largest 5 vendor" products than attacked firms and 38 percent more "platform vendor" products than firms that were attacked. However, in the post attack period, the mean number of security products for attacked firms from the largest 5 vendors increased by 100 percent, while the mean number of security products from platform vendors increased by 141 percent. The percent change in these categories for non-attacked firms was much more moderate.While we cannot determine whether the products from larger and platform vendors were of higher quality, that seems to be the "revealed" beliefs of the attacked firms. 1
- 10 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Impact of Cyber Attacks on Security Portfolios: Firm-Level Panel Data
We study how firms adjust their cybersecurity postures after experiencing a cyber attack. We combine publicly disclosed cyber incidents with detailed data on security tool and vendor deployments from the SWZD Company Intelligence Database (CIDB) over multiple years. Our empirical approach compares attacked firms to similar nonattacked firms using a fixed effects (difference-indifference) model. We find that there was little difference between attacked and non-attacked firms regarding security posture before the attacks. Controlling for common changes made by all firms over time, in the "post attack" period, firms that were attacked increased the breadth of their security posture relative to non-attacked firms. They adopted more National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) functions and had broader category coverage than non-attacked firms in the "post attack" period. Attacked firms also dramatically increased the usage of security products from large and "platform" vendors relative to non-attacked firms in the "post attack" period. Interestingly, in contrast to security posture, however, non-attacked and attacked firms differed significantly in vendor portfolios before the attack. In particular, before the attacks, non-attacked firms used 36 percent more "largest 5 vendor" products than attacked firms and 38 percent more "platform vendor" products than firms that were attacked. However, in the post attack period, the mean number of security products for attacked firms from the largest 5 vendors increased by 100 percent, while the mean number of security products from platform vendors increased by 141 percent. The percent change in these categories for non-attacked firms was much more moderate.While we cannot determine whether the products from larger and platform vendors were of higher quality, that seems to be the "revealed" beliefs of the attacked firms. 1
- Open Access
- 13 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 57-63
Measuring Enterprise Software Supply Chain Security using Public Repositories
Vulnerabilities introduced through outdated third party libraries remain a primary entry point for supply-chain attacks. To quantify this risk at enterprise scale, we examined every public GitHub repository maintained by the Forbes Global 2000. We identified 275 corporate accounts and cloned all 34 368 repositories (1.9 TB of source code). Next, we used two open source tools to identify vulnerable software libraries in the repositories. Syft lists every library in a project creating software bills of materials (SBOMs), while Grype checks each library for known vulnerabilities (CVEs or GitHub Security Advisories). 11.7% of the 3,791,834 library occurrences have at least one known vulnerability. Surprisingly, we observe active projects are almost as risky as inactive ones. Moreover, some vulnerable libraries affect many disparate projects. For example, one vulnerability in the JavaScript package semver appears in 805 projects developed by 89 companies, and 43 firms still publish code that contains the infamous Log4j RCE flaw. We publish our full dataset the largest of its kind to help other researchers. We also note limits of our approach and point to new rules that will soon push more companies to create and share SBOMs.
- 13 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 57-63
Open AccessMeasuring Enterprise Software Supply Chain Security using Public Repositories
Vulnerabilities introduced through outdated third party libraries remain a primary entry point for supply-chain attacks. To quantify this risk at enterprise scale, we examined every public GitHub repository maintained by the Forbes Global 2000. We identified 275 corporate accounts and cloned all 34 368 repositories (1.9 TB of source code). Next, we used two open source tools to identify vulnerable software libraries in the repositories. Syft lists every library in a project creating software bills of materials (SBOMs), while Grype checks each library for known vulnerabilities (CVEs or GitHub Security Advisories). 11.7% of the 3,791,834 library occurrences have at least one known vulnerability. Surprisingly, we observe active projects are almost as risky as inactive ones. Moreover, some vulnerable libraries affect many disparate projects. For example, one vulnerability in the JavaScript package semver appears in 805 projects developed by 89 companies, and 43 firms still publish code that contains the infamous Log4j RCE flaw. We publish our full dataset the largest of its kind to help other researchers. We also note limits of our approach and point to new rules that will soon push more companies to create and share SBOMs.
- 26 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Information Systems Frontiers
- Vol. 28 (2) , 529-539
Quantifying Costs of Enhanced Security in Multifactor Authentication
- 26 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Information Systems Frontiers
- Vol. 28 (2) , 529-539
Quantifying Costs of Enhanced Security in Multifactor Authentication
- 25 August 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Security
- Vol. 159
How informative are cybersecurity risk disclosures? Empirical analysis of firms targeted by ransomware
- 25 August 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Security
- Vol. 159
How informative are cybersecurity risk disclosures? Empirical analysis of firms targeted by ransomware
- 4 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 306-325
A Cost-Sensitive Approach for Managing Intrusion Alerts in OT Environments
- 4 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 306-325
A Cost-Sensitive Approach for Managing Intrusion Alerts in OT Environments
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by HICSS Conference Office
Beyond the Hype: Empirical Evaluation of Cryptocurrency Unicorn Success
Thousands of cryptocurrency coins and tokens have been introduced in recent years, with each purporting to offer a unique take on disrupting traditional financial instruments. Most fail to attract significant investment, but some grow quite valuable for at least a short time. This paper focuses on so-called "crypto unicorns'', which reach a market capitalization of at least $1 billion at some point during their lifetimes. 37 coins and 139 tokens have reached unicorn status. However, only 15 coins and 35 tokens retain market capitalizations exceeding $1 billion at end of our study, with 6 coins and 31 tokens falling below $100 million. We empirically examine the factors that influence the relative success or failure of crypto unicorns. Using regression analysis, we find that bitcoin price, the type of service offered by the coin or token, having an ICO and social media activity all affect success.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by HICSS Conference Office
Open AccessBeyond the Hype: Empirical Evaluation of Cryptocurrency Unicorn Success
Thousands of cryptocurrency coins and tokens have been introduced in recent years, with each purporting to offer a unique take on disrupting traditional financial instruments. Most fail to attract significant investment, but some grow quite valuable for at least a short time. This paper focuses on so-called "crypto unicorns'', which reach a market capitalization of at least $1 billion at some point during their lifetimes. 37 coins and 139 tokens have reached unicorn status. However, only 15 coins and 35 tokens retain market capitalizations exceeding $1 billion at end of our study, with 6 coins and 31 tokens falling below $100 million. We empirically examine the factors that influence the relative success or failure of crypto unicorns. Using regression analysis, we find that bitcoin price, the type of service offered by the coin or token, having an ICO and social media activity all affect success.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by HICSS Conference Office
Leveraging Situational Judgment Tests to Measure Behavioral Information Security
Situational Judgement Tests (SJTs) are a multidimensional measurement method commonly used in the context of employment decisions and widely researched in the field of industrial and organizational (I-O) psychology. However, the use of SJTs in the field of information system (IS) security is limited. Applying SJT research from the field of I-O psychology to IS security research, particularly research with behavioral components, could prove beneficial. SJT items typically present participants with realistic hypothetical work/job-related situations and potential response items. The use of SJTs in IS security research could provide researchers with a new measurement tool for a wide range of research goals.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by HICSS Conference Office
Open AccessLeveraging Situational Judgment Tests to Measure Behavioral Information Security
Situational Judgement Tests (SJTs) are a multidimensional measurement method commonly used in the context of employment decisions and widely researched in the field of industrial and organizational (I-O) psychology. However, the use of SJTs in the field of information system (IS) security is limited. Applying SJT research from the field of I-O psychology to IS security research, particularly research with behavioral components, could prove beneficial. SJT items typically present participants with realistic hypothetical work/job-related situations and potential response items. The use of SJTs in IS security research could provide researchers with a new measurement tool for a wide range of research goals.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by HICSS Conference Office
Identifying Subdomain Doppelganger Attacks against Companies
Cybercriminals regularly impersonate organizations when carrying out attacks. This paper investigates a tactic that has not been studied previously. In so-called doppelgänger attacks, miscreants register domains similar to legitimate subdomains used by organizations. Investigation of domain registration data from 2009-2022 uncovers 84, 952 1st-party doppelgänger attacks that mimic valid subdomains of organization websites, plus a further 5, 448 3rd-party doppelgängers in which service providers used by organizations are impersonated. By analyzing patterns of the gathered data, the paper studies how victims are affected and attackers organize their activities. It is hoped that by raising awareness to this attack technique, future malicious activities may be curtailed.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by HICSS Conference Office
Open AccessIdentifying Subdomain Doppelganger Attacks against Companies
Cybercriminals regularly impersonate organizations when carrying out attacks. This paper investigates a tactic that has not been studied previously. In so-called doppelgänger attacks, miscreants register domains similar to legitimate subdomains used by organizations. Investigation of domain registration data from 2009-2022 uncovers 84, 952 1st-party doppelgänger attacks that mimic valid subdomains of organization websites, plus a further 5, 448 3rd-party doppelgängers in which service providers used by organizations are impersonated. By analyzing patterns of the gathered data, the paper studies how victims are affected and attackers organize their activities. It is hoped that by raising awareness to this attack technique, future malicious activities may be curtailed.