Rui Chang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Rui Chang has a total of 139 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Yajin Zhou
The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
22 shared publications - Wenbo Shen
Zhejiang University
20 shared publications - Lei Wu
Zhejiang University
12 shared publications - Yufeng Hu
City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
9 shared publications - Bowen He
Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China and Mohamed bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence, Abu Dahbi, United Arab Emirates
6 shared publications - Yang Liu
Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, The Second Affiliated Hospital of Kunming Medical University, China
6 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 1 November 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 23  (6) , 13268-13281
Building Reuse-Sensitive Control Flow Graphs (CFGs) for EVM Bytecode
- 1 November 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 23  (6) , 13268-13281
Building Reuse-Sensitive Control Flow Graphs (CFGs) for EVM Bytecode
- 1 November 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
- Vol. 52  (11) , 3427-3445
Untangling Intricate Dependencies: Characterizing and Resolving Software Package Dependencies
- 1 November 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
- Vol. 52  (11) , 3427-3445
Untangling Intricate Dependencies: Characterizing and Resolving Software Package Dependencies
- 10 March 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 23  (3) , 7242-7258
Beyond Control: Exploring Novel File System Objects for Data-Only Attacks on Linux Systems
The widespread deployment of control-flow integrity has shifted attackers' focus to non-control data attacks. In OS kernel exploits, attackers can gain root access or escalate privileges by corrupting critical non-control objects without hijacking the control flow. However, searching for exploitable non-control data in the OS kernel is challenging because of the data's semantic complexity and lack of universal patterns. This work represents the first study to semi-automatically discover and evaluate exploitable non-control data within the Linux kernel's file system, with minimal domain knowledge. Utilizing a custom analysis and testing framework, we identify promising candidate objects both statically and dynamically. We categorize these objects into types suitable for various exploit strategies, including a systematic strategy to overcome defenses that isolate many of these objects. These objects can be exploitable without requiring KASLR, thus making the exploits simpler and more reliable. We evaluate the exploitability of the file system objects using 18 real-world CVEs with various exploit strategies. We further develop 10 end-to-end exploits against the kernel with all state-of-the-art mitigations enabled.
- 10 March 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 23  (3) , 7242-7258
Beyond Control: Exploring Novel File System Objects for Data-Only Attacks on Linux Systems
The widespread deployment of control-flow integrity has shifted attackers' focus to non-control data attacks. In OS kernel exploits, attackers can gain root access or escalate privileges by corrupting critical non-control objects without hijacking the control flow. However, searching for exploitable non-control data in the OS kernel is challenging because of the data's semantic complexity and lack of universal patterns. This work represents the first study to semi-automatically discover and evaluate exploitable non-control data within the Linux kernel's file system, with minimal domain knowledge. Utilizing a custom analysis and testing framework, we identify promising candidate objects both statically and dynamically. We categorize these objects into types suitable for various exploit strategies, including a systematic strategy to overcome defenses that isolate many of these objects. These objects can be exploitable without requiring KASLR, thus making the exploits simpler and more reliable. We evaluate the exploitability of the file system objects using 18 real-world CVEs with various exploit strategies. We further develop 10 end-to-end exploits against the kernel with all state-of-the-art mitigations enabled.
- 7 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Security
- Vol. 166
ROParser: A high-efficient framework for return-oriented programming deobfuscation
- 7 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Security
- Vol. 166
ROParser: A high-efficient framework for return-oriented programming deobfuscation
- 11 December 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 21  (15566013) , 476-489
PA-Boot: A Formally Verified Authentication Protocol for Multiprocessor Secure Boot Under Hardware Supply-Chain Attacks
Hardware supply-chain attacks are raising significant security threats to the boot process of multiprocessor systems. In this paper, we investigate critical stages of the multiprocessor system boot process and identify a new, prevalent hardware supply-chain attack surface that can bypass secure boot due to the absence of processor-authentication mechanisms. To defend against such attacks, in this paper, we present PA-Boot, the first formally verified processor-authentication protocol for secure boot in multiprocessor systems. PA-Boot is proved functionally correct and is guaranteed to detect multiple adversarial behaviors, such as processor replacements and man-in-the-middle attacks. The fine-grained formalization of PA-Boot and its fully mechanized security proofs are carried out in the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover with 348 lemmas/theorems and ~7,100 LoC. We further implement in C an instance of PA-Boot. Experiments on the proof-of-concept implementation indicate that PA-Boot can effectively identify boot-process attacks with a minor overhead (4.98% on Linux boot process) and thereby improve the security of multiprocessor systems.
- 11 December 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 21  (15566013) , 476-489
PA-Boot: A Formally Verified Authentication Protocol for Multiprocessor Secure Boot Under Hardware Supply-Chain Attacks
Hardware supply-chain attacks are raising significant security threats to the boot process of multiprocessor systems. In this paper, we investigate critical stages of the multiprocessor system boot process and identify a new, prevalent hardware supply-chain attack surface that can bypass secure boot due to the absence of processor-authentication mechanisms. To defend against such attacks, in this paper, we present PA-Boot, the first formally verified processor-authentication protocol for secure boot in multiprocessor systems. PA-Boot is proved functionally correct and is guaranteed to detect multiple adversarial behaviors, such as processor replacements and man-in-the-middle attacks. The fine-grained formalization of PA-Boot and its fully mechanized security proofs are carried out in the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover with 348 lemmas/theorems and ~7,100 LoC. We further implement in C an instance of PA-Boot. Experiments on the proof-of-concept implementation indicate that PA-Boot can effectively identify boot-process attacks with a minor overhead (4.98% on Linux boot process) and thereby improve the security of multiprocessor systems.
- 14 November 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 23  (2) , 3131-3146
M1Pecker: A Dynamic Analysis Framework for Pointer Authentication in Apple M1 Chips
Pointer Authentication (PA) was introduced by ARMv8.3 to safeguard the integrity of pointers. While ARM specification allows vendors to implement and customize PA, Apple has tailored it to protect iPhones and Macs with M-series chips on their hardware. Since its debut, Apple PA has been considered to introduce domain isolation to defeat pointer corruption. However, its details have not been publicly disclosed. To shed light on Apple PA customization, this paper first establishes a security model for PA that defines expected properties for cross-domain and intra-domain isolation. We then introduce M1Pecker, a novel analysis framework built upon our Trap-Relay-Based Automated Analysis technique, to evaluate Apple's hardware and software dynamically and automatically against this model. Based on our framework, we perform a comprehensive kernel analysis that combines static and dynamic approaches. We confirm that Apple PA employs multiple diversifiers that robustly satisfy our model's cross-domain isolation property. In contrast, our intra-domain analysis of the XNU kernel identifies violations of intra-domain properties, resulting in four attack surfaces. Apple has fixed these issues in a security update, assigned us a new CVE, and publicly acknowledged our findings.
- 14 November 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 23  (2) , 3131-3146
M1Pecker: A Dynamic Analysis Framework for Pointer Authentication in Apple M1 Chips
Pointer Authentication (PA) was introduced by ARMv8.3 to safeguard the integrity of pointers. While ARM specification allows vendors to implement and customize PA, Apple has tailored it to protect iPhones and Macs with M-series chips on their hardware. Since its debut, Apple PA has been considered to introduce domain isolation to defeat pointer corruption. However, its details have not been publicly disclosed. To shed light on Apple PA customization, this paper first establishes a security model for PA that defines expected properties for cross-domain and intra-domain isolation. We then introduce M1Pecker, a novel analysis framework built upon our Trap-Relay-Based Automated Analysis technique, to evaluate Apple's hardware and software dynamically and automatically against this model. Based on our framework, we perform a comprehensive kernel analysis that combines static and dynamic approaches. We confirm that Apple PA employs multiple diversifiers that robustly satisfy our model's cross-domain isolation property. In contrast, our intra-domain analysis of the XNU kernel identifies violations of intra-domain properties, resulting in four attack surfaces. Apple has fixed these issues in a security update, assigned us a new CVE, and publicly acknowledged our findings.
- Open Access
- 28 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 430-444
Unmasking the Shadow Economy: A Deep Dive into Drainer-as-a-Service Phishing on Ethereum
- 28 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 430-444
Open AccessUnmasking the Shadow Economy: A Deep Dive into Drainer-as-a-Service Phishing on Ethereum
- 9 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Information Security
- Vol. 24  (5) , 1-16
Flow Hijacking in eBPF: Exploitation and Mitigation Across both Interpreter and JIT Execution
- 9 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Information Security
- Vol. 24  (5) , 1-16
Flow Hijacking in eBPF: Exploitation and Mitigation Across both Interpreter and JIT Execution
- Open Access
- 6 August 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 64-80
DejaVuzz: Disclosing Transient Execution Bugs with Dynamic Swappable Memory and Differential Information Flow Tracking Assisted Processor Fuzzing
- 6 August 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 64-80
Open AccessDejaVuzz: Disclosing Transient Execution Bugs with Dynamic Swappable Memory and Differential Information Flow Tracking Assisted Processor Fuzzing
- Open Access
- 22 June 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering
- Vol. 2  (ISSTA) , 2045-2067
Freesia: Verifying Correctness of TEE Communication with Concurrent Separation Logic
The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), a security extension in modern processors, provides a secure runtime environment for sensitive code and data. Although TEEs are designed to protect applications and their private data, their large code bases often harbor vulnerabilities that could compromise data security. Even though some formal verification efforts have been directed toward the functionality and security of TEE standards and implementations, the verification of TEE correctness in concurrent scenarios remains insufficient. This paper introduces an enhancement for ensuring concurrency safety in TEEs, named Freesia, which is formally verified using concurrent separation logic. Through a thorough analysis of the GlobalPlatform TEE standards, Freesia addresses data race issues in the TEE communication interfaces and ensures consistency protection for shared memory between the client and the TEE. A prototype of Freesia is implemented in the open-source TEE platform, OP-TEE. Additionally, the concurrency correctness of Freesia is modeled and verified using the Iris concurrent separation logic framework. The effectiveness and efficiency of Freesia are further demonstrated through real-world case study and performance evaluations.
- 22 June 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering
- Vol. 2  (ISSTA) , 2045-2067
Open AccessFreesia: Verifying Correctness of TEE Communication with Concurrent Separation Logic
The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), a security extension in modern processors, provides a secure runtime environment for sensitive code and data. Although TEEs are designed to protect applications and their private data, their large code bases often harbor vulnerabilities that could compromise data security. Even though some formal verification efforts have been directed toward the functionality and security of TEE standards and implementations, the verification of TEE correctness in concurrent scenarios remains insufficient. This paper introduces an enhancement for ensuring concurrency safety in TEEs, named Freesia, which is formally verified using concurrent separation logic. Through a thorough analysis of the GlobalPlatform TEE standards, Freesia addresses data race issues in the TEE communication interfaces and ensures consistency protection for shared memory between the client and the TEE. A prototype of Freesia is implemented in the open-source TEE platform, OP-TEE. Additionally, the concurrency correctness of Freesia is modeled and verified using the Iris concurrent separation logic framework. The effectiveness and efficiency of Freesia are further demonstrated through real-world case study and performance evaluations.