Gualtiero Piccinini
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Gualtiero Piccinini has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Stephen Allan Selesnick
Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Missouri - St. Louis, St. Louis, USA
3 shared publications - Andrea Scarantino
Georgia State University
2 shared publications - Armin W. Schulz
Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas, Lawrence, USA
2 shared publications Corey J. Maley
University of Kansas
2 shared publicationsWorth Boone
2 shared publicationsAlex Morgan
Rice University, Houston, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 17 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Biological Physics
- Vol. 52 (1)
Allocentric navigation is computationally universal
I present three proofs that idealized neurocomputational architectures capable of navigation guided by allocentric maps with landmark structure can be computationally universal. Navigation may occur online, in the environment, or offline, in the animal’s head. The first proof encodes the counters of a two-counter machine as positions of movable markers on orthogonal axes. The second directly simulates a one-tape Turing machine using a writable tape-path embedded in the map. The third realizes the tape-path’s predecessor/successor relation through local cues at a two-row landmark track rather than through a globally indexed path primitive. I establish universality in two senses: each class of navigation models is Turing-complete, and each contains a single machine that simulates every machine in its class. These constructions are mathematically close to classical graph-based models, including Kolmogorov–Uspensky machines, storage-modification machines, and graph Turing machines, so the bare computability results are unsurprising. My contribution is to reconstruct them explicitly within an allocentric cognitive-map architecture whose representational and computational primitives are drawn from empirical and theoretical work on spatial navigation and cognitive control. This shows that an allocentric navigation-based architecture can be computationally universal and opens the possibility of reconstructing aspects of biological cognition, including symbolic processing, in navigation-based terms.
- 17 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Biological Physics
- Vol. 52 (1)
Open AccessAllocentric navigation is computationally universal
I present three proofs that idealized neurocomputational architectures capable of navigation guided by allocentric maps with landmark structure can be computationally universal. Navigation may occur online, in the environment, or offline, in the animal’s head. The first proof encodes the counters of a two-counter machine as positions of movable markers on orthogonal axes. The second directly simulates a one-tape Turing machine using a writable tape-path embedded in the map. The third realizes the tape-path’s predecessor/successor relation through local cues at a two-row landmark track rather than through a globally indexed path primitive. I establish universality in two senses: each class of navigation models is Turing-complete, and each contains a single machine that simulates every machine in its class. These constructions are mathematically close to classical graph-based models, including Kolmogorov–Uspensky machines, storage-modification machines, and graph Turing machines, so the bare computability results are unsurprising. My contribution is to reconstruct them explicitly within an allocentric cognitive-map architecture whose representational and computational primitives are drawn from empirical and theoretical work on spatial navigation and cognitive control. This shows that an allocentric navigation-based architecture can be computationally universal and opens the possibility of reconstructing aspects of biological cognition, including symbolic processing, in navigation-based terms.
- 17 September 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 49, e353
The neurobiophysical substrate of consciousness
I argue that creature consciousness depends on specific neurobiophysical properties that constitute the medium for phenomenally conscious states. Such properties are not medium flexible in the way required by computational functionalism. Therefore, computational functionalism fails, and one of the following holds: biological naturalism, a nonbiological yet noncomputational version of functionalism, or a view according to which consciousness requires specific (macro)physical qualities.
- 17 September 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 49, e353
The neurobiophysical substrate of consciousness
I argue that creature consciousness depends on specific neurobiophysical properties that constitute the medium for phenomenally conscious states. Such properties are not medium flexible in the way required by computational functionalism. Therefore, computational functionalism fails, and one of the following holds: biological naturalism, a nonbiological yet noncomputational version of functionalism, or a view according to which consciousness requires specific (macro)physical qualities.
- 31 July 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 1-17
New foundations for the philosophy of mind and the mind sciences
This volume argues that progress in our understanding of the mind requires understanding how the brain works. Therefore, neuroscience makes a profound difference to psychology and the philosophy of mind. This chapter begins by listing the main versions of the influential Autonomist Picture of the mind, according to which psychology and the philosophy of mind are autonomous from neuroscience. The chapter also points out that Reductionism, which rejects Autonomism, tends to leave Autonomists entrenched in their position. Then, the chapter sketches an Integrationist Picture that rejects Autonomism without endorsing reductionism. According to such an Integrationist Picture, mental processes at different levels of organization are interdependent and explain mental phenomena in complex ways that must be studied empirically, and neuroscience is indispensable to studying and understanding multilevel mental processes. The chapter concludes by listing some ways in which paying attention to the brain leads to changing foundational assumptions about the mind.
- 31 July 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 1-17
New foundations for the philosophy of mind and the mind sciences
This volume argues that progress in our understanding of the mind requires understanding how the brain works. Therefore, neuroscience makes a profound difference to psychology and the philosophy of mind. This chapter begins by listing the main versions of the influential Autonomist Picture of the mind, according to which psychology and the philosophy of mind are autonomous from neuroscience. The chapter also points out that Reductionism, which rejects Autonomism, tends to leave Autonomists entrenched in their position. Then, the chapter sketches an Integrationist Picture that rejects Autonomism without endorsing reductionism. According to such an Integrationist Picture, mental processes at different levels of organization are interdependent and explain mental phenomena in complex ways that must be studied empirically, and neuroscience is indispensable to studying and understanding multilevel mental processes. The chapter concludes by listing some ways in which paying attention to the brain leads to changing foundational assumptions about the mind.
- 31 July 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis
Neurocognitive Foundations of Mind
This volume provides a cohesive and comprehensive case that cognitive neuroscience is maturing into an integrated, interdisciplinary science that is transforming our understanding of the mind. The rise of cognitive neuroscience has prompted a rethinking of levels, computation, representation, psychological explanation, and the relation between psychology and neuroscience. Despite these advances, many philosophers and scientists of the mind continue to write as though cognitive neuroscience didn’t exist and psychology remains autonomous from neuroscience or, perhaps, they maintain that cognitive neuroscience has not deepened our understanding of the mind. The chapters in this volume showcase important ways in which cognitive neuroscience makes a profound difference to our understanding of the mind. The contributors address a wide range of topics, including explanation, computation, representation, inference, emotion, language, intention, and thought. Together, they demonstrate the ways in which cognitive neuroscience supersedes traditional cognitive science and supports a unified, integrated, multilevel, mechanistic, neurocomputational account of the mind. Neurocognitive Foundations of Mind is essential reading for scholars and advanced students interested in the foundations of the philosophy of mind and the mind sciences.
- 31 July 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis
Neurocognitive Foundations of Mind
This volume provides a cohesive and comprehensive case that cognitive neuroscience is maturing into an integrated, interdisciplinary science that is transforming our understanding of the mind. The rise of cognitive neuroscience has prompted a rethinking of levels, computation, representation, psychological explanation, and the relation between psychology and neuroscience. Despite these advances, many philosophers and scientists of the mind continue to write as though cognitive neuroscience didn’t exist and psychology remains autonomous from neuroscience or, perhaps, they maintain that cognitive neuroscience has not deepened our understanding of the mind. The chapters in this volume showcase important ways in which cognitive neuroscience makes a profound difference to our understanding of the mind. The contributors address a wide range of topics, including explanation, computation, representation, inference, emotion, language, intention, and thought. Together, they demonstrate the ways in which cognitive neuroscience supersedes traditional cognitive science and supports a unified, integrated, multilevel, mechanistic, neurocomputational account of the mind. Neurocognitive Foundations of Mind is essential reading for scholars and advanced students interested in the foundations of the philosophy of mind and the mind sciences.
- Open Access
- 7 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Acta Analytica
- Vol. 41 (2) , 321-346
Composition as Trans-Scalar Identity
We define mereologically invariant composition as the relation between a whole object and its parts when the object retains the same parts during a time interval. We argue that mereologically invariant composition is identity between a whole and its parts taken collectively. Our reason is that parts and wholes are equivalent measurements of a portion of reality at different scales in the precise sense employed by measurement theory. The purpose of these scales is the numerical representation of primitive relations between quantities of being. To show this, we prove representation and uniqueness theorems for composition. We conclude that mereologically invariant composition is trans-scalar identity.
- 7 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Acta Analytica
- Vol. 41 (2) , 321-346
Open AccessComposition as Trans-Scalar Identity
We define mereologically invariant composition as the relation between a whole object and its parts when the object retains the same parts during a time interval. We argue that mereologically invariant composition is identity between a whole and its parts taken collectively. Our reason is that parts and wholes are equivalent measurements of a portion of reality at different scales in the precise sense employed by measurement theory. The purpose of these scales is the numerical representation of primitive relations between quantities of being. To show this, we prove representation and uniqueness theorems for composition. We conclude that mereologically invariant composition is trans-scalar identity.
- Open Access
- 20 December 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 205 (1) , 1-31
Knowing that as knowing how: a neurocognitive practicalism
- 20 December 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 205 (1) , 1-31
Open AccessKnowing that as knowing how: a neurocognitive practicalism
- 10 November 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 61-73
RESEARCH ARTICLE: The Ways of Altruism
- 14 July 2022
- Published by Imprint Academic Ltd in Journal of Consciousness Studies
- Vol. 29 (7) , 226-250
Neurocognitive Mechanisms Some Clarifications
I argue that good metaphysics and good metascience go hand in hand and go on to clarify my egalitarian ontology of levels, defend the aspect view of realization, insist that computation must be medium independent and neurocognitive processes are largely computational even though some medium-dependent phenomena affect neural computation, and sketch an account of mental representation in terms of neural representation.
- 14 July 2022
- Published by Imprint Academic Ltd in Journal of Consciousness Studies
- Vol. 29 (7) , 226-250
Neurocognitive Mechanisms Some Clarifications
I argue that good metaphysics and good metascience go hand in hand and go on to clarify my egalitarian ontology of levels, defend the aspect view of realization, insist that computation must be medium independent and neurocognitive processes are largely computational even though some medium-dependent phenomena affect neural computation, and sketch an account of mental representation in terms of neural representation.
- 14 July 2022
- Published by Imprint Academic Ltd in Journal of Consciousness Studies
- Vol. 29 (7) , 167-174
Neurocognitive Mechanisms A Situated, Multilevel, Mechanistic, Neurocomputational, Representational Framework for Biological Cognition
I introduce three themes: egalitarian ontology, explanatory integration, and neural computation-cum-representation. I argue that all levels of composition and realization are ontologically on a par (no level is more fundamental than the others). In addition, I argue that all levels and their relations must be studied and integrated within multilevel mechanistic explanations. Finally, I argue that neural computation and representations ought to be understood in their own right and cognition explained in their terms. In the end, biological cognition is explained by situated, multilevel, neurocomputational, representational mechanisms.
- 14 July 2022
- Published by Imprint Academic Ltd in Journal of Consciousness Studies
- Vol. 29 (7) , 167-174
Neurocognitive Mechanisms A Situated, Multilevel, Mechanistic, Neurocomputational, Representational Framework for Biological Cognition
I introduce three themes: egalitarian ontology, explanatory integration, and neural computation-cum-representation. I argue that all levels of composition and realization are ontologically on a par (no level is more fundamental than the others). In addition, I argue that all levels and their relations must be studied and integrated within multilevel mechanistic explanations. Finally, I argue that neural computation and representations ought to be understood in their own right and cognition explained in their terms. In the end, biological cognition is explained by situated, multilevel, neurocomputational, representational mechanisms.