Tae Seok Moon
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Tae Seok Moon has a total of 188 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Drew M. DeLorenzo
Department of Energy, Environmental and Chemical Engineering, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri 63130, United States
10 shared publications- William R. Henson
Department of Energy, Environmental and Chemical Engineering, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO, 63130, USA
10 shared publications - Gautam Dantas
The Edison Family Center for Genome Sciences and Systems Biology, Washington University School of Medicine, St. Louis, MO, USA
8 shared publications Austin G. Rottinghaus
7 shared publicationsChenggang Xi
6 shared publicationsJinjin Diao
Department of Energy, Environmental and Chemical Engineering, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, USA
6 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 30 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in New Biotechnology
- Vol. 96, 86-96
Engineered Escherichia coli Nissle with an inducible phenylalanine degrading cassette and a multi-input kill switch
- 30 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in New Biotechnology
- Vol. 96, 86-96
Open AccessEngineered Escherichia coli Nissle with an inducible phenylalanine degrading cassette and a multi-input kill switch
- 5 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Trends in Biotechnology
- Vol. 44 (8) , 2171-2172
J. Craig Venter (1946—2026)
- 5 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Trends in Biotechnology
- Vol. 44 (8) , 2171-2172
J. Craig Venter (1946—2026)
- Open Access
- 5 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Cell Reports Methods
- Vol. 6 (6) , 101430
Resilience of recombinant antibiotic resistance gene-containing plasmids against common cell culture disposal methods
- 5 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Cell Reports Methods
- Vol. 6 (6) , 101430
Open AccessResilience of recombinant antibiotic resistance gene-containing plasmids against common cell culture disposal methods
- 2 March 2026
- Published by American Chemical Society (ACS) in Environmental Science & Technology
- Vol. 60 (10) , 7983-7994
Genetic Markers Remain Detectable in Genetically Engineered Microbes Biocontained with a CRISPR Kill Switch
Biocontainment strategies, such as kill switches, have been developed to avoid the unintended proliferation of genetically engineered microbes (GEMs) intended for open-release environmental applications. However, the presence of GEM DNA after successful biocontainment presents new environmental risks and challenges for monitoring. In this study, we investigated whether biocontainment using a CRISPR-Cas9 kill switch, which causes double-strand breaks in target genes essential for GEM growth, could resolve this challenge in a model Escherichia coli GEM. Surprisingly, the escape rates of the GEM as determined by CRISPR-targeted gene abundances were as high as 10-1.6 to 10-1.0 in LB media, despite the escape rates measured by colony forming units (cfu) being only 10-6.2 under the same condition. This discrepancy suggested that the CRISPR-Cas9 kill switch prevents colony growth while still leaving a large fraction of target genes intact for detection by molecular methods. Within 1 h after biocontainment, these target genes remained predominantly inside an intact cell membrane and were resistant to degradation by DNase, though degradation was observed in river water over multiple days. Overall, a detailed understanding of the impact of the biocontainment mechanism on both the GEM and its DNA is needed to minimize unintended environmental risks.
- 2 March 2026
- Published by American Chemical Society (ACS) in Environmental Science & Technology
- Vol. 60 (10) , 7983-7994
Genetic Markers Remain Detectable in Genetically Engineered Microbes Biocontained with a CRISPR Kill Switch
Biocontainment strategies, such as kill switches, have been developed to avoid the unintended proliferation of genetically engineered microbes (GEMs) intended for open-release environmental applications. However, the presence of GEM DNA after successful biocontainment presents new environmental risks and challenges for monitoring. In this study, we investigated whether biocontainment using a CRISPR-Cas9 kill switch, which causes double-strand breaks in target genes essential for GEM growth, could resolve this challenge in a model Escherichia coli GEM. Surprisingly, the escape rates of the GEM as determined by CRISPR-targeted gene abundances were as high as 10-1.6 to 10-1.0 in LB media, despite the escape rates measured by colony forming units (cfu) being only 10-6.2 under the same condition. This discrepancy suggested that the CRISPR-Cas9 kill switch prevents colony growth while still leaving a large fraction of target genes intact for detection by molecular methods. Within 1 h after biocontainment, these target genes remained predominantly inside an intact cell membrane and were resistant to degradation by DNase, though degradation was observed in river water over multiple days. Overall, a detailed understanding of the impact of the biocontainment mechanism on both the GEM and its DNA is needed to minimize unintended environmental risks.
- 29 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Trends in Biotechnology
- Vol. 44 (5) , 1425-1451
Elucidation of odd-chain dicarboxylate metabolism in Acinetobacter baylyi and application to polyethylene upcycling
- 29 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Trends in Biotechnology
- Vol. 44 (5) , 1425-1451
Elucidation of odd-chain dicarboxylate metabolism in Acinetobacter baylyi and application to polyethylene upcycling
- Open Access
- 18 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Metabolic Engineering Communications
- Vol. 22, e00271
Elucidating biodegradation of dimethyl terephthalate by two Rhodococcus strains for its valorization applications
- 18 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Metabolic Engineering Communications
- Vol. 22, e00271
Open AccessElucidating biodegradation of dimethyl terephthalate by two Rhodococcus strains for its valorization applications
- Open Access
- 11 December 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Communications
- Vol. 17 (1)
Engineering microbial consortia for mixed plastic upcycling
Recent studies in developing processes using ‘single’ plastic waste for microbial conversion have demonstrated great promise in advancing a circular economy. However, chemical complexity and compositional variability of post-consumer ‘mixed’ plastic waste pose huge challenges to using it as a feedstock for biomanufacturing. Here, we present a process leveraging a synthetic microbial consortium, comprising Rhodococcus jostii strain PET and Acinetobacter baylyi ADP1, enabled by engineering the division of labor. The robust consortium synergistically and stably consumes diverse mixtures of oxygenated compounds, derived from the depolymerization of post-consumer, mixed plastic waste, regardless of the fluctuating plastic waste compositions. We evaluate the upcycling potential of the stable consortium by applying rational metabolic engineering to both specialists, enabling the funneling of these oxygenates into lycopene and lipids. This work highlights the potential of stable microbial consortia to valorize untapped, mixed plastic waste for sustainable biomanufacturing, offering a promising solution to global plastic pollution.
- 11 December 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Communications
- Vol. 17 (1)
Open AccessEngineering microbial consortia for mixed plastic upcycling
Recent studies in developing processes using ‘single’ plastic waste for microbial conversion have demonstrated great promise in advancing a circular economy. However, chemical complexity and compositional variability of post-consumer ‘mixed’ plastic waste pose huge challenges to using it as a feedstock for biomanufacturing. Here, we present a process leveraging a synthetic microbial consortium, comprising Rhodococcus jostii strain PET and Acinetobacter baylyi ADP1, enabled by engineering the division of labor. The robust consortium synergistically and stably consumes diverse mixtures of oxygenated compounds, derived from the depolymerization of post-consumer, mixed plastic waste, regardless of the fluctuating plastic waste compositions. We evaluate the upcycling potential of the stable consortium by applying rational metabolic engineering to both specialists, enabling the funneling of these oxygenates into lycopene and lipids. This work highlights the potential of stable microbial consortia to valorize untapped, mixed plastic waste for sustainable biomanufacturing, offering a promising solution to global plastic pollution.
- Open Access
- 12 August 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Journal of Astrobiology
- Vol. 24, e18
How can planetary back-contamination protection guidelines inform biosafety for synthetic biology?
Due to the nascency of synthetically derived biological systems, there is a need to develop protocols for safety and security management. These protocols can be adapted from existing safety and security protocols (e.g., Biosafety Level Classification of biological agents) as well as NASA’s and ESA’s planetary protection guidelines. Currently, NASA is preparing for its first sample return mission from Mars including determining how to manage the types of hazards that may be returned to Earth. Synthetic biology can look to risk management practices from related disciplines, and NASA can look to its established protocols from lunar exploration as it strives to minimize Mars sample return bio-risk. Notably, the biosafety concerns of synthetic cell research are very similar to those of planetary back-contamination from extraterrestrial samples. Thus, the measures taken to limit planetary back-contamination can serve to help develop biosafety protocols for synthetic cell research. We summarize existing tools used in planetary protection that can be repurposed to establish protocols for synthetic cell safety and security.
- 12 August 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Journal of Astrobiology
- Vol. 24, e18
Open AccessHow can planetary back-contamination protection guidelines inform biosafety for synthetic biology?
Due to the nascency of synthetically derived biological systems, there is a need to develop protocols for safety and security management. These protocols can be adapted from existing safety and security protocols (e.g., Biosafety Level Classification of biological agents) as well as NASA’s and ESA’s planetary protection guidelines. Currently, NASA is preparing for its first sample return mission from Mars including determining how to manage the types of hazards that may be returned to Earth. Synthetic biology can look to risk management practices from related disciplines, and NASA can look to its established protocols from lunar exploration as it strives to minimize Mars sample return bio-risk. Notably, the biosafety concerns of synthetic cell research are very similar to those of planetary back-contamination from extraterrestrial samples. Thus, the measures taken to limit planetary back-contamination can serve to help develop biosafety protocols for synthetic cell research. We summarize existing tools used in planetary protection that can be repurposed to establish protocols for synthetic cell safety and security.
- Open Access
- 17 July 2025
- Published by Elsevier in New Biotechnology
- Vol. 89, 105-118
Conditional guide RNA deactivation by mRNA and small molecule triggers in Saccharomyces cerevisiae
- 17 July 2025
- Published by Elsevier in New Biotechnology
- Vol. 89, 105-118
Open AccessConditional guide RNA deactivation by mRNA and small molecule triggers in Saccharomyces cerevisiae
- 11 April 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Advanced Drug Delivery Reviews
- Vol. 221, 115578
Be a GEM: Biocontained, environmentally applied, genetically engineered microbes
- 11 April 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Advanced Drug Delivery Reviews
- Vol. 221, 115578
Be a GEM: Biocontained, environmentally applied, genetically engineered microbes