FBFrancesca Barigozzi

Francesca Barigozzi

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Francesca Barigozzi has a total of 38 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

    • 21 July 2025
    • Published by HAL in HAL
    Open Access

    Workers’ Motivation and Quality of Services in Mission-Driven Sectors

    by Francesca Barigozzi, Chiara Canta, Helmuth Cremer

    This paper studies how firms’ ownership choices and workers’ intrinsic motivation jointly shape service quality and market outcomes in labor-intensive, mission-driven sectors. Two organizations first choose whether to operate as standard for-profit or as mission-oriented firms, and then compete in both the labor and the user markets. Mission-oriented firms have higher unit costs but attract better-motivated workers. Service quality is endogenously determined through the sorting of intrinsically motivated workers and depends on the firm’s ownership type. We show that all market structures—standard, mission-oriented, or mixed— can arise in equilibrium, and that mixed structures can be Pareto superior by efficiently allocating the most motivated workers to the mission-oriented firm while preserving the cost advantage of the other firm. While equilibrium outcomes generally diverge from the social optimum due to externalities and lack of coordination, they are both driven by the trade-off between cost-efficiency and motivation. The model helps explain the coexistence of heterogeneous ownership structures observed in some sectors—such as the nursing homes sector—andidentifies conditions under which such diversity is welfare-enhancing.

  • Open Access

    Beyond Time: Unveiling the Invisible Burden of Mental Load

    by Francesca Barigozzi, Pietro Biroli, Chiara Monfardini, Natalia Montinari, Elena Pisanelli, Sveva Vitellozzi

    This paper introduces a novel, scalable methodology to measure individual perceptions of gaps in mental load—the cognitive and emotional burden associated with organizing household and childcare tasks—within heterosexual couples. Using original data from the TIMES Observatory in Italy, the study combines time-use diaries with new survey indicators to quantify cognitive labor, emotional fatigue, and the spillover of mental load into the workplace. Results reveal systematic gender asymmetries: women are significantly more likely than men to bear organizational responsibility for domestic tasks, report lower satisfaction with this division, and experience higher emotional fatigue. These burdens are underestimated by their partners. The effects are particularly pronounced among college-educated and employed women, who also report greater spillovers of family responsibilities than men during paid work hours. The perceived responsibility for managing family activities is more strongly associated with within-couple gaps in time use than with the absolute time spent on their execution, underscoring the relational and conflictual nature of mental load.


  • The motherhood wage and income traps

    by Francesca Barigozzi, Helmuth Cremer, Emmanuel Thibault


  • Open Access

    The Motherhood Wage and Income Traps

    by Francesca Barigozzi, Helmuth Cremer, Emmanuel Thibault

    We present a simple dynamic model based on on-the-job human capital accumulation affecting the dynamic of wage rates and labor earnings. We show how these dynamics are determined by the interplay between the supply and demand sides of the labor market. The model can generate and explain the different dynamics of women’s earnings after childbirth documented in the empirical literature on child penalties. We show that the temporary negative shock in labor supply due to childbearing may create a wage trap and a permanent divergence of labor earnings between genders. Even when the wage trap is avoided, and working mothers are on a path toward a high-wage equilibrium, slow convergence can permanently lose earnings. We use this model to study the impact of different policies on the gender wage gap and child penalties. We show that mandatory maternal leave exacerbates the shock which pleads against long leaves. Similarly, cash transfers to mothers via the income effect on labor supply aggravate gender wage differences. By contrast, temporary subsidies to mothers’ wages (possibly in the form of Income Tax Credits) are not only useful to exit the wage trap, but also to speed up recovery and reduce the child penalty when the shock in labor supply is small enough to avoid the wage trap. Other family policies, like formal child-care subsidies and in-kind provision of formal childcare, are potentially useful because they reduce the mothers’ cost of labor supply, but they affect mothers’ choices only indirectly.

  • Open Access

    The Motherhood Wage and Income Traps

    by Francesca Barigozzi, Helmuth Cremer, Emmanuel Thibault

    We present a simple dynamic model based on on-the-job human capital accumulation affecting the dynamic of wage rates and labor earnings. We show how these dynamics are determined by the interplay between the supply and demand sides of the labor market. The model can generate and explain the different dynamics of women's earnings after childbirth documented in the empirical literature on child penalties. We show that the temporary negative shock in labor supply due to childbearing may create a wage trap and a permanent divergence of labor earnings between genders. Even when the wage trap is avoided, and working mothers are on a path toward a high-wage equilibrium, slow convergence can permanently lose earnings. We use this model to study the impact of different policies on the gender wage gap and child penalties. We show that mandatory maternal leave exacerbates the shock which pleads against long leaves. Similarly, cash transfers to mothers via the income effect on labor supply aggravate gender wage differences. By contrast, temporary subsidies to mothers' wages (possibly in the form of Income Tax Credits) are not only useful to exit the wage trap, but also to speed up recovery and reduce the child penalty when the shock in labor supply is small enough to avoid the wage trap. Other family policies, like formal child-care subsidies and in-kind provision of formal childcare, are potentially useful because they reduce the mothers' cost of labor supply, but they affect mothers' choices only indirectly.

  • Open Access

    From Personal Values to Social Norms

    by Francesca Barigozzi, Natalia Montinari

    In Experimental Economics, coordination games are used to elicit social norms as incentivized beliefs about others’ beliefs. Conversely, representative surveys like the World Values Survey elicit social norms as personal attitudes and values that are independent of others’ beliefs. Using a representative survey of the Italian population (N = 1, 501), we compare the two ways of measuring social norms with gender roles as a working example and find the following results. At the aggregated level, appropriateness ratings obtained under the two elicitation methods follow the same pattern but differ significantly in magnitude, with the incentivized social norm elicitation depicting a more conservative view on gender roles than the unincentivized one. The analysis carried out at the individual level allows us to explain the previous result. Most respondents report personal values as more progressive than the perceived norm, which may be consistent with a desirability and/or a self-image bias. This occurs irrespectively of whether respondents correctly perceive the social norm or not. We conclude that analyses based on personal values lead to a proxy of gender norms significantly more progressive than the norms elicited in coordination games.

  • Open Access

    Gender Wage and Longevity Gaps and the Design of Retirement Systems

    by Francesca Barigozzi, Helmuth Cremer, Jean-Marie Lozachmeur

    We study the design of pension benefits for male and female workers. Women live longer than men but have a lower wage. Individuals can be single or live in couples who pool their incomes. Social welfare is utilitarian but an increasing concave transformation of individuals' lifetime utilities introduces the concern for redistribution between individuals with different life-spans.We derive the optimal direction of redistribution and show how it is affected by a gender neutrality rule. With singles only, a simple utilitarian solution implies redistribution from males to females. When the transformation is sufficiently concave redistribution may or may not be reversed. With couples only, the ranking of gender retirement ages is always reversed when the transformation is sufficiently concave.Under gender neutrality pension schemes must be self-selecting. Gender neutrality implies distortions of retirement decisions, limits redistribution and, negatively affects the group towards which redistribution is targeted. With couples, a first best that implies a lower retirement age for females can be implemented by a gender-neutral system. Otherwise, gender neutrality implies equal retirement ages and restricts the possibility to compensate the shorter-lived individuals. Calibrated simulations show that when singles and couples coexist, gender neutrality substantially limits redistribution in favor of single women and fully prevents redistribution in favor of male spouses.

  • Open Access

    Gender Wage and Longevity Gaps and the Design of Retirement Systems

    by Francesca Barigozzi, Helmuth Cremer, Jean-Marie Lozachmeur

    We study the design of pension benefits for male and female workers. Women live longer than men but have a lower wage. Individuals can be single or live in couples who pool their incomes. Social welfare is utilitarian but an increasing concave transformation of individuals’ lifetime utilities introduces the concern for redistribution between individuals with different life-spans. We derive the optimal direction of redistribution and show how it is affected by a gender neutrality rule. With singles only, a simple utilitarian solution implies redistribution from males to females. When the transformation is sufficiently concave redistribution may or may not be reversed. With couples only, the ranking of gender retirement ages is always reversed when the transformation is sufficiently concave. Under gender neutrality pension schemes must be self-selecting. With singles only this implies distortions of retirement decision and restricts redistribution across genders. With couples, a first best that implies a lower retirement age for females can be implemented by a gender-neutral system. Otherwise, gender neutrality implies equal retirement ages and restricts the possibility to compensate the shorter-lived individuals. Calibrated simulations show that when singles and couples coexist, gender neutrality substantially limits redistribution in favor of single women and fully prevents redistribution in favor of male spouses.