Darren K. Hayunga
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Darren K. Hayunga has a total of 24 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- R. Kelley Pace
LREC Endowed Chair of Real Estate, Department of Finance, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, USA
6 shared publications - John C. Adams
University of Texas at Arlington, USA
5 shared publications - Henry J. Munneke
Insurance, Legal Studies, and Real Estate University of Georgia Athens Georgia USA
3 shared publications Peter P. Lung
University of Texas at Arlington
3 shared publications- Ehab Abdel-Tawab Yamani
Chicago State University
2 shared publications Lu Fang
Tibor and Sheila Hollo School of Real Estate Florida International University Miami Florida Florida USA
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 26 July 2026
- Published by Wiley in Real Estate Economics
Real estate agents’ collaboration and housing outcomes
This article examines how collaboration between listing and selling agents influences housing market outcomes and how these effects differ across the institutional environments of conventional and foreclosure (real estate owned [REO]) transactions. We develop a conceptual framework linking seller objectives, institutional constraints, and agent incentives to heterogeneous collaboration effects across market segments and test its predictions using more than 150,000 single‐family sales from the Dallas–Fort Worth metro area. We estimate jointly determined price and time‐on‐market (TOM) equations with detailed agent controls and distinguish between repeated interactions within specific agent pairs (depth) and broader patterns of collaborative activity (breadth). In conventional sales, neither dyad depth nor collaboration breadth materially affects prices or TOM once agent characteristics are accounted for. In the REO segment, repeated interactions beyond the first two joint sales are associated with price discounts of roughly 2%–3%, whereas collaboration has little effect on TOM. Further analysis reveals that the REO discount originates in the negotiation stage, as listing agents become progressively more willing to accept prices below the original list price as collaborative relationships deepen.
- 26 July 2026
- Published by Wiley in Real Estate Economics
Open AccessReal estate agents’ collaboration and housing outcomes
This article examines how collaboration between listing and selling agents influences housing market outcomes and how these effects differ across the institutional environments of conventional and foreclosure (real estate owned [REO]) transactions. We develop a conceptual framework linking seller objectives, institutional constraints, and agent incentives to heterogeneous collaboration effects across market segments and test its predictions using more than 150,000 single‐family sales from the Dallas–Fort Worth metro area. We estimate jointly determined price and time‐on‐market (TOM) equations with detailed agent controls and distinguish between repeated interactions within specific agent pairs (depth) and broader patterns of collaborative activity (breadth). In conventional sales, neither dyad depth nor collaboration breadth materially affects prices or TOM once agent characteristics are accounted for. In the REO segment, repeated interactions beyond the first two joint sales are associated with price discounts of roughly 2%–3%, whereas collaboration has little effect on TOM. Further analysis reveals that the REO discount originates in the negotiation stage, as listing agents become progressively more willing to accept prices below the original list price as collaborative relationships deepen.
- Open Access
- 10 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Real Estate Agents' Collaboration and Housing Outcomes
This paper examines how collaboration between listing and selling agents influences housing market outcomes and how these effects differ across the institutional environments of conventional and foreclosure (REO) transactions. Using more than 150,000 singlefamily sales from the Dallas-Fort Worth metro area, we develop a conceptual framework describing how REO market structure can generate heterogeneous collaboration effects. We estimate jointly determined price and time-on-market (TOM) equations with detailed agent controls and distinguish between repeated interactions within specific agent pairs (depth) and broader patterns of collaborative activity (breadth). In conventional sales, neither dyad depth nor collaboration breadth materially affects prices or TOM once agent characteristics are accounted for. In the REO segment, repeated interactions beyond the first two joint sales are associated with price discounts of roughly two percent, while collaboration has little effect on TOM. Overall, the evidence indicates no meaningful collaboration effects in conventional transactions and modest, price-specific effects in the institutionally constrained REO market.
- 10 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessReal Estate Agents' Collaboration and Housing Outcomes
This paper examines how collaboration between listing and selling agents influences housing market outcomes and how these effects differ across the institutional environments of conventional and foreclosure (REO) transactions. Using more than 150,000 singlefamily sales from the Dallas-Fort Worth metro area, we develop a conceptual framework describing how REO market structure can generate heterogeneous collaboration effects. We estimate jointly determined price and time-on-market (TOM) equations with detailed agent controls and distinguish between repeated interactions within specific agent pairs (depth) and broader patterns of collaborative activity (breadth). In conventional sales, neither dyad depth nor collaboration breadth materially affects prices or TOM once agent characteristics are accounted for. In the REO segment, repeated interactions beyond the first two joint sales are associated with price discounts of roughly two percent, while collaboration has little effect on TOM. Overall, the evidence indicates no meaningful collaboration effects in conventional transactions and modest, price-specific effects in the institutionally constrained REO market.
- Open Access
- 6 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Pocket Sales in the Housing Market: Selection, Outcomes, and Policy
We investigate pocket sales—residential transactions negotiated privately and recorded in the MLS with zero days on market. Contrary to search-theoretic models where limited exposure necessitates a discount, we document a robust 1.7 percent price premium. We reject agency conflict explanations, finding instead that the premium arises from avoiding the open-market negotiation discount. By immunizing sellers against adverse signaling, pocket sales achieve a sale-to-list price surplus of 1.6 percent, effectively capturing the listing price. We further find these returns are convex, quadrupling for luxury assets where privacy demands are maximized. Finally, we exploit the 2020 Clear Cooperation Policy (CCP) as a natural experiment. We document a compliance paradox: while the policy failed to reduce the volume of pocket sales, it successfully eroded their economic value. By removing the exclusivity essential to the mechanism, the CCP commoditized the channel without eliminating the practice.
- 6 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessPocket Sales in the Housing Market: Selection, Outcomes, and Policy
We investigate pocket sales—residential transactions negotiated privately and recorded in the MLS with zero days on market. Contrary to search-theoretic models where limited exposure necessitates a discount, we document a robust 1.7 percent price premium. We reject agency conflict explanations, finding instead that the premium arises from avoiding the open-market negotiation discount. By immunizing sellers against adverse signaling, pocket sales achieve a sale-to-list price surplus of 1.6 percent, effectively capturing the listing price. We further find these returns are convex, quadrupling for luxury assets where privacy demands are maximized. Finally, we exploit the 2020 Clear Cooperation Policy (CCP) as a natural experiment. We document a compliance paradox: while the policy failed to reduce the volume of pocket sales, it successfully eroded their economic value. By removing the exclusivity essential to the mechanism, the CCP commoditized the channel without eliminating the practice.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Pocket Sales in the Housing Market: Selection, Outcomes, and Policy
We investigate pocket sales-residential transactions negotiated privately and recorded in the Multiple Listing Service with zero days on market. Contrary to search-theoretic models where limited exposure necessitates a discount, we document a robust 1.7 percent price premium. The evidence is inconsistent with agency conflict explanations; the premium arises from avoiding the open-market negotiation tax. By immunizing sellers against the signal trap of public price adjustments, pocket sales achieve a sale/original list surplus of 1.6 percent. The premium is convex in asset complexity, quadrupling for luxury properties, and market-condition-dependent: it compresses toward zero in hot markets where competitive bidding has already eliminated the open-market negotiation discount, and expands to approximately 3.5 percent in cold markets where that discount is deepest. We exploit the May 2020 implementation of the Clear Cooperation Policy (CCP) as a regulatory shock to the private search window. By compressing the private matching window to a single business day, the CCP reduced the pocket premium by more than 70 percent to a level that is economically negligible and statistically indistinguishable from zero, while pocket sale volume showed no statistically significant decline. The policy eroded the pricing power of private placement without eliminating the practice.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessPocket Sales in the Housing Market: Selection, Outcomes, and Policy
We investigate pocket sales-residential transactions negotiated privately and recorded in the Multiple Listing Service with zero days on market. Contrary to search-theoretic models where limited exposure necessitates a discount, we document a robust 1.7 percent price premium. The evidence is inconsistent with agency conflict explanations; the premium arises from avoiding the open-market negotiation tax. By immunizing sellers against the signal trap of public price adjustments, pocket sales achieve a sale/original list surplus of 1.6 percent. The premium is convex in asset complexity, quadrupling for luxury properties, and market-condition-dependent: it compresses toward zero in hot markets where competitive bidding has already eliminated the open-market negotiation discount, and expands to approximately 3.5 percent in cold markets where that discount is deepest. We exploit the May 2020 implementation of the Clear Cooperation Policy (CCP) as a regulatory shock to the private search window. By compressing the private matching window to a single business day, the CCP reduced the pocket premium by more than 70 percent to a level that is economically negligible and statistically indistinguishable from zero, while pocket sale volume showed no statistically significant decline. The policy eroded the pricing power of private placement without eliminating the practice.
- Open Access
- 29 July 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Housing Economics
- Vol. 69
Relisting, agent switching, and sale outcomes in the housing market
- 29 July 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Housing Economics
- Vol. 69
Open AccessRelisting, agent switching, and sale outcomes in the housing market
- 20 December 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics
- Vol. 71 (1) , 1-9
Modeling Spatial, Temporal, and Multivariate Autoregressive Dependence in Real Estate Prices
- 20 December 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics
- Vol. 71 (1) , 1-9
Modeling Spatial, Temporal, and Multivariate Autoregressive Dependence in Real Estate Prices
- 11 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics
- p. 1-25
Differential Measurement Error in House Price Indices
- 11 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics
- p. 1-25
Differential Measurement Error in House Price Indices
- 26 April 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics
- Vol. 73 (1) , 1-34
Volume Traders of Non-Homogenous Assets
- 26 April 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics
- Vol. 73 (1) , 1-34
Volume Traders of Non-Homogenous Assets
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Bargaining Outcomes of Housing Investors Across Diverse Neighborhoods
Recent housing research underscores investors' adept bargaining skills in US single-family housing markets. While previous studies focus on metropolitan areas, there remains a gap in understanding whether this advantage varies within diverse municipalities. This study addresses this gap by examining investor bargaining effects across almost 2,500 census tracts in Los Angeles County. Leveraging this finer spatial granularity, we incorporate factors such as income, race, and education. To address potential endogeneity challenges associated with these socioeconomic and sociodemographic characteristics, we employ an identification strategy based on the exogenous factor of district-wide tenant evictions. Our findings confirm investors' innate bargaining prowess and shed light on the nuanced negotiation dynamics in neighborhoods with unique racial compositions. Furthermore, we uncover the significant influence of socioeconomic and sociodemographic characteristics on the property class traded by investors, presenting an alternative empirical approach for researchers in this domain.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessBargaining Outcomes of Housing Investors Across Diverse Neighborhoods
Recent housing research underscores investors' adept bargaining skills in US single-family housing markets. While previous studies focus on metropolitan areas, there remains a gap in understanding whether this advantage varies within diverse municipalities. This study addresses this gap by examining investor bargaining effects across almost 2,500 census tracts in Los Angeles County. Leveraging this finer spatial granularity, we incorporate factors such as income, race, and education. To address potential endogeneity challenges associated with these socioeconomic and sociodemographic characteristics, we employ an identification strategy based on the exogenous factor of district-wide tenant evictions. Our findings confirm investors' innate bargaining prowess and shed light on the nuanced negotiation dynamics in neighborhoods with unique racial compositions. Furthermore, we uncover the significant influence of socioeconomic and sociodemographic characteristics on the property class traded by investors, presenting an alternative empirical approach for researchers in this domain.
- Open Access
- 4 December 2023
- Published by Wiley in Real Estate Economics
- Vol. 52 (1) , 45-72
The impact of real estate agents’ expertise on house prices and TOM
This study investigates whether the expertise levels of real estate agents impact the fundamental market outcomes of transaction prices and marketing durations. A primary contribution of this article is joint examination of three knowledge categories for both listing and selling agents. Instead of the length of agents’ license periods or recent transaction volumes, the results demonstrate that the important expertise category is agents’ local market knowledge. We consistently find that the economically important determinant of transaction prices is the separation distances between the subject homes being traded and agents’ micromarkets where they have conducted recent transactions. The results further demonstrate that agents who have tighter market concentrations increase prices and vice versa for unfocused micromarkets. We find that agents’ expertise levels do not materially alter marketing durations.
- 4 December 2023
- Published by Wiley in Real Estate Economics
- Vol. 52 (1) , 45-72
Open AccessThe impact of real estate agents’ expertise on house prices and TOM
This study investigates whether the expertise levels of real estate agents impact the fundamental market outcomes of transaction prices and marketing durations. A primary contribution of this article is joint examination of three knowledge categories for both listing and selling agents. Instead of the length of agents’ license periods or recent transaction volumes, the results demonstrate that the important expertise category is agents’ local market knowledge. We consistently find that the economically important determinant of transaction prices is the separation distances between the subject homes being traded and agents’ micromarkets where they have conducted recent transactions. The results further demonstrate that agents who have tighter market concentrations increase prices and vice versa for unfocused micromarkets. We find that agents’ expertise levels do not materially alter marketing durations.