Arhan Sabri Ertan
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Arhan Sabri Ertan has a total of 501 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Hamid Akin Unver
Department of International Relations, Kadir Has University, Istanbul, Turkey
5 shared publications - Mehmet Burak Akren4 shared publications
- Adrian Dominik Wojcik
Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Toruń, Poland 1
3 shared publications - Aleksandra Cichocka
School of Psychology University of Kent Kent UK
3 shared publications - Anat Perry
Psychology Department, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
3 shared publications - Antoine Marie
Institut Jean Nicod ENS‐PSL‐CNRS‐EHESS Paris France
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Ancestral Composition Distance
This paper introduces Ancestral Composition Distance (ACD); a bilateral measure of how similarly two countries assemble their populations from a common set of ancestral clusters. Each cluster contains countries whose native populations were culturally close around 1500. Across a global sample of country dyads (involving 163 countries), greater ancestral composition distance is systematically associated with greater contemporary cultural distance and human capital gap. More ancestrally distant countries also exhibit larger differences in income, human development, institutional characteristics, and foreign-policy positions, while trading less and exchanging fewer migrants. These relationships survive an extensive set of geographic, historical, institutional, genetic, linguistic, and religious controls, indicating that ACD captures a dimension of bilateral relatedness not summarized by standard measures. Decomposing ACD into differences already present in 1500 and differences that emerged due to post-Columbian population movements, we show that pairs whose ancestral compositions converged after 1500 are culturally closer today, conditional on their initial ancestral separation. All these results are robust to alternative ways to group countries into pre-1500 cultural clusters. We view ACD both as a useful measure for understanding contemporary cultural differences as well as a historically determined bilateral resistance term that complements conventional measures of geography, shared history, and population relatedness.
- 14 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessAncestral Composition Distance
This paper introduces Ancestral Composition Distance (ACD); a bilateral measure of how similarly two countries assemble their populations from a common set of ancestral clusters. Each cluster contains countries whose native populations were culturally close around 1500. Across a global sample of country dyads (involving 163 countries), greater ancestral composition distance is systematically associated with greater contemporary cultural distance and human capital gap. More ancestrally distant countries also exhibit larger differences in income, human development, institutional characteristics, and foreign-policy positions, while trading less and exchanging fewer migrants. These relationships survive an extensive set of geographic, historical, institutional, genetic, linguistic, and religious controls, indicating that ACD captures a dimension of bilateral relatedness not summarized by standard measures. Decomposing ACD into differences already present in 1500 and differences that emerged due to post-Columbian population movements, we show that pairs whose ancestral compositions converged after 1500 are culturally closer today, conditional on their initial ancestral separation. All these results are robust to alternative ways to group countries into pre-1500 cultural clusters. We view ACD both as a useful measure for understanding contemporary cultural differences as well as a historically determined bilateral resistance term that complements conventional measures of geography, shared history, and population relatedness.
- Open Access
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Land, Power and Population Density in the Global Population Shifts of 1500 -1960
The regional distribution of world population underwent profound changes during the age of exploration and colonization, in which a handful of European powers colonized the better part of the remaining continents. One consequence is that countries in the Americas, Australia and New Zealand, after sharp contractions of indigenous populations following exposure to Old World diseases, today have populations in which European or African descendants form majorities and speak predominantly European languages. Migration and in some cases colonization also altered population compositions in countries including South Africa, Cape Verde, Fiji and Singapore. And descendants of émigrés came to outnumber those of "stayers" in some non-colonizing countries, including Ireland and Lebanon. We identify major determinants of who settled where, during this era of colonialism and migration, demonstrating that both "natural" factors like availability and fertility of agricultural land and climate and disease prevalence, on the one hand, and power inequalities and cultural variables, on the other, explain the broad patterns of migration.
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessLand, Power and Population Density in the Global Population Shifts of 1500 -1960
The regional distribution of world population underwent profound changes during the age of exploration and colonization, in which a handful of European powers colonized the better part of the remaining continents. One consequence is that countries in the Americas, Australia and New Zealand, after sharp contractions of indigenous populations following exposure to Old World diseases, today have populations in which European or African descendants form majorities and speak predominantly European languages. Migration and in some cases colonization also altered population compositions in countries including South Africa, Cape Verde, Fiji and Singapore. And descendants of émigrés came to outnumber those of "stayers" in some non-colonizing countries, including Ireland and Lebanon. We identify major determinants of who settled where, during this era of colonialism and migration, demonstrating that both "natural" factors like availability and fertility of agricultural land and climate and disease prevalence, on the one hand, and power inequalities and cultural variables, on the other, explain the broad patterns of migration.
- Open Access
- 11 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Climate Stress and International Migration from MENA
Existing research on the drivers of international migration is constrained by incomplete measurement of volumes, directions and country coverage. Most studies focus on recent decades, a narrow set of OECD destinations or a single flow type, even though categories are blurred, new destinations have emerged and many developing countries now host large migrant populations. Recent work suggests that migration drivers are best understood within a broader migration system rather than in isolation. However, even in this newer literature, long-run historical ties, such as deep ancestry links or very old migrant stocks, are still rarely analyzed jointly with contemporary drivers and environmental pressures in a unified empirical framework. In this paper, we focus on MENA countries and use bilateral flow estimates from Abel (2018) in a gravity framework to analyse how environmental stress interacts with the broader social, political, and historical structures that organise migration. We distinguish fast-onset shocks, measured by the number of people affected by floods and storms, from slow-onset anomalies, captured by 12-month SPEI indicators for unusually dry and unusually wet conditions. These origin-year shocks have been analyzed in a rich context of civil conflict, development, urbanization, and agrarian exposure, and we further augmented the study with historical migrant stocks around 1960 and a new ancestry stock measure we developed, reflects historical ties built up in the Colonial Era. This study is one of the first to incorporate deep ancestry-based ties into an empirical analysis of migration from MENA. Our results show that fast-onset disasters affect emigration from MENA in a non-linear way: small and moderate events are largely absorbed locally, while very severe shocks lead to sharp increases in cross-border outflows. Deviations from normal moisture in either direction, whether drought or excess rainfall, are also associated with higher emigration. In addition, migrant stocks and ancestry links are strong and robust predictors of where migrants move, even after we control for other conditions.
- 11 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessClimate Stress and International Migration from MENA
Existing research on the drivers of international migration is constrained by incomplete measurement of volumes, directions and country coverage. Most studies focus on recent decades, a narrow set of OECD destinations or a single flow type, even though categories are blurred, new destinations have emerged and many developing countries now host large migrant populations. Recent work suggests that migration drivers are best understood within a broader migration system rather than in isolation. However, even in this newer literature, long-run historical ties, such as deep ancestry links or very old migrant stocks, are still rarely analyzed jointly with contemporary drivers and environmental pressures in a unified empirical framework. In this paper, we focus on MENA countries and use bilateral flow estimates from Abel (2018) in a gravity framework to analyse how environmental stress interacts with the broader social, political, and historical structures that organise migration. We distinguish fast-onset shocks, measured by the number of people affected by floods and storms, from slow-onset anomalies, captured by 12-month SPEI indicators for unusually dry and unusually wet conditions. These origin-year shocks have been analyzed in a rich context of civil conflict, development, urbanization, and agrarian exposure, and we further augmented the study with historical migrant stocks around 1960 and a new ancestry stock measure we developed, reflects historical ties built up in the Colonial Era. This study is one of the first to incorporate deep ancestry-based ties into an empirical analysis of migration from MENA. Our results show that fast-onset disasters affect emigration from MENA in a non-linear way: small and moderate events are largely absorbed locally, while very severe shocks lead to sharp increases in cross-border outflows. Deviations from normal moisture in either direction, whether drought or excess rainfall, are also associated with higher emigration. In addition, migrant stocks and ancestry links are strong and robust predictors of where migrants move, even after we control for other conditions.
- Open Access
- 7 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Gravity of OECD-Bound Migration, 1960-2020: Uncovering Contemporary and Deep-Rooted Determinants
This study examines the determinants of migration from non-OECD origins to OECD destinations from 1960 to 2020 using a structural gravity framework. We first argue for a more comprehensive approach to migration dynamics than typically found in the literature. Utilizing Shapley dominance decomposition across a wide range of contemporary and historical drivers, we find that migration networks, historical ties, development, natural disasters, and conflict make comparable contributions and must be considered jointly. Second, we document shifting effects among origin-specific drivers. Natural disaster exposure is negatively associated with migration in 1960-1990-reflecting immobility under binding constraints-but becomes positively associated in 1990-2020. Conflict intensity remains a consistent positive driver. Economic development follows the "migration-hump" pattern in the earlier period, though this relationship weakens and shifts over time. Third, we demonstrate the significant role of dyadic determinants, introducing a novel ancestry-based connectedness measure derived from the World Migration Matrix. This indicator captures the persistent effects of deep-rooted demographic and cultural ties and exhibits robust explanatory power even after controlling for geographic distance, cultural proximity, and traditional historical linkages.
- 7 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Gravity of OECD-Bound Migration, 1960-2020: Uncovering Contemporary and Deep-Rooted Determinants
This study examines the determinants of migration from non-OECD origins to OECD destinations from 1960 to 2020 using a structural gravity framework. We first argue for a more comprehensive approach to migration dynamics than typically found in the literature. Utilizing Shapley dominance decomposition across a wide range of contemporary and historical drivers, we find that migration networks, historical ties, development, natural disasters, and conflict make comparable contributions and must be considered jointly. Second, we document shifting effects among origin-specific drivers. Natural disaster exposure is negatively associated with migration in 1960-1990-reflecting immobility under binding constraints-but becomes positively associated in 1990-2020. Conflict intensity remains a consistent positive driver. Economic development follows the "migration-hump" pattern in the earlier period, though this relationship weakens and shifts over time. Third, we demonstrate the significant role of dyadic determinants, introducing a novel ancestry-based connectedness measure derived from the World Migration Matrix. This indicator captures the persistent effects of deep-rooted demographic and cultural ties and exhibits robust explanatory power even after controlling for geographic distance, cultural proximity, and traditional historical linkages.
- Open Access
- 23 December 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Democratization, state capacity and developmental correlates of international artificial intelligence trade
Does acquiring artificial intelligence (A.I.) technologies from the U.S. or China render countries more authoritarian or technologically less advantageous? In this article, we explore to what extent importing A.I./high-tech from the U.S. and/or China goes parallel with importers’ a) democratization or autocratization, b) state capacity, and c) technological progress across a decade (2010–2020). Our work demonstrates that not only are Chinese A.I./high-tech exports not congruous with importers’ democratic backsliding, but autocratization attributed to Chinese A.I. is also visible in importers of U.S. [AH1] A.I. In addition, for most indicators, we do not observe any significant effect of acquiring A.I. from the U.S. or China on importers’ state capacity or technological progress across the same period. Instead, we find that the story has a global inequality dimension as Chinese exports are clustered around countries with a lower GDP per capita, whereas U.S. high-technology exports are clustered around relatively wealthier states with slightly weaker capacity over territorial control. Overall, the article empirically demonstrates the limitations of some of the prevalent policy discourses surrounding the global diffusion of A.I. and its contribution to democratization, state capacity, and technological development of importer nations.
- 23 December 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessDemocratization, state capacity and developmental correlates of international artificial intelligence trade
Does acquiring artificial intelligence (A.I.) technologies from the U.S. or China render countries more authoritarian or technologically less advantageous? In this article, we explore to what extent importing A.I./high-tech from the U.S. and/or China goes parallel with importers’ a) democratization or autocratization, b) state capacity, and c) technological progress across a decade (2010–2020). Our work demonstrates that not only are Chinese A.I./high-tech exports not congruous with importers’ democratic backsliding, but autocratization attributed to Chinese A.I. is also visible in importers of U.S. [AH1] A.I. In addition, for most indicators, we do not observe any significant effect of acquiring A.I. from the U.S. or China on importers’ state capacity or technological progress across the same period. Instead, we find that the story has a global inequality dimension as Chinese exports are clustered around countries with a lower GDP per capita, whereas U.S. high-technology exports are clustered around relatively wealthier states with slightly weaker capacity over territorial control. Overall, the article empirically demonstrates the limitations of some of the prevalent policy discourses surrounding the global diffusion of A.I. and its contribution to democratization, state capacity, and technological development of importer nations.
- 17 December 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Democratization
- Vol. 31 (5) , 1018-1048
Democratization, state capacity and developmental correlates of international artificial intelligence trade
- 17 December 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Democratization
- Vol. 31 (5) , 1018-1048
Democratization, state capacity and developmental correlates of international artificial intelligence trade
- 16 October 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 192-207
The Strategic Logic of Digital Disinformation
Why do countries engage in disinformation campaigns even though they know that they will likely be debunked later on? We explore a core puzzle in information warfare in which countries that pursue disinformation to confuse and demobilise their adversaries usually suffer from reputational penalties after they are debunked, yet they nonetheless continue to pursue such tactics. In order to explain this dilemma, we employ a formal model and walk through anarchy, pre-emption and cost miscalculation explanations of disinformation and demonstrate that countries may rationally engage in disinformation campaigns if they have a different calculus about reputational costs, if they believe their adversaries will not be able to debunk their claims successfully, and if those adversaries will not be able to disseminate their debunked claims well enough to incur reputational costs on the initiator. Ultimately, we suggest that deterrence in information warfare is attainable if the “defender” can signal its debunking and “naming-shaming” capacity prior to the disinformation campaign and if it can mobilise the support of the international audience against the attacker. We conclude by arguing that a country’s fact-checking ecosystem and its pre-existing perception within the mainstream international digital media environment are the strongest defences against disinformation.
- 16 October 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 192-207
The Strategic Logic of Digital Disinformation
Why do countries engage in disinformation campaigns even though they know that they will likely be debunked later on? We explore a core puzzle in information warfare in which countries that pursue disinformation to confuse and demobilise their adversaries usually suffer from reputational penalties after they are debunked, yet they nonetheless continue to pursue such tactics. In order to explain this dilemma, we employ a formal model and walk through anarchy, pre-emption and cost miscalculation explanations of disinformation and demonstrate that countries may rationally engage in disinformation campaigns if they have a different calculus about reputational costs, if they believe their adversaries will not be able to debunk their claims successfully, and if those adversaries will not be able to disseminate their debunked claims well enough to incur reputational costs on the initiator. Ultimately, we suggest that deterrence in information warfare is attainable if the “defender” can signal its debunking and “naming-shaming” capacity prior to the disinformation campaign and if it can mobilise the support of the international audience against the attacker. We conclude by arguing that a country’s fact-checking ecosystem and its pre-existing perception within the mainstream international digital media environment are the strongest defences against disinformation.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 11 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Data
- Vol. 10 (1) , 1-26
Social and moral psychology of COVID-19 across 69 countries
The COVID-19 pandemic has affected all domains of human life, including the economic and social fabric of societies. One of the central strategies for managing public health throughout the pandemic has been through persuasive messaging and collective behaviour change. To help scholars better understand the social and moral psychology behind public health behaviour, we present a dataset comprising of 51,404 individuals from 69 countries. This dataset was collected for the International Collaboration on Social & Moral Psychology of COVID-19 project (ICSMP COVID-19). This social science survey invited participants around the world to complete a series of moral and psychological measures and public health attitudes about COVID-19 during an early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic (between April and June 2020). The survey included seven broad categories of questions: COVID-19 beliefs and compliance behaviours; identity and social attitudes; ideology; health and well-being; moral beliefs and motivation; personality traits; and demographic variables. We report both raw and cleaned data, along with all survey materials, data visualisations, and psychometric evaluations of key variables.
- 11 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Data
- Vol. 10 (1) , 1-26
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessSocial and moral psychology of COVID-19 across 69 countries
The COVID-19 pandemic has affected all domains of human life, including the economic and social fabric of societies. One of the central strategies for managing public health throughout the pandemic has been through persuasive messaging and collective behaviour change. To help scholars better understand the social and moral psychology behind public health behaviour, we present a dataset comprising of 51,404 individuals from 69 countries. This dataset was collected for the International Collaboration on Social & Moral Psychology of COVID-19 project (ICSMP COVID-19). This social science survey invited participants around the world to complete a series of moral and psychological measures and public health attitudes about COVID-19 during an early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic (between April and June 2020). The survey included seven broad categories of questions: COVID-19 beliefs and compliance behaviours; identity and social attitudes; ideology; health and well-being; moral beliefs and motivation; personality traits; and demographic variables. We report both raw and cleaned data, along with all survey materials, data visualisations, and psychometric evaluations of key variables.
- Open Access
- 16 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Political Behavior
- Vol. 46 (2) , 1013-1035
When to Not Respond in Kind? Individuals’ Expectations of the Future and Their Support for Reciprocity in Foreign Policy
This paper investigates if individuals’ negative assessments of the future drive micro-level reluctance for international cooperation and reciprocal behavior, a core principle of multilateralism. To test our theoretical expectations, we field online survey experiments on a sample of over 3000 respondents in the US and Turkey in October–November 2020. The experimental results show that on average, individuals are fairly sensitive to target countries’ policy actions and are inclined to reciprocate when contemplating whether to increase contributions to UN or consent to bilateral trade liberalization. Yet, further analyses concur that individual inclinations to reciprocate are substantially moderated by their future expectations. Specifically, individuals who are more pessimistic about their material prospects remain fairly indifferent to the positive actions of other countries, but are more likely to penalize negative foreign policy actions by reciprocating in kind.
- 16 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Political Behavior
- Vol. 46 (2) , 1013-1035
Open AccessWhen to Not Respond in Kind? Individuals’ Expectations of the Future and Their Support for Reciprocity in Foreign Policy
This paper investigates if individuals’ negative assessments of the future drive micro-level reluctance for international cooperation and reciprocal behavior, a core principle of multilateralism. To test our theoretical expectations, we field online survey experiments on a sample of over 3000 respondents in the US and Turkey in October–November 2020. The experimental results show that on average, individuals are fairly sensitive to target countries’ policy actions and are inclined to reciprocate when contemplating whether to increase contributions to UN or consent to bilateral trade liberalization. Yet, further analyses concur that individual inclinations to reciprocate are substantially moderated by their future expectations. Specifically, individuals who are more pessimistic about their material prospects remain fairly indifferent to the positive actions of other countries, but are more likely to penalize negative foreign policy actions by reciprocating in kind.
- Open Access
- 5 July 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in PNAS Nexus
- Vol. 1 (3) , pgac093
Predicting attitudinal and behavioral responses to COVID-19 pandemic using machine learning
At the beginning of 2020, COVID-19 became a global problem. Despite all the efforts to emphasize the relevance of preventive measures, not everyone adhered to them. Thus, learning more about the characteristics determining attitudinal and behavioral responses to the pandemic is crucial to improving future interventions. In this study, we applied machine learning on the multinational data collected by the International Collaboration on the Social and Moral Psychology of COVID-19 (N = 51,404) to test the predictive efficacy of constructs from social, moral, cognitive, and personality psychology, as well as socio-demographic factors, in the attitudinal and behavioral responses to the pandemic. The results point to several valuable insights. Internalized moral identity provided the most consistent predictive contribution—individuals perceiving moral traits as central to their self-concept reported higher adherence to preventive measures. Similar results were found for morality as cooperation, symbolized moral identity, self-control, open-mindedness, and collective narcissism, while the inverse relationship was evident for the endorsement of conspiracy theories. However, we also found a non-neglible variability in the explained variance and predictive contributions with respect to macro-level factors such as the pandemic stage or cultural region. Overall, the results underscore the importance of morality-related and contextual factors in understanding adherence to public health recommendations during the pandemic.
- 5 July 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in PNAS Nexus
- Vol. 1 (3) , pgac093
Open AccessPredicting attitudinal and behavioral responses to COVID-19 pandemic using machine learning
At the beginning of 2020, COVID-19 became a global problem. Despite all the efforts to emphasize the relevance of preventive measures, not everyone adhered to them. Thus, learning more about the characteristics determining attitudinal and behavioral responses to the pandemic is crucial to improving future interventions. In this study, we applied machine learning on the multinational data collected by the International Collaboration on the Social and Moral Psychology of COVID-19 (N = 51,404) to test the predictive efficacy of constructs from social, moral, cognitive, and personality psychology, as well as socio-demographic factors, in the attitudinal and behavioral responses to the pandemic. The results point to several valuable insights. Internalized moral identity provided the most consistent predictive contribution—individuals perceiving moral traits as central to their self-concept reported higher adherence to preventive measures. Similar results were found for morality as cooperation, symbolized moral identity, self-control, open-mindedness, and collective narcissism, while the inverse relationship was evident for the endorsement of conspiracy theories. However, we also found a non-neglible variability in the explained variance and predictive contributions with respect to macro-level factors such as the pandemic stage or cultural region. Overall, the results underscore the importance of morality-related and contextual factors in understanding adherence to public health recommendations during the pandemic.