Amie L. Thomasson
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Amie L. Thomasson has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Arindam Chakrabarti
1 shared publication- Luiz Helvécio Marques Segundo
Federal University of São João del-Rei
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 24 September 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- p. 1-32
In defense of rethinking metaphysics
- 24 September 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- p. 1-32
Open AccessIn defense of rethinking metaphysics
- Open Access
- 3 May 2026
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Vol. 113 (1) , 74-87
Metaethics and the Functions of Moral Language
Metaethics has long included debates about the function of moral discourse. Some have argued that moral statements express our attitudes, others that they serve as prescriptions for how to act, still others that they describe moral facts or properties. This article argues that we can best address these questions about function by attending to work in empirical linguistics. Tracing the development of moral language through different grammatical forms, and noting the additional functions added at each stage of development, enables us to give a more empirically grounded and fine‐grained answer to questions about the functions of moral discourse. This analysis shows how multiple functions come to be layered up through different grammatical forms. Interestingly, it also preserves the different grains of truth picked up on by historically “rival” views—including prescriptivist, expressivist, and even descriptivist views. In so doing, it helps develop a comprehensive neo‐pragmatist approach to understanding moral discourse.
- 3 May 2026
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Vol. 113 (1) , 74-87
Open AccessMetaethics and the Functions of Moral Language
Metaethics has long included debates about the function of moral discourse. Some have argued that moral statements express our attitudes, others that they serve as prescriptions for how to act, still others that they describe moral facts or properties. This article argues that we can best address these questions about function by attending to work in empirical linguistics. Tracing the development of moral language through different grammatical forms, and noting the additional functions added at each stage of development, enables us to give a more empirically grounded and fine‐grained answer to questions about the functions of moral discourse. This analysis shows how multiple functions come to be layered up through different grammatical forms. Interestingly, it also preserves the different grains of truth picked up on by historically “rival” views—including prescriptivist, expressivist, and even descriptivist views. In so doing, it helps develop a comprehensive neo‐pragmatist approach to understanding moral discourse.
- Open Access
- 9 July 2025
- Published by Universidade Federal de Pernambuco in Perspectiva Filosófica
- Vol. 52 (1)
Um método pragmático para o trabalho conceitual normativo
Este artigo apresenta um método pragmático para o trabalho conceitual normativo em metafísica. Argumenta-se que a metafísica envolve tarefas conceituais descritivas e normativas, concentrando-se em como estas últimas devem ser conduzidas. Ao contrastar uma “abordagem metafísica” com uma “abordagem pragmática” alinhada com o deflacionismo metaontológico, a autora aborda preocupações sobre o abandono da metafísica tradicional. O núcleo do método pragmático está na compreensão dos conceitos pela sua função. Essa visão orientada pela função permite explicar intuições sobre a estrutura do mundo, garantindo escolhas conceituais não arbitrárias e fornecendo uma base para a crítica, tudo isso sem depender de fatos metafísicos.
- 9 July 2025
- Published by Universidade Federal de Pernambuco in Perspectiva Filosófica
- Vol. 52 (1)
Open AccessUm método pragmático para o trabalho conceitual normativo
Este artigo apresenta um método pragmático para o trabalho conceitual normativo em metafísica. Argumenta-se que a metafísica envolve tarefas conceituais descritivas e normativas, concentrando-se em como estas últimas devem ser conduzidas. Ao contrastar uma “abordagem metafísica” com uma “abordagem pragmática” alinhada com o deflacionismo metaontológico, a autora aborda preocupações sobre o abandono da metafísica tradicional. O núcleo do método pragmático está na compreensão dos conceitos pela sua função. Essa visão orientada pela função permite explicar intuições sobre a estrutura do mundo, garantindo escolhas conceituais não arbitrárias e fornecendo uma base para a crítica, tudo isso sem depender de fatos metafísicos.
- Open Access
- 18 October 2024
- Published by Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) in Principia: an international journal of epistemology
- Vol. 28 (3) , 357-381
Should Ontology be Explanatory?
The central question of ontology has long been thought to be ‘What is there?’. The central way of answering it has been to consider which entities we must posit as part of a best total explanatory theory. This paper argues against this ‘explanatory’ conception of metaphysics, by showing that it relies on an unarticulated assumption that all the terms at issue in these metaphysical debates serve an explanatory function. Making use of work in systemic functional linguistics enables us to identify the many different functions played by terms of interest in metaphysics. And that makes it clear that ‘contribution of explanatory power’ should be rejected as an across-the-board criterion in ontology. This work in functional linguistics also enables us to see why it is useful to have a language that entitles us to useredundant inferences to introduce terms for properties, numbers, and the like, giving us new reason to accept ‘easy’ inferences that there are such things. As a result, we should give up thinking that ‘what is there?’ provides a deep and interesting question for a discipline called ‘ontology’ to answer, and give up thinking that the task for ontology is to determine which entities to ‘posit’ as part of a best total explanatory theory.
- 18 October 2024
- Published by Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) in Principia: an international journal of epistemology
- Vol. 28 (3) , 357-381
Open AccessShould Ontology be Explanatory?
The central question of ontology has long been thought to be ‘What is there?’. The central way of answering it has been to consider which entities we must posit as part of a best total explanatory theory. This paper argues against this ‘explanatory’ conception of metaphysics, by showing that it relies on an unarticulated assumption that all the terms at issue in these metaphysical debates serve an explanatory function. Making use of work in systemic functional linguistics enables us to identify the many different functions played by terms of interest in metaphysics. And that makes it clear that ‘contribution of explanatory power’ should be rejected as an across-the-board criterion in ontology. This work in functional linguistics also enables us to see why it is useful to have a language that entitles us to useredundant inferences to introduce terms for properties, numbers, and the like, giving us new reason to accept ‘easy’ inferences that there are such things. As a result, we should give up thinking that ‘what is there?’ provides a deep and interesting question for a discipline called ‘ontology’ to answer, and give up thinking that the task for ontology is to determine which entities to ‘posit’ as part of a best total explanatory theory.
- Open Access
- 25 October 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 67 (8) , 2321-2338
Precis of Amie L. Thomasson, norms and necessity
- 25 October 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 67 (8) , 2321-2338
Open AccessPrecis of Amie L. Thomasson, norms and necessity
- 24 October 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 67 (8) , 2417-2456
Norms and necessity: replies to critics
- 24 October 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 67 (8) , 2417-2456
Norms and necessity: replies to critics
- 13 May 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 67 (3) , 840-871
How should we think about linguistic function?
Talk of the functions of language or concepts plays a central role in developing an appealing pragmatic approach to conceptual engineering. But some have expressed skepticism that we can make any good sense of the idea of function as applied to concepts or language, or argued that the most we can say is that the function of ‘F’ is to refer to the Fs. In this paper, however, I argue that identifying linguistic functions is not hopeless, and that we can make progress by working at the level of system functions, and drawing on work in systemic functional linguistics. For that enables us to develop a better framework for thinking about the functions that language serves, and the ways its subsystems contribute to those functions. This approach to understanding linguistic functions enables us to develop a pragmatic approach to conceptual engineering that provides standards for conceptual engineering without metaphysical mysteries. It also enables us to make progress in figuring out what functions certain philosophically interesting parts of language serve, and how they are introduced into language, in ways that may disentangle us from a range of old philosophical problems.
- 13 May 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 67 (3) , 840-871
How should we think about linguistic function?
Talk of the functions of language or concepts plays a central role in developing an appealing pragmatic approach to conceptual engineering. But some have expressed skepticism that we can make any good sense of the idea of function as applied to concepts or language, or argued that the most we can say is that the function of ‘F’ is to refer to the Fs. In this paper, however, I argue that identifying linguistic functions is not hopeless, and that we can make progress by working at the level of system functions, and drawing on work in systemic functional linguistics. For that enables us to develop a better framework for thinking about the functions that language serves, and the ways its subsystems contribute to those functions. This approach to understanding linguistic functions enables us to develop a pragmatic approach to conceptual engineering that provides standards for conceptual engineering without metaphysical mysteries. It also enables us to make progress in figuring out what functions certain philosophically interesting parts of language serve, and how they are introduced into language, in ways that may disentangle us from a range of old philosophical problems.
- Top Cited Papers
- 16 November 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 68 (9) , 2993-3018
Conceptual engineering: when do we need it? How can we do it?
This paper addresses several foundational questions in conceptual engineering: When is conceptual engineering needed? When we engage in conceptual engineering, should we think of ourselves primarily as aiming to change concepts or language – and how should we think of either of those? Finally, how is implementing the changes recommended by conceptual engineering possible? I begin by outlining a number of different sorts of circumstances in which conceptual engineering is desirable, bringing out the commonalities across many classic projects in the history of philosophy and contemporary, socially-conscious, work in conceptual engineering. I then argue that some prominent ways of understanding concepts and meanings are unhelpful for conceptual engineering. We can do better if we think first and foremost of engineering words, considering words as a certain kind of abstract cultural artifact, which (like other artifacts) have functions and norms of use. Then we can begin to understand better how words do change naturally, and use that as a way to investigate how they (like other cultural artifacts and social norms) can also be changed artificially.
- 16 November 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 68 (9) , 2993-3018
Top Cited PapersConceptual engineering: when do we need it? How can we do it?
This paper addresses several foundational questions in conceptual engineering: When is conceptual engineering needed? When we engage in conceptual engineering, should we think of ourselves primarily as aiming to change concepts or language – and how should we think of either of those? Finally, how is implementing the changes recommended by conceptual engineering possible? I begin by outlining a number of different sorts of circumstances in which conceptual engineering is desirable, bringing out the commonalities across many classic projects in the history of philosophy and contemporary, socially-conscious, work in conceptual engineering. I then argue that some prominent ways of understanding concepts and meanings are unhelpful for conceptual engineering. We can do better if we think first and foremost of engineering words, considering words as a certain kind of abstract cultural artifact, which (like other artifacts) have functions and norms of use. Then we can begin to understand better how words do change naturally, and use that as a way to investigate how they (like other cultural artifacts and social norms) can also be changed artificially.
- 9 June 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 198 (S8) , 2077-2106
How can we come to know metaphysical modal truths?
- 9 June 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 198 (S8) , 2077-2106
How can we come to know metaphysical modal truths?
- 11 November 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Mind
- Vol. 126 (503) , 769-779
Why we Should Still take it Easy
In an earlier paper in this journal (2013) I argued that deflationism is preferable to fictionalism as an alternative to both traditional realism and eliminativism. Gabriele Contessa (2016) questions this conclusion, denying that fictionalist arguments beg the question against easy ontological arguments, presenting a new argument against easy ontology, and suggesting a response to the challenge I raise for fictionalists. Below I respond to these points in turn. In so doing, I hope to clarify the broader theoretic orientation of easy ontology—in particular, its rejection of a Quinean criterion of ontological commitment and its commitment to a form of functional pluralism about language.
- 11 November 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Mind
- Vol. 126 (503) , 769-779
Why we Should Still take it Easy
In an earlier paper in this journal (2013) I argued that deflationism is preferable to fictionalism as an alternative to both traditional realism and eliminativism. Gabriele Contessa (2016) questions this conclusion, denying that fictionalist arguments beg the question against easy ontological arguments, presenting a new argument against easy ontology, and suggesting a response to the challenge I raise for fictionalists. Below I respond to these points in turn. In so doing, I hope to clarify the broader theoretic orientation of easy ontology—in particular, its rejection of a Quinean criterion of ontological commitment and its commitment to a form of functional pluralism about language.