CCC. Daryl Cameron

C. Daryl Cameron

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


C. Daryl Cameron has a total of 47 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:

  • Michael Inzlicht

    University of Toronto, Ontario, Canada

    3 shared publications
  • B. Keith Payne

    Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, United States

    2 shared publications
  • Julian A. Scheffer

    Department of Psychology, The Pennsylvania State University, United States

    2 shared publications
  • Paige Amormino

    Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, USA

    2 shared publications
  • Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

    Department of Philosophy, Duke University, United States; Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, United States; Kenan Institute for Ethics, Duke University, United States; Duke Institute for Brain Sciences, Duke University, United States

    2 shared publications
  • Alan R. Wagner

    Aerospace Engineering and Rock Ethics Institute, Penn State University

    1 shared publication

Latest Publications

  • Who cares? Religiosity’s role in compassionate responses to human suffering.

    by Patty Van Cappellen, Pawel Łowicki, Cheryl S. Tan, C. Daryl Cameron, Amanda Bernal, Kunalan Manokara

  • Open Access

    What We Talk About When We Talk About Empathy: Toward a Common Lexicon of Empathy-Related Constructs

    by Mark H. Davis, Sara Konrath, Fritz Breithaupt, C. Daryl Cameron, Jean Decety, Frans B. M. de Waal, Nancy Eisenberg, Judith A. Hall, Sara D. Hodges, Suzanne Keen, et al.

    Almost since the term “empathy” was coined, there has been scholarly disagreement about its meaning. Today it can best be viewed as an umbrella term encompassing a host of more specific constructs, almost all of which are regularly referred to as “empathy” in some form or fashion. Promiscuous use of this global label to denote very different constructs has impaired communication among and between scholars, practitioners, and the general public. A team of 15 empathy scholars assessed this issue and created a lexicon for these specific lower-order constructs. In this article we report the result of this effort. The lower-order constructs making up this lexicon are vicarious affect , emotional contagion , emotion co-sharing , sympathy / compassion , personal distress , perspective taking , accurate inference , mimicry , synchrony , projection , and transportation . We recommend that this more specific language be used more frequently and that the umbrella term “empathy” be used more sparingly.


  • Open Access

    The Empathic Cost of the Future: Temporal Distance, Effortful Empathy, and Moral Obligation Toward Future Generations

    by Paige Amormino, Kyle Fiore Law, Stylianos Sryopoulos, Daryl Cameron

    Securing the welfare of future generations depends on a psychological capacity that is poorly understood: the willingness to extend genuine concern to people who are distant in time. Bridging the study of empathy with the study of futures, we ask whether empathy for future others, and felt moral obligation toward them, declines across temporal distance, and whether a brief intergenerational harm reduction intervention can counteract this decline. In a preregistered experiment (N = 601), participants completed an empathy-selection task across nine temporal distances (0-400 years in the future) after random assignment to an intergenerational harm reduction intervention or control. As targets receded into the future, participants anticipated greater effort to empathize (b=0.16 per 50 years, p < .001), chose to empathize less often (OR = 0.92, p < .001), and felt less moral obligation (b = -3.04, p < .001); anticipated effort predicted both reduced empathy selection and reduced obligation (OR = 0.83 and b -1.91, ps < .001, in both conditions). The intervention did not, however, lower the anticipated effort of empathy or increase empathy selection (ps>.05); instead it raised obligation towards future generations uniformly across all distances (b=12.33, p<.001)—an effect concentrated among those lower in fear of compassion (three-way interaction b=-0.55, p=.007). The effortfulness of empathy is thus an under-examined barrier to intergenerational concern. Because obligation and empathy can be moved independently, duty-based appeals may broaden responsibility for the future without easing the effort of empathy, with direct consequences for the design of foresight and institutions.

  • Open Access

    Motivating Empathy and Moral Pluralism in Health Policy

    by C. Daryl Cameron, Paige Amormino, Joel E. Segel

    Health policy is motivated by a variety of factors including moral concerns, values and convictions. Policymakers are motivated to consider how constituents and those directly impacted by policies will react to the policies they enact. Thus, it is advantageous for policymakers to understand the psychological processes that shape constituents' reactions toward health policies. We outline how and when policymakers and constituents are motivated to empathize, moralize, and compromise on divisive health policies, such as opioid-related policies, by considering the motivational frameworks of empathy and the plurality of moral values that inform attitudes. We offer insight for policymakers balancing tradeoffs between different moral values and concerns, suggesting that policymakers should consider cultivating an active dialogue around the relevant moral emotions felt by both supporters and opponents. For example, when considering syringe services programs, supporters and opponents may both be motivated by the moral concern of harm—as supporters may see services as preventing infections and keeping people healthy, while opponents may see services as promoting drug use and in turn, harmful health outcomes. We suggest that such a morally pluralistic effort will (1) highlight moral alignment amongst supporters to cultivate collective resolve and (2) acknowledge the competing moral concerns of opponents so that they feel understood and in turn, feel more willing to understand competing perspectives. While leaning into moral emotions may feel like a turn toward divisiveness, we suggest that acknowledging the plurality of moral values at stake sets the foundation for support and compromise.

  • Open Access

    Empathy for and From Embodied Robots: An Interdisciplinary Review

    by C. Daryl Cameron, Alan R. Wagner, Martina Orlandi, Eliana Hadjiandreou, India G. Oates, Stephen Anderson

    Several years ago, the world was stunned when the cute robot HitchBOT was destroyed. Does empathy for robots—sharing experiences and feeling compassion—make sense for humans? How do people empathize with robots, and what are the ethical and practical implications of doing so? How do people react when robots seem to be empathizing with them? In this review, we detail empirical work on empathy for robots, discuss the ethics of extending empathy toward robots, and consider how to engineer robots that elicit empathy. We then review empirical work on empathy received from robots to explore psychological, philosophical, and engineering implications. In our final section, we suggest how interactions with robots might cultivate human empathy. Can interactions with a robot build human empathy and help it to become more resilient and reliable?


  • Empathy regulation, prosociality, and moral judgment

    by C. Daryl Cameron, Paul Conway, Julian A. Scheffer


  • Empathic choices for animals versus humans: the role of choice context and perceived cost

    by C. Daryl Cameron, Michael L. Lengieza, Eliana Hadjiandreou, Janet K. Swim, Robert M. Chiles

    People appear to empathize with cases of animal suffering yet to disregard such suffering when it conflicts with human needs. In three studies, we used an empathy regulation measure – the empathy selection task – to test whether people choose or avoid sharing in experiences of animals versus humans. In Study 1, when choosing between sharing experiences of animals or humans, participants preferred humans and rated sharing animal (versus human) experiences as more cognitively costly. In Studies 2a-2b, the choice to share experiences or be objective was done without a forced choice between animals and humans. When empathy opportunities for humans and animals were not contrasted against each other, participants avoided experience sharing for humans but not for animals. Manipulations of prosocial cost in these studies did not consistently moderate choice differences. Freeing people from contexts that pit empathy for animals against empathy for humans may diminish motivated disregard of animals’ experiences.


  • Empathy choice in physicians and non‐physicians

    by C. Daryl Cameron, Michael Inzlicht

    Empathy in medical care has been one of the focal points in the debate over the bright and dark sides of empathy. Whereas physician empathy is sometimes considered necessary for better physician–patient interactions, and is often desired by patients, it also has been described as a potential risk for exhaustion among physicians who must cope with their professional demands of confronting acute and chronic suffering. The present study compared physicians against demographically matched non‐physicians on a novel behavioural assessment of empathy, in which they choose between empathizing or remaining detached from suffering targets over a series of trials. Results revealed no statistical differences between physicians and non‐physicians in their empathy avoidance, though physicians were descriptively more likely to choose empathy. Additionally, both groups were likely to perceive empathy as cognitively challenging, and perceived cognitive costs of empathy associated with empathy avoidance. Across groups, there were also no statistically significant differences in self‐reported trait empathy measures and empathy‐related motivations and beliefs. Overall, these results suggest that physicians and non‐physicians were more similar than different in terms of their empathic choices and in their assessments of the costs and benefits of empathy for others.


  • Motivating empathy: Three methodological recommendations for mapping empathy

    by C. Daryl Cameron

    Empathy has received much attention in psychology, philosophy, and neuroscience. In this article, I first discuss a motivated emotion regulation approach to empathy, outlining some recent advances in motivated empathy. I then discuss how this approach can advance three questions about empathy: (1) How should we assess the boundaries between empathy and other states? (2) How should we assess empathic ability and empathic propensity? and (3) How should we assess automatic and controlled propensities to empathize? In each case, I suggest that the motivated emotion regulation approach can suggest methodological innovations to reframe these questions and outline recommendations for advancing the science of empathy.