Bruno Galantucci

Experimental semiotics (ES) investigates how novel semiotic systems emerge by observing people ground communication in lab games, thus exposing the fundamental principles of human semiosis and the pressures through which they originate. We review the past of ES and describe its key findings. We then discuss challenges and future directions for ES, including how a tighter integration with neuroscience can enrich our understanding of the social processes exposed by ES, and how ES can in turn help neuroscience investigate human semiosis in more realistic settings. Briefly, we argue that ES provides neurosemiotics with new tools to integrate the social and biological components of communication.

Experimental Semiotics (ES) investigates how novel semiotic systems emerge by observing people ground communication in lab games, thus exposing the fundamental principles of human semiosis and the pressures through which they originate. We review the past of ES and describe its key findings. We then discuss challenges and future directions for ES, including how a tighter integration with neuroscience can enrich our understanding of the social processes exposed by ES, and how ES can in turn help neuroscience investigate human semiosis in more realistic settings. ES provides neurosemiotics with new tool to integrate the social and biological components of communication.

Common‐sense intuition suggests that, when people are engaged in informational exchanges, they communicate so as to be reasonably sure that they perform the exchanges faithfully. Over the years, we have found evidence suggesting that this intuition, which is woven into several influential theories of human communication, may be misleading. We first summarize this evidence and discuss its potential limitations. Then, we present a new study that addresses the potential limitations. A confederate instructed participants to “pick up the skask” from a tray containing six objects and move it to a specific location. Since skask is a non‐word invented by us, participants had to ask for clarification to perform the instruction faithfully. In contradiction with the intuition that people pursue faithfulness when engaged in informational exchanges, 29 of the 48 participants we tested performed the instruction without asking for clarification. We identified a possible cause for this behavior, which occurred more frequently when avoiding the clarification was unlikely to result in an overt consequence (an error in the execution of the instruction that could be noticed by the confederate or the experimenter). Other factors such as individual differences and the specific interpersonal dynamics of the experimental settings, if they played a role at all, did it to an extent that is unlikely to be comparable to that of the role played by overt consequences. Considered together, our various assessments of the extent to which people engage in faithful informational exchanges converge on a simple conclusion: Communicating faithfully is a substantially demanding task, and people often fail at it. We discuss the implications of this conclusion and speculate on its relevance for understanding the evolutionary past of human communication.

Common-sense intuition suggests that, when people are engaged in informational exchanges, they communicate so as to be reasonably sure that they perform the exchanges faithfully. Over the years, we have found evidence suggesting that this intuition, which is woven into several influential theories of human communication, may be misleading. We first summarize this evidence and discuss its potential limitations. Then we present a new study that addresses the potential limitations.A confederate instructed participants to “pick up the skask” from a tray containing six objects and move it to a specific location. Since skask is a non-word invented by us, participants had to ask for clarification to perform the instruction faithfully. In contradiction with the intuition that people pursue faithfulness when engaged in informational exchanges, 29 of the 48 participants we tested performed the instruction without asking for clarification. We identified a possible cause for this behavior, which occurred more frequently when avoiding the clarification was unlikely to entail overt consequences. Other factors such as individual differences and the specifics of the experimental settings, if they played a role at all, they did it to an extent that is unlikely to be comparable to that of the role played by overt consequences. Considered together, our various assessments of the extent to which people engage in faithful informational exchanges converge on a simple conclusion: Communicating faithfully is a substantially demanding task, and people often fail at it. We discuss the implications of this conclusion and speculate on its relevance for understanding the evolutionary past of human communication.

Experimental semiotics is a new discipline developed over the last decade to study human communication. Studies within this discipline typically involve people creating novel signs by associating signals with meanings. Here we suggest ways this discipline can be used to shed light on how people create and communicate meaning. First we present observations drawn from studies in which participants not only construct novel signals, but also have considerable freedom over what these signals refer to. These studies offer intriguing insight on non-saussurian signs (where a single unit of meaning is associated with different signals), communicative egocentricity, private and public meaning, and the distinction between meaningful and meaningless units in linguistic structure, that is between morphemes and phonemes (or analogous entities). We then present a novel quantitative approach to determining the extent to which a signal unit is meaningful, and illustrate its use with data from a study in which participants construct signals to refer to predetermined meanings. Aside from these specific contributions, we show more generally how challenging investigating meaning in Experimental Semiotics is, but we argue that this reflects the difficulties we must face when studying meaning, outside the lab as well as in it.

In the dominant theoretical framework, human communication is modeled as the faithful transmission of information. This implies that when people are involved in communicational exchanges, they should be sensitive to the success with which information is transmitted, easily detecting when conversations lack coherence. The expectation that humans are good at detecting conversational incoherence is in line with common intuition, but there are several reasons to suspect that it might be unrealistic. First, similar intuitions have been shown to be unrealistic for a number of psychological processes. Second, faithful information transmission may conflict with other conversational goals. Third, mechanisms supporting information transmission may themselves lead to cases of incoherence being missed. To ascertain the extent to which people are insensitive to patches of serious conversational incoherence, we generated such patches in the laboratory by repeatedly crossing two unrelated conversations. Across two studies, involving both narrowly and broadly focused conversations, between 27% and 42% of the conversants did not notice that their conversations had been crossed. The results of these studies suggest that it may indeed be unrealistic to model spontaneous conversation as faithful information transmission. Rather, our results are more consistent with models of communication that view it as involving noisy and error-prone inferential processes, serving multiple independent goals.

The concept of duality of patterning (henceforth DP) has recently begun to undergo new scrutiny. In particular, the fact that Al-Sayyid Bedouin Sign Language (ABSL) does not appear to exhibit a layer of meaningless units (Sandler et al. 2011) casts doubt on the universality of DP as a defining feature of natural language. Why, then, do the vast majority of the world's languages exhibit DP? Two hypotheses have been suggested. The first is that DP is a necessary solution to the problem of conveying a large number of meanings; the second is that DP arises as a consequence of conventionalization. We tested these hypotheses in an experimental-semiotics study. Our results supported the hypothesis based on conventionalization but were inconclusive with regard to the hypothesis based on the number of meanings. At the same time, the task of measuring DP in an experimental-semiotics study presented interesting challenges, suggesting that the concept of DP may need some overhauling.