Robert T. Foley
Research Subjects
Robert T. Foley has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Helen McCartney
Senior Lecturer in the Defence Studies Department, King's College London based at the Joint Services Command and Staff College
1 shared publication - Stuart Griffin
Senior Lecturer in the Defence Studies Department, King's College London
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 14 March 2014
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Affairs
- Vol. 90 (2) , 279-298
Dumb donkeys or cunning foxes? Learning in the British and German armies during the Great War
- 14 March 2014
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Affairs
- Vol. 90 (2) , 279-298
Dumb donkeys or cunning foxes? Learning in the British and German armies during the Great War
- 15 May 2012
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Strategic Studies
- Vol. 35 (6) , 799-827
A Case Study in Horizontal Military Innovation: The German Army, 1916–1918
Using the German Army from 1916 to 1918 as a case study, this article demonstrates a different form of military innovation than has hitherto been analysed by literature on the subject. During World War I, the German Army innovated by spreading knowledge between units rather than up and downthe chain of command. Thus, this army used ‘horizontal innovation’, rather than vertical innovation to change how it fought in the midst of battle. Although combat in World War I is significantly different from operations today, horizontal innovation offers armed forces a means by which to transform themselves much more rapidly than the traditionally recognised forms of military innovation.
- 15 May 2012
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Strategic Studies
- Vol. 35 (6) , 799-827
A Case Study in Horizontal Military Innovation: The German Army, 1916–1918
Using the German Army from 1916 to 1918 as a case study, this article demonstrates a different form of military innovation than has hitherto been analysed by literature on the subject. During World War I, the German Army innovated by spreading knowledge between units rather than up and downthe chain of command. Thus, this army used ‘horizontal innovation’, rather than vertical innovation to change how it fought in the midst of battle. Although combat in World War I is significantly different from operations today, horizontal innovation offers armed forces a means by which to transform themselves much more rapidly than the traditionally recognised forms of military innovation.
- 17 March 2011
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Affairs
- Vol. 87 (2) , 253-270
‘Transformation in contact’: learning the lessons of modern war
- 17 March 2011
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Affairs
- Vol. 87 (2) , 253-270
‘Transformation in contact’: learning the lessons of modern war
- 1 December 2006
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Historian
- Vol. 68 (4) , 722-746
What's in a Name?: The Development of Strategies of Attrition on the Western Front, 1914–1918
- 1 December 2006
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Historian
- Vol. 68 (4) , 722-746
What's in a Name?: The Development of Strategies of Attrition on the Western Front, 1914–1918
- 1 January 2006
- Published by SAGE Publications in War in History
- Vol. 13 (1) , 91-115
The Real Schlieffen Plan
In recent years Terence Zuber has maintained that the document commonly known as the ‘Schlieffen Plan’ was, in fact, no real war plan. This article takes issue with Zuber’s far-ranging conclusions. It examines his use of sources, places German war planning in its wider political context, and considers evidence overlooked by Zuber. It demonstrates how a fundamental shift occurred in Germany’s strategic situation in 1905 and how this shift led to change in Germany’s war plans. Schlieffen’s 1905 memorandum took account of this strategic change and allowed Schlieffen at last to place at the heart of his war plan ideas he had been developing since the 1890s. Although modifications were made to meet changes in Germany’s strategic situation, this memorandum served as the basis for all German war plans before 1914. Thus, Schlieffen deserves to be remembered as the father of Germany’s war plan, with all its strengths and weaknesses, in 1914.
- 1 January 2006
- Published by SAGE Publications in War in History
- Vol. 13 (1) , 91-115
The Real Schlieffen Plan
In recent years Terence Zuber has maintained that the document commonly known as the ‘Schlieffen Plan’ was, in fact, no real war plan. This article takes issue with Zuber’s far-ranging conclusions. It examines his use of sources, places German war planning in its wider political context, and considers evidence overlooked by Zuber. It demonstrates how a fundamental shift occurred in Germany’s strategic situation in 1905 and how this shift led to change in Germany’s war plans. Schlieffen’s 1905 memorandum took account of this strategic change and allowed Schlieffen at last to place at the heart of his war plan ideas he had been developing since the 1890s. Although modifications were made to meet changes in Germany’s strategic situation, this memorandum served as the basis for all German war plans before 1914. Thus, Schlieffen deserves to be remembered as the father of Germany’s war plan, with all its strengths and weaknesses, in 1914.
- 1 January 2006
- Published by American Library Association in Choice Reviews Online
- Vol. 43 (05) , 43-3009
German strategy and the path to Verdun: Erich von Falkenhayn and the development of attrition, 1870-1916
- 1 January 2006
- Published by American Library Association in Choice Reviews Online
- Vol. 43 (05) , 43-3009
German strategy and the path to Verdun: Erich von Falkenhayn and the development of attrition, 1870-1916
- 1 December 2005
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Intelligence History
- Vol. 5 (2) , 1-24
Easy Target or Invincible Enemy? German Intelligence Assessments of France Before the Great War
- 1 December 2005
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Intelligence History
- Vol. 5 (2) , 1-24
Easy Target or Invincible Enemy? German Intelligence Assessments of France Before the Great War
- 1 October 2004
- Published by Taylor & Francis in War & Society
- Vol. 22 (2) , 1-25
Preparing the German Army for the First World War: The Operational Ideas of Alfred von Schlieffen and Helmuth von Moltke the Younger
- 1 October 2004
- Published by Taylor & Francis in War & Society
- Vol. 22 (2) , 1-25
Preparing the German Army for the First World War: The Operational Ideas of Alfred von Schlieffen and Helmuth von Moltke the Younger
- 1 July 2003
- Published by SAGE Publications in War in History
- Vol. 10 (3) , 355-356
Book Review: The Kaiser’s Army: The Politics of Military Technology in Germany During the Machine Age, 1870-1918
- 1 July 2003
- Published by SAGE Publications in War in History
- Vol. 10 (3) , 355-356
Book Review: The Kaiser’s Army: The Politics of Military Technology in Germany During the Machine Age, 1870-1918
- 1 April 2003
- Published by SAGE Publications in War in History
- Vol. 10 (2) , 222-232
The Origins of the Schlieffen Plan
- 1 April 2003
- Published by SAGE Publications in War in History
- Vol. 10 (2) , 222-232
The Origins of the Schlieffen Plan