Regina Reichardt

Motivated reasoning denotes the phenomenon that individuals are more likely to arrive at conclusions that they want to arrive at. Properly understanding this phenomenon requires at least three things: first, to pin down the preconditions of motivated reasoning; second, to identify the cognitive processes that lead to biased judgments; and third, to identify whether a measured bias is the result of motivated reasoning or other processes. Although motivated reasoning has received continued attention from the research community over the last decades, there are considerable conceptual ambiguities regarding these three aspects. By focusing on key publications that have had a formative effect on the development of the field as well as recent publications that reflect the state-of-the-art, the present paper provides a concise and selective overview of research on motivated reasoning, discusses existing conceptual ambiguities, and derives recommendations for future research.

Research on gender stereotypes about academia often focused on broad areas (natural sciences vs. humanities), but fields within these areas may differ. We measured gender stereotypes about fields from natural sciences (physics, biology), humanities (German language, philosophy), and social sciences (educational science, psychological science, law) among university students. Gender stereotypes differed significantly between fields within areas. Stereotypes about some fields from the natural and social sciences (biology = female, law = male) were even opposite to others in the same area (physics = male, educational and psychological sciences = female). Perceived gender ratios and communion stereotypes about researchers predicted field gender stereotypes. The results demonstrate strong heterogeneity in gender stereotypes within the natural and social sciences, but not the humanities.

Introduction: The present research investigates whether ingroup-outgroup distinction salience moderates automatic intergroup bias (i.e., more positive evaluations of ingroup targets relative to outgroup targets) toward multiply categorizable social targets.Methods: In two experiments, we manipulated the salience of participants’ social identity based on age vs. race, respectively. Afterwards, we measured automatic evaluations of social targets varying in age and race.Results: Young White participants exhibited higher automatic race bias when their racial identity (i.e., White in contrast to Black) was salient. Conversely, they exhibited higher automatic age bias when their age identity (i.e., young in contrast to old) was salient.Discussion: Going beyond previous research, we show that it is sufficient to direct participants’ attention to their ingroup-identity in contrast to the respective outgroup to cause changes in automatic intergroup bias. This is important because it provides a strong test of the hypothesis that ingroup-outgroup distinction salience moderates automatic intergroup bias.

According to previous research, taking the perspective of an outgroup member reduces intergroup bias. These effects were demonstrated on explicit evaluations, explicit stereotyping, and automatic evaluations of the outgroup. We investigated whether perspective taking reduces automatic stereotyping and whether effects on automatic evaluation replicate with a novel paradigm of perspective taking. Across two studies, we found that perspective taking increased self-reported likeability of and perceived similarity to the target of perspective taking. Moreover, perspective taking influenced automatic stereotype-based judgments (Study 1) and automatic evaluations (Study 2) of the target of perspective taking. However, the effects did not generalize to the ethnic group as a whole. We discuss features of perspective taking paradigms that may be key for effectively reducing automatic intergroup bias.

Despite societal efforts toward enhancing gender equality, females are still underrepresented in STEM (science, technology, engineering, mathematics). Prominent explanations draw on gender differences in attitudes about STEM (with females holding more negative attitudes than males), which result from the gender stereotype that STEM is a male domain. While a lot of research has focused on explicit attitudes, little is known about implicit attitudes toward STEM. The present research sought to examine implicit attitudes among adolescents, and how they relate to other STEM cognitions. We measured implicit attitudes about the STEM concept as a whole, and about math in particular. For this purpose, we developed two Brief Implicit Associations Tests (BIATs) and administered them online in a sample of adolescents (N = 517). We additionally measured a variety of self-reported motivational and social-psychological variables (interest, aspiration, self-concept of ability, and sense of belonging to the math and STEM community, respectively), which previous research has identified as factors contributing to the gender gap in STEM participation. Our findings confirm the reliability and validity of both the STEM BIAT and the Math BIAT. Moreover, implicit STEM attitudes predicted interest in and aspiration for STEM, self-concept of STEM ability, and sense of belonging to the STEM community. Similarly, implicit math attitudes predicted interest in and aspiration for math, and sense of belonging to the math community (but not self-concept of math ability). Our findings confirm that our novel online BIATs are efficient measurement tools of implicit attitudes in adolescents. Moreover, our findings underscore the significance of implicit attitudes in the STEM domain.

Previous research presented a multinomial model to estimate four latent processes (target detection, stereotype activation, stereotype application, guessing) that contribute to responses in the Stereotype Misperception Task, an indirect measure of stereotyping (Krieglmeyer and Sherman, 2012). The present research further investigates the validity of the target detection (D) and stereotype activation (SAC) parameters. To this end, the data from Experiment 2 and Experiment 4 in Krieglmeyer and Sherman (2012) were re-analyzed using a bootstrap method to investigate the robustness of the results. Furthermore, two conceptual replication studies were conducted and analyzed with the same bootstrap method. A manipulation of target distinctness influenced the D parameter as predicted. A manipulation of prime prototypicality influenced the SAC parameter as predicted. Taken together, the results support the validity of the D and SAC model parameters.

Abundant evidence suggests that affective stimuli facilitate responses that lead to a compatible change in distance between the affective stimulus and the self (positive → approach, negative → avoidance). A special situation arises, when a barrier blocks the direct way toward or away from an affective stimulus. Recent evidence suggests that in such cases affective stimuli facilitate responses that ultimately lead to a compatible change in distance, even when this requires an initial step in the opposite and thus incompatible direction. The present study investigated whether this is the case even when relatively complex processing is required to recognize the presence of a barrier and, thus, the need for a detour. Employing a stimulus-response-compatibility task, we asked participants to move a manikin along the pathways of a maze toward or away from a positive or negative stimulus. The direct way was possible on half of the trials and blocked by a barrier on the other half of the trials. In the latter case, the manikin had to first be moved in the direction opposite to the position ultimately intended. We manipulated between participants the type of barrier and, thus, the complexity of cognitive processing required to recognize the need for a detour. In the simple condition, a black bar was presented as a barrier on the way. In the complex condition, a blue or yellow bar was presented, and the color indicated whether the bar constituted a barrier (locked gate) or not (open gate). Replicating and extending previous findings, the present study shows that affective stimuli facilitate ultimately (not immediately) compatible approach–avoidance responses, even when relatively complex processing is required to recognize the need for a detour.