Mirja Hartimo
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Mirja Hartimo has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Frode Kjosavik
School of Economics and Business, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Aas, Norway
1 shared publication- Jenni Rytilä
Tampere University, Tampere, Finland
1 shared publication Leila Haaparanta
1 shared publication- Luis Alberto Canela Morales
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)
1 shared publication - Mitsuhiro Okada
Keio University
1 shared publication Øystein Linnebo
IFIKK, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 17 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1346-1352
Mathematics, as a Theme in Phenomenology
- 17 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 371-378
Carnap, Rudolf (1891–1970)
- 9 June 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 52-65
Logic and the Crisis of Reason
The question of how logic relates to reason and its crisis presupposes an understanding of what is meant by logic, reason, and the crisis of reason, and how these are related. This chapter formulates two views on logic, one traditional view and another, broadly Kantian, critical view of logic. The chapter suggests taking these two views of logic as models of reason. The two models yield fundamentally different conceptions of reason and accordingly on the source and nature of the crisis of reason. The traditional view sees reason as something general and formal, whereas the critical view is characterized by entanglement between the subject matter and logic. On the latter view, reason is contextual and it requires extra-logical deliberation and justification. Whereas on the traditional view, the crisis of reason appears as a technical problem related to a failure of the used formal apparatus, on the critical view, the crisis results from ignoring the more pervasive questions related to the choice of methods with respect to the nature of the subject matter and the goals of the practice in question. Ultimately, the chapter argues that explicating different conceptions of reason makes us aware of the tacit conceptions of reason that we live by. It will be argued further that the critical view is likely to produce a more rigorous, relevant, and reliable account of reason whereas reason on the traditional conception is less demanding.
- 9 June 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 52-65
Logic and the Crisis of Reason
The question of how logic relates to reason and its crisis presupposes an understanding of what is meant by logic, reason, and the crisis of reason, and how these are related. This chapter formulates two views on logic, one traditional view and another, broadly Kantian, critical view of logic. The chapter suggests taking these two views of logic as models of reason. The two models yield fundamentally different conceptions of reason and accordingly on the source and nature of the crisis of reason. The traditional view sees reason as something general and formal, whereas the critical view is characterized by entanglement between the subject matter and logic. On the latter view, reason is contextual and it requires extra-logical deliberation and justification. Whereas on the traditional view, the crisis of reason appears as a technical problem related to a failure of the used formal apparatus, on the critical view, the crisis results from ignoring the more pervasive questions related to the choice of methods with respect to the nature of the subject matter and the goals of the practice in question. Ultimately, the chapter argues that explicating different conceptions of reason makes us aware of the tacit conceptions of reason that we live by. It will be argued further that the critical view is likely to produce a more rigorous, relevant, and reliable account of reason whereas reason on the traditional conception is less demanding.
- 7 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-8
Carnap, Rudolf (1891–1970)
- Open Access
- 1 July 2024
- Published by Corporacion Filosofia y Sociedad in Mutatis Mutandis: Revista Internacional de Filosofía
- Vol. 2 (1) , 1-13
Husserl, Kant y el enfoque crítico de la lógica
Este artículo busca aclarar las observaciones críticas de Husserl al enfoque de Kant sobre la lógica, comparando sus respectivas visiones de la misma. En su obra Lógica formal y lógica trascendental (1929, §100), Husserl critica a Kant no por plantear preguntas trascendentales sobre la lógica formal, sino por adscribirle una “aprioridad extraordinaria” (extraordinary apriority). Husserl considera que la razón de la actitud acrítica de Kant hacia la lógica se debe a su visión de la lógica en tanto dirigida hacia lo subjetivo, en lugar de estar interesada con un “mundo” de objetos ideales. Mientras que, para Kant, la lógica general trata de las leyes del razonamiento, Husserl piensa que la lógica formal debería describir las estructuras formales. Husserl sostiene que, si Kant hubiera tenido un concepto más integral de la lógica, habría planteado preguntas críticas sobre cómo es posible la lógica. Este tipo de crítica no puede usar formas de juicios o silogismos de la lógica, ni siquiera, de manera más general, el método “inferencial” (Schliessende), sino que debe ser de naturaleza descriptiva. La fenomenología trascendental de Husserl es el método para realizar dicha crítica. El artículo argumenta que esto conlleva una reflexión y posiblemente una revisión de los principios lógicos en relación con los objetivos normativos que rigen la investigación en cuestión.
- 1 July 2024
- Published by Corporacion Filosofia y Sociedad in Mutatis Mutandis: Revista Internacional de Filosofía
- Vol. 2 (1) , 1-13
Open AccessHusserl, Kant y el enfoque crítico de la lógica
Este artículo busca aclarar las observaciones críticas de Husserl al enfoque de Kant sobre la lógica, comparando sus respectivas visiones de la misma. En su obra Lógica formal y lógica trascendental (1929, §100), Husserl critica a Kant no por plantear preguntas trascendentales sobre la lógica formal, sino por adscribirle una “aprioridad extraordinaria” (extraordinary apriority). Husserl considera que la razón de la actitud acrítica de Kant hacia la lógica se debe a su visión de la lógica en tanto dirigida hacia lo subjetivo, en lugar de estar interesada con un “mundo” de objetos ideales. Mientras que, para Kant, la lógica general trata de las leyes del razonamiento, Husserl piensa que la lógica formal debería describir las estructuras formales. Husserl sostiene que, si Kant hubiera tenido un concepto más integral de la lógica, habría planteado preguntas críticas sobre cómo es posible la lógica. Este tipo de crítica no puede usar formas de juicios o silogismos de la lógica, ni siquiera, de manera más general, el método “inferencial” (Schliessende), sino que debe ser de naturaleza descriptiva. La fenomenología trascendental de Husserl es el método para realizar dicha crítica. El artículo argumenta que esto conlleva una reflexión y posiblemente una revisión de los principios lógicos en relación con los objetivos normativos que rigen la investigación en cuestión.
- 13 September 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-7
Mathematics, as a Theme in Phenomenology
- Open Access
- 19 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Topoi
- Vol. 42 (1) , 283-295
No Magic: From Phenomenology of Practice to Social Ontology of Mathematics
The paper shows how to use the Husserlian phenomenological method in contemporary philosophical approaches to mathematical practice and mathematical ontology. First, the paper develops the phenomenological approach based on Husserl's writings to obtain a method for understanding mathematical practice. Then, to put forward a full-fledged ontology of mathematics, the phenomenological approach is complemented with social ontological considerations. The proposed ontological account sees mathematical objects as social constructions in the sense that they are products of culturally shared and historically developed practices. At the same time the view endorses the sense that mathematical reality is given to mathematicians with a sense of independence. As mathematical social constructions are products of highly constrained, intersubjective practices and accord with the phenomenologically clarified experience of mathematicians, positing them is phenomenologically justified. The social ontological approach offers a way to build mathematical ontology out of the practice with no metaphysical magic.
- 19 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Topoi
- Vol. 42 (1) , 283-295
Open AccessNo Magic: From Phenomenology of Practice to Social Ontology of Mathematics
The paper shows how to use the Husserlian phenomenological method in contemporary philosophical approaches to mathematical practice and mathematical ontology. First, the paper develops the phenomenological approach based on Husserl's writings to obtain a method for understanding mathematical practice. Then, to put forward a full-fledged ontology of mathematics, the phenomenological approach is complemented with social ontological considerations. The proposed ontological account sees mathematical objects as social constructions in the sense that they are products of culturally shared and historically developed practices. At the same time the view endorses the sense that mathematical reality is given to mathematicians with a sense of independence. As mathematical social constructions are products of highly constrained, intersubjective practices and accord with the phenomenologically clarified experience of mathematicians, positing them is phenomenologically justified. The social ontological approach offers a way to build mathematical ontology out of the practice with no metaphysical magic.
- 3 July 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 65 (6) , 631-637
Introduction to special issue on 'critical views of logic'
Critical views of logic are presented. These are views that are critical of logic in a sense akin to the way in which Kant is critical rather than dogmatic about traditional metaphysics. Such approaches differ from the Fregean 'logic-first' view. In accordance with the latter, logic is often regarded as epistemologically and methodologically fundamental. Hence, all disciplines - including mathematics - are considered as answerable to logic, rather than vice versa. In critical views of logic, by contrast, the logical principles that govern some subject matter may depend on the metaphysics of this subject matter or on the semantics of our discourse about it. Space is thereby carved out between a Fregean position on the one hand and thoroughgoing holism a la Quine on the other.
- 3 July 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 65 (6) , 631-637
Introduction to special issue on 'critical views of logic'
Critical views of logic are presented. These are views that are critical of logic in a sense akin to the way in which Kant is critical rather than dogmatic about traditional metaphysics. Such approaches differ from the Fregean 'logic-first' view. In accordance with the latter, logic is often regarded as epistemologically and methodologically fundamental. Hence, all disciplines - including mathematics - are considered as answerable to logic, rather than vice versa. In critical views of logic, by contrast, the logical principles that govern some subject matter may depend on the metaphysics of this subject matter or on the semantics of our discourse about it. Space is thereby carved out between a Fregean position on the one hand and thoroughgoing holism a la Quine on the other.
- Open Access
- 1 October 2020
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Journal of Transcendental Philosophy
- Vol. 1 (3) , 289-306
Husserl’s Transcendentalization of Mathematical Naturalism
The paper aims to capture a form of naturalism that can be found “built-in” in phenomenology, namely the idea to take science or mathematics on its own, without postulating extraneous normative “molds” on it. The paper offers a detailed comparison of Penelope Maddy’s naturalism about mathematics and Husserl’s approach to mathematics in Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929). It argues that Maddy’s naturalized methodology is similar to the approach in the first part of the book. However, in the second part Husserl enters into a transcendental clarification of the evidences and presuppositions of the mathematicians’ work, thus “transcendentalizing” his otherwise naturalist approach to mathematics. The result is a moderately revisionist view that takes the existing mathematical practices seriously, calls for reflection on them, and eventually gives suggestions for revisions if needed.
- 1 October 2020
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Journal of Transcendental Philosophy
- Vol. 1 (3) , 289-306
Open AccessHusserl’s Transcendentalization of Mathematical Naturalism
The paper aims to capture a form of naturalism that can be found “built-in” in phenomenology, namely the idea to take science or mathematics on its own, without postulating extraneous normative “molds” on it. The paper offers a detailed comparison of Penelope Maddy’s naturalism about mathematics and Husserl’s approach to mathematics in Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929). It argues that Maddy’s naturalized methodology is similar to the approach in the first part of the book. However, in the second part Husserl enters into a transcendental clarification of the evidences and presuppositions of the mathematicians’ work, thus “transcendentalizing” his otherwise naturalist approach to mathematics. The result is a moderately revisionist view that takes the existing mathematical practices seriously, calls for reflection on them, and eventually gives suggestions for revisions if needed.