OUOktay Urcan

Oktay Urcan

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Oktay Urcan has a total of 31 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    The Effect of Non‐US Tax Authority Monitoring on Income Shifting by Affiliates of US Multinationals: Evidence From EDGAR Search Activity

    by Sabrina Chi, Anh V. Persson, Terry Shevlin, Oktay Urcan

    Governments worldwide are concerned that multinational enterprises (MNEs) shift profits across borders to avoid taxes. While prior research shows that home‐country tax enforcement can reduce tax avoidance, far less is known about whether foreign tax authorities (FTAs) can constrain income shifting by MNE affiliates. We measure FTA monitoring using data on FTAs' downloads of US MNEs' annual reports filed with the SEC. We find that FTA monitoring is more intensive in higher‐tax‐rate countries with a larger MNE presence, consistent with those jurisdictions facing stronger incentives to monitor income shifting. More importantly, we find that monitoring by an affiliate's local tax authority does not systematically reduce income shifting by US MNE affiliates, whereas aggregate monitoring in the MNE group affects an affiliate even when its own local FTA is not observably monitoring it. This result is consistent with a spillover effect of FTA monitoring. This association is stronger when FTAs operate under information‐exchange treaties, when company disclosures are more detailed, and when enforcement capacity is greater. We also find positive associations between aggregate FTA monitoring and subsequent tax avoidance and tax settlements of US MNEs. Our findings suggest monitoring by multiple FTAs effectively combats MNE tax avoidance and have implications for how tax administrations design and coordinate monitoring efforts.

  • Open Access

    Using AI to identify exogenous shocks and conduct archival accounting research

    by William A. Ciconte, Andrea M. Rozario, Oktay Urcan

    We explore the capabilities and dangers of artificial intelligence (AI) usage in accounting research. We focus on mining U.S. securities regulations as an economic shock, testing the causal effect of these shocks on U.S. firms’ voluntary disclosure, and writing a complete academic paper, conditional upon finding statistically significant results. Overall, this research experiment demonstrates the capacity for AI to provide efficiencies in research. AI-generated papers are not ready to be submitted to top accounting journals, but they constitute a useful starting point for accounting researchers and using AI saves valuable time in identifying exogenous shocks that significantly affect an outcome of interest. When we repeat the same experiment to explore the causal effect of non-U.S. securities regulations on U.S. firms’ voluntary disclosure practices, AI writes many professional looking papers with spurious results and unsubstantiated economic arguments, highlighting the potential dangers of AI for accounting scholarship.

  • Multi-Metric Vesting Schemes in Executive Performance Equity Grants

    by Francesca Franco, Oktay Urcan

    Using a large sample of executive performance equity grants over 2006–2019, we provide a comprehensive representation of the single- and multi-metric vesting schemes used by U.S. public firms and investigate the incentives provided by alternative functional forms of vesting formulas that combine earnings with stock returns and other nonearnings targets. Our results indicate that, compared to earnings-vesting single- and multi-metric summative grants, binding schemes that require the contemporaneous achievement of both earnings and nonearnings targets for grant vesting limit executive fixation on earnings and the associated incentives to maximize grant payouts by managing earnings around the targets. The findings confirm the expectation of different incentive effects from alternative (linear versus nonlinear) aggregations of multiple performance targets in the grant vesting formulas, with binding schemes being more effective in mitigating the risk of executives prioritizing earnings relative to other targets in multi-metric grants. JEL Classifications: G34; J33.

  • Open Access

    Using AI to Identify Exogenous Shocks and Conduct Archival Accounting Research

    by Will Ciconte, Andrea Rozario, Oktay Urcan

    In this paper, we explore the capabilities and dangers of AI usage in accounting research. We focus on mining U.S. securities regulations as an economic shock, testing the causal effect of these exogenous shocks on U.S. firms' voluntary disclosure behavior, and writing a complete academic paper conditional upon finding statistically significant results. Overall, this research experiment demonstrates the capacity for AI to provide efficiencies in the research production process. AI-generated papers are not ready to be submitted to top accounting journals, but they constitute a useful starting point for accounting researchers and utilizing AI saves valuable time in identifying exogenous shocks which significantly affect an outcome of interest. When we repeat the same experiment to explore the causal effect of non-U.S. securities regulations on U.S. firms' voluntary disclosure practices, AI writes many professional looking papers with spurious results and unsubstantiated economic arguments highlighting the potential dangers of AI for accounting scholarship.

  • Do Companies Redact Material Information from Confidential SEC Filings? Evidence from the FAST Act

    by Anne M. Thompson, Oktay Urcan, Hayoung Yoon

    The Securities and Exchange Commission permits companies to redact proprietary information from material contract filings, so long as the redacted information (1) would cause competitive harm if disclosed, and (2) the information is legally immaterial. Because these joint criteria are inherently contradictory, we examine whether legally immaterial redacted information is economically material to investors. We find that firms’ stock price discovery process is significantly slower and insider trading is significantly greater after companies file redacted contracts compared to nonredacted contracts. We then examine the impact of the 2019 FAST Act, which reduced the SEC’s oversight of redacted contracts. Companies redact more frequently and insider trading (but not speed of stock price discovery) is more pronounced after the FAST Act. Taken together, these findings suggest that at least some redacted information is economically material to investors and that reducing SEC oversight of redacted information may not be in investors’ best interests. JEL Classifications: M41.


  • Accounting for Leases and Corporate Investment

    by Ciao-Wei Chen, Maria Correia, Oktay Urcan

    We examine the real effects of lease-capitalization rules (i.e., standards that require firms to capitalize finance leases) on corporate investment. We show that the introduction of these rules leads to a decrease in investment, which is more pronounced for firms with high reliance on leases. We posit and find that lease capitalization affects investment via a learning channel and a contracting channel. Regarding the first channel, we argue that managers identify areas of overinvestment and activities that should be discontinued or downsized because of the information they collect and analyze to comply with lease-capitalization rules. Accordingly, we find that the effect of lease capitalization is stronger when learning opportunities are higher. Regarding the second channel, we argue that lease capitalization affects investment via its effect on contracts. Accordingly, we document an increase in the likelihood of covenant breaches and a stronger decline in investment for financially constrained firms.JEL Classifications: G31; M41.


  • Executive Deferral Plans and Insider Trading†

    by Francesca Franco, Oktay Urcan

    We study executive equity contributions to nonqualified deferred compensation plans, which consist of the election to defer part or all of the executive's annual base salary and other cash pay into the company's stock. These transactions provide executives with an alternative channel to purchase shares in the firm while benefiting from an affirmative defense against illegal insider‐trading allegations. Using a large sample of executive equity deferrals over 2000–2014, we find evidence that executives use these transactions as a means to acquire the company's stock during blackout windows. Consistent with the conjecture that deferrals can benefit from lower litigation costs that inhibit insider trades before the release of corporate news, we also find that the deferred amounts are significantly higher (lower) before the disclosure of good (bad) earnings news. These results suggest that executives can use equity deferrals to circumvent Rule 10b5 trading restrictions and generate significant returns through the timing and content of corporate disclosures around these transactions. Together, our evidence supports the recent concerns that executives might be engaging in strategic information releases around Rule 10b5 transactions.


  • Corporate Tax Avoidance and Debt Costs

    by Terry Shevlin, Oktay Urcan, Florin P. Vasvari

    We use path analysis to investigate how corporate tax avoidance is priced in bond yields and bank loan spreads. We find that approximately one half of the total effect of tax avoidance on bond yields is explained through the negative effect of tax avoidance on future pre-tax cash flow levels and volatility and, to a lesser extent, lower information quality. The effects of these mediating variables are much less pronounced for bank loan spreads. The results of additional cross-sectional analyses indicate that, relative to bond investors, banks are able to reduce information asymmetry problems more effectively, given their access to firms' private information and greater ability to monitor borrowers. JEL Classifications: G31; G32; M10; O16.


  • Macroeconomic effects of corporate tax policy

    by Terry Shevlin, Lakshmanan Shivakumar, Oktay Urcan