Nura Sidarus
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Nura Sidarus has a total of 25 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Patrick Haggard
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, UK
10 shared publications - Valérian Chambon
Institut Jean Nicod, Département d’Études Cognitives, École Normale Supérieure, CNRS, PSL University, Paris, France
4 shared publications - Matti Vuorre
Department of Social Psychology, Tilburg University
3 shared publications - Frederike Beyer
Queen Mary University of London, London, United Kingdom
2 shared publications - Beatrice Hayes
School of Life Sciences and the Environment, Royal Holloway University of London, Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX, U.K.
1 shared publication Eoin Travers
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 24 December 2025
- Published by Portland Press Ltd. in Emerging Topics in Life Sciences
- Vol. 9 (6)
Peer mentoring to support learning in the life sciences
We present a pair of case studies of undergraduate peer mentoring schemes in schools of life science to support student transition and reduce demographic awarding gaps. The first, PEMENTOS (PEer MEntoring TO Succeed), was piloted at Royal Holloway University of London to ease the transition to university for students from Black and Global Majority (BGM) backgrounds by fostering belonging and informal knowledge-sharing. The second, Kingston University’s Academic Peer Mentoring Programme, was an institution-wide initiative offering flexible, department-led models of academic and psychosocial support. Evaluation of PEMENTOS showed increased mentee confidence, engagement and academic performance, with narrowing first-year grade gaps between BGM and White students. Mentees at Kingston, as shown by an analysis of their results across the university and in the Pharmaceutical Science course in particular, demonstrated greater pass and progression rates, with large gains among BTEC-qualified and commuting students. Both programmes also yielded developmental benefits for mentors. These case studies suggest that peer mentoring programmes can enhance undergraduate student success and inclusion in the life sciences. Key shared features – a high level of programme structure, alongside mentor training and compensation – may be particularly important.
- 24 December 2025
- Published by Portland Press Ltd. in Emerging Topics in Life Sciences
- Vol. 9 (6)
Open AccessPeer mentoring to support learning in the life sciences
We present a pair of case studies of undergraduate peer mentoring schemes in schools of life science to support student transition and reduce demographic awarding gaps. The first, PEMENTOS (PEer MEntoring TO Succeed), was piloted at Royal Holloway University of London to ease the transition to university for students from Black and Global Majority (BGM) backgrounds by fostering belonging and informal knowledge-sharing. The second, Kingston University’s Academic Peer Mentoring Programme, was an institution-wide initiative offering flexible, department-led models of academic and psychosocial support. Evaluation of PEMENTOS showed increased mentee confidence, engagement and academic performance, with narrowing first-year grade gaps between BGM and White students. Mentees at Kingston, as shown by an analysis of their results across the university and in the Pharmaceutical Science course in particular, demonstrated greater pass and progression rates, with large gains among BTEC-qualified and commuting students. Both programmes also yielded developmental benefits for mentors. These case studies suggest that peer mentoring programmes can enhance undergraduate student success and inclusion in the life sciences. Key shared features – a high level of programme structure, alongside mentor training and compensation – may be particularly important.
- Open Access
- 16 April 2025
- Published by The Royal Society in Royal Society Open Science
- Vol. 12 (4) , 241857
Reducing the burden of psychological questionnaire measures through selective item re-weighting
Questionnaire measures are central to many areas of study within the psychological sciences. However, they often place a heavy burden on participants; questionnaires are frequently lengthy and unengaging, and with participants often required to complete multiple measures within a single study, this results in lower data quality, increased cost and a poor participant experience. Here, we introduce a straightforward method for creating short versions of existing measures that are able to accurately determine participants’ sum scores, subscale scores or factor scores. Our method, referred to as Factor Score Item Reduction with Lasso Estimator, uses Lasso-regularized regression to select items and weight them such that true scores can be predicted accurately from a reduced item set. We demonstrate the performance of this method on an example dataset, and provide code and guidance for implementing the approach.
- 16 April 2025
- Published by The Royal Society in Royal Society Open Science
- Vol. 12 (4) , 241857
Open AccessReducing the burden of psychological questionnaire measures through selective item re-weighting
Questionnaire measures are central to many areas of study within the psychological sciences. However, they often place a heavy burden on participants; questionnaires are frequently lengthy and unengaging, and with participants often required to complete multiple measures within a single study, this results in lower data quality, increased cost and a poor participant experience. Here, we introduce a straightforward method for creating short versions of existing measures that are able to accurately determine participants’ sum scores, subscale scores or factor scores. Our method, referred to as Factor Score Item Reduction with Lasso Estimator, uses Lasso-regularized regression to select items and weight them such that true scores can be predicted accurately from a reduced item set. We demonstrate the performance of this method on an example dataset, and provide code and guidance for implementing the approach.
- Open Access
- 6 September 2019
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS Computational Biology
- Vol. 15 (9) , e1007326
Cost-benefit trade-offs in decision-making and learning
Value-based decision-making involves trading off the cost associated with an action against its expected reward. Research has shown that both physical and mental effort constitute such subjective costs, biasing choices away from effortful actions, and discounting the value of obtained rewards. Facing conflicts between competing action alternatives is considered aversive, as recruiting cognitive control to overcome conflict is effortful. Moreover, engaging control to proactively suppress irrelevant information that could conflict with task-relevant information would presumably also be cognitively costly. Yet, it remains unclear whether the cognitive control demands involved in preventing and resolving conflict also constitute costs in value-based decisions. The present study investigated this question by embedding irrelevant distractors (flanker arrows) within a reversal-learning task, with intermixed free and instructed trials. Results showed that participants learned to adapt their free choices to maximize rewards, but were nevertheless biased to follow the suggestions of irrelevant distractors. Thus, the perceived cost of investing cognitive control to suppress an external suggestion could sometimes trump internal value representations. By adapting computational models of reinforcement learning, we assessed the influence of conflict at both the decision and learning stages. Modelling the decision showed that free choices were more biased when participants were less sure about which action was more rewarding. This supports the hypothesis that the costs linked to conflict management were traded off against expected rewards. During the learning phase, we found that learning rates were reduced in instructed, relative to free, choices. Learning rates were further reduced by conflict between an instruction and subjective action values, whereas learning was not robustly influenced by conflict between one’s actions and external distractors. Our results show that the subjective cognitive control costs linked to conflict factor into value-based decision-making, and highlight that different types of conflict may have different effects on learning about action outcomes. Value-based decision-making involves trading off the cost associated with an action–such as physical or mental effort–against its expected reward. Although facing conflicts between competing action alternatives is considered aversive and effortful, it remains unclear whether conflict also constitutes a cost in value-based decisions. We tested this hypothesis by combining a classic conflict (flanker) task with a reinforcement-learning task. Results showed that participants learned to maximise their earnings, but were nevertheless biased to follow irrelevant suggestions. Computational model-based analyses showed a greater choice bias with more uncertainty about the best action to make, supporting the hypothesis that the costs linked to conflict management were traded off against expected rewards. We additionally found that learning rates were reduced when following instructions, relative to when choosing freely what to do. Learning was further reduced by conflict between instructions and subjective action values. In short, we found that the subjective cognitive control costs linked to conflict factor into value-based decision-making, and that different types of conflict may have different effects on learning about action outcomes.
- 6 September 2019
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS Computational Biology
- Vol. 15 (9) , e1007326
Open AccessCost-benefit trade-offs in decision-making and learning
Value-based decision-making involves trading off the cost associated with an action against its expected reward. Research has shown that both physical and mental effort constitute such subjective costs, biasing choices away from effortful actions, and discounting the value of obtained rewards. Facing conflicts between competing action alternatives is considered aversive, as recruiting cognitive control to overcome conflict is effortful. Moreover, engaging control to proactively suppress irrelevant information that could conflict with task-relevant information would presumably also be cognitively costly. Yet, it remains unclear whether the cognitive control demands involved in preventing and resolving conflict also constitute costs in value-based decisions. The present study investigated this question by embedding irrelevant distractors (flanker arrows) within a reversal-learning task, with intermixed free and instructed trials. Results showed that participants learned to adapt their free choices to maximize rewards, but were nevertheless biased to follow the suggestions of irrelevant distractors. Thus, the perceived cost of investing cognitive control to suppress an external suggestion could sometimes trump internal value representations. By adapting computational models of reinforcement learning, we assessed the influence of conflict at both the decision and learning stages. Modelling the decision showed that free choices were more biased when participants were less sure about which action was more rewarding. This supports the hypothesis that the costs linked to conflict management were traded off against expected rewards. During the learning phase, we found that learning rates were reduced in instructed, relative to free, choices. Learning rates were further reduced by conflict between an instruction and subjective action values, whereas learning was not robustly influenced by conflict between one’s actions and external distractors. Our results show that the subjective cognitive control costs linked to conflict factor into value-based decision-making, and highlight that different types of conflict may have different effects on learning about action outcomes. Value-based decision-making involves trading off the cost associated with an action–such as physical or mental effort–against its expected reward. Although facing conflicts between competing action alternatives is considered aversive and effortful, it remains unclear whether conflict also constitutes a cost in value-based decisions. We tested this hypothesis by combining a classic conflict (flanker) task with a reinforcement-learning task. Results showed that participants learned to maximise their earnings, but were nevertheless biased to follow irrelevant suggestions. Computational model-based analyses showed a greater choice bias with more uncertainty about the best action to make, supporting the hypothesis that the costs linked to conflict management were traded off against expected rewards. We additionally found that learning rates were reduced when following instructions, relative to when choosing freely what to do. Learning was further reduced by conflict between instructions and subjective action values. In short, we found that the subjective cognitive control costs linked to conflict factor into value-based decision-making, and that different types of conflict may have different effects on learning about action outcomes.
- Open Access
Trading off the cost of conflict against expected rewards
Value-based decision-making involves trading off the cost associated with an action against its expected reward. Research has shown that both physical and mental effort constitute such subjective costs, biasing choices away from effortful actions, and discounting the value of obtained rewards. Facing conflicts between competing action alternatives is considered aversive, as recruiting cognitive control to overcome conflict is effortful. Yet, it remains unclear whether conflict is also perceived as a cost in value-based decisions. The present study investigated this question by embedding irrelevant distractors (flanker arrows) within a reversal-learning task, with intermixed free and instructed trials. Results showed that participants learned to adapt their choices to maximize rewards, but were nevertheless biased to follow the suggestions of irrelevant distractors. Thus, the perceived cost of being in conflict with an external suggestion could sometimes trump internal value representations. By adapting computational models of reinforcement learning, we assessed the influence of conflict at both the decision and learning stages. Modelling the decision showed that conflict was avoided when evidence for either action alternative was weak, demonstrating that the cost of conflict was traded off against expected rewards. During the learning phase, we found that learning rates were reduced in instructed, relative to free, choices. Learning rates were further reduced by conflict between an instruction and subjective action values, whereas learning was not robustly influenced by conflict between one’s actions and external distractors. Our results show that the subjective cost of conflict factors into value-based decision-making, and highlights that different types of conflict may have different effects on learning about action outcomes.
Open AccessTrading off the cost of conflict against expected rewards
Value-based decision-making involves trading off the cost associated with an action against its expected reward. Research has shown that both physical and mental effort constitute such subjective costs, biasing choices away from effortful actions, and discounting the value of obtained rewards. Facing conflicts between competing action alternatives is considered aversive, as recruiting cognitive control to overcome conflict is effortful. Yet, it remains unclear whether conflict is also perceived as a cost in value-based decisions. The present study investigated this question by embedding irrelevant distractors (flanker arrows) within a reversal-learning task, with intermixed free and instructed trials. Results showed that participants learned to adapt their choices to maximize rewards, but were nevertheless biased to follow the suggestions of irrelevant distractors. Thus, the perceived cost of being in conflict with an external suggestion could sometimes trump internal value representations. By adapting computational models of reinforcement learning, we assessed the influence of conflict at both the decision and learning stages. Modelling the decision showed that conflict was avoided when evidence for either action alternative was weak, demonstrating that the cost of conflict was traded off against expected rewards. During the learning phase, we found that learning rates were reduced in instructed, relative to free, choices. Learning rates were further reduced by conflict between an instruction and subjective action values, whereas learning was not robustly influenced by conflict between one’s actions and external distractors. Our results show that the subjective cost of conflict factors into value-based decision-making, and highlights that different types of conflict may have different effects on learning about action outcomes.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2018
- Published by Society for Neuroscience in eneuro
- Vol. 5 (1)
Losing Control in Social Situations: How the Presence of Others Affects Neural Processes Related to Sense of Agency
Social contexts substantially influence individual behavior, but little is known about how they affect cognitive processes related to voluntary action. Previously, it has been shown that social context reduces participants’ sense of agency over the outcomes of their actions and outcome monitoring. In this fMRI study on human volunteers, we investigated the neural mechanisms by which social context alters sense of agency. Participants made costly actions to stop inflating a balloon before it burst. On “social” trials, another player could act in their stead, but we analyzed only trials in which the other player remained passive. We hypothesized that mentalizing processes during social trials would affect decision-making fluency and lead to a decreased sense of agency. In line with this hypothesis, we found increased activity in the bilateral temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), precuneus, and middle frontal gyrus during social trials compared with nonsocial trials. Activity in the precuneus was, in turn, negatively related to sense of agency at a single-trial level. We further found a double dissociation between TPJ and angular gyrus (AG): activity in the left AG was not sensitive to social context but was negatively related to sense of agency. In contrast, activity in the TPJ was modulated by social context but was not sensitive to sense of agency.
- 1 January 2018
- Published by Society for Neuroscience in eneuro
- Vol. 5 (1)
Open AccessLosing Control in Social Situations: How the Presence of Others Affects Neural Processes Related to Sense of Agency
Social contexts substantially influence individual behavior, but little is known about how they affect cognitive processes related to voluntary action. Previously, it has been shown that social context reduces participants’ sense of agency over the outcomes of their actions and outcome monitoring. In this fMRI study on human volunteers, we investigated the neural mechanisms by which social context alters sense of agency. Participants made costly actions to stop inflating a balloon before it burst. On “social” trials, another player could act in their stead, but we analyzed only trials in which the other player remained passive. We hypothesized that mentalizing processes during social trials would affect decision-making fluency and lead to a decreased sense of agency. In line with this hypothesis, we found increased activity in the bilateral temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), precuneus, and middle frontal gyrus during social trials compared with nonsocial trials. Activity in the precuneus was, in turn, negatively related to sense of agency at a single-trial level. We further found a double dissociation between TPJ and angular gyrus (AG): activity in the left AG was not sensitive to social context but was negatively related to sense of agency. In contrast, activity in the TPJ was modulated by social context but was not sensitive to sense of agency.
- Open Access
- 13 April 2017
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Psychology
- Vol. 8, 545
Investigating the Prospective Sense of Agency: Effects of Processing Fluency, Stimulus Ambiguity, and Response Conflict
How do we know how much control we have over our environment? The sense of agency refers to the feeling that we are in control of our actions, and that, through them, we can control our external environment. Thus, agency clearly involves matching intentions, actions and outcomes. The present studies investigated the possibility that processes of action selection, i.e. choosing what action to make, contribute to the sense of agency. Since selection of action necessarily precedes execution of action, such effects must be prospective. In contrast, most literature on sense of agency has focussed on the retrospective computation whether an outcome fits the action performed or intended. This hypothesis was tested in an ecologically rich, dynamic task based on a computer game. Across three experiments, we manipulated three different aspects of action selection processing: visual processing fluency, categorisation ambiguity, and response conflict. Additionally, we measured the relative contributions of prospective, action selection-based cues, and retrospective, outcome-based cues to the sense of agency. Manipulations of action selection were orthogonally combined with discrepancy of visual feedback of action. Fluency of action selection had a small but reliable effect on the sense of agency. Additionally, as expected, sense of agency was strongly reduced when visual feedback was discrepant with the action performed. The effects of discrepant feedback were larger than the effects of action selection fluency, and sometimes suppressed them. The sense of agency is highly sensitive to disruptions of action-outcome relations. However, when motor control is successful, and action-outcome relations are as predicted, fluency or dysfluency of action selection provides an important prospective cue to the sense of agency.
- 13 April 2017
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Psychology
- Vol. 8, 545
Open AccessInvestigating the Prospective Sense of Agency: Effects of Processing Fluency, Stimulus Ambiguity, and Response Conflict
How do we know how much control we have over our environment? The sense of agency refers to the feeling that we are in control of our actions, and that, through them, we can control our external environment. Thus, agency clearly involves matching intentions, actions and outcomes. The present studies investigated the possibility that processes of action selection, i.e. choosing what action to make, contribute to the sense of agency. Since selection of action necessarily precedes execution of action, such effects must be prospective. In contrast, most literature on sense of agency has focussed on the retrospective computation whether an outcome fits the action performed or intended. This hypothesis was tested in an ecologically rich, dynamic task based on a computer game. Across three experiments, we manipulated three different aspects of action selection processing: visual processing fluency, categorisation ambiguity, and response conflict. Additionally, we measured the relative contributions of prospective, action selection-based cues, and retrospective, outcome-based cues to the sense of agency. Manipulations of action selection were orthogonally combined with discrepancy of visual feedback of action. Fluency of action selection had a small but reliable effect on the sense of agency. Additionally, as expected, sense of agency was strongly reduced when visual feedback was discrepant with the action performed. The effects of discrepant feedback were larger than the effects of action selection fluency, and sometimes suppressed them. The sense of agency is highly sensitive to disruptions of action-outcome relations. However, when motor control is successful, and action-outcome relations are as predicted, fluency or dysfluency of action selection provides an important prospective cue to the sense of agency.
- Open Access
- 1 April 2017
- Published by Elsevier in NeuroImage
- Vol. 150, 1-13
How action selection influences the sense of agency: An ERP study
- 1 April 2017
- Published by Elsevier in NeuroImage
- Vol. 150, 1-13
Open AccessHow action selection influences the sense of agency: An ERP study
- Open Access
- 1 January 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Neuroscience of Consciousness
- Vol. 2017 (1) , nix012
Integrating prospective and retrospective cues to the sense of agency: a multi-study investigation†
Sense of agency (SoA) refers to the experience of voluntary control over one's own actions, and, through them, over events in the outside world. Recent accounts suggest that SoA involves an integration of various cues. These include prospective cues, for example, related to the fluency of action selection, and retrospective cues, linked to outcome monitoring. It remains unclear whether these cues may have independent effects on SoA, and, in particular, how their relative contributions may change during instrumental learning. In the present study, we explored these issues by conducting a multi-study analysis of seven published and unpublished studies on the role of prospective cues to the SoA. Our main question was how the effects of selection fluency on SoA might change as information about action-outcome contingencies is gathered. Results show that selection fluency can have a general and consistent influence on the SoA, independent of outcome monitoring. This suggests selection fluency is used as a heuristic cue, to prospectively inform our SoA. In addition, our results show that the influence of selection fluency on SoA may change systematically as action-outcome contingencies are gradually learned. We speculate that dysfluent selection may impair formation of mental associations between action and outcome.
- 1 January 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Neuroscience of Consciousness
- Vol. 2017 (1) , nix012
Open AccessIntegrating prospective and retrospective cues to the sense of agency: a multi-study investigation†
Sense of agency (SoA) refers to the experience of voluntary control over one's own actions, and, through them, over events in the outside world. Recent accounts suggest that SoA involves an integration of various cues. These include prospective cues, for example, related to the fluency of action selection, and retrospective cues, linked to outcome monitoring. It remains unclear whether these cues may have independent effects on SoA, and, in particular, how their relative contributions may change during instrumental learning. In the present study, we explored these issues by conducting a multi-study analysis of seven published and unpublished studies on the role of prospective cues to the SoA. Our main question was how the effects of selection fluency on SoA might change as information about action-outcome contingencies is gathered. Results show that selection fluency can have a general and consistent influence on the SoA, independent of outcome monitoring. This suggests selection fluency is used as a heuristic cue, to prospectively inform our SoA. In addition, our results show that the influence of selection fluency on SoA may change systematically as action-outcome contingencies are gradually learned. We speculate that dysfluent selection may impair formation of mental associations between action and outcome.
- Open Access
- 1 December 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience
- Vol. 12 (1) , 138-145
Beyond self-serving bias: diffusion of responsibility reduces sense of agency and outcome monitoring
Diffusion of responsibility across agents has been proposed to underlie decreased helping and increased aggression in group behaviour. However, few studies have directly investigated effects of the presence of other people on how we experience the consequences of our actions. This EEG study investigated whether diffusion of responsibility simply reflects a post-hoc self-serving bias, or rather has direct effects on how we process the outcomes of our actions, and our experience of agency over them. Participants made voluntary actions whose outcomes were more or less negative. Presence of another potential agent reduced participants’ sense of agency over those outcomes, even though it was always obvious who caused each outcome. Further, presence of another agent reduced the amplitude of feedback-related negativity evoked by outcome stimuli, suggesting reduced outcome monitoring. The presence of other agents may lead to diffusion of responsibility by weakening the neural linkage between one’s actions and their outcomes.
- 1 December 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience
- Vol. 12 (1) , 138-145
Open AccessBeyond self-serving bias: diffusion of responsibility reduces sense of agency and outcome monitoring
Diffusion of responsibility across agents has been proposed to underlie decreased helping and increased aggression in group behaviour. However, few studies have directly investigated effects of the presence of other people on how we experience the consequences of our actions. This EEG study investigated whether diffusion of responsibility simply reflects a post-hoc self-serving bias, or rather has direct effects on how we process the outcomes of our actions, and our experience of agency over them. Participants made voluntary actions whose outcomes were more or less negative. Presence of another potential agent reduced participants’ sense of agency over those outcomes, even though it was always obvious who caused each outcome. Further, presence of another agent reduced the amplitude of feedback-related negativity evoked by outcome stimuli, suggesting reduced outcome monitoring. The presence of other agents may lead to diffusion of responsibility by weakening the neural linkage between one’s actions and their outcomes.