Qiuhui Pan
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Qiuhui Pan has a total of 49 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Mingfeng He
School of Mathematical Science, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, China
19 shared publications Mingfeng He
School of Mathematical Science, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, China
14 shared publicationsSha Song
School of Mathematical Science, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, People’s Republic of China
5 shared publicationsLiyan Gao
4 shared publicationsWenqiang Zhu
3 shared publications- Xuesong Liu
School of Information Engineering, Dalian University, Dalian, Liaoning, China
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 18 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Microbiological Methods
- Vol. 246, 107553
A novel core genome clustering method proposed for population structure analysis and genotyping of bacterial genomes
- 18 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Microbiological Methods
- Vol. 246, 107553
A novel core genome clustering method proposed for population structure analysis and genotyping of bacterial genomes
- 1 February 2025
- Published by AIP Publishing in Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science
- Vol. 35 (2)
Evolution of cooperation under threshold public goods game
When the number of cooperators does not reach the collective target, resulting in the collective risk social dilemma, the self-organizing behavior of the group leads to the loss of collective interest and the government intervention leads to the increase of collective interest. For these two situations, we study the evolution of cooperation under threshold public goods game in well-mixed population. The results show that the introduction of the threshold makes it possible to generate complex dynamics with two interior equilibria in the replication equation. For self-organizing behavior, increasing the threshold is a double-edged sword. Although raising the threshold may increase the level of cooperation, the risk of dominance of defection also increases. For government intervention behavior, increasing the threshold significantly promotes cooperation. The common result is that individuals tend to free-ride when the group size increases. In addition, the greater the impact of the two behaviors on collective interest, the more conducive to promoting cooperation. When there are fewer initial cooperators, the government should intervene in time to generate cooperation. When there are more initial cooperators, self-organizing behavior is more conducive to attracting cooperators than government intervention. We hope that the model and results proposed in this paper can contribute to addressing the challenges posed by global issues such as climate change and the degradation of the ecological environment.
- 1 February 2025
- Published by AIP Publishing in Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science
- Vol. 35 (2)
Evolution of cooperation under threshold public goods game
When the number of cooperators does not reach the collective target, resulting in the collective risk social dilemma, the self-organizing behavior of the group leads to the loss of collective interest and the government intervention leads to the increase of collective interest. For these two situations, we study the evolution of cooperation under threshold public goods game in well-mixed population. The results show that the introduction of the threshold makes it possible to generate complex dynamics with two interior equilibria in the replication equation. For self-organizing behavior, increasing the threshold is a double-edged sword. Although raising the threshold may increase the level of cooperation, the risk of dominance of defection also increases. For government intervention behavior, increasing the threshold significantly promotes cooperation. The common result is that individuals tend to free-ride when the group size increases. In addition, the greater the impact of the two behaviors on collective interest, the more conducive to promoting cooperation. When there are fewer initial cooperators, the government should intervene in time to generate cooperation. When there are more initial cooperators, self-organizing behavior is more conducive to attracting cooperators than government intervention. We hope that the model and results proposed in this paper can contribute to addressing the challenges posed by global issues such as climate change and the degradation of the ecological environment.
- 22 November 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Applied Mathematics and Computation
- Vol. 490
The effect of ecological compensation on a coevolutionary common pool resource game
- 22 November 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Applied Mathematics and Computation
- Vol. 490
The effect of ecological compensation on a coevolutionary common pool resource game
- Open Access
- 1 July 2024
- Published by The Royal Society in Royal Society Open Science
- Vol. 11 (7) , 231960
Study on the interior equilibrium point of a special class of 2 × 2 × 2 asymmetric evolutionary games
Many behavioural interactions in real life involve three individuals. When each individual has two alternative strategies, they can be abstracted into mathematical models by means of 2×2×2 asymmetric games. In this paper, we explore a special class of 2×2×2 asymmetric games satisfying fixed conditions. Firstly, we analyse two solitary interior equilibrium points and provide the judgement condition for their instability based on the Jacobi matrix local stability analysis method. Secondly, we analyse the interior equilibrium points that are continuously distributed within a line and probe into their stability conditions based on generalized Hamiltonian systems theory. Under the circumstances, the stable interior equilibrium point is surrounded by closed orbits in phase space, which presents an observable stable state where two strategies coexist and fluctuate in each of the three game populations. This work enriches the study of 2×2×2 asymmetric games’ evolutionary dynamics.
- 1 July 2024
- Published by The Royal Society in Royal Society Open Science
- Vol. 11 (7) , 231960
Open AccessStudy on the interior equilibrium point of a special class of 2 × 2 × 2 asymmetric evolutionary games
Many behavioural interactions in real life involve three individuals. When each individual has two alternative strategies, they can be abstracted into mathematical models by means of 2×2×2 asymmetric games. In this paper, we explore a special class of 2×2×2 asymmetric games satisfying fixed conditions. Firstly, we analyse two solitary interior equilibrium points and provide the judgement condition for their instability based on the Jacobi matrix local stability analysis method. Secondly, we analyse the interior equilibrium points that are continuously distributed within a line and probe into their stability conditions based on generalized Hamiltonian systems theory. Under the circumstances, the stable interior equilibrium point is surrounded by closed orbits in phase space, which presents an observable stable state where two strategies coexist and fluctuate in each of the three game populations. This work enriches the study of 2×2×2 asymmetric games’ evolutionary dynamics.
- 1 July 2024
- Published by AIP Publishing in Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science
- Vol. 34 (7)
Two-stage strategy update rule based on learning cost in weak prisoner’s dilemma
When players are dissatisfied with their actual payoffs, they will change the actuality by learning strategy of neighbors. The more effort players put in, the more likely they are to succeed in learning. Inspired by this, this paper proposes a two-stage strategy update rule based on learning cost. The players first decide whether to learn strategy according to the updating willingness. If the players imitate the strategy of neighbors, they need to pay the learning cost. Results show that for the well-mixed population, if the updating willingness is homogeneous and remains unchanged, reducing the updating willingness or increasing the learning cost can extend the life cycle of cooperators. If the updating willingness is heterogeneous and dynamically adjusted based on the difference between the actual payoff and the expected payoff, increasing aspiration value and learning cost promotes cooperation. For the structured population, if the updating willingness is homogeneous and remains unchanged, the moderate learning cost is beneficial for cooperators to resist the temptation of defection, and reducing updating willingness makes the system maintain cooperation within a larger parameter range. If the updating willingness is heterogeneous and dynamically adjusted, the larger learning cost and the appropriate aspiration value promote cooperation. This study highlights the complex dynamics of cooperation in paid strategy learning, contributing to the theory of cooperation in the evolutionary game.
- 1 July 2024
- Published by AIP Publishing in Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science
- Vol. 34 (7)
Two-stage strategy update rule based on learning cost in weak prisoner’s dilemma
When players are dissatisfied with their actual payoffs, they will change the actuality by learning strategy of neighbors. The more effort players put in, the more likely they are to succeed in learning. Inspired by this, this paper proposes a two-stage strategy update rule based on learning cost. The players first decide whether to learn strategy according to the updating willingness. If the players imitate the strategy of neighbors, they need to pay the learning cost. Results show that for the well-mixed population, if the updating willingness is homogeneous and remains unchanged, reducing the updating willingness or increasing the learning cost can extend the life cycle of cooperators. If the updating willingness is heterogeneous and dynamically adjusted based on the difference between the actual payoff and the expected payoff, increasing aspiration value and learning cost promotes cooperation. For the structured population, if the updating willingness is homogeneous and remains unchanged, the moderate learning cost is beneficial for cooperators to resist the temptation of defection, and reducing updating willingness makes the system maintain cooperation within a larger parameter range. If the updating willingness is heterogeneous and dynamically adjusted, the larger learning cost and the appropriate aspiration value promote cooperation. This study highlights the complex dynamics of cooperation in paid strategy learning, contributing to the theory of cooperation in the evolutionary game.
- 2 February 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
- Vol. 180
Impact of dynamic compensation with resource feedback on the common pool resource game
- 2 February 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
- Vol. 180
Impact of dynamic compensation with resource feedback on the common pool resource game
- 17 January 2024
- Published by The Royal Society in Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences
- Vol. 480 (2282)
Stability analysis of evolutionary dynamics of 2 × 2 × 2 asymmetric games
In biology, economics, sociology as well as other fields, there is often a 2 × 2 × 2 asymmetric evolutionary game problem in which each party has a set of strategies, and different strategy combinations correspond to the specific pay-offs of each party. Since each participant dynamically adjusts the strategy for maximizing their own interests, the pay-off matrix plays an important role in the evolution of the game system. Based on the pay-off matrix, we probe into the resulting state of 2 × 2 × 2 asymmetric evolutionary games. The results show that from the information of the pay-off matrix, the judgement conditions for the system to evolve into three pure strategies, two pure strategies and one pure strategy can be determined directly. What is more, under a certain type of fixed pay-off matrix, the strategy combinations observed at different evolution times is always varying. Here, we explore the connection between the pay-off matrix and the evolution of behaviours through stability theory, and results obtained are conducive to deeply understand and predict the dynamic evolution of behaviour in game systems.
- 17 January 2024
- Published by The Royal Society in Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences
- Vol. 480 (2282)
Stability analysis of evolutionary dynamics of 2 × 2 × 2 asymmetric games
In biology, economics, sociology as well as other fields, there is often a 2 × 2 × 2 asymmetric evolutionary game problem in which each party has a set of strategies, and different strategy combinations correspond to the specific pay-offs of each party. Since each participant dynamically adjusts the strategy for maximizing their own interests, the pay-off matrix plays an important role in the evolution of the game system. Based on the pay-off matrix, we probe into the resulting state of 2 × 2 × 2 asymmetric evolutionary games. The results show that from the information of the pay-off matrix, the judgement conditions for the system to evolve into three pure strategies, two pure strategies and one pure strategy can be determined directly. What is more, under a certain type of fixed pay-off matrix, the strategy combinations observed at different evolution times is always varying. Here, we explore the connection between the pay-off matrix and the evolution of behaviours through stability theory, and results obtained are conducive to deeply understand and predict the dynamic evolution of behaviour in game systems.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by EJournal Publishing in International Journal of Pharma Medicine and Biological Sciences
The Impacts of Testing Susceptible and Exposed Individuals on Emerging Infectious Diseases with Infectiousness in Incubation Period
On the premise that both susceptible and exposed individuals in incubation period are asymptomatic, in this paper, we establish epidemic models with compulsory testing or voluntary testing to study the impact of susceptible and exposed individuals’ testing rate on the emerging infectious diseases. Results show that when compulsory testing is performed on individuals, sometimes the testing rate of susceptible and exposed individuals can be increased to prevent epidemic from spreading among the population. Sometimes both the testing rate of susceptible, exposed and symptomatic infected individuals need to reach a certain level, and sometimes it can be achieved by increasing the testing rate of symptomatic infected individuals. When individuals take voluntary testing, if individuals think the risk of epidemic is low, increasing the individual’s trust in medical treatment is conducive to increasing the testing number of exposed individuals. However, if individuals think the risk is high, the change in medical trust can not affect the testing number of exposed individuals. Comparing these two models, it is interesting to note that the epidemic size corresponding to average testing rate of voluntary testing is almost the same as the epidemic size corresponding to the same testing rate of compulsory testing, reflecting the effectiveness of voluntary testing.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by EJournal Publishing in International Journal of Pharma Medicine and Biological Sciences
Open AccessThe Impacts of Testing Susceptible and Exposed Individuals on Emerging Infectious Diseases with Infectiousness in Incubation Period
On the premise that both susceptible and exposed individuals in incubation period are asymptomatic, in this paper, we establish epidemic models with compulsory testing or voluntary testing to study the impact of susceptible and exposed individuals’ testing rate on the emerging infectious diseases. Results show that when compulsory testing is performed on individuals, sometimes the testing rate of susceptible and exposed individuals can be increased to prevent epidemic from spreading among the population. Sometimes both the testing rate of susceptible, exposed and symptomatic infected individuals need to reach a certain level, and sometimes it can be achieved by increasing the testing rate of symptomatic infected individuals. When individuals take voluntary testing, if individuals think the risk of epidemic is low, increasing the individual’s trust in medical treatment is conducive to increasing the testing number of exposed individuals. However, if individuals think the risk is high, the change in medical trust can not affect the testing number of exposed individuals. Comparing these two models, it is interesting to note that the epidemic size corresponding to average testing rate of voluntary testing is almost the same as the epidemic size corresponding to the same testing rate of compulsory testing, reflecting the effectiveness of voluntary testing.
- 6 September 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
- Vol. 175
Evolution of cooperation in games with dual attribute strategy
- 6 September 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
- Vol. 175
Evolution of cooperation in games with dual attribute strategy
- 31 July 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
- Vol. 174
Impact of peer pressure on the evolution of cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma game
- 31 July 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
- Vol. 174
Impact of peer pressure on the evolution of cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma game