Vsevolod Bederson

Grassroots activism constitutes the backbone of civil society across political regimes. While many studies explored the role of social media and digital platforms in social movements, we focus on the ways local activists use these social media platforms to organize collectively against unwanted urban development. Localized (place-based) contention differs from large-scale social movements: it is less endowed with resources and it is directly related to physical space. We analyze 26 urban conflicts in six Russian cities based on 185 interviews with activists and experts to show how the residents leverage digital platforms’ affordances and argue that the former extensively rely on the latter for coordination, communication, and recruitment purposes. Yet, the nature of place-based conflicts makes blending online and offline organizational activities inevitable. We also demonstrate that despite their benefits, digital platforms also bring organizational challenges. The authoritarian state imposes further constraints, requiring activists to take into account state surveillance and repression in their engagement with social media. Our study contributes to the scholarship on digitally mediated actions, urging a reevaluation of social media’s role in local collective actions.

The article presents an analysis of conditions for the transfer of powers in the field of urban planning from the local level to the regional level. At the end of 2014, a federal law allowed the regions to centralize powers that were previously considered to be the exclusive competence of the municipalities (development and adoption of master plans, surveying standards, land use, and development rules). The study considers several conditions that contribute to the centralization of urban planning authorities: the representation of developers’ interests in the local and regional assemblies, the representation of the “United Russia” party in the city assembly, as well as the budgetary autonomy of the city. Based on qualitative comparative analysis (multi-values QCA), the study finds that, contrary to expectations, the dominance of deputies-developers in the city assembly has not become a necessary condition for the protection of municipal powers in urban planning. On the contrary, the dominance of developers among the deputy councilors in the city and regional legislatures facilitated the transfer of powers. The results also show that the dominance of “United Russia”’ in the city assembly served as an institutional disciplinary tool to consolidate deputies to centralize powers in favor of the regional level. The relatively high level of budgetary autonomy of a city is also a necessary condition for the centralization of urban planning powers.

В центре внимания статьи – мобилизация и коллективные действия современных москвичей. Автор выявляет социально-организационные факторы, влияющие на коллективные действия москвичей. Исследование основывается на теориях доверия и социального капитала, а также теориях организационной плотности и мобилизации ресурсов. Работа базируется на результатах массового репрезентативного социологического опроса в 30 районах Москвы, а также данных о зарегистрированных в этих районах некоммерческих организациях. На основе анализа научной литературы автор выдвигает теоретическое ожидание связи между характеристиками взаимодействий и коммуникации людей, а также организационными структурами, с одной стороны, и вовлеченностью граждан в различные типы коллективных действий: как политические, так и неполитические, – с другой. Разработанные формальные модели, базирующиеся на методе логистической регрессии, частично подтверждают гипотезы. Ожидания в отношении связи формы управления домом, частоты межперсональных соседских взаимодействий, наличия собственности на недвижимость, а также срока резидентства не показали статистически значимой связи с участием граждан в коллективных действиях. Напротив, факторы коммуникации – вовлеченность в дела дома (участие в собраниях и подобное) и вовлеченность в соседские/районные социальные сети и мессенджеры – оказались значимыми и показали положительную связь с участием в коллективных действиях всех типов. Организационные факторы также показали положительную связь: плотность гражданских ассоциаций оказалась связана с участием москвичей в коллективных действиях. Результаты фиксируют, что общение в институциональных формах – важное условие для мобилизации москвичей к участию в коллективных действиях разных типов: одновременно и политизированных в виде публичных протестных акций, и неполитизированных в виде благотворительности или субботников.

The article is a study of the peculiarities of voting for the opposition in the municipal elections in Moscow in 2017 through the logic of the socio-psychological voting model. The author considers the social characteristics of citizens and neighboring / district communities as conditions associated with greater support for the opposition in local elections in 30 Moscow districts. The density of communications, the level of generalized trust, organizational experience, as well as the average cost of real estate in the area are taken as such conditions. The method of analysis in the article is the multi-values qualitative comparative analysis (mvQCA), which makes it possible to consider the necessary conditions associated with a greater representation of the opposition in municipal councils. The results of the analysis partially confirm the theoretical expectations: the density of communication within the community is a prerequisite for higher support for the opposition in local elections. However, the level of generalized trust and organizational experience are not necessarily enough. The class characteristic in the form of the cost of housing is also a prerequisite for supporting the opposition in the elections.

The quality of interaction among key urban actors, which is described by the concept of an urban regime, is a significant structural factor influencing the logic of urban conflicts. Definitions of urban regime are based on the prerequisite that cities possess large political and economic autonomy, which is a key indicator in the appearance of an urban regime appearance. Large cities in Russia exist in an authoritarian context and strongly depend on higher-level authorities. This dependence predictably reduces opportunities for the shaping of specific urban regimes. At the same time, large cities remain leading resource centres, maintaining their political, economic, and social diversity, which leads to diversity in urban regimes across Russia, especially in the extent of political competition and range of urban actors. In the article, we show a variety of urban regimes in all Russia's million-plus cities (except for Moscow and St. Petersburg), offering a typology to categorize them. The analysis is based on data of local assemblies' compositions in 2012-2020 as well as on media reports. The basic idea of the typology is based on an assessment of the degree of competition between political and economic groups. We proceed from the premise that competition is a key factor boosting the responsiveness of authorities and expanding opportunities for urban conflict participants. For the typology, we use two criteria: both the extent of business group fragmentation and political competition. In most of Russia's million-plus cities, we reveal politically non-competitive urban regimes with fragmented ('competitive authoritarian arrangement') or non-fragmented business ('encapsulated urban regime'), in which business is mostly associated with the party of power. In only one case political competition remains along with a diversity of business groups ('competitive urban regime') and in some cases, political competition is combined with the domination of one business group ('confrontational urban regime').

The article is devoted to studying political foundations of interaction between business and government in large cities. The authors study construction sector in two Russian cities with a population over one million — Yekaterinburg and Perm — and show that political considerations play an important role even in those areas where the government’s position towards business, as it would seem, should be determined solely by economic factors. Relationships between government and construction sector are usually viewed through the prism of coalitions, when cooperation with developers is a priority and a winning strategy for the government. Thus, in the logic of the theory of “growth machines”, the mutual interest of the construction sector and the government is based on the mutual need for the development of the urban economy. However, the observed public conflicts between the government and large developers indicate that this logic has flaws and the government is guided not only by the economic interests when selecting coalition partners. In the article the authors employ the method of qualitative comparative analysis using data from Yekaterinburg and Perm and try to explain why, contrary to the expectations, the relationships between business and government can be uncooperative and conflicting. According to their hypothesis, the authoritarian context and the formation of the management vertical change stimuli and incentivize government to prioritize political loyalty when dealing with business. Their research confirms that it is the demonstration of political loyalty, which signals consent to invest into maintaining political regime, that allows business to avoid conflicts with the government. If there is no loyalty, one cannot guarantee administration’s friendly attitude even if business participates in implementing social projects. Moreover, in such circumstances high business activity, especially in combination with the local registration, increases the likelihood of a conflict with the government.

Статья нацелена на обобщение и систематизацию научной литературы и научной дискуссии, посвященных проблеме баланса между политическим контролем за гражданскими ассоциациями и их социальной эффективностью по исполнению функций поддержки населения и оказания социальных услуг в недемократических политических режимах. Рассматриваются ключевые теоретико-методологические направления и проблемы исследований гражданского общества в автократиях. Отмечается, что эмпирические исследования накопили значительный материал, посвященный анализу механизмов воздействия авторитарных режимов на гражданские ассоциации с целью сохранения политического контроля и обеспечения социальных функций (кооптация, организационно-правовой контроль, организационно-политической контроль, квазинеправительственные организации), а также тому, почему гражданские ассоциации участвуют в поддержке авторитарного политического порядка (доступ к ограниченным ресурсам, доступ к бюрократической инфраструктуре, возможность консультирования органов власти, манифестации прав целевой группы). К настоящему времени не сформулирована устойчивая объяснительная модель или теория среднего уровня, которая стала бы конвенциональной для данных исследований. В статье подробно рассматривается, как научная литература отвечает на вопросы: зачем авторитарным режимам нужны независимые гражданские ассоциации, которые могут стать триггерами демократизации и/или политических реформ, и по каким причинам независимые ассоциации участвуют в поддержке авторитарной стабильности, несмотря на то что режим стремится к ограничению независимой гражданской активности. Автор выдвигает идеи о перспективных направлениях как в теоретико-методологическом, так и в эмпирическом развитии исследований динамики отношений авторитарных режимов и институтов гражданского общества.

This article addresses the issue of support for civil society organizations in an authoritarian regime. Autocracies and civic associations are traditionally viewed as antagonists as the former frequently suppress the activity of the latter. However, recent research demonstrates that these relationships are more complex, and that autocracies can use such institutions to legitimize and strengthen their political resilience: autocracies use NGOs as feedback mechanisms, for monitoring problem situations, monitoring mobilization, and divide the non-profit sector into loyal and disloyal. Using data on the distribution of the "presidential grants" among human rights NGOs in Russia in 2017-2018 and data on the inclusion of the representatives of these organizations in state-sponsored institutions (consultative bodies, the All-Russian People's Front, and parliamentary parties), we analyze the relationship between these two indicators and find evidence for political bias in providing financial help. In particular, we find that affiliation with the All-Russian People's Front (a Kremlin initiative) and systemic opposition both positively affect the likelihood of obtaining a larger grant. Affiliation with the ruling party is not a factor in this regard. We conclude that the promotion of the political loyalty of NGOs via the redistribution of state financial help is a more subtle mechanism than might seem at first glance.